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ABSTRACT / vii
Abstract
'Vivre et mourir en Lareligion ancienne, romaine et cathoLique'. Catholic activism
in south-west France, 1560-1570. Kevin Gould PhD in History June 2003
This thesis determines the impact of Catholic activism in south-west France during
the 1560s. Using manuscript and archival material, it examines the nascence,
infrastructure and aims of the various /igues and associations of the period, and
assesses their ability to secure hegemony by usurping local administrative and
military apparatus. The thesis is divided into four parts:
Part I studies Catholic activism at Bordeaux and the Bordelais. Chapters 1
and 2 establish the demography and structure of government there and evaluate
antecedents to the ligues of the 1560s: namely the activities of the confraternity of
Saint- Yves, the basoche and the syndicat of 1561. Chapter 3 examines the role of the
Catholic nobility in the internecine struggles of the period, and Chapter 4 explores
the post-1568 domination of military and bureaucratic offices at Bordeaux by a
coalition ofleading Catholic activists.
Part II focuses on events at Agen and the Agenais. Chapter 5 details the
establishment of an executive council of Catholic notables within the town, while
Chapter 6 assesses the role of the local nobility in supporting this coalition
government after 1563.
Part III concentrates on affairs at Toulouse. Chapter 7 examines the birth of
formal Catholic activism within the town, focussing on the enterprises of the
confraternity, basochiens and militant court officials. Chapter 8 analyses the
reinvigoration of Catholic endeavours at Toulouse after 1567, gauging the success of
a policy to finance the Catholic war effort by sequestering Protestant goods, and
appraising the somewhat anachronistic phenomenon of the croisade of 1568.
Part IV considers the extent to which national and European dimensions
influenced the form and nature of Catholic activism during the 1560s. Chapter 9
examines the impact of Catholic grandee patronage on the ligues of the south-west,
and assesses the resurgence in confraternal activism after 1567. Chapter 10 examines
the influence of Spain and the papacy on the evolution of the associations, and
explores the level of reciprocity between ligueurs and European potentates. Chapter
11 details the ambitions of Catholic powers to remove the Calvinist queen of
Navarre, Jeanne d' Albret, from power in Beam and Navarre, and assesses the role
played by the ligueurs in this enterprise.
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INTRODUCTION / 1
Introduction
In 1986, John Bossy delivered a paper to The Ecclesiastical History Society that
aimed 'to expound the conviction that the persistence of French Catholicism through
the crises of the Reformation was largely the result of the voluntary association of
French Catholics'. 1 But the author added an important caveat: 'despite the very
considerable importance of this subject, one might even claim its decisive
importance for the outcome of the wars of religion in Europe as a whole, it has (with
some shining exceptions) not received very much attention from historians, and that
in England essential texts and studies are hard to come by'. 2 While Bossy may have
overplayed the role of Catholic ligues and associations in the wider European
context, their impact on the course of the religious wars in France (1562-1598) was
indeed significant. Episodes of Catholic militancy litter the sectarian conflict: from
the massacre at Vassy in 1562 through to the Saint Bartholomew's day massacre of
August 1572; and from the Guise-led insurrection of the 1580s to the final stand of
the Sainte Union in 1598. Yet, while historians have made great strides in their
dissection of this national League after 1584 they have paid little attention to
provincial precursors. Standard commentaries on the 1560s, for example, focus on
the activities of Catholics only at times of acute tension, notably the three distinct
conflicts of 1562, 1567 and 1568, preferring instead to concentrate on two themes:
the Huguenot struggle for security and legitimacy; and the crown's attempts to
impose limited toleration through the publication of numerous edicts of pacification.
I John Bossy, 'Leagues and associations in sixteenth-century French Catholicism', SIudies in Church
History, 23 (1986). pp. 171-89. For quotation, see p. 171.
llbid.
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The result is that the evolution in Catholic sentiment has tended to be
marginalized in the historiography of the early stages of the conflict. Of the few
general surveys that cover aspects of this issue, Denis Crouzet's massive two-volume
appraisal of sectarian violence during the religious wars is the most influential. It
argues that the period's confessional strife can only be properly understood if set in
the context of the millenarian angst that pervaded French society during the second
half of the sixteenth century. For Crouzet, while political and economic factors
would play their part in motivating Catholics to militancy, their fanaticism was
driven by a need to purge society of heresy and to prepare the community for the
coming apocalyptic 'end of days'. Natalie Zemon Davis's groundbreaking study of
the nature of confessional violence during the wars did much to lay the foundations
for such an approach; being the first such survey to detail the specifics of sectarian
violence. Olivier Christin has recently added to this debate. He argues that much
Catholic activism during the 15508 and 15608 constituted a riposte to Huguenot
iconoclasm rather than premeditated deeds, and that, initially, Catholics reacted by
reinforcing their conceptions of orthodoxy - re-emphasising ritual and confirming
doctrine - rather than resorting to overt violence. On a broader theme, Myriam
Yardeni suggests that Catholics at this time were not simply defending themselves
from physical assault, but were seeking to protect their traditions and customs against
institutional and bureaucratic pressures, as Protestants infihrated the corridors of
urban and provincial power. As a result, Catholics were obliged to confront wider
notions of patriotism and nationalism too, with Yardeni showing that Catholic
propaganda of the period was satiated with the concept that to be 'un bon ~'
one bad to be 'un bon catholique'. Nancy Roelker bas also addressed this issue,
revealing that Catholics attempted to use the argument of 'le bon catholique' to
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strengthen the argument against plurality of religion in France, while Luc Racaut, in
his study of Catholic propaganda of the period, finds that the crown struggled to
counter such viewpoints; its attempts to censor Catholic polemic by targeting the
more vocal proponents failing in many instances. 3
More recently, though, a number of more focussed, regional reviews of
Catholic attitudes during the 1560s have appeared. David Nicholls has examined the
clashes between Protestant and Catholic magistrates within the administration at
Tours during this decade, and detailed the measures taken by the latter to secure
Catholic hegemony within the town. For Paris, Barbara Diefendorf has reconstructed
developments in collective Catholic piety throughout the period, assessing the
efficacy of Catholic ritual and polemic in unifying Parisians against the emergent
Reform movement. Ann Ramsey, meanwhile, has shown that the invigoration of the
community through ritual and polemic was also a feature of contestation between
moderate and militant Catholics at Paris, although both proved more intransigent in
their loyalty to political, social and cuhural allegiances than they did in their
adherence to doctrinal dogma. For Burgundy, Mack P. Holt's socio-cuhural
investigations in events across the Dijonnais reveal how Protestantism was
'suppressed' by concerted action from Catholic communities and institutions alike,
with Catholic politicisation and cuhural ties forged by wine growers from below and
3 Denis Crouzet. Les guen-ien de Dieu (2 vols., SeysseI, 1990); Natalie Zemon Davis, 'The rites of
violence', in her Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford. CA., 1975), pp. 152-87;
Olivier Christin, Une rivoIlllion symho/ique. L'iconoelMme huguenot et La reconstruction catholiqve
(Paris, 1991), esp. Part Two: 'La riposte', pp. 177-28S; Myriam Yardeni, La conscience noIionale en
France pendant les guerres de religion (1559-98) (paris, 1971), esp. pp. 99-119; Luc Racaut, Hatred
in Print. Catholic Propaganda and Protestant Identity during the French Wars of Religion (Aldershot,
2002); Nancy Lyman Roeiker, One King, One Faith: Heresy and Tridentine Cotholicism in lhe
sixteenth-century ParlementofParis(Berkeley, 1996), esp. Chapter 10. De Potter reports that in 1568
the papacy. outraged at Otarles lX's sympathetic stance towards the Huguenots. issued a catechism
detailing how 'Ie boo catholique' should interact with Protestants. desaibing the preferred practices
for the arrest, denunciation, and excommunication of 'heretics' . See De Potter, Lettres de Saint Pie Y,
SIll" /es religieKJes de son le"'fJS en France, suivi d'"" catkhisme cotholique-rolltoin (Brussels. 1827).
pp. 4-149 for papal letters; pp. 155-328 fur Catholic catechism.
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magistrates and clerics from above. James R. Farr has also focussed on this region,
assessing notions of traditional Catholic authority (hierarchy, order and conflict, and
perceptions of rebels and royalists under the League) through an examination of the
customs and practices of the artisans of Dijon 4
For Normandy, Philip Benedict's study of Rouen shows that the town's
Catholic activists, described as 'penitents as well as militants', understood well the
need to assume control of the machinery of town authority rather than simply to
wage a battle of polemic and propaganda against their Huguenot neighbours. stuart
Carroll, meanwhile, has examined the relationship between the Guise 'affinity' and
the Catholic cause in this northern province, finding that, for the 1560s at least,
religious dogma was not yet a mature determining factor of the duke's political
strategy; instead, it was the feud between Coligny and Guise which directed
Catholic/Guise policy in the region There are three important surveys of Catholic
activity in the Champagne region A N. Galpem's study of religion and religious
change in this north-eastern province during the sixteenth century deals largely with
the decline of late-medieval piety, revealing the extent to which traditional Christian
practices were fragmented by the successes of the local Reform movement. Its
exploration of the manner in which Catholic communities responded to this
challenge suggests that their reactions were vibrant if never fully militant in nature.
In detailing the ascendancy of the Catholic League at Troyes, however, Penny
Roberts has described substantial participation by Catholic zealots in the usurpation
4 David Nicholls, 'Protestants. Catholics and magistrates in Tours, 1562-1572: The making of a
Catholic city dwing the religious wars', French HIStory, 8, I (1994), pp. 14-33; Barbara B.
Diefend<rt: Beneath the Cross. Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (Oxford, 1991);
Ann W. Ramsey, Lihlrgy. Politics. and Salvation: The Catholic League in Paris and the Nature of
Catholic Reform 1540-1630 (Rochester, N.Y., 1999); Mack P. Holt, 'Burgundians into Frenchmen:
Catholic identity in sixteenth-century Burgundy', in Michael Wolfe (ed.), Changing Identities in Early
Modem France (Dmfuun, N.C., 1997). pp. 345-70; Made P. ~ 'Wme. cOllloltmity and
Rebmation in sixteentb-century Burgundy', Past and Preselll , 138 (1993). pp. 59-93; James R. FaIT,
Hands of Honor. Artisam and Their World in Dijon. 155-1650 (ltbac:a, 1988), see esp. his duIpta':
'Artisan Religion: Reformed and Traditional', pp. 223-60.
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of the town's administrative institutions, and shown that contestation at Troyes was
not simply confined to confrontation between /igueurs and Reformers, but that a
power struggle between moderate and militant Catholics also pervaded. Finally,
Mark W. Konnert has examined events at Chalons-sur-Marne, revealing how the
determination of the civic corporation to tolerate rather than exploit religious
differences ensured the town would escape serious sectarian violence during the
1560s - this despite Champagne being the epicentre of Guise power in the region. 5
As regards the south of France, Marc Venard has studied Catholic activity at
Avignon, showing that despite increasing pressure from external Protestant forces
this papal enclave was able to complete its programme of Tridentine reforms with
relative freedom from interference. For Venard, the presence of numerous well-
established confraternities helped to facilitate this progress, and, alongside the
introduction of the Jesuits, provided a stabilising force within the town, one that
facilitated greater authoritative control for its Catholic leadership. For Nimes, Robert
Sauzet provides a detailed 'church history' of attitudes to Catholic reform within the
diocese, while Wolfgang Kaiser's 'morphologie sociale' of the southern port of
Marseille examines the growth of militant Catholicism in an urban setting devoid of
the influence of a parlemem and lacking a strong presence of royal officials. Janine
Garrisson-Estebe supplies a valuable general account of Catholic responses to the
S Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wan of Religion (Cambridge, 1981); Stuart Carroll, Noble Power
during the French Wars of Religion. 11Je Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy
(Cambridge, 1998); Stuart Carroll, 'The Guise affinity and popular protest dwing the Wars of
Religion', French History, 9 (1995), pp. 125-51; A N. Galpem, 11Je ReligiolU of the People in
Sixteenth-Century Champagne (Cambridge, Mass., 1976); Peony Roberts, A City in Co"pict. 7royes
during the French Wars of religion (Manchester, 1996); Marte W. Konnert, Civic Agelldas aIrd
Religious Pauion. ChdIons-sur-Mame during the French Wars of Religion, 1560-1594 (Kirksville,
Miss., 1997); Mark W. Konnert, 'Provincial governors and their regimes dwing the Frendl Wars of
Religion: the due de Guise and the city cooncil ofChilons-sur-Marne', Sixteenth-Century Joumol. 25
(1994), pp. 823-40.
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domination of political and social institutions of the south by the Huguenot elites, but
her study of a 'United Provinces of the Midi' rarely ventures west of'Castres,"
Surveys of Catholic activism in the south-west of France - the focal point of
this thesis - are, however, conspicuous by their absence. Of the small pool of
published research, the articles of Joan Davies and Mark Greengrass are perhaps the
most pertinent, as they scrutinise confessional clashes at Toulouse during the
religious wars. The doctoral thesis of each author is also an important source for
general studies of Catholic activity within the region. as both provide broad surveys
of the political and religious dynamics confronting Languedoc during the period.
Michel Cassan's assessment of confraternal activism at Limoges is most relevant too,
as it sets Catholic doctrinal and organisational reform of the 1560s in the context of
increasing Protestant violence against local Catholic communities, especially the
disruption of Catholic processions and ceremonial. Finally, Philip Conner's study of
Montauban provides a brief analysis of regional political associations during this
period, arguing that 'leaguing' was by no means the prerogative of the Reformers
during the 1560s, as many have suggested, but that Catholics also recognised and
developed its potential from an early stage. 7
6 Marc Venard, Reforme protest ante, reforme catholique, dans la province d'A.vignon au XVle s;ec/e
(Paris, 1993); Marc Venard, 'Catholicism and resistance to the Reformation inFrance, 1555-1585', in
Philip Benedict, Guido Mame( Henk van Nierop and Marc Venard (eds.), Reformation, Revolt, and
Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555-1585 (Amsterdam. 1999). pp. 133-48; Robert Sauzet,
Contre-reforme et rejorme catholique en Bas-Languedoc (Louvain, 1981); Woligang Kaiser,
Marseille au temps des troubles. Morphologie sociale etlutles defactions 1559-1595 (Paris, 1992);
Janine Garrisson-Estebe, Protestants du 1IIidi 1559-1598 (foulouse, 1980).
7 Joan Davies, 'Persecution and Protestantism: Toulouse, 1562-1575', Historical Journal. 22 (1979).
pp. 31-51; Languedoc and its Governor, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, 1563-1589 (Unpublished
PhD Thesis, University of London, 1974); Mark Greengrass, 'The anatomy of a religious riot in
Toulouse inMay 1562'. Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 34 (1983), pp. 367-91; 'The Sainte Union
in the provinces: The case of Toulouse'. Sixteenth Century Journal, 14.4 (1983). pp. 469-96; War,
Politics and Religion in Languedoc in the govemmenl of Henri de Montmorency-lJaIIIyille. /574-
1610, (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1979); Michel Cassan. Le temps des guerres de religion. Le
cas du Limousin (Yen /530-ven 1630) (Paris. 1996); Philip Conner, Ihlguenot Heartland. Monlauban
and Southern French Calvinism during the Wars of Religion (Aldershot, 2002).
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For the most part, though, the brevity of contemporary surveys of the south-
west is frustrating. Should the historian wish to access secondary accounts of
Catholic activities at Bordeaux, for example, it is to the nineteenth-century
antiquarians that one must turn. Earlier research on the conduct of Blaise de Monluc,
one of the king's leading military officials in Guyenne between 1560 and 1570,
highlighted such incongruities. Attempts to gain greater insights into the function of
the various Catholic organisations under his sway were frustrated by the limitations
of secondary material With no definitive synthesis of Catholic activism available,
Joseph Lecler's short article 'Aux origines de la Iigue' becomes a most important
point of reference. It assesses numerous oath-bound Catholic associations: the
syndical at Bordeaux; the ligues at Agen, Toulouse and Cadillac; the militant
confraternity at Limoges; and the croisade at Toulouse.' However, Lecler's emphasis
concerns the precursory nature of these associations to the later national Catholic
League. Thus, he does little to quantifY the size, structure, or the activities and
objectives of these earlier 'antecedents'. Other commentaries return similarly
fragmentary results: in his Histoire de Bordeaux, Dom Devienne also alludes to
Monluc's role in energising the Catholic towns of Guyenne during the 1560s, but
omits any detailed discussion on the form this action took, while Ernest Gaullieur
prefers a simple narrative, examining Protestant reaction to Catholic enterprises. In
two equally cursory essays, A. Dupre and Charles Dartigue examine the formation of
the syndical of Catholic officials within the parlement at Bordeaux in 1561, but fail
to ascertain its origins or its position within the hierarchical structures of the
sovereign court; while even Monluc's biographer, Paul Courteault, neglects to
expand on this turbulent period of his charge's career. James Westphall Thompson's
• Joseph Lecler, 'Aux origines de 18 Ligue: Premiers projets et premiers essais (1561-1570)" Etudes,
227 (1936). pp. 188-208;
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survey is perhaps the most useful companion to Lecler's work, and includes a
commendable, if ultimately unsatisfactory attempt to form a coherent historiography
from hitherto incongruent sources. But Thompson's attention rarely concentrates on
affairs at Bordeaux and Toulouse, with much of his chapter on provincial leagues
focussing on events in northern and eastern France."
The study of Catholic activism in the south-west of France during the 1560s,
then, is minimal at best. This lacuna in the historiography is curious, especially given
the presence of figures as renowned as Monluc, and the recent predilection of
historians for focussed, local studies in place of broader narratives. Preliminary
observations suggest that many commentators have simply dismissed these early
associations as disparate, localised entities, their parochial nature and inability to
expand into province-wide forces ensuring their continuing anonymity. Indeed. even
Lecler, the most reflective authority on these matters, succumbed to such
complacency, describing the earliest ligues as "limitees, ephemeres, sans lien entre
elles' .10 This thesis will contend, however, that this was far from the case. It will
argue that historians are too quick to label these associations simply as reactive
forces, transient unions that had little influence on the political affairs of the
provinces. They were neither spontaneous responses to specific provocation nor
disparate bodies confined within geographic or administrative boundaries. Instead, an
inter-connectedness of organisation and activity will be revealed that belies their
omission from the historiography. For as Bossy has noted, the failure to explore such
9 Dom Devienne, Histoire de Bordeara (Bordeaux. 1771); Ernest GauIlicu, Histoire de fa
reformation a Bordeaux et dmu Ie ressort du parlement de Guyenne (2 vols., Bordeaux, 1884), I, pp.
322-27; A Dupre, 'Projet de Iigue catbolique a Bordeaux en 1562 et 1563', Revue catholiqlle de
Bordeaux, 12 (1891), pp. 372-78; Charles Dartigue, 'Une cabale poIiti~religieuse a Bordeaux en
juillet 1562: Ie syndicat cootre Ie parlement', Bulletin de la societe de l'histoire du prote&tantisme
f'ranfais. 98 (1951). pp. 141-52; Paul CourteauIt, Blaise de MotrJuc. IrlSlorien (Geneva, 1970); James
West&l11bompson, The Wan of Religion in France, 1559-1576 (New York, 1958). esp. Chapter IX:
~. 206-31.
I Leeler, 'Aux origines de la Ligue', p. 189.
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complex forces in greater detail has precluded valuable insights being made into
Catholic mentalites during the early years of sectarian conflict, a time of seismic
shifts in Catholic perspectives and posture. I I
Two factors have determined the selection of the south-west as the
geographical region to be studied here: the aggressive character of the Reformed
church in the provinces of Guyenne and Languedoc, and the intercession of
neighbouring foreign powers in support of Catholic communities. The south-west
witnessed arguably the most concentrated, and the most successful, thrust of the
Reformed church's early evangelical missions during the 1550s and 1560s. Across
the region towns, villages and great swathes of the population in the countryside
converted to, or at least came under the control of: Huguenot nobles and ministers.
Contemporaries captured the magnitude of these incursions quite succinctly. A letter
from the Toulouse parlement to the crown in January 1562 reported that:
Par violence et insidieuses proditions, Ies reforrnes ont saisy et mis en captivitC
plusieurs villes, esglises et monastaires et mis hors les religieux, et aulcuns
brutallement battus, blesses et mortris, mis aussy en ruine partie desdictes esglises,
autelz, croix et ymaiges de nostre redempteur et de la glorieuse vierge et autres
saints, piJh6 calices et reliquaries d'argent et autres omemens preeieex. Et faut
entendre par faict et parolle qu'ils ont conspire se render dominateurs en ce
royaulme,"
In Guyenne, Monluc, newly appointed as lieutenant-general, warned the crown that
the Reformers 'estoient maistres de la compagne', 13 while Raymond de Pavie, sieur
de Fourquevaux, the Catholic governor of Narbonne, informed the French
II As there are so tew relevant religi~ or socio-political models relating to the Catholic: associations
of the IS6Os, and little secondary material relevant to this thesis, a detailed discussion of the archival,
f:rinted primary and secondary sources used in this survey has been provided in the Appendix.
2 Parlement of Toulouse to Charles IX (7 January 1562). A. de Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la guerre
civile (Paris, (897), p. 101.
13 Commentaires, p. 513.
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ambassador in Spain that 'les seditieux audit Guienne font les maulvais comme par
toutz aultres lieux'. 14
Recent work by James Wood has confirmed that these observations were not
exaggerated. Wood has shown that of the seventeen dioceses which suffered the
greatest financial impact during the 1560s, twelve (seventy-one per cent) were
located in or on the borders of Guyenne and Languedoc; seven of the eleven highest
regional mortality rates from conventional military operations during the religious
wars occurred in the south-west; while Guyenne would also feature some of the
highest levels of Huguenot abuse against Catholic priests and canons in France
during this period. IS Denis Crouzet concurs, stating that the south-west represented
'Ia geographie d'un protestantisme conquerant et violent, qui est a l'avant garde, par
son radicalisme, de la Reforme ~... Guyenne est un peu comme un
laboratoire des experiences destructives qui vont en 1562 rhythmer Ie parcours
combatant de la Reforme' .16 For Crouzet it was the very ferocity of the Reformers'
expansion across the south-west that induced such an energetic Catholic response,
and it was little wonder that the region assumed something of the character of a
nursery for fledgling /igues and associations. By the end of the first war, in April
1563, each faith bad consolidated their battle lines: Protestant forces held La
Rochelle, Montauban and Moissac to the north, Nimes and Montpellier to the east,
and Beam and Navarre to the south; Catholic resistance was centred mainly at
14 Fourquevaux to Saint-Sulpice, ambassador of Charles IX in Spain, (17 June 1562), Edmond Cabie,
Guerres de religion dans Ie sud-ouest de la France et principalemem dans Ie Quercy, d'apres les
papiers des seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice de 1561 a 1590. Documents transcrits, classes et annotes
(Paris, 1906), pp. 5-6.
IS The archdiocese of Toulouse witnessed the highest levels of Protestant violence against mars
during the IS60s. See J.B. Wood, "The impact of the Wars of Religion: A view of France in 1581',
Sixteenth Century Jouma1, 15 (l984), pp. 148-53.
16 Crouzet. Les guerriers de Dieu; I, pp. 523-24. In his analysis of the amalgam of sectarian clashes
amid 'Ia grande angoisse eschatologique', Crouzet gives more emphasis to the south-west of France
than to any other region. Crouzet even mtides a chapter of Les guerrier's de Dieu, ·Pourquoi Ie sud-
ouest?'. a reference to the region's volatile nature.
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Bordeaux, Toulouse, Agen and Castres. The scale of the armies deployed across the
region, and of the military forces assembled in defence of the towns, caused
Florimond de Raemond, a conseiller of the Bordeaux parlement, to remark that
Guyenne was 'Ie magasin de soldats et la pepiniere des armees' .17
The intercession of external powers, such as Spain and the papacy, in support
of the Catholic activists of the south-west is the second determining factor in the
selection of the south-west as a focus of study. As frontier provinces, Guyenne and
Languedoc had long traditions of resisting military, political and economic pressures
from external potentates. During the 1560s, however, Catholic ligue leaders would
seek out intervention from foreign allies in an attempt to bolster their power bases at
home. These alliances, which became reciprocal in nature as the ligueurs acted as
intelligence conduits for their associates at Madrid and Rome, were especially
prominent in the campaigns in Beam and Navarre against the Calvinist queen, Jeanne
d'Albret. Here, the ligueurs' support of the Catholic rebels at Oloron after 1563, and
of the royal army sent in to secure the territory after 1568, was substantial. In filet,
the succour provided by the Catholic captains of the south-west to the Beamais
rebels, together with the determination of - and no little provision of money and
mercenaries from - Spain and the papacy, would see the Calvinist proselytising of
Beam and Navarre reversed, albeit temporarily, during this period.
The notional parameters delineating the term 'south-west' in this thesis,
therefore, will extend from the towns of Perigueux and Limoges in the north, to Pau
and Navarrenx at the foot of the Pyrenees, and from Bayonne in the west across to
Castres in the east (See Map 2). Much of the focus will fall necessarily on the main
centres of Catholic activism within this zone: Bordeaux, Agen and Toulouse.
17 Paul Courteault, Histolre de Gascogne et de Beam (Paris, 1938), p. 210. Florimood de Raemood
would later become mayor of Bordeaux, and was the first to publish MOIlluc's Commenlaires in the
15908.
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However, as many leading activists ranged extensively across the region, some active
in several associations simultaneously, this survey will not restrict itself
dogmatically to specific loci but will assess the activities of the ligueurs in situ as
necessary. Of course, in creating such geographical boundaries the problem of
administrative jurisdiction is raised. This region, for example, included two
sovereign courts of parlement (Bordeaux and Toulouse), several provincial and
numerous local etats, and a multitude of senechaussees, presidiaux and lesser courts.
And while the French crown governed Guyenne and Languedoc, the neighbouring
territories of Albret, Foix and Armagnac were administered by Jeanne d' Albret.
Contention arising from such overlaps of jurisdiction was a recurring issue in early
modem France, and this study will examine the capacity of provincial and urban
authorities to preserve their prerogatives in light of such controversies, and of the
crown to maintain its authority despite the presence of numerous competing
philosophies.
Defining a timescale over which the survey should run requires equal
deliberation, The logical opening point seems to be the formal outbreak of hostilities
in April 1562, at which the prince of Conde raised the Protestant banner at Orleans.
According to standard histories, it was at this juncture that Catholic opposition to the
Reform movement polarised and assumed a more prescribed, militaristic aspect. As a
result, Catholic ligues sprang up across France intermittently, mainly in 1563, 1567
and 1568, with the provincial episodes of the Saint Bartholomew massacres at
Bordeaux and Toulouse in October 1572 signalling the end of this first phase of the
wars, and ushering in a new era in Catholic political machinations. Examination of
provincial archival material, however, suggests that significant instances of organised
Catholic activity are apparent even before this period, with various confraternities
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and other community-based groups vigorously opposing the Reformed church in the
south-west as early as 1540. Catholic activism, therefore, cannot be so easily
compartmentalised, especially as several of these initial assemblies would prove
influential to the structure and philosophy of the later, formal associations of the
1560s. The birth of the Catholic syndicat at Bordeaux in 1561 is one such case in
point, where confratemal activism of the previous decades greatly influenced
Catholic sentiment at the beginning of the religious wars. Such a view is supported
by Ann Ramsey's recent study of the nature of Catholic reform at Paris, which
reveals evidence of similar confratemal endeavours, much of which also commenced
its tendency towards militancy during the 1540s: 'confraternities are one of the most
elusive yet strategic sites where elite desires to reform popular culture intersect with
broadly held Catholic desires to reform intense religious experience ... attitudes
towards these mixed religious, trade and political associations are a key to
understanding the socially complex strands of Catholic militancy that emerge from
the 1540s onwards, .' a
A similar variance arises regarding the upper limit of the study. The provincial
massacres of October 1572 could provide an appropriate finishing date, given the
shattering blow to the Protestant psyche that such experiences dealt. But further
analysis of extant archival material revealed that 1570 was a more apposite
watershed for the research, for two reasons. Firstly, at the edict of Saint-Germain, of
August 1570, both faiths were effectively impotent, neutralised by exhaustion and
the ruinous impact of the high cost of years of warfare. Secondly, 1570 signalled the
beginning of the fall from grace of Monluc; the terrible facial injuries received at
Rabestens that July forced a temporary retirement from command in Guyenne,
.8 Ramsey, Liturgy, Politics, and Salvation, pp. 21-22. See esp. Part One and Part Two.
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during which time his opponents attempted to oust the general from office by
presenting numerous allegations of corruption and mismanagement before the royal
COurt.19 Monluc had been the cornerstone of the region's Catholic activism
throughout the previous decade and, while other Catholic magistrates and veteran
ligueurs continued to dominate affairs after this period, his demise signalled a
lessening of the interaction and interconnectedness between individual spheres of
Catholic power across the south-west. Each town now tended towards a more insular
approach to its defence, less reliant on neighbouring or external succour in times of
trouble. The thesis, therefore, will focus on the period 1560-1570, assessing attitudes
and responses to the outbreak of the first, second and third wars, exploring relevant
antecedents where applicable, and setting all exemplars in context with later Catholic
activity of the 1570s and 1580s.
The standard histories are correct, however, to state that it was high-ranking,
experienced men - veteran military commanders, senior local and royal officials, and
leading members of the clergy - that assumed command of the Catholic /igues of the
156Os. Even the syndicat at Bordeaux, formed by politically active avocats and lesser
officials within the parlement, will be shown to have needed the patronage of senior
magistrates within the court to prevent its immediate censure. This study, then, will
examine the role played by the leadership of the various associations, but also go
beyond this to assess the extent to which subsequent political and social interaction
between the protagonists shaped the nature of Catholic relations across the region
Three factors are pertinent here: the integral nature in provincial affairs of Monluc;
the dearth of Guise influence in the south-west; and the power vacuum caused by the
absence of a provincial governor in Guyenne throughout the decade. Monluc's
t9 A. Jouann&, J. Boucher, D. Biloghi, and O. Thiec (eds.), Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de
religion (paris. 1998), p. 1,114.
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central role in Catholic activity here suggests that pervasive connections did exist
among the more militant Catholics of the region. Monluc, after all, was heavily
involved at Bordeaux, Agen, Toulouse, Limoges, and in Beam and Navarre, while
even those associations not under his direct supervision were controlled by long-
standing allies or former captains: Roffignac and Malvin oversaw the syndicat at
Bordeaux; Candalle founded the /igue at Cadillac; and Negrepelisse and Terride
managed the union of Catholic nobles across the Bordelaia/" The question would be,
then, one of definition: were the ties that bound the Catholic activists under Monluc
and his fellow militant leaders the vertical patron-client bonds so favoured by Roland
Mousnier, Robert Harding and Sharon Kettering, where distinct contracts ofjidelite
were drawn up between the clients; the more horizontal ties of kinship, sociability,
deference and loyalty, as explored by Stuart Carroll in his study on the Guise affinity
in Normandy; the 'multiplex relationships' of Mark Greengrass's studies, which deal
more with the 'personal and affective traffic of honour' than with overt client
networking; the long-standing amities between Gascon veterans, as described by
Ruble and Courteault; or simply 'loops of association' - a term used by English
social historians of the seventeenth century to describe expedient relations between
sma.ll groups who shared a common, if short-term political or economic focus?"
20 Other illustrious Catholic nobles to serve under Monluc during the ]560s were the s;eurs de
Tilladet, Bellegarde, Cancon, Monferrand, Lamothe-Gondrin, Fimarcon, Cosseils, Besoles, Larroque
Des-Arts, Saint-Salvy, Bardadlin, Lamothe-Rouge, Pay, Eymet. Verdusan, Uza, Civrac, Seignan,
Barrauw, Larroque-Dorman, Pourdac, Goes, LadlapeIIe, Castel, Saint..<Jenies, Lavit, Lussan fi'eres.
Lebron, and Noe. See Franeois Vigneron. Eloge d'Armand Gontaut de Biron, mt11'khtU de France
SOlIS Henry [Y. su;,; notes historiques sur les octes de valuer et de patriotisme de la noblesse de
Guienne. et particulierement de celle de Gascogne (Paris, 1788), pp. 88-89.
21 Roland Mousnier, Lea ;nst;hd;Ons de /a France sous la monarchie absolue, /598-/789 (2 vols.,
Paris, 1974), I,pp. 85-93; Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite. The ProvincioJ Governors of
Early Modem France (London, 1978), pp. 21-107; Sharon Kettering, 'Clientage during the French
Wars of Religion', Sixteenth Century Journal, 20 (1989), pp. 221-39; Sharon Kettering, 'Patronage
and kinship in Early Modern France', French Historical Studies, 16 (1989), pp. 408-35. For
discussions on fllMlile without ac:tual service being provided. see Roland Mousnier, 'Les concepts
d'ordres d'6tats, de fid6lit6 et de monarchie absolue en France de la fin du xve si~le a la fin du
xviiie', Revue KlStOf'ique, 247 (1972), pp. 289-312; Stuart Carroll, Noble Power DuriIrg the French
Wars of Religion. The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy (Cambridge, 1998), p. 53;
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Further, were those magistrates and judicial officers active in supporting the ligueurs
coerced into doing so, or were they acting of their own accord? And were the ligues
stronger for their close ties with fellow activists in neighbouring centres, or were
they equally as effective in isolation?
The dearth of Guise patronage in the south-west is surprising, given the high
profile of several former clients of this grandee family in regional affairs, So while
Guise patronage of Catholic militancy in the northern and eastern homelands was
extensive throughout the 1560s, it was conspicuous by its absence in Guyeme and
Languedoc. Whether this resulted from difficulties in communication due to the great
distance between Bordeaux and Toulouse and the north-eastem centres of Guise
patrimony, or whether the Guise were wary of overt involvement in lands notionally
governed by the Bourbons, is open to debate. Certainly, Stuart Carroll suspects that
this was a conscious decision on their part, noting that Guise policy during the early
1560s 'was dominated not by dogma but by a wily defence of family honour and an
opportunistic and flexible reaction to events'. 22
The absence of provincial governors at Guyenne and at Languedoc would also
have a bearing on the nature of Catholic activism during this period. Both Robert
Harding and Sharon Kettering have identified the governor as a leading determinant
of the extent to which networks, local alliances, and bonds of fidelity permeated
regional political and social structures in late sixteenth-century France, especially at
Mark Greengrass, 'Functions and limitations of political clientalism in France before Cardinal
Ricbelieu', inN. Buist, R. Descimon &A Guerreau, L 'elm Ollie rot: Les foll1ldations de fa modemile
monarchique en France (XIVe-XVIle steeles) (Paris, 1991), pp. 78-79; Roland de Catalogne, 'Monluc
et la r6fonne a Toulouse', Archistra, 42-43 (October-December 1979), pp. 67-88; CourteauIt, Blaise
de Mon/uc. Hislorien, esp. Chapters 9-10; the term 'loops of association' is used by StqJhen Hipkin in
his study of the confederation of interests that united opponents of enclosure in seventeenth-c::entury
England. Stephen Hipkin. '''Sitting on his Penny Rent': Conflict and Right of Common in Faversbam
Blean, 1595-1610', RlITai History 11,1 (2000), p. 23. A similarly important study of civic and
collective identity and association within the urban setting in England during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries is found in Jonathan Barry and Christopher Brooks, The Middling Sort of
People. Culture, Society and Politics in Engkmd, 1550-1800 (Lon~ 1994), pp. 84-89.
n Carroll. Noble Power, p. 252.
INTRODUCTION / 17
times of weak central authority as occurred during the religious wars.23 Yet, in
Guyenne, there would be no resident governor throughout the 1560s: the incumbent,
Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, was permanently absent, preferring to
administer his office by communique from the royal court; at his death, in November
1562, his heir, Henri de Bourbon, was too young to assume the title, and remained
disenfranchised until late in 1569. In Languedoc, the situation was similar. The
governor, constable Montmorency, rarely visited his province throughout his tenure,
while his son, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, fared only slightly better, spending
intermittent time within his gouvemement, before leaving to head the royal army
after 1565 as marshal of France.24 As a result of these factors, leading royal officials
and local nobles, both Catholic and Protestant, were less restricted in their attempt to
:fill the ensuing power vacuum and to fight for control of the administrative
institutions of the localities. This temporary rupture in the traditional hierarchy of
provincial authority may well have allowed Catholic activists more room to establish
themselves and expand their associations, free from the restrictions usually imposed
by grandee and governor patrons.
In Guyenne, the absence of the Bourbons saw the mandate of governorship
pass to Burie, the lieutenant du roi. Burie would prove an exasperating character to
Catholics, infuriating the militants at Bordeaux by siding with the moderate premier
president of the parlement, Jacques-Benoit de Lagebiton, in matters relating to
conciliation with Protestants. For Burie, the sovereign court was simply 'la
mediatrice de paix entre Ie Roy et son peuple', not a tool to be wielded by zealots
23 Harding, Anatomy ofa Power Elite, pp. 21-107; Kettering, 'Clientage', pp. 221-39, and 'Patronage
and kinship', pp. 408-35.
24 Damville was made Marshal of France on 10 February 1566. See HGL, 9, p. 25. In fila, the
constable, Anne de Monbnorency, only owned two seigneuries in Languedoc: Florae and Bagnols.
See Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p. 40.
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against royal authority." He would not be alone in this view. In 1560, a leading
noble of Guyenne, Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron, warned the Bordeaux
parlement not to become embroiled in disputes over religion at the expense of
performing its principal duties, urging magistrates to adhere more strictly to the letter
of their commission, and to engage only in pursuits that met with royal approval and
that reinforced the royal edicts." Catholics, however, responded by vilifying Burie's
leadership and martial skills, claiming he was insipid and inept, a complaint that
should be seen in context of the contrasting tactics being employed by Burie's
subordinate, Monluc, who had embarked upon a ruthless campaign to subjugate
Huguenot suspects at this time.27
This friction between crown officials and local representatives would become
pivotal to the success or failure of Catholic activism across the region, especially at
Bordeaux where the ideological clash between Lagebaton and the militant Catholics
dominated affairs throughout the decade. Philip Benedict has shown that such
tensions were particularly prevalent at urban centres that housed provincial
parlements,28 while Jonathan Powis, whose study of the Bordeaux parlement in the
sixteenth century suggests that unremitting discord was a feature of court life, notes
that innate frictions within urban institutions were always exaggerated during times
25 Jean de Metivier, Chronique du parlement de Bordeaux (2 vols., Bordeaux, 1886), II, pp. 288-89.
26 Biron to Burie (30 October 1560), Armand de Gontaut, Baron de Biron, The Letters and Documents
of Armand de Gontaul. Baron de Biron. Marshall of France (1524-/592) (2 vols., ed, J. W.
Thompson, Berkeley, 1936), I, pp. 6-7. Such counsel against malpractice was by no means restricted
to elite officials within the administration. Harding has shown that the public's image of lesser
officials and clerks of the court throughout the religious wars bordered on 'notoriety', with the
municipal syndics of Nantes going so filr as to propose in 1588 that all avocats et procureurs be
excluded from candidacy for municipal charges on the grounds that they were 'gens pernicieux'.
Robert R.Harding, 'Revolution and reform in the Holy League: Angers, Rennes and Nantes', Journal
o(Modern History, 53 (1981). p. 415.
2 Monluc wrote in March 1562: 'si j'eusse mit Ie doux, comme Monsieur Ie Burie, nous estions
perdus', Commentaires, p. 487. A similar attack was launched by Jean de Lange, leader of the
Bordeaux syndical, against Burie's competence (February 1562), see AM Bordeaux, ms 768, Co. 696.
21 Philip Benedict, 'French cities from the sixteenth century to the Revolution. An overview', inPhilip
Benedict (ed.), Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France (London, 1989), p. 20.
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of sectarian conflict." At Bordeaux, these antagonisms were exacerbated further by
the turbulence of the revolt of the Gabelle in 1548, in which a leading Catholic noble,
Tristan de Moneins, had been murdered by a riotous mob." The town was still
wracked by ongoing recriminations over this affair, leading Hauser to claim that the
inroads made by the Reform church, and the converse militant posturing of the two
sovereign courts of the south-west, owed much to this event." The fractious and
contentious nature of elite relationships at Bordeaux would thus prove a fertile
exemplar for Jonathan Powis's doctoral research on the history of the magistrates of
the parlement, a locus Geralde Nakam describes as 'la theatre de graves tensions'."
The main focus of contention within the parlements of Bordeaux and Toulouse,
of course, centred on Catholic hostility to Protestant attempts to influence legislation
by gaining election to office. The crown's insistence that both faiths were
represented within the local institutions agitated Catholics; for them, such a policy
was assisting Huguenots in their aspirations to secure legitimacy. Catholics were also
concerned at the extensive restructuring of Protestant political and military
infrastructures in the south-west, realised by the synods of Clairac (November 1560)
and Sainte-Foy (November 1561). These innovations were a defining moment in
relations within the province. Where before, traditional rivalries and petty jealousies
had characterised relations among the Catholic nobility and urban officiate, now
unanimity and homogeneity of purpose described Catholic activism, as lesser and
29 Friction and contestation within the various institutions of Bordeaux during the sixteenth century
has been examined in Jonathan Powis, The Magistrates of the Par/ement of Bordeaux c. 1500-1563
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, Oxford University, 1975),
30 For this episode, see S. C. Oigon, La revo/te de la gobe/le en Guyenne. 1548-1549 (Paris, 1906),
esp. 'L'insurrection dans le Bordelais', pp. 73-84.
31 Hauser wrote that the 'Democratic revolutionary character of the Huguenot movement in Guyenne
probably owes some of its intensity to the memory of the revolt of 1548 and the merciless suppression
thereof'. Henri Hauser, 'A Review ofCourteault, Blaise de Monluc', Revue Hislorique, 97 (March-
April, 19(8), p. 341 note 6.
32 Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux; Oeralde Nakam, Montaigne et son temps.
Les evenements et les essais (paris, 1982), p. 73.
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elite officials put aside past antagonisms to unite in common goals: the defence of
Catholic prerogatives and customs; and the ostracising of all Huguenot officials and
citizens. It is as a consequence of these initiatives that Monluc and other military
captains assumed a more pro-active rather than reactive stance in Guyenne. All levels
of society were galvanised into action, from the elites through to the urban officiate
and down to the community. Here,loyalty and fraternity were encouraged by the use
of specific oaths of allegiance, sworn to the Catholic Church, to the defence of their
town, and to the furtherance of the Catholic cause. Formal affiliation could also be
displayed and reaffirmed in the many civic processions and ceremonials, while
membership fees were introduced to enable the associations to secure the services of
veteran captains and to stockpile arms and munitions ready for distribution in times
of crisis. These were hardly features of temporary, rapidly assembled, clandestine
units, but an indication of stable, structured corporations, proud of their heritage,
overt in their intent to engage and prevail.
But Catholic enmity should not be seen as focussed solely against the Reform
movement during this period. Resentment at the crown's policy of limited religious
toleration for Protestants was also a factor in the antipathy felt by many ligueurs to
royal authority.33 Catholic hackles were especially raised at the amnesty granted to
Huguenot prisoners and exiles by successive royal edicts, despite assertions that
abuse and provocation of Catholic communities continued unabated across the
region. Nicola Sutherland has described these initial edicts as 'curious, contradictory,
self-defeating and provisional'." Catholic commentators, however, were far more
33 For an overview, see Olivier Cbristin, <From repression to pacification: French royal policy in the
face of Protestantism', in Philip Benedict, Guido Marne( Henk van Nierop, Marc Venard (eds.),
Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands J 555- J 585 (Amsterdam, 1999), pp.
201-14.
34 Nicola M. Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle/or Recognition (New Haven, 1980), p. 128. There
were six royal edicts published between 1560 and 1563: the edict of Amboise (2 March 1560), which
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damning, questioning the very ideology behind the crown's strategy. For them, the
concept of tolerating Protestantism was anathema, as Jean de la Vacquerie, a doctor
of the Sorbonne in Paris, iterated to the king in early 1561: 'Religion is the primary
and principal foundation of all order... there is never more trouble or a greater
tempest in a commonwealth than when there is some schism or dissension
concerning the issue of religion there' .35 But Catholic grievances also linked the
theological controversy with the intense social frictions ravaging France during the
early 1560s, a connection Mack P. Holt has explored in his study of the nature of
sectarian violence during the religious wars. Holt sketches each confession as 'a
body of believers rather than a body of beliefs', each viewing the other as 'pollutants
of their own particular notion of the body social, as threats to their own conception of
ordered society'. 36 Mario Turchetti believes the crown was well aware of these
concerns, and shaped its legislation to address social disorder as much as it did
accommodation of multiple filiths.37 The problem for the crown, though, was that
neither Catholic nor Protestant truly favoured a move towards religious pluralism, as
both viewed toleration as a failure to defeat the 'other' militarily and evangelically.3B
disassociated religion from politics, thereby allowing Calvinists to escape charges of sedition so long
as they remained loyal to the state; the edict of Romorantin (May 1560), which transferred the
prosecution of heresy from the aown courts, which could impose the death penalty, to the church
courts, which could not, effectively securing less severe sentencing fur Protestants; the edicts of
Fontainebleau (19 April 1561), and of Saint -Genna in (11 July 1561), which introduced amnesties for
Huguenot prisoners and exiles; the edict of Saint-Gennain (17 January 1562), the first formal
acknowledgement of Huguenot rights of worship, which granted limited liberties for Protestant
ceremonial, but required that Catholic worship should not suffer from such concessions; and the edict
of Amboise (19 March 1563), the peace edict, and determinant of the crown's policy of 'pacification'
fur the coming years. For a summary of each, see Robert J. Knecht, Catherine de' Medici (London,
1998), pp. 288-89.
3S Jean de la Vacquerie, 'Catholique remonstrances aux Rays et princes Chrestiens ... ', (Paris, 1561).
Quoted in Holt, French Wars of Religion, p, 44.
36 Holt, French Wars of Religion, p. 2.
37 M. Turchetti, 'Religious concord and political tolerance in sixteenth- and sew:nteenth- century
France', Sixteenth CentwyJoumaJ, 22 (1991), pp. 15-25.
31 Stankiewicz suggests that Catholics saw toleration as a term of contempt: 'They had no interest in
promoting it; occasionally they practiced a quasi-toleration - a false attitude concealing some ulterior
motive, a utilitarian attitude taking for granted that at some point toleration would be rejected, an
expedient usually referred to with derision'. W. J. Stankiewicz, Politics and Religion in Seventeenth-
Century France (Berkeley, 1960), p. I.
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In fact, if the preambles of the various edicts are examined closely, the crown also
conceded this point, each stating they were merely 'par provision, et jusques a la
determination dudit concile generale' .39
The need to end the warfare that was devastating the kingdom, however, meant
that the crown would persist with its attempts at conciliation throughout the decade.
In March 1563, the edict of Amboise confirmed Huguenot rights of worship,
declared a new amnesty, and ordered all confiscated property and lands to be
returned to their former owners. If Catholics were aggrieved at these concessions,
they were outraged at the clause banning affiliation to their associations. Worse, the
crown determined that it would be the parlements who enforced these measures,
effectively casting the magistrates as executors of its policy of toleration in the
provinces. This dilemma., which forced militant Catholics to dismantle their /igues or
defy royal authority, would define relations between the ligueurs and crown until the
renewal of hostilities in September 1567.
The final years of the decade saw a most confused situation. The appearance of
a sizeable Protestant army in the south-west forced the king - now more vulnerable
than at any juncture during his brief reign - to reconcile with Catholics in order to
39 Edict of Saint-Gennain (17 January 1562), Andre Stegmann, Edits des guerres de religion (Paris,
1979), p. 10. The theme of toleration until an interim council could reunite both sides was quite
prevalent at the time. Yet while Michel de I'Hapital openly berated Catholics for their intolerance, and
Protestants for their reforming zeal, urging both to show restraint until a council could settle their
differences, Loris Petris has shown that the long term goal of the chancellor was always a return to
religious unity; civil tolerance was simply employed in the meantime to prevent Fnnce from
imploding into civil war. See Loris Petris, 'Faith and religious policy in Michel de I'Hospital's civic
evangelism', in K. Cameron, M. Greengrass, P. Roberts, (eds.), The Adventure of Religious Pluralism
in Early Modern France (Bern, 2000), p. 140. Indeed, as late as 1591, the Protestant military
commander, Fran9Qis de la Noue, argued that re-unification of the two creeds was still possible.
urging that liberty of conscience and reform of abuses could yet unite the French church. See M.
Wolfe. 'Protestant reactions to the conversion of Henry IV', inM. Wolfe. (ed.), Changing Identities in
Early Modern France (Durham, N.C., 1997), p. 378; Turchetti, 'Religious concani and political
tolerance', pp. 16-18. For the provisional character of this edict, see Mario Turchetti, 'Middle parties
in France during the Wars of Religion', in Philip Benedict, Guido Marne( Henk van Nierop, Marc
Venard (eds.), Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555-1585
(Amsterdam, 1999), p. 169. For an overview of I'HOpital's policy on religious toleration in France,
see Albert Buisson, Michel de I 'Hospital (Paris, 1950), pp. 143-226.
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impede the ambitions of the Huguenot nobility. Militants such as Roffignac,
Candalle and Lange at Bordeaux, Lalande and de Nort at Agen, and Annagnac,
Daffis and de Paulo at Toulouse, were thus returned to favour as the crown sought to
harness Catholic military resources in the region If Catholics continued to be
exasperated by crown policy - concessions were still granted to Huguenots and
associations still banned in subsequent edicts - their communities would find new,
legitimate vehicles with which to champion the defence of orthodoxy: the resurgent
confraternities and urban coalitions.
In order to engage fully in these controversies, this thesis will be divided into
four parts. The first three are studies of specific geographic areas - Bordeaux, Agen
and Toulouse - while the fourth is an examination of wider national and European
dimensions. Part I comprises a study of Catholic activism at Bordeaux and across the
Bordelais. Chapter 1 establishes the demography and structure of government of the
region and evaluates the impact of the growth of the Reformed church across
Guyeme on Catholic mentalites. It then examines the activities of the confraternity
of Saint-Yves and its affiliated sub-group, the performers of the basoche, in events in
Bordeaux during the 1540s and 1550s, arguing that their defence of Catholic
traditions and practices can be viewed as an antecedent to the associations of the
1560s. Chapter 2 will assess the role of the Catholic syndicat at Bordeaux, formed in
May 1561 by minor officials of the parlement ostensibly to counter the increasing
influence of the Refonners within the administration of the town. The subsequent
confrontation between militant officials and moderate parlementaires for ascendancy
would prove a pivotal episode in the affairs of the sovereign court, polarising
allegiances across the province by confession The syndicat's role in opposing crown
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and provincial attempts to accommodate the Reform movement will then be
assessed, along with a review of its success and events leading to its ultimate demise.
Chapter 3 examines the part played by the Catholic nobility in the internecine
struggles of the early 1560s, specificallytheir support for senior Catholic magistrates
at Bordeaux and their participation in attempts to remove the leading moderate at
court, the premier president of the parlement, Jacques-Benoit de Lagebaton, from
office. The formation of an elite-led /igue at Cadillac will also be considered. This
association, commanded by a prominent militant and former captain under Monluc,
Frederic de Foix-Candalle, would unite the Catholic nobility of the Bordelais in
opposition both to the expansion of the Reformed church and to the crown's
determined efforts to impose limited toleration on the provinces. As such, its
structure, modus operandi, legitimacy and longevitywill be assessed. Chapter 4 will
conclude this survey, exploring later events across the region, especially the post-
1568 domination of military and bureaucratic offices at Bordeaux by a coalition of
leading Catholic activists from the parlement, town council and local church. Forged
to prevent further Huguenot insurrectionwithin the town, such cooperative command
of urban administration would prove an important feature of Catholic tactics over
subsequent years. It would usher in a new era of Catholic hegemony, the piece de
resistance of which would be the return to Bordeaux of the Jesuits - initiated and
financed by leadingpersonalities of the Catholic hierarchy.
Part II switches focus to concentrate on events at Agen and across the Agenais.
Chapter 5 details the pressure placed on Catholic communities of the region by a
belligerent Reform movement and examines their response to such provocation. As
at Bordeaux, a coalition 'government' made up of Catholic nobles and notables from
the town council, presidial, and clergy was employed to confront the ascendancy of
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the Huguenots, although this occurred far earlier at Agen. Chapter 6 assesses the next
phase of Catholic activism at Agen: the part played by the local nobility in
supporting the Catholic cause during 1563. Directed by Monluc, and backed by
delegates of the etats de I 'Agenais, and by the coalition at Agen, Catholic militants
established the earliest oath-bound /igue of the period in February 1563. This would
be the first Catholic association capable of taking the fight to the Protestants rather
than relying on defensive measures for security. Although forcibly dismantled soon
after by the crown, the mere fact that Catholics had set aside traditional jealousies
and rivalries to combine to form the /igue at Agen seems to have united the disparate
Catholic bodies of the region.
The period 1565-1570 would see the continuing domination of affairs in the
Agenais by Monluc and his forces. Monluc was able to balance the securing of
Catholic hegemony at Agen with adherence to crown dictate as lieutenant du roi in
Guyenne, largely due to some imaginative interpretation of royal authority. The
vigour and resourcefulness with which he and his Catholic comrades supported the
Catholic cause, yet avoided open censure from the crown, perplexed Protestants and
moderates alike. Despite not being rated as important a Catholic centre to the course
of the war in the south-west as the citadels of Bordeaux or Toulouse, Agen was none
the less a strategic prize for both faiths during the 15608. Its safeguarding required
Catholic defenders to display an innovation in strategy that would prove a model for
many similar episodes of urban resistance.
Part III concentrates on affairs at Toulouse, the second great Catholic bastion
of the south-west. Chapter 7 mirrors the approach of Chapter 1. It explores possible
antecedents to the formal associations of Toulouse in 1563: the growth of an active
confraternity; a pro-active group of street performers that energised the Catholic
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community on the streets; and the growing involvement of royal officials in the
Catholic cause despite pressure from the crown to implement its policy of toleration.
Two specific events are then evaluated: the Protestant coup of May 1562, which
forced the Catholics of Toulouse into military action; and the elite-led /igue of March
1563, by which the Catholic leadership consolidated its supremacy over its
opponents. Chapter 8 analyses the reinvigoration of Catholic activism within
Toulouse after 1567, examining the success of the Catholic policy in financing the
war effort through the sequestering of Protestant goods and the taxing and fining of
local Huguenots. It also explores the somewhat anachronistic phenomenon of the
croisade, called at Toulouse in August 1568 to combat Protestantism. That the
croisade ultimately failed to achieve its purpose should not lessen its relevance to
this study, as the fact that it was validated by the papacy, backed by the parlement,
and supported by leading nobles of the senechaussee, reflects the depth of sentiment
felt by many Catholics at this time. And that Catholics should consider such an entity
as a tool says much about the prevailing tension and sense of urgency in Toulouse
towards the end of the decade.
Part IV considers the extent to which national and European dimensions
influenced the form or nature of Catholic activism during the 1560s. This is
especially relevant as the Catholic leadership of Guyenne and Languedoc were
concerned not only with local issues, but faced the problems associated with the
governance of border provinces. Chapter 9 will examine the impact of Catholic
grandee patronage on the ligues of the south-west, specifically the role of the Guise
in Guyenne, and, to a lesser extent, Montmorency in Languedoc. The influence of the
Triumvirate, the union of elite Catholic nobles in 1562 that boasted financial and
military backing from Spain and the papacy, will then be assessed to ascertain
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whether the /igues should be seen as local phenomena, or as part of a pan-European
Catholic corpus. The role played by Catholic activists in promoting the resurgence in
confraternal activism after 1567 - an attempt, arguably, by the Catholic military
conunanders to bolster their forces by co-opting highly motivated confreres into their
urban militias and local garrison troops - will also be examined.
In Chapter 10, the involvement of Spain and the papacy in the progress and
activities of the /igues will be explored. Philip II of Spain had long been a vociferous
opponent of conciliation with Protestants, and did not hesitate to offer financial and
military support to Monluc in Guyenne to advance Spanish foreign policy aims. The
degree to which Philip's succour was accepted, or indeed requested, will be
examined to define the relationship between the associations of the region with their
Catholic neighbour. The extent to which the ligues received similar support from the
papacy, not only in terms of finance and manpower, but in validating the various
oaths, unions and crusading ideals of the period, will also be assessed, as will the
endeavours of a key protagonist in the region, cardinal Armagnac, a leading militant
at Toulouse but also the papal inquisitor for the south of France. The papal
inquisition in the 1560s may well be viewed as an anachronism, but there is evidence
to suggest that Armagnac used this office as yet one more weapon in the Catholics'
diverse arsenal against the Huguenots, a tool to prise out Protestant suspects and an
instnunent with which to assail the Calvinist queen of Navarre, Jeanne d' Albret.
Chapter 11 will explore this point in more depth, detailing the ambitions of
France, Spain and the papacy to oust Jeanne from her lands in Beam and Navarre.
Here, Armagnac, Monluc and the Catholic generals were used as pawns in a wider
conspiracy, adding military muscle to the diplomatic pressures applied from Paris,
Madrid and Rome. At the local level, though, these men were active supporters of the
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Catholic rebels of Basse-Navarre, Oloron and Lescar, who sought to overthrow
Jeanne's Calvinist regime from within. These rebellions are usually viewed as
isolated occurrences, unconnected with Catholic activism at Bordeaux and Toulouse.
But by assessing their interaction, the merging of command hierarchies, and the
mutual support and reciprocity offered by each, the sphere of influence of the
ligueurs will be shown to have been more diverse than is traditionally stated, and to
encompass concepts broader than simply localised defence. Such inter-connectedness
of activism across the entire region has rarely been acknowledged or explored by
historians, and it is expected that this study will reposition the various associations of
the south-west within the historiography the religious wars. It will show them to have
been continuations of established Catholic activism rather than spontaneous reactions
to specific episodes of Protestant aggression, and far more than the disparate,
localised, limitedand parochial entities of the annals.
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PART I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS
Chapter 1. Catholic activism at Bordeaux: antecedents
Chapter 2. Catholic activism at Bordeaux: the syndical
Chapter 3. Catholic activism at Bordeaux: the nobility
Chapter 4. Catholic activism at Bordeaux, 1565-1570
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Chapter 1. Catholic activism at Bordeaux: antecedents
The town of Bordeaux deserved its status as capital of Guyenne. The largest urban
centre of the province by far - its population of around 50,000 in 1559 dwarfed that
of the surrounding towns - Bordeaux was also the premier Atlantic trading port of the
region, exporting vast quantities of wine to Europe. 1 Its formidable defensive
architecture reflected a chequered history, in which French, English, and Gascon
troops had fought incessantly for dominion over the town. Encircled by an imposing
curtain wall, Bordeaux was fortified by seven stout gateways: two opening to the
countryside; five facing the river Garonne. A decorated central gateway, the porte de
Cailhau, provided a ceremonial entrance into the town from the port, while its
battlements posed a daunting obstacle to any amphibious assault. Its location at the
mouth of the river allowed the town fathers to control all waterway traffic along this
important southern artery. In times of strife, chains could be thrown across the
Garonne from its landing stage to prevent galleys from continuing downriver.i
Incorporated into the curtain defences were two robust fortresses: the chateau
Trompette commanding the north-eastern approaches to Bordeaux; and the chateau
Hi guarding the land to the north-west. Garrisoned within each were royal soldiers
and the town's formal guard, each commanded by a professional captain,'
I Bordeaux's population had swelled from 25,000 in 1515 to around 50,000 by 1559. Anne-Marie
Cocula, Etienne de la Bootie (Bordeaux, 1995), pp. 72-73.
2 Chevalier describes the porte de Cailhau at Bordeaux as 'un veritable arc de triomphe'. Bernard
Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France duXIVe auXVle siecle (paris, 1982), p. 125.
3 Some useful general histories of Bordeaux can be found in: Robert Boutrouche (ed.), Bordeaux de
1453 a 1715 (Bordeaux, 1966); Alex Ducourneau, La Guienne historique et monumentaie (2 vols.,
Bordeaux, 1844); Dom Devienne, Histoire de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1771); Camille Julian, L 'histoire
de Bordeaux depuis les origines jusqu '0 1895 (Bordeaux, 1895); Abb6 Patrice-John O'Reilly, Histoire
complete de Bordeaux (6 voIs., Bordeaux, 1863); Gabriel de Lurbe, Chronique Bordeloise (Bordeaux,
1594); Jean Damat, Chronique Bordelois. Supplement (Bordeaux, 1619).
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As in other large French towns, the administrative infrastructure of Bordeaux
comprised a maelstrom of complex, competing entities. Civil government was the
prerogative of the town council, the jurade. An arret du parlement of 1527 specified
that the civic corporation should consist of a mayor and twelve serving officers, or
jurats (a figure halved seven years later by decree), so that each of the six quartiers
of Bordeaux - Saint-Eloi, Saint-Pierre, Saint-Michel, Saint-Remy, Sainte-Eulalie, and
Saint-Mexent - was represented by a single jurat.4 Following the revolt of the
Gabelle in 1548, when numerous jurats were implicated in the insurrection that saw
the sieur de Moneins dragged from his home and murdered on the streets of
Bordeaux, the jurade was temporarily suspended. In its stead, twenty-four
prud'hommes were elected from among the loyal bourgeoisie to serve under the
mayor. When the king exonerated the sixjurats two years later, in 1550, reinstating
the ancient rights of the city corporation, the incumbent prud 'hommes were kept on,
forming a new body, the Trente. The office of mayor, previously named 'in
perpetuity' by the king, was now made an elective post, restricted to one two-year
term. 5 By lettres patentes of 1559 and 1560, the jurats were then granted jurisdiction
over the town's policing, with responsibility to appoint both the captain and
lieutenant of the guard,"
Bordeaux was also the seat of the sovereign court ofparlement in Guyenne. Its
origins date back to the late-fifteenth century, when a single courtroom, the
Grand'Chambre, dispensed royal justice. A chambre des enquetes was established
4 AM Bordeaux, Carton II, 17, Ceremonies (24 July 1527). See also Ducourneau, La (]uienne
historique, II, p. 204.
5 Elected mayors of Bordeaux after 1550: 1550-52, Francois de Lamothe, sieur de Cambes; 1552-54,
Gaston de l'Isle, baron de la Riviere; 1554-56, Pierre Eyquem, sieurde Montaigne; 1556-58, Louis de
Saint-Gelais, sieur de Lansac; 1558-59, Fran~is de Lamothe, sieur de Cambes; 1559-61, Pierre
Geneste, sieur de Fabas, 1561, Francois de Carle, s;eur de la Raquette; 1561-63, Antoine, sieur de
Noailles; 1563-64, Gaston de l'Isle, baron de la Riviere; 1564-67, Gaston de la Touche. sieur de la
Faye; 1567-71, Guy de Saint-Gelais, sieur de Lansac; 1571-73, Henri de Foix, comte de Candalle;
1573-75, Charles de Montferrand. See Boutrouche, Bordeaux de 1453 a 1715, pp. 541-45.
6 AM Bordeaux, Carton II, 14, Guet de Garde (1559/1560).
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under Louis XII, with a chambre criminelle added in 1519, and two new chambers; a
chambre des requites and a second cour crtminelle, or toumelle, added in 1546 and
1547 respectively.' Each chamber played a specific role in the judicial administration
of the province. The Grand 'Chambre provided the major appeal court for Guyenne,
dealing mainly with high profile local and crown issues, while the chambre des
enquetes served as its annex, hearing all lesser civil cases. The chambre des requites
incorporated petitioning into the daily life of the parlement, allowing litigants to
plead their case and offer a defence rather than simply be judged. It also served to
relieve the chambre des enquetes of many of its petty cases, while the cour
criminelle served to vet appeals to decide whether they were worthy of proceeding
before the Grand'Chambref
With the expansion of legal chambers, the number of officials appointed to
serve the parlement increased too. Originally, the court was served by two presidents
and eighteen conseillers, of which nine served as clercs. In 1519, royal lettres
created a new office, that of premier president, and added eight further offices of
conseiller. Four more were created in 1537, five in 1543, while 1547 saw fifteen
conseillers and two presidents added to serve in the new chambers.' Thus, when
Etienne de la Boetie entered the parlement in 1553 as an up-and-coming conseiller,
he reported a professional corpus numbering one premier president, seven
presidents, sixty-two conseillers, sixty-two avocats, eighty-five procureurs, eleven
huissiers, eight secreta/res, two greffiers and two receveurs aux amendesl''
7 Gaston Zeller, Lea institutions de la France au XVIe steele (paris, 1948), pp. 153-54. The parlement
suffered a similar fate to the jurade following the Gabelle riots of 1548, being suspended by royal
order until the amnesty of 1 January 1550.
• Zeller, Les institutions de la France, pp. 177-81.
9 Boutrouche, Bordeaux de 1453 a 1715, pp. 289-90; C.B.F. Boscheron-Desportes, Histotre du
parlement de Bordeaux depuis sa creationjusqu'a sa suppression (1451-1790) (Geneva, 1978), p. 99.
10 CocuIa, Etienne de la Bootie, pp. 72-73.
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Guyenne also boasted nine presidial courts, judicial bodies aimed at bridging
the gap between the parlement and the lesser seigneurial and senechaussee courts. 11
The presidiaux were the cause of intense friction between administrative bodies of
the province, especially as the edict of Fontainebleau (1552) granted them 'last
resort' jurisdiction over many criminal cases, a prerogative previously held by the
parlement. This became increasingly evident during the initial stages of the religious
wars in Guyenne, where cases involving Protestants were regularly dismissed by
prestdial officers sympathetic to the new religion, even if Catholic magistrates had
decided to the contrary." The governance of Bordeaux was thus wracked by
jurisdictional conflict and jealousies, as the various institutions - jurade, presidial
and parlement - fought for pre-eminence.
Autonomous fiscal bodies, such as the cour des aides at Perigueux, could also
add to the tensions. Formed by the crown in 1554, ostensibly to create and then sell
offices to fund the royal war chest, the officers of the cow des aides were paid
significantly higher wages than the Bordeaux parlementaires, 500 livres per year as
opposed to 375 livres. I3 This caused immense resentment, so much so that when the
opportunity arose, the magistrates moved to annex the cour des aides, absorbing its
rival into the structures of the parlement by October 1557. This was a serious blow to
the consulate of Perigueux, who had paid the crown 50,000 ecus in 1554 to guard
against this very outcome, although jurisdictional rivalries would blight the early
period of the merger, with the cour des aides forced to operate in parallel with the
newly-established chambre des requetes et des aides for several years, only fully
11 Zeller, Us institutions de la France, pp. 175-77. Each presidial was officiated by apresident, seven
consetllers, a procureur and an avocat du roi.
12 Powis has shown that many of these discrepancies centred on the lieutenant-criminel of the
presidial at Bordeaux, whose leniency in cases of 'scandal and illegal assembly' forced the parlement
to review and revise many decisions. Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, pp. 77-
78.
13 Boscheron-Desportes, Histoire du parlement de Bordeaux, p. 104; Nakam, Montaigne et son temps,
p.55.
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integrated into the parlement in November 1561.14 Wider representation also
suffered in the shadow of these three behemoths, with neither the etats de Guyenne,
nor the assemblees particulieres (the etats de I 'Agenais, de Quercy, de Rouergue,
and de Perigord), being convoked on a regular basis. IS
The Reformed church in Guyenne
Protestant gains during the 1550s were so extensive that, by 1561, it was
estimated that over 2,100 Reformed churches were active across the kingdom. 16 In
Guyenne and Languedoc, the gains were even more spectacular. That same year, it
was estimated that of Bordeaux's fifty thousand inhabitants, over fourteen percent,
around seven thousand, were allied to the Reform movement;' while the Spanish
Ambassador to the French court, Thomas Perrenot, sieur de Chantonnay, estimated
that over four hundred Catholic churches in the south-west had been desecrated by
Huguenots during the recent sectarian strife.IS Astute policy from Calvin in Geneva
can take much of the credit for this phenomenon. Buoyed by repeated requests from
local communities, Calvin's evangelical mission provided large numbers of qualified
ministers and preachers to serve the towns, nobility and menu peuple of the south-
west; of the eighty-eight ministers sent from Geneva to France between 1555 and
14 See Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, pp. 66-68; Zachary Sayre Schiflinan,
'An intellectual in politics: Montaigne in Bordeaux', in Michael Wolfe (ed.), Changing Identities in
Early Modern France (Durham, N.C., 1997), p. 309; Boscheron-Desportes, Histoire du parlement de
Bordeaux, pp. 107-11.
IS Zeller, Les institutions de la France, pp. 57-70.
16 R. M. Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France 1555-1563 (Geneva,
1956), p. 106. For an ootline of the scale to which the nobility of France converted to Protestantism,
see Jean-Marie Constant, 'The Protestant nobility in France during the Wars of Religion: A leaven of
innovation in a traditional world', in Philip Benedict, Guido Marne( Henk van Nierop, Marc Venard
(eds.), Reformation, Revolt, and Civil War in France and the Netherlands 1555-1585 (Amsterdam,
1999), pp. 69-82.
17 Nakam, Montaigne et son temps, p. 47; Boutrouche, Bordeaux de 1453 a 17JJ, p. 243. Monluc
reported that ten per cent of the population of GU)'eIlDe were of 'Ia nouvelle religion' in 1562. BN
Dupuy, 588, fo. 106.
11 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, p. 139.
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1562, sixteen were appointed to Guyenne, nine to Languedoc, and three to
Bergerac." The Abbe O'Reilly encapsulates these inroads: 'la reforme trouva une
grande facilite d'expansion; elle y fit des progres etonnants et enrola sous sa banniere
de nouveaux et de nombreux proselytes'r" For O'Reilly, a Catholic historian, the
blame for such incursions lay squarely with royal ministers who, following the death
of Henry II in 1559, allowed a lull in heresy persecution while simultaneously
debating the merits of toleration. This shift in crown policy, culminating in the
acconnnodatory edicts of Saint-Germain (January 1562) and Amboise (March 1563),
appears to have empowered many representatives of the Reform movement to seek
access to local and provincial institutions, a move which further boosted the
argument for concessions.
Protestant expansion across Guyenne, and especially into the corridors of
power at Bordeaux, only served to strain the tensions between the governing elites.
Until 1555, the Huguenot's best hope of achieving any representative position in
Guyenne had been to infiltrate the universities of the south-west, traditionally
welcoming of Humanist intellectuals. By 1561, though, they were succeeding in
penetrating the machinery of government, as increasing numbers of incumbent office
holders converted from Catholicism, with monasteries, convents and the lesser clergy
of Guyenne all reporting that their numbers had dwindled considerably." For
Catholics, the infiltration of Protestants into the body politic of Guyenne was no
subtle metamorphosis. It represented a damaging break with tradition; one they
claimed would threaten the stability of the province. Throughout Henry II's reign,
19 The 16 ministers assigned to Guyenne took residency in 12 churches there; the 9 sent to Languedoc
served in 9 churches. See Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion, p. 55; Holt,
French Wars of Religion, p. 38; Ianine Garrisson-Est&e, Les protestants au XV/e steele (Paris, 1988),
fc·207.
o O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, II, p, 188.
21 Courteault. Histoire de Gascogne et de Beam, p. 209.
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Catholic nobles and magistrates had been at the vanguard of the fight against heresy
and sedition, with royal authority and Catholicism inexorably linked: to challenge
one meant to challenge the other. By 1562, though, with the crown seemingly intent
on turning a blind eye to Huguenot machinations in its urgency to implement its
policy of accommodation, the Bordeaux parlement feared for the welfare and
integrity oflocal authority.22
An analysis of Protestant infrastructure in the south-west reveals that such fears
were not unwarranted. In order to consolidate their gains of the late 1550s, the
Reformed church had convened a synod at Clairac, on 19 November 1560, under the
auspices of Calvin's chief minister, Boisnormand.P This meeting sought to integrate
the disparate churches of the region into a single entity. Guyenne would be divided
into seven constituencies: Condommois, les Landes, Beam, Agenais de la Garonne,
Agenais vers Sainte-Foy, Bordelais et Bazadais, Quercy and Rouergue, each
governed through its colloquy, answerable only to the provincial synod. The two
largest colloquies established were at Agen, containing twenty-one churches, and at
Condom, with fourteen, though all were responsible for the affairs of their individual
churches, irrespective of their size.24 By instituting such revisions, the Reformers had
created a province-wide bureaucracy that facilitated the establishment of an effective
military infrastructure, with individual churches ordered to acquire military cadres
capable of defending the local community. Each church would fund the recruitment
of a professional captain and appropriate forces by diverting money away from local
taxes into a war chest, with additional sums put aside should the levying of
mercenary companies be required. The synod, however, made it clear these would
22 Jonathan Powis, 'Order, religion, and the magistrates of a provincial parlement in sixteenth-century
France', Archiv /Or Reformationsgeschichle, 71 (1980), p. lSI.
23 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 201, fo. I.
24 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 201, fo. I.
I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS - I / 37
not be autonomous commands. Orders were to be issued by the colloquy to the
church leadership, and the captains were to follow these to the letter. No doubt aware
that such innovations might alarm Catholic authorities, the synod urged all captains
to make their military activities as unobtrusive as possible, with all muster rolls and
manoeuvres to be undertaken in secrecy or at night.2S There was little difficulty in
recruiting suitable commanders, either, as the south-west had been flooded with
unemployed veterans after the royal army had been disbanded following the peace
with Spain in 1559.26 Monluc reported that the incentives offered to these veterans
were, at times, more than financial: 'les bons ministres leur promettoient non-
seulement des richesses, mais, a ce que j'oyois dire, paradis comme s'ils en eussent
eu la clef.27 Ironically, Monluc would also receive such an offer from a captain of
the Reformed church at Nerac in January 1562.28
Huguenot military potential continued to evolve over this period. One of the
more important innovations, the assemblee politique, emanated from a second synod,
held at Sainte-Foy, near Agen, in November 1561. The assemblee politique
essentially fonna1ised the military structures of the Reformed churches by creating
local councils to oversee the organisation, training and deployment of its troops. This
would prove to be the foundation of a pyramidal hierarchy that successfully united
the Huguenot communities across Guyenne. Each church contracted an experienced
2S For further reading on the Synod at Clairac, see G. Bourgeon, La reforme a Nerac. Us origines
(1530-1560) (Toulouse. 1880), pp. 83-84; Lucien Romier, La conjuration d'Amboise (paris, 1923),
pp. 222-25; Georges Tholin, 'La ville d' Agen pendant les guerres de religion du XVIe siecle', Revue
de I 'Agenais et des anciennes provinces flu sud-ouest XIV - XVI (Agen, 1887-1889), XIV, p. 439;
Lecler, 'Aux origines de la ligue', p, 190. For a broader picture of provincial synods across France
during 1559/60, see Garrisson-Estebe, Les protestants au XVIe steele. p. 193.
26 The Venetian ambassador. Barbaro, noted that most of the Protestant infimtry deployed during the
first war was 'composee de vieux soldats, pour la plupart gascons'. Commentaires, p. 1,207, note 10.
2? Commemaires, p. 510.
21 This elicited a most vitriolic response from the newly-appointed lieutenant-general to Guyenne: let
queUes diables d'egIises soot cecy, qui font les capitaines?'. Commentaires. p. 478. In &ct, Monluc
claims to have been solicited on numerous occasions by the Reformers, one offer promising money
and the use of four thousand foot soldiers. /bid., pp. 476-77.
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captain to organise its militia, who would report to the regional colloquy for
instructions. The colloquies now featured committees to oversee military affairs,
each governed by a colonel, with two protecteurs, stationed at Bordeaux and
Toulouse, commanding the combined forces of the south-west." As a model for
organising defence and uniting disparate centres of population across Guyenne, this
pyramidal hierarchy would prove immensely successful. So much so, in fact, that it
was quickly adopted by regional synods across France, and ultimately by the national
synod as the blueprint for its military reforms after April 1562.30
Catholic condemnation of such innovation was swift. Florimond de Raemond,
a Catholic conseiller at Bordeaux, ridiculed the colloquies for featuring 'un ministre,
un avocat, un marchand, un solliciteur, un tailleur, un chaudronnier, un jardinier',"
while more senior magistrates accused the Reformers of 'vouloir introduire leur
religion a coup d'espee, abattre la monarchie de France, et la reduire en forme de
republique et cantons'." Theodore de Beze, Calvin's representative in the south-
west, rejected these charges, arguing that the Clairac and Sainte-Foy initiatives were
nothing more than a means to allow Protestants to contribute more effectively to
royal military potential.33 Monluc, though, was in no doubt that the synod's
reorganisation of its military structure was at the root of much of the region's
troubles." The threat posed by Protestant forces was now very real for Catholics.
Their innovations had already delivered an improved fighting force in Guyenne; at
Bordeaux, complaints of iconoclasm, armed assemblies and abuses of the clergy
29 See Lucien Romier, 'A dissident nobility under the cloak ofreligion', in I.HM. Salmon, (ed.), The
French Wars of Religion. How Important were Religious Factors? (Boston, Mass., 1967), p. 28.
30 See especially the re-organisation of the synod at Nimes, in R. I. Knecht, The French Civil Wars,
1562-1598 (London, 2000), pp. 74-75. For wider reformed military structures, see Kingdon, Geneva
and the Coming of the Wars of Religion, pp. 106-09.
31 Florimond de Raemond, Histoire de la naissance, progrez et decadence de I 'heresie de ce steele (2
vols., Rouen, 1610), I, p. 994.
32 Jouanna et aI, Histoire et Dictionnaire, p. 68
33 HE, I,p. 888.
34 Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 118.
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flooded in to the authorities." The parlement, though, was divided over a course of
action, with the moderate officials preferring to continue adherence to the crown's
policy of promoting accommodation as a means of securing stability within the
province. The situation could have proven bleak indeed for Catholics had not two
dynamics been at play: the first comprised a current of pro-Catholic sentiment,
invigorated by the activities of a confraternity within Bordeaux; the second saw the
establishment of a syndicat of Catholic officers within the parlement at Bordeaux,
supported by the Catholic magistrates and nobles of the region, emphatically
opposed by moderates and Reformers alike.
The presence of these two dynamics challenges the traditional history of
Catholic activity within Bordeaux, which sees dissenting Catholic voices fuse into a
distinct political corpus, the syndicat, only in November 1561, in response to a failed
assault on the chateau Trompette by Protestant troops the month before. This is too
blunt an analysis, and needs to be reassessed. Instead, it will be proposed that
organised Catholic activism had been rife within the town for decades before the
religious wars, sometimes concerted, sometimes disparate, but always encapsulating
a wide gamut of Bordeaux society, and supported by prominent members of the
judiciary. This activism was driven by two bodies within Bordeaux: the confraternity
of Saint-Yves, the representative corporation of the avocats and procureurs of the
parlemenr; and the basochiens, the affiliated actors and musicians of the
confraternity, whose performances brought colour and melody to the town's various
religious processions and feast day celebrations. An appraisal of the political, social
and religious map of Bordeaux during the mid-sixteenth century reveals that the
35 See especially AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 374-427 for April 1560; fos. 428-554 for May 1560;
fos. 555-632 for June 1560; fos. 633-707 for July 1560; Bordeaux parlement to king (23 August
1560), BN ms ft, IS,873. James B. Wood has noted that the highest incidences of violence against
priests, canons and mars during the first decades of the religious wars occurred in Guyenne and lower
Languedoc. Wood, 'The impact of the Wars of Religion', p. 148.
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confraternity and basoche were fundamental to organised Catholic activity within the
town, establishing foundations that facilitated the birth of the syndical, and
constructing networks and alliances of sympathetic Catholics that would support
even greater activism during the 1560s. To ascertain their impact on events in
Bordeaux, and to place them in the wider context of Catholic activism, the
endeavours of the confraternity and basoche will be outlined below.
Early Catholic reaction: confraternity of Saint-Yves and playen of the basoche
The cuh of Saint-Yves had been a medieval phenomenon. Its patron, Yves
Helory, was born on 7 October 1253 at Kermartin, near Treguier in northern France.
The son of a local nobleman, Yves had been expected to pursue a military career, but
instead entered the university at Orleans to embark upon a vocation in the legal
profession. On qualifying as a juge el avocat, Yves quickly gained renown for his
tireless defence of the poor, needy and abused of the region, and, at his death in
1303, locals immortalised his achievements in inscription on his tomb: 'consolateur
des affliges.,; avocat des veuves ... tuteur des orphelins ... defenseur des innocents ...
patron des avocats' .36 Over the following years, numerous miracles were reported at
this site, prompting a papal inquest. On 19 May 1347, Yves was pronounced a saint
by pope Clement VI at Avignon, and assumed the role of patron des avocats within
the courts of the land.37
36 See Christian Chavanon, Beatification professionnelle de Saint Ylles (Bordeaux, 1936), pp. 7-10.
37 The best general histories of the cult of Saint-Yves in France are: Jean Francois Fournel, Histolre
des avocats au parlement de Paris depuis Saint Louis jusq 'au 15 octobre 1790 (2 vols., Paris, 1813);
S. Ropartz, Histoire de Saint YlIes, patron des gens de justice (Saint-Brieux, 18S6); Louis Arthur de la
Borderie, Monuments originaux de l'histoire de Saint Yves (Saint-Brieux, 1887). I would like to thank
Professor Michael Jones for his time in sharing his knowledge of northern French confraternities of
Saint-Yves in the late medieval and early modern periods.
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While revered in various regions throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, it was the early decades of the sixteenth century that witnessed the wide
scale veneration of Saint- Yves across France. In the various parlements,
confraternities dedicated to the protection of the needy were established by the
avocats and procureurs as a mark of respect to their patron. The first appeared at
Paris in 1517, celebrating its feast day on 19 May, the date of Yves' canonisation.
The earliest reference to such a confraternity at Bordeaux is to be found in the
registres du parlement for May 1529: 'la fete Saint-Yves avoit este remise ce jour ...
ledit jour, devers le soir, ont este celebrees vespres, et ce fait, le hoire a este bailie par
les syndics de la confrerie Saint-Yves'v" An examination of the registres for
subsequent years shows that this feast day ritual was observed each May without fail
throughout the century. The entry for May 1536 reveals that the ceremony was never
restricted solely to the avocats and procureurs, but that significant numbers of
magistrates were frequently in attendance:
Apres-disner, furent dites vespres a Ia maniere accoustom6e pour 1a confrairie Saint-
Yves... et faite la collation par MM. les presidens, conseillers, et advocats et
procureurs en ladite cour et autres, comme est de coustume faire, en Ia salle de
I' audience, et furent crees syndics de Iadite confrairie, deux procureurs en icelle pour
la presente annee.39
The integral role of the attending parlementaires in the administrative affairs
of the confraternity is best seen in an entry for May 1559, which reports that once the
mass in veneration of Saint-Yves had been completed, an election was held to
appoint four commissaires to represent the confraternity before the court for the
31 BM Bordeaux. ms 1,497, m, fo. 89. Unfortunately, the articles of the Confraternity of Saint-Yves at
Bordeaux no Imger exist. However, a complete set of articles, drawn up in 1527, does exist for the
Confraternity of Saint-Yves at Rieux. See Le Palenc, 'La confi'6rie des avocats de Rieux au seizieme
siecle', Bulletin de la societe archeologique du midi de la France, 25-28 (1899-1901), pp. 313-14.
39 BM Bordeaux. ms 1,497, III, fo. 101.
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coming year. The avocats and procureurs would nominate eight contenders, four
from each corporation, with the gathered magistrates selecting their preferred
candidates. Supervising this procedure were the four outgoing commissaires, whose
terms of office would terminate at the swearing-in of the new electees before the
altar of the palace chapel. To conclude proceedings, two conseillers were taken to
examine the confraternity's accounts; a practice that suggests the parlement's
financial division took a keen interest in the expenditure of the brotherhood.t" It is
pertinent to note that among those magistrates who regularly attended the Saint-Yves
ceremonial were some of the more active Catholic zealots of the l560s, such as
presidents, Roffignac and la Chassaigne, and conseillers, Malvin, Baulon and de
Nort.
Music and pageantry played prominent roles in the feast-day services. This fell
under the remit of the clercs de la basoche, young and apprentice avocats and
procureurs of the sovereign court, whose role as musicians and performing artists
allowed them a distinctive identity and sense of community within the town.41 The
basoche were, in filet, one of only two groups permitted to stage plays, ballads and
40 See AM Bordeaux. ms 765, fos, 867-69. The election of the commissaires for May 1559 is
described here in great detail. For the avocats, the four candidates proposed were Pierre Bouchot and
Simon Chimbault, 'vieux maitres', and Berthome Bellinguet and Jean de Lauteur. For the procureurs.
the candidates were Pierre Abouseilh, Pierre Monteil, Martial Simon and Jean Ytier. The four
outgoing commissaires were Rencille and la Riviere, avocots, and La Roche and Nantiac, procureum.
In the subsequent elecdoo, the magistrates decided upon Chimbault, Bellinguet, Monteil and Simon as
representatives for the coming twelve months.
41 The origins of the basoche in France date back to 1303, when Philippe Ie Bel authorised the
institution of a community of clercs du parlement de Paris. Paris had specific organisations of
basoche: basoche du palais; basocbe du chdlelel; basoche de 10 chambre des comptes (called
L 'Empire de Galilee); and les Enfants sans-souci (known as les Sots). Due to the exponential rise in
legal cases before the parlement fullowing the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438, Harvey estimates that by
the end of the fifteenth century there were over ten thousand basochiens at Paris. Howard Graham
Harvey, The Theatre of the Basoche. The Contributions of the Law Societies 10 French Medieval
Comedy (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), p. 17. For further details of the origins of the basocbe, see M.
Brives-Cazes, Notices historiques sur 10 bazoche de Bordeaux du XVe au XVI/Ie sieele (Toulouse,
s.d.); E. VaJsse-Cibiel, 'Notes retrospective sur la basoche Toulousaine', Memoires de I 'academie
Imperiale des sciences, inscriptions et belles-lettres de Toulouse. 6 (1868), p. 223; Rene Olangeaud,
La basoche de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1912), p. 5; Jean-Baptiste Dub6dat, Histoire du parLement de
Toulouse (2 vols., Paris, 1885), I. p. 310; Abbe Can-Durban, 'Statuts de la basoche du s6l6chal de
Toulouse', Memoires de Lasociete archeologique du midi de 10 France, XVI (1908), pp. 167-68.
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processional songs on the streets of Bordeaux during the sixteenth century, the other
being the ecoliers from the college de Guyenne, although only the basoche
performed for the Saint-Yves festivities.42 The two groups were almost exact
contemporaries; the college de Guyenne being founded in 1533 by members of the
jurade, keen to replace the town's defunct college de grammaire, while the first
mention of the basoche performing for the confraternity appears in the registres du
parlement for 1534.43
The staple for both groups had been traditional biblical tales and devotional
song. By the 1540s, however, each began favouring the more controversial morality
plays and farces, so popular across the rest of France." This new material, which
ridiculed church abuses and even mocked individual jurats and parlementaires, was
well received by audiences at first. But as the Reform movement gained momentum
in and around Bordeaux, its provocative content began to incite vocal outbursts from
attending partisans. The sectarian nature of the plays was exacerbated as the two
groups diverged along confessional lines. The basoche, as members of the
confraternity, proffered the Catholic voice in Bordeaux, deriding the Huguenots and
their innovations, and defending the traditional church structures of the region. By
performing at the confraternity's feast-day celebrations, the basoche were able to
reach a wide audience across the town, especially as the festivities often lasted for
eight daYS.4S As such, their performances became a focal point for Catholic sentiment
in Bordeaux, a forum at which Catholic identity within the town could be defined.
42 Harvey shows that it had long been a tradition for the students of the college de Guyenne to rehearse
and present plays during their training, thus occasioning the rivalry between the eoolters and basocbe
at Bordeaux. See Harvey. The Theatre of the Basocbe, p. 14; Gaullieur, Histoire de la re.!ormation a
Bordeaux. I, pp. 251-55.
43 AM Bordeaux, ms 759, fo. 869. For the formation of the college du Guyenne at Bordeaux, see
Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France, p. 231; Zeller, Les institutions de la France, p. 211.
44 For detailed study of the various forms offorce, moralite and sottie performed by the basoche in
France during the sixteenth century, see Harvey, The Theatre of the Basoche.
45 'La fetes des basoches durant 8 jours avant Ie fete de St Yves. Le roi de la basoche se promenoit par
les rues suivis tous les eleves deux a deux, l'epee au c6t6'. BM Bordeaux, ms 828, 5, fo. 53.
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The Protestant cause was championed by the ecolters of the college, an institution
once respected across France as a prominent seat of Humanist learning, but now
renowned as an engine of Reform evangelism in the south-west. By 1551, many
ecolters could be seen openly espousing the Calvinist faith in Bordeaux, even
attacking local Catholic ceremonies and chanting psalms to interrupt processions and
masses."
With public performances now a popular vehicle for the dissemination of
sectarian propaganda, the authorities in Bordeaux were forced to deal with rising
numbers of confrontations between the two groups. By 1545, members of the jurade
were regularly intervening to restore order, causing the parlement to rule that from
henceforth the content of every play was to be vetted before performance.f The
court appointed a committee to validate the coming month's material, with
representatives from both groups charged with presenting their proposed repertoires
before the Grand 'Chambre well in advance. In the Catholic case, this duty fell to the
incumbent artistic director of the company, an elected official notionally titled the rot
de la basoche. The office of rot had been honorific at best, although the holder did
receive a redevance annuelle of 15 sols from the confraternity. For Jehan
Pachabelier, however, things would be slightly different. Elected to the position of
rot in May 1545, Pachabelier became the first basochien fully accountable for the
activities ofhis fellow Catholic players before the COurt.48
This development had important ramifications for Catholics. Firstly, it
legitimised the status of the basoche within Bordeaux; despite their affiliation to the
confraternity, they had never been recognised formally by the magistrates. It also
46 For examples of urban violence committed by the youth during religious ceremonies, see Chevalier,
Les bonnes villes de France, pp. 287-308.
47 BM Bordeaux, ms 367, fo. 81. For wider moves to censor the content of basochien performances
across France at this time, see Harvey, The Theatre o/the Basoche, p. 34.
48 Ernest Gaullieur, Histoire du college de Guyenne (Paris, 1874), p. 257.
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raised the profile of the roi de la basoche within the hierarchy of Bordeaux society.
Thus, from 1545 onwards, the roi became an intrinsic part of formal ceremonial
within the town, heading processions and welcoming visiting dignitaries on arrival.
His status was raised even further in May 1549, when Henry II formally integrated
the office of roi into the administrative structures of the Bordeaux parlement,
effectively granting Catholics five distinct representative voices within the court: the
four elected commissaires and the newly-appointed roi de la basoche/"
The zenith for the basoche came in December 1559, with the royal visit of
Elizabeth of Spain to Bordeaux. As the queen's entourage processed through the
porte de Cailhau into the town, it was the confraternity of Saint-Yves that formed the
elite guard, marching 'en armes en fort bon ordre sous l'enseigne du roy de
Bazoche', with their roi, Jehan Larquier, mounted on a white charger, in full armour,
leading the way.soLarquier had fought hard for this honour; a recent royal arret had
temporarily frozen further appointments to sovereign courts in France, an attempt by
the crown to cut back on royal expenditure, denying Larquier his planned promotion
to the office of procureur. Holding office as either an avoca! or procureur was a
prerequisite of candidacy for the role of rot. Only a personal appeal to the king,
sweetened by the offer 'mettre en annes tous ses supporte', and a promise that the
basoche would play a special piece before Elizabeth during her visit, allowed
Larquier to enter the court officiate, and thus gain election as roi.51 Larquier then
managed to delay his appointment just long enough to ensure that his promotion
49 BM Bordeaux, ms 367, fo. 96; AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fo. 149. The registres du parlemenl confirm
that cotisations were paid in full to the procureur-gb,eral of the court by the basochiens, AD Gironde,
lB 211, Arret du parlement (16 February 1560), £0. 56, and by the avocats and procureurs of the
confraternity of Saint-Yves, AD Gironde, IB 165, Arret du parlement (2 March 1556), fo. 20; AD
Gironde, IB 212, Arret du parlemem (18 March 1560), £0. 266.
so AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 89-94 and 104; BM Bordeaux, ms 369, n, fos. 179-88. See also AD
Gironde, IB 207, Arret du parlement (29 November 1559), fos. 40; 182.
51 AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 147-50.
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would be presided over by Elizabeth herself, a brashness that was not appreciated by
the court, which threatened to fine Larquier and censure his office as punishment. 52
Confrontation between basoehe and leolieTS at Bordeaux
With so much polemic now channelled through the plays, literature and songs
of the basoche and ecolters, the rivalry between the two bodies intensified
throughout the 1550s.53 This war of propaganda captured in microcosm the growing
social tension between Catholics and Protestants across Guyenne. Inevitably, the
initial weapons of the players - parody and satire - gave way to stones, swords and
guns. At one Catholic performance at Libourne, in May 1555, attending Reformers
attacked the basoehe with clubs, claiming that much of the material was offensive to
their church. Royal troops were needed to quell the ensuing riot. 54 As a result of this
melee, the roi, and leading members of the confraternity of Saint-Yves, were
sununoned by the Grand'Chambre at Bordeaux, on pain of a 500 livres fine, to
explain Catholic involvement in the disturbances. 55
Matters escalated dramatically in 1556 with the institution of a military-style
structure to the college de Guyenne by the ecolters. The students divided themselves
into four divisions - Gascogne, France, Navarre, Provence - each headed by a
captain and sub-lieutenant to oversee discipline. Each cell would be responsible for
co-ordinating specific militant activity in Bordeaux, able to deploy separately or in
52 AD Gironde, IB 207, Amt du parlement (26 November 1559), fo. 96. Larquier held his nerve
though, and on 16 December 1559 he received confirmation of his promotion to procureur, and of his
tenure as roi de la basoche, before Elizabeth within the Grand'Chambre at Bordeaux. AM Bordeaux,
ms 766, Cos. 147-50.
'3 Harvey claims that the issue of censorship was circumvented by both troupes by performing in
secret and not writing down the content of the plays. This may have led to fewer prosecutions, but it
leaves the historian with fewer records to examine. Harvey, The Theatre o/the Basoche, p. 223.
54 AD Gironde, IB 158, Amt du parlement (14 May 1555), Cos. 93-97.
" AD Gironde, IB 161, Arret du parlement (September 1555), fo. 30.
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conjunction with others. 56 Gaullieur highlights the close resemblance between these
measures and the innovations of the synods ofClairac and Sainte-Foy after 1560, and
suggests that the schemes employed by the ecolters at this early date may well have
been precursors to the military initiatives adopted by the Reformed church four years
later.S7 The escalation forced the parlement into stronger action. In April 1556, it
issued an arret banning 'aucunes pieces concernant la religion ou foi chretienne, la
veneration des saintes et les institutions de l'Eglise' from the plays and comedies of
both the basoche and ecoliers and, the following year, proscribed any material that
defamed the jurats and parlementaires themselves." By 1559, however, both groups
had taken to patrolling the streets of Bordeaux in gangs, actively seeking out their
rivals, with armed skirmishes the norm. On one occasion, in May 1560, a band of
ecoliers was intercepted by the town guard before it could disrupt Catholic services
at Saint-Andre. In the ensuing fight, however, the guard found themselves so heavily
outnumbered that only assistance from the soldiers at the nearby chAteau Hi allowed
them to escape without too many casualties. 59 The parlement ordered an immediate
inquest into this outrage, requisitioning all similar cases of accusations of armed
~ Gaullieur, Histoire du college de Guyenne, pp. 257-60. It is interesting to note that the students of
the University of Paris in the early thirteenth century were similarly divided into four nations: France,
Picardy, Normandy, England. See David Nicholas, The Evolution of the Medieval World (London,
1992), p. 349.
57 Gaullieur, Histoire du college de Guyenne, p. 257.
58 ARG, 3, p. 466. Caricatures against royal and provincial magistrates were rare during the early
decades of the sixteenth century. The farces tended to reflect notorious criminal trials, as in the oft
performed 'La condamnacion des banquetz', or would parody the avocats themselves, as in 'La filrce
de Mestre Trubert et d' Artrongnart' and 'Plaidoye de la Simple et de la Rusee', See Harvey, The
Theatre of the Basoche, pp. 72-103. During the high period of Calvinist evangelism during the ISSOs,
however, Catholic sentiments turned on those magistrates suspected of sympathising with the Reform
church. Thus, Harvey shows that anti-magisterial performances increased dramatically across France,
with the morality play 'Mars et Justice' (c. 1553) a prime example ofa diatribe against the latitude
being granted to Calvinist ministers. Ibid., p. 51. Even those members of the clergy thought to be
reticent in confronting the Reformers were satirised, as the profusion of anti -clerical &rces of the late
ISSOs reveals: 'Les pauvres deables'; 'Le meunyer de qui Ie diable emporte I'ame'; 'Le porteur de
Patience'; 'Frere Guillebert'; 'Du pardonneur, du Triaculeur'; 'De la Taverniere'. Ibid.; p. 173.
'9AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 433-42.
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bands of ecoliers roaming the region so as to track down the ringleadera/" On 16
May, the court took the decisive step of banning the ecoliers from assembling
outside the walls of their college, warning that further transgressions would be
severely dealt with. 61
The college de Guyenne, though, had a powerful patron in Antoine de
Bourbon, king of Navarre, and governor of the province. Navarre dispatched letters
to Bordeaux vilifying the magistrates for showing favour to the basoche, forcing the
court to rescind their punitive arret against the ecoliers.62 This divided the court
completely. Catholic conseil/ers and confreres vehemently opposed such
interference, urging that further measures should be taken against the college, not
concessions. The moderate party within the court, meanwhile, led by the premier
president, Lagebaton, affirmed the governor's right to intervene, and urged
conciliation between all parties. A compromise of sorts was reached; the decision to
censure the ecolters would be re-examined by magistrates if Catholic accusations of
illicit assemblies in Bordeaux were investigated fully by the COurt.63 Thus, in January
1561, the parlement dispatched a number of its conseillers, in pairs, and
accompanied by soldiers from the Chateau Hi for protection, to survey the town and
to arrest those caught attending any illegal gathering. Within two months, six
conseillers were being employed on a full-time basis to search suspect houses and
remove any weapons found to the security of the maison de vil/e.64 Yet difficulties
remained. One Catholic merchant, whose name is missing from the registres,
complained to Charles de Couci, steur de Burle, the king's lieutenant to Guyenne,
that he had sent six communiques to the parlement relating details of over thirty
60 AD Gironde, IB214,Arretduparlement(3 May 1560), fo. 23.
61 AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 452-58.
62 BM Bordeaux, ms 367, fo. 213.
63 AM Bordeaux, ms 766, Cos. 461-66.
64 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, ro. 300.
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armed assemblies within the town in recent months, but that nothing had yet been
done to end these gatherings.f Similarly, Huguenots began to lodge counter-
complaints, reporting those Catholics suspected of contravening the various royal
edicts of 1561.66
Matters came to a head in February 1561, when the incumbent roi de la
basoche, Charles Amussat, marched a large force of armed basochiens to the gates of
the college, intent on gaining entry and attacking the ecoliers. Fortunately, the
parlement had been informed of this, and deployed a number of soldiers in the
vicinity to forestall full-scale fighting." This was the final straw for the beleaguered
magistrates. On 15 February, an arret was issued censuring the activities of both
parties. The ecoliers were ordered to disband their divisional structures, while the
confreres were prevented from electing a roi de la basoche for the immediate
future.68 Five days later, the Grand Chambre issued a more detailed ordinance,
forcing both ecolters and basochiens to disarm completely and to hand in all
weapons to the COurt.69
Denied recourse to armed pursuits, the ecoiters continued to vex the Catholics
of Bordeaux by gathering on street corners and, on occasion, within the corridors of
the parlement building itself: to chant the psalms of Clement Marot. While
apparently a more peaceable activity, this was no less illegal, as an arret of26 March
1561 had banned the singing of psalms anywhere within the walls of Bordeaux 'sur
peine de la hart,.70 Catholics living near the college felt especially aggrieved at this
65 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, to. 400.
66 In one instance. numerous Catholic magistrates and notables of Bordeaux were accused offailing to
surrender their arms, and of continuing their surreptitious patrols of the streets at night, in direct
contravention of a recent arret calling for the disarming of the town's inhabitants. AM Bordeaux, ms
767, fo. 339.
67 Gaullieur, Htstoire du college de Guyenne, p. 260.
68 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, Il, fo. 269.
69 AD Gironde, IB 226, Arret du parlement (20 February 1561), fo. 274.
70 AD Gironde, IB 227, Arret du parlement (26 March 1561), to. 363.
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new phenomenon, reporting that 'les escoliers et martinets, accompagnees de 400 a
500 personnes, chantoient les psaumes dans le cour du dit college, a quoy il ne
pouvoit pourvoir"." An investigation launched by the parlement found the ecolters
guilty of contravening the arret, and charged them accordingly, although the
judgement was not delivered until later in the year.72 There were many who argued,
however, and with some justification, that the deputation sent to examine the claims
constituted a fait accompli, in that each of the four deputies assigned - Roffignac,
Beraud, Baulon and Monein - was a known, and most zealous, Catholic. It would be
most interesting to know the response, if any, of those militant Catholics based
within the parlement building to this aural provocation. The court was, after all,
home to both the confraternity and the basoche, and would soon be the seat of the
nascent syndicat too. The registres, though, are silent on this matter.
Naseeaee of the Catholi~ syndJctll at Bordeaux: 19 May 1561
It was amid such tensions that Jean de Lange, one of the more vocal Catholic
activists of the period, took centre stage in affairs at Bordeaux. Lange had entered
professional life in July 1547, as an avocat de la chambre de platde in the Bordeaux
parlement. He served two concurrent terms on the jurade between September 1554
and October 1556, and would be appointed to the office of conseiller du parlement in
1568.73 The first reference to Lange participating in Catholic affilirs at Bordeaux
appears in the registres for 1556, with the entry for 2 March reporting he 'rendre
71 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, roo 273.
72 AD Oironde, IB 236, Arret du parlement (29 November 1561), roo 98.
73 'Serment prete par Jean de Lange, l'un des Trente; i1jure d'etre obeissant aux mandements de MM.
les Jurats, de bien les conseillers. sans 6gard pour personne, et de garder Ie secret (IS September
1554)" 'lnventaire sommaire des registres de la jurade, 1520-1783', I, Archives MunicipaJes de
Bordeaux, (Bordeaux, 1896), roo 22. See also Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, 'Jean Lange, conseiller
au parlement de Bordeaux', Revue catholique de Bordeaux, 1883 (Bordeaux), p. 687.
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l'administration et comptes de la confrairie Saint-Yves' .74 He continued as treasurer
for the confraternity up until 19 May 1560, when his application for election to the
office of commissaire proved successful.f The significance of this promotion is
made apparent when an amendment to the confraternity's rules of May 1555 is
considered: it required all candidates wishing to apply for the office of commissaire
to have served a minimum ten years membership with the confraternity beforehand. 76
This would indicate that Lange had been an affiliate since the 1550s and therefore
involved, perhaps, in conflict with the Reform movement and the ecoliers of the
college, since at least 1550.77
Lange was to become the Catholic zealot par excellence at Bordeaux. Ernest
Gaullieur describes him as 'un avocat d'un grand talent, mais d'une fanatisme qui fit
couler a Bordeaux des flots de sang' /8 while Jean Darnal, writing only years after
Lange's death, was of much the same opinion; 'Lange ... porte de zele a la religion
Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine ... [ill esmouvoit les habitans de la ville de faire
un scindic'. 79 Boscheron- Desportes lauds Lange as 'un brillant orateur', who carried
many a Catholic argument in debates before the parlement." His distinguished
performance at the etats-generaux at Orleans on 21 August 1560, where he delivered
a vibrant harangue against church abuses, confirmed this view, and would prove a
formative moment in Lange's career. For it not only established him as a significant
74 AD Gironde, 18 165, An-et du parlement (2 March 1556), fo. 20.
7S AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 503-04. The office of commissaire carried the expectation that the
holder would defend zealously the Catholic cause in Guyenne. Of the commissaires elected between
1554 and 1560, the following would prove to be keen adherents of Catholic activism in Bordeaux
during the religious wars: (1554) Bertrand de Camaing and Charles Morin, avocats, Antoine Vigoac
and Etienne Reynac, procureurs (1554); Laroche and Lurnel, avocats, l'Enseigoe and Dupre,
procureurs (1555); Rencille and la Riviere, avocats, Laroche and Nantiac, procureurs (1558); Simon
Chimbault and Berthome Bellinguet, avocats, Pierre Monteil and Martial Simon,procureurs (1559);
Lange, Languellieur and Benoist (1560).
76 AM Bordeaux, ms 763, fos. 577-79; BM Bordeaux, ms 1,497, III, fo. 183.
77 The ten-year apprenticeship period was also applied to performers of the basoche after 1551. See
Harvey, The Theatre o/the Basoche, pp. 66-67.
71 GaulJieur, Histoire du col/ege de Guyenne, p. 289.
79 Darnal, Chronique Bordelais, Supplement, p. 76.
80 Boscheron-Desportes, Histoire du parlement de Bordeaux, I, p. 159.
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voice within Catholic polemic at this time, but brought him to the attention of the
cardinal and duke of Guise, the foremost Catholic grandees in Prance."
While historians have acknowledged, if not yet fully exposed, Lange's
participation in the affairs of the syndicat at Bordeaux, they invariably fail to address
two concurrent factors. Firstly, no reference is made to the contribution of previous
episodes of Catholic activism, especially the activities of the confraternity of Saint-
Yves and the basoche, in shaping the political climate that spawned the syndicat, nor
indeed to Lange's involvement in this. Secondly, no attempt is made to examine the
veracity of traditional histories that place the nascence of the syndicat in November
1561, a decision largely, and incorrectly, predicated on Lange's impassioned address
to the parlement that same month, in which he lambasted Huguenot attempts to seize
the nearby chateau. This study has already shown that concerted Catholic opposition
to the Reform movement in Bordeaux began long before 1561. It has revealed how,
through the activities of the confraternity and the basoche, Catholics were
experienced in challenging attempts to legitimise and accommodate Protestantism, a
capacity that would see many of its activists play leading roles not only in the
functions of the syndicat, but in the development of wider Catholic activism during
the 1560s at Agen, Cadillac and Toulouse. This correlation has rarely been
acknowledged.
This chapter will now turn to the emergence of the syndicat, to examine the
timescale associated with events at Bordeaux, and to illustrate the extent of the
symbiosis between Catholic traditions of activism and the necessity for a concerted
response in the early 1560s. The registres du parlement hold the key here. The entry
• t For •La harangue du peuple et tiers estats de toute la France au Roy tres-dtrestien Charles neufic!me,
tenant ses estats generaulx en sa ville d'Orleans Ie premier jour de janvier 1560, faicte par maistre
Jean de Lange de Luxe, conseiller et advocat de la Royne au parlement de Bordeaux (Orleans, August
1560)', see BM Bordeaux, H 8,613; BM Bordeaux, ms 712, 8, II, £0. 208. See also Tamizey de
Larroque, •Jean Lange, conseiller', p. 687.
I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS - 1/53
for 19 May 1561 appears at first to detail a standard Saint-Yves ceremony, listing the
assembled parlementaires and their participation in the administrative functions of
the confraternity. 82 It continues, though, by describing how the assembled
magistrates then granted Lange permission to establish an autonomous appendage to
the confraternity, a body that would be open to current members and Catholic
officers of the parlement only, but one that would be administered from within, and
financed solely by, the confraternity itself.83 This appendage was, in fact, the
syndicat, receiving official authorisation a full six months earlier than is traditionally
attributed. The entry further discloses that this was not an impulsive decision, lodged
before the parlementaires by desperate Catholics, but that the magistrates, in
granting Lange's request, were simply confirming an application made twelve
months previous. This suggests that permission to form a syndicat at Bordeaux must
have been sought during the Saint-Yves festivities of May 1560, the same ceremonial
at which Lange was inaugurated as commissaire. The registres for 19 May 1560
confirm this, disclosing that the parlement had been forced to suspend judgement on
the lettres patentes presented by the confraternity until both the Grand' Chambre at
Bordeaux and the conseil prive at Paris had consulted fully over the issue and given
their assent. 84
This shifts the syndical further back in time, preceding any serious armed
confrontation between Catholics and Reformers at Bordeaux by months, and the first
major attempt on the chateau Trom.pette by a year and a half. Yet for the lettres
patentes to be presented before the confraternity's assembly in May 1560, the
syndical must have been mooted in Catholic circles even before this date. Again, the
registres provide the answer, revealing that the first application occurred as early as
82 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 441-42; BM Bordeaux, ms 370, fo. 599.
B3 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 442-43; BM Bordeaux, ms 370, fo. 599.
B4 AM Bordeaux, ms 766, £0. 505.
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May 1558. In fact, it appears that the confraternity were granted official permission
for their association on 4 June 1558, only for the parlement to delay proceedings by
refusing to discuss the matter until the following November."
The extensive activities of the confraternity of Saint-Yves and the basoche in
confronting the Reform movement during the 1540s and 1550s, and their proposing
of such a formal association a full three and a half years before standard
interpretations have suggested, alters completely our perspective on organised
Catholic activism at Bordeaux during this period. It obviates the traditional rationale
that posits the syndicat as a response to specific military threats, as concerted
military action would not threaten Bordeaux for a further two years. It also implies
that the syndicat was not an innovation of November 1561, but an adjunct of the
confraternity, a culmination of established Catholic activism within the town. It also
serves to reposition the role of Jean de Lange in its initial formulation. For while
Lange was undoubtedly the key protagonist during the early 1560s, his role within
the confraternity was largely administrative during the 1550s. It may be the case,
then, that the syndicat was intended to counter the escalating threat from the ecolters
during the previous decade, a determined response to the divisional organisation of
the college, rather than a response to events in 1561. This would certainly explain
how, in May 1561, Lange was able to offer the parlement the services of four
thousand fighting men, a mere week after the syndicat's supposed creation." Were
these men the same confreres and basochiens who had confronted the ecolters on the
streets of Bordeaux throughout the latter half of the 1550s?
What is most evident, however, is that organised Catholic activism in the
south-west of France should not be seen as a prerogative of the post-1562 conflict.
IS BM Bordeaux. ms 369, II, fo. 155.
86 Devienne, Histoire de la ville de Bordeaux, I, p. 134.
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Catholic activists have been shown to be involved in disputes over religious
ideology, in the contestation with Huguenots over the domination of social space,
and in the struggle for political hegemony within Bordeaux's institutions, well before
the first religious war. The syndicat should be viewed, perhaps, as an escalation of
Catholic resources, a harnessing by the confraternity of sympathetic magistrates who
previously only interacted through the ceremonial and administrative functions of the
confraternity, but who now preferred a more pro-active role in combating the growth
of the Reform movement in Guyenne.87 It may well have been seen as the vehicle
that would help Catholics steer the political agenda at Bordeaux to their own
advantage, a reciprocal agreement whereby its membership gained the support and
protection of high ranking Catholic parlementatres, who in return were provided
with an extensive power base that would boost the possibility of Catholic hegemony
in the province. The following chapter will explore these issues further, examining
the structure and activities of the syndical, its role vis-a-vis the parlement and other
institutions of Bordeaux, and assess its contribution to the Catholic cause during the
first years of the 1560s.
87 Among the magistrates registered as attending the confraternity's ceremonial were many of the
period's most zealous defenders of the Catholic cause: presidents Roffignac, La Chassaigne,
Fauguerolles and Beraud, and conseillers Malvin, Baulon, and de Nort. See BMBordeaux. ms 369, II,
fo. ISS; AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fo. 50S; AM Bordeaux, ms 767, £0. 443.
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Chapter 2. Catholic activism at Bordeaux: the svndicat
The formation of a Catholic syndicat at Bordeaux in May 1561 would prove to be a
milestone in the progression of Catholic activism in the south-west of France. It
facilitated effective opposition to the growing moderate consensus within the
administration at Bordeaux, and helped define Catholic attitudes to the crown's
policy of accommodating Protestants. Yet, as has been noted above, this primacy is
not reflected in the historiography of the religious wars in France; no dedicated study
has yet been made of the syndicat, while broader surveys of Catholic activity tend to
play down its importance, emphasising that it was forcibly decommissioned the
following year by royal decree. All circumvent any determination of its hierarchical,
administrative or financial structures - dissuaded, perhaps, by the dearth of surviving
archival material pertaining to its functions. Even the more explicit commentators on
Catholic activism of the period, such as Lecler, Thompson and Gaullieur, are vague,
as is Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, the biographer of Jean de Lange, who makes
only fleeting references to his charge's involvement with the syndicat. Jonathan
Powis, whose doctoral thesis on the magistrates of the Bordeaux parlement during
the sixteenth century was rightly heralded as a tour de force on administrative
politics in Guyenne, also evades the question, allocating few pages to its activities,
while the tacit conclusions reached by Denis Crouzet and Camille Julian, regarding
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the syndicat's structure and modus operandi, draw heavily from Theodore de Beze's
commentary in the Histoire Ecclesiastique, rather than from archival sources.'
Yet despite such shortcomings, the syndicat should not be seen as a chimera.
By analysing the registres du parlement, and the copious correspondence generated
by crown and provincial officials opposed to the syndicat's existence, it is still
possible to gamer valuable insights into affairs. Four themes are especially
prominent within these records: Catholic initiatives aimed at deploying its militia on
the streets of the town; crown attempts to pacify the region by forcing the populace
to disarm; Catholic surveillance of the Huguenot population within Bordeaux; and
the deteriorating relations between the syndicat and the lieutenant du roi in Guyenne,
the sieur de Burie. These issues dominated court business during this time, revealing
a unity of purpose among the clergy, magistrates and local nobility that provided
solid support for the syndicat. This chapter will use these resources to explore events
during the early 1560s at Bordeaux, and to reconstruct, where possible, the birth of
Catholic ascendancy within the town. It will offer new conclusions over the size,
strength and aims of the syndicat, examine its modus operandi, trace its forced
demise in June 1562, and assess its legacy for the wider Catholic cause inGuyenne.
CathoDe ascendancy: the deployment of militia
Of the surviving documentation, the most abundant category relates to
Catholic attempts to deploy its armed supporters onto the streets of Bordeaux. Once
more, Jean de Lange was the most vocal proponent of this policy. He had advocated
1 Lecler, •Aux origines de la Ligue', pp. 188-208; Gaullieur, Histoire de la rejormation ci Bordeaux, I,
pp. 322-27; Thompson, Wars of Religion; Tamizey de Larroque, 'Jean Lange, conseiller', pp. 685-97;
Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu; F.
Hauchecorne, 'Le parlement de Bordeaux pendant la premiere guerre civile', Annales du Midi, 62
(1950), pp. 329-40; Jullian, Histoire de Bordeaux.
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a greater policing role for the confraternity of Saint-Yves as early as May 1560, only
for the parlement to delay a response until it had received guidance from the crown
on such a sensitive issue. Lange received his response on 7 September, with royal
lettres missives authorising the confraternity to arm itself and take its place within the
town guard to bolster security during the coming vacation/ Perhaps aware of this
new mood at court, Francois de Peyrusse, comte d'Escars, the lieutenant du roi de
Navarre for Guyenne in the absence of the governor, requested that the
confraternity's remit be extended to increase the nwnber of patrols of the town's
walls and gates, and to assist in the surveillance of hotels situated near the perimeter
wall.' In light of the recent lettres, the parlement had little option other than to agree,
although it insisted that no confratemal members be used to confront suspects or to
enter the hotels to check passports. The lieutenant du roi to Guyenne, the sieur de
Burie, endorsed these moves, albeit grudgingly, decrying the shortage of manpower
at Bordeaux. He stipulated, though, that it should be the jurade who assumed
jurisdiction over the inspection of the town's hotels, not the confraternity's militia.
As such, all hoteliers were to maintain up-to-date brevets listing all guests residing
on their premises to speed up the work of the investigatingjurats.4
The policing of the wider Bordelais, however, gave cause for great concern.
With Burie having only minimal resources at his disposal, and those largely centred
within Bordeaux, the authorities lacked sufficient manpower to patrol the countryside
effectively. This forced the lieutenant du roi to co-opt the local Catholic nobility into
maintaining order across the region, much to the anger of Huguenot communities.
2 AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fo. 810.
3 AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 787-92. O'Escars would be an important figure in Catholic hegemony
within the south-west, holding numerous high offices: lieutenant-general du Limousin (22 September
1561); seneschal de Toulouse (25 May 1562); gouveneur de Bordeaux (4 May 1563); gouverneur de
la chdteau Hd at Bordeaux (4 May 1563); cappitaine de compagnie de cinquante hommes (12
February 1565); lieutenant des chdtellenies de Rancon, Champagnac, et du Perigord (7 February
1568). See Cassan, Le temps des guerres de religion, pp. 198-99.
4 Burie to Francis II (14 September 1560). BN ms ft, 15,873, fo. 8.
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Initially, the deployment of the private retinues of the sieurs de Monluc, Lanssac,
d'Orthe, Candalle, d'Aussun, Lauzaun, Caumont, Biron and Noailles proved
effective in this role, as confirmed in a report to the king from Lanssac, who testified
that the Catholic nobility had prevented any substantial escalation of violencef Burie
accepted this, and requested permission to maintain the Catholic nobles under arms
for the immediate future. But he also urged the crown to send reinforcements to
augment his personal forces,"
Within Bordeaux, though, the lieutenant du roi's policies continued to be
questioned by Catholics. In October 1560, Lange wrote to the regent, Catherine de
Medici, accusing Burie of incompetence and mal-administration, and of failing to
adequately defend the province," Attached to the letter was a memo ire, written on
behalf of the Catholics of the parlement, which named several magistrates suspected
of favouring the Reformers. These allegations were to polarise the parlement.
Dubois, a moderate conseiller, contended that the court had always striven to
perform their duties with impartiality and rebuked Lange, a mere avocat, for
speaking above his station. In response, Thomas de Ram, the lieutenant-general of
the senechaussee of Guyenne, and a solid Catholic, disputed Dubois's assertions,
claiming that moderate magistrates had recently ordered the release of a number of
Protestant prisoners, arrested for assaulting Catholics, even though they had not yet
stood trial. The court ordered an internal investigation, but failed to verify Ram's
assertions. As a result, the invective between Catholics and moderates intensified.s
In December, Burie was forced to reply to further allegations by Lange:
$ Lanssac to Francis II (11 September 1560), AHG, 13, p. 125.
6 Burie to Catherine de Medici (3 November 1560), AHG, 13, pp. 136-39.
7 AM Bordeaux, ms 778, fos. 360-95.
I O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, Il, p. 204.
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Madame, j'ay entendu qu'un advocat de ceste court de parlement, nomme Lange, a
couru la poste pour vous faire entendre beaucoup de choses de moy... je vous
asseure, Madame, que je n' ay rien gaste en vostre gouvemement et ne fuz oncques
callompnye, que je scaiche, que par ledict Lange, ce que je ne voudrois endurer
d'ung beaucoup plus homme de bien que celuy-la."
A second letter, contrasting Burie's lengthy, loyal service to the crown with the
subterfuge practiced by certain Catholic officers at Bordeaux, followed in January
1561; its suggestion that 'ledit Lange soit retenu, car par sa detemption et confession
se pourront descouvrir plusieurs autres choses qui sont contre le service du Roy, ou
beaucoup d'autres personnes pourront estre comprises', a tacit admission of the
ascendancy of the Catholic faction within the town. 10
Lange escaped reprimand, however, due to the support of sympathetic voices
within the upper echelons of the Bordeauxparlement. Foremost among these was the
president, Christophe de Roffignac, described by Camille Jullian as 'un des plus
intelligents sectaires qu'ait produits le catholicisme bordelais'.!' Roffignac would
playa key role in defending elite and grass roots Catholicism at Bordeaux during the
1560s. Backed by patronage from the leading Catholic family of France, the house of
Guise, and having spent ten years in Paris as a client of the cardinal of Lorraine
during the 1540s and 1550s, he was also a regular of the Saint-Yves festivities, often
presiding over its elective and administrative functions.12 Courteault portrays
Roffignac as the antithesis of Lagebston and Burie, his zealous orthodoxy and
keenness to eradicate Protestantism from the south-west being in stark contrast to the
9 Burie to Catherine de Medici (19 January 1561), AHG, 10, p. 38.
10 'Madame, sij'ay esteS aceuze a tort, qu'iI vous plaise avoir souvenance qu'iI y a cinquante-deux ans
que je suys nourry du pain du Roy, et que au lieu de repoz sur la fin de mes jours, je ne soye
recompense d'estre callompnye par ung tel homme que celui-Ia et ses complices'. Bwie to Catherine
de Medici (20 January 1561), AHG, 10, pp. 35-36.
II Julian, Histoire de Bordeaux, esp. Chapter 12.
12 See Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 107.
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conciliatory tones of the two moderate leaders.13 As such, it was inevitable that
Roffignac would be pitted against these two adversaries for most of the period. In
this struggle, the president was ably served by a number of loyal conseillers of the
parlement, the most prominent being Charles de Malvin and Francois de Baulon.
Malvin would prove a tireless defender of Catholic cases brought before the court,
organising their defence and often giving evidence himse1f. 14 Baulon played a similar
role, supporting Roffignac and Malvin where necessary, although his most prominent
actions would come later in the decade: securing the return of the Jesuits to Bordeaux
in 1568.
But it was the accord between Lange and Roffignac that would provide the
fulcrum for Catholic activism at this time. Tamizey de Larroque is correct in
identifying the two as key to events during this period: 'si Ie fougueux president de
Roffignac fut, a cette epoque, Ie chef de la ligue bordelais, Lange en fut Ie
secretaire'." This description, though, fails to grasp the precise nuance of the
relationship; Lange was no mere lieutenant to the president; theirs was a partnership,
reciprocal in nature. Each was able to initiate independent activity within Bordeaux
and to support the other as necessary - a most important factor for Lange, who, as an
avocat, was vulnerable to attack from moderate magistrates within the parlement.
The need to address the increasing cycle of violence across the Bordelais
resurfaced in November 1561. As the limitations of Burie's resources became
apparent, the parlement moved to ensure that Bordeaux remained secure. Orders
were dispatched requisitioning forty soldiers from each of the town's fortresses, the
chateaux Trompette and Hi, only for their respective captains, Vaillac and Noailles,
13 Courteauh, Histoire de Gascogne et de Beam, p. 217.
14 For example, Malvin's evidence against the Reformers' illegal armed assemblies outside Bordeaux.
AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 179-86.
IS Tamizey de Larroque, •Jean Lange, conseiller', p. 687.
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to refuse, claiming they possessed insufficient numbers to meet this demand while
maintaining the integrity of their own defences.l" So the parlement turned once more
to the syndicat for manpower. Roffignac directed all avocats and procureurs to take
their turn on guard duty; the younger officials ordered to arm themselves and report
to the maison de ville at once, while the older and more infirm were granted
exemption so long as they provided a trustworthy representative to take their place. 17
Lange and the procureur-general of the parlement, la Ferriere, were instructed to
initiate a count of all Catholics of fighting age across the Bordelais, to be undertaken
by the senechal of each ressort, in case further reinforcements were required.18 Burie
raised several objections to the court's use of Catholic officials for this purpose, only
supporting the plan on condition that the recruits were restricted to guarding the
gates, and that each group was placed under the authority of a jurat and accountable
to the capitaine du guet for their conduct} 9 In April 1562, at the outbreak of war
across France, these security measures were updated. The parlement now ordered
that only Catholic officers were to man the gates, with two 'presidans et
conseillers ... aveq leurs robes longues' to be stationed at each at all times, with one
hundred armed members to be enlisted from the syndicat's militia to patrol the streets
at night.1° Requiring magistrates to wear their fonnal robes while on guard duty
seems to have been a common ploy during this period. By making themselves
conspicuous, the elites aimed to demonstrate that this was a group effort; that
everyone should pitch in to secure the town. It also served as a reminder of the
symbolism and tradition associated with the town and its guard, themes intended to
16 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, fos. 304-25.
17 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fos. 229-31.
II AD Gironde, IB 245, Amt du parlement (8 May 1562), fo. 66.
19 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 886-91; BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, fo. 331.
20 For order that only Catholics could man the gates, see BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, fo. 421. For order
that presidents and conseillers should serve too, see BM Bordeaux, ms 370, fo. 654. For order that a
hundred militia were to serve in night patrols, see BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, fo. 359.
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energise the defenders into standing firm and fighting. Ducourneau has shown that
the complement on duty at each gate rose from thirteen in November 1561 (a
dixainier, two soldiers, and ten town guardsmen) to twenty five - all Catholics - in
June 1562 (two magistrates of the parlemeni, a canon of Saint-Andre, an officer of
the chancellery, ten representatives of the bourgeoisie, ten confraternity members,
and two soldiers of the municipal guard), while the night patrols of the streets rose
from fifty to one hundred and fifty over the same period.i'
It was also decided at this time that three hundred additional soldiers would
be levied from outside the town to bolster its defences.22 To finance this measure,
Antoine de Noailles, the governor of Bordeaux, enforced a new tax on the Huguenot
citizens, although Burie was successful in securing assurances that the syndicat and
members of the clergy should contribute toO.23 Catholics, however, were spared the
ignominy of having the soldiers lodged in their homes; Noailles determined that only
Protestant homes were to be used for this purpose, adding that each jurat was to
accommodate two soldiers each - payback, no doubt, for repeated attempts by the
jurade to counter Catholic authority over the past year.24 By June 1562, the rising
cost of maintaining the garrison force meant that Catholic conseillers were now
expected to pay a monthly sum of 6 livres to the town's coffers.2S Members of the
confraternity of Saint-Yves, on the other hand, were still giving only on a voluntary
basis, with the result that very little was raised from this source. This forced the
parlement to rule that all confreres should now pay a monthly disbursement, the
amount to be negotiated by each official. The body of avocats backed this motion
21 For November 1561 guard figures, see AM Bordeaux. ms 768, fo. 248; BM Bordeaux. ms 369, II,
Cos. 295-97. For June 1562 guard figures, see Ducourneau. La Guienne historique et monumentale, II,
g. 192.
2 BM Bordeaux. ms 370, fo. 644.
23 AM Bordeaux. ms 768, fo. 874.
24 BM Bordeaux. ms 369, Il, fo. 385.
25 BM Bordeaux. ms 370, fo. 644.
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unanimously, seemingly keen to ensure the Catholic leadership of Bordeaux had a
sizeable military presence at its disposal.26 The corporation of procureurs, however,
failed to agree on a contribution, and rejected the court's decision. In response, the
parlement ordered the procureurs to appear before the Grand 'Chambre to settle the
issue, on pain of a 500 livres fine. On arrival, they were 'tellement diviser que ceux
de l'ancienne religion se mettent d'un cote et ceux de la nouvelle religion de l'autre',
and then admonished for refusing to pay. 27
The decision to separate the procureurs within the chamber along
confessional lines is a most intriguing one. It perhaps indicates that the bulk of those
reluctant to pay towards the maintenance of the troops were of the Reformed
persuasion, aggrieved at being forced to finance soldiers that had proven hostile to
their coreligionists in the town. There had been numerous appeals before the
parlement supporting this view: the Protestant avocat, l'Aubergnac, for example, had
petitioned the court arguing that the garrisoned troops 'etoient ordonne pour les
facher et molester' .28 By separating them, then, the magistrates may have been
attempting to apply greater pressure to each grouping. Whether this is the case or not,
the measure proved successful and, on 15 June, an arret was published confirming
that full contributions had been agreed upon by all con/reres.29
Catholic ascendaney: disarmament
The second most abundant category of surviving records relates to crown
attempts to disarm the populace at Bordeaux. The edict of Saint-Germain, in July
26 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, Co. 198.
27 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, Co. 200.
28 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, Co. 922.
29 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, fo. 232.
I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS - 2 / 65
1561, imposed a strict ban on the carrying of all weapons within the town, even for
the nobility. For many, this compromised the town's municipal charter, which placed
matters pertaining to the security of the town in the hands of the jurade, not the
crown. Catholics argued that disarming their militia would leave the town at the
mercy of Protestant forces and disrupted the debate over ratification of the edict to
such an extent that the premier president, Lagebaton, was forced to adjourn
proceedings, pending further guidance from the conseil prive.3o In the meantime,
Lange collected a petition of over 3,000 Catholic signatures, demanding that
Lagebaton rescind the edict. The premier president reported Lange's refusal to
disarm the syndical'S militia to the crown, adding that 'les catholicques de ladicte
ville ont cree six syndics d'entre eulx'."
Lecler suggests that this development, similar in many ways to the measures
implemented by the Reformed church following the synod of Clairac seven months
earlier, was a defining moment for Catholic organisation in Bordeaux, the point at
which the syndicat determined its infrastrueture.P Gaullieur concurs, adding that the
six syndics mentioned by Lagebaton pertained to the syndical's division of the town
into quasi-military units, each embedded within one of the six jurades of Bordeaux,
with eachjurade sub-divided into quartiers and paroisses, and a captain appointed to
command each sector.33 The Histoire Ecclesiatique also verifies this development,
adding that the syndicat sought to maintain surveillance over the Huguenot
population by 'attirans Ii leur ligue les paysans des banlieues'. 34 If it seems that the
syndical was simply borrowing from the innovations of the Reformed synod, it
should be noted that comparable mechanisms were being implemented by the
30 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, IT, fos. 297-303.
31 LagebAton to Catherine de Medici (July 1561), BN ms fr, 15,875, fo. 442; AHG, 10, p. 320.
32 Lecler, 'Aux origines de la Ligue', p. 193.
33 Gaullieur, Histoire de la reformation a Bordeaux, I, pp. 311-25.
34 HE, I, p. 872.
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parlement concurrently to bolster the guard patrols across the town: a deputy,
supported by two conseillers, was to be appointed to maintain order in each of the
eight parishes of Bordeaux, a move itself somewhat reminiscent of the Calvinist
consistorial hierarchy of deacons and elders within the community." A closer
inspection of the confessional composition of the deputies suggests further
confluences between the syndicat's initiatives and the dictates of the parlement:
seven of the eight consei/lers appointed were staunch Catholics, each being a regular
participant in the ceremonies of the confraternity of Saint-Yves, and each becoming
an integral part of Catholic hegemony at Bordeaux over the coming years.36 It may
be the case, then, that the syndicat and the Catholic leadership of Roffignac, Baulon
and Malvin, who himself assumed the deputyship of the parish of Saint-Pro jet, were
working in unison, with the parlement allowing Lange and the confreres to
implement their organisation within each jurade, then reinforcing this with a formal
surveillance of the parishes under its own officers.
The Catholic party at Bordeaux lost their petition, though, with LagebAton
ordering the immediate registration of the edict.37 In this, the premier president was
supported by Burie, who claimed that recent violence at Toulouse had been the resuh
of allowing the town's dizaines to remain under arms.38 This left the Catholic party
with one option: a joint letter from the syndicat and the clergy of Bordeaux, urging
35 15 July 1561. AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 536-38.
36 The Catholic deputies were: Malvin (parish of Saint-Pro jet); Vergoing (Saint-Pierre); Anselin
(Saint-Bloy); de Nort (Sainte-Maxance); de Monehn (Sainte-Colombe); Guilleragues (Sainte-Aulaye);
and d' Alesme (Saint R6my). Only de Ferron represented the moderate consensus, though his
appointment to the largest parish of Bordeaux - that of Saint-Midlel, which required four conseillers
to serve there due to its size - may have been an expedient, as de Ferron was one of the more
experienced officials within the parlement, and so more likely to restore order to this district. AM
Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 536-38. Even when the parlement tightened its hold within the parishes the
fullowing December by providing each deputy with a list of two hundred parishioners eligible to be
mobilised for active duty should the need arise, the bias towards Catholic appointees remained at
seven to one. Cocula, Etienne de la Boette, p. 134.
37 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 614-22.
31 BN ms ft, 22,372, fu. 949.
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the crown to exempt Bordeaux from the terms of the edict due to its position as 'une
ville frontiere et maritime' .39 This would be an oft-repeated supplication by Catholics
of the south-west during this period. In March 1562, Monluc would try to exempt
Bordeaux from having to site a preche near its walls by citing a clause within the
edict of January that allowed 'frontier towns' to ban such assemblies within its
jurisdiction for security reasons." The following year, in September 1563, the
governor of Bordeaux, the comte d'Escars, attempted to secure similar immunity
from the terms of the edict of Amboise, claiming that 'la ville de Bourdeaulx est ville
de frontiere et maritime, par cella aysee d'estre surprinse des ennemys ... [etl habitee
de tant de diverses nations et deux diverses religions demouroit sans garde de porte
et guet'." One month later, d'Escars repeated his request, claiming that an English
force, recently landed at La Rochelle, threatened to move into Guyenne unless local
Catholics were allowed to arm themselves and join the king's forces arrayed against
the enemy.42 In December, the clergy of Bordeaux dispatched a remonstrance to the
crown arguing that 'ladicte ville et pays de Bourdeloys est assez en frontiere de la
royaume d'espaigne, navarre et angleterre', that this had been the case for centuries,
and, as such, the town had traditionally been allowed to arm its citizens to ensure its
defence against external foes." The Catholics of Languedoc were no less willing to
try this manoeuvre, with the provincial governor, Damville, arguing 'que le
Languedoc est un pays de frontiere, comme la Picardie, Bourgogne, Bretagne,
Provence et autres, requerant que d'autant que votre bon plaisir a este iceu1x
exempter de l'effet de l'edit quant aux ministres et predicans, pour les dangereux
39 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, p. 47.
40 BN ms ft, 3,186, fo. 60.
41 D'Escars to Catherine de Medici (6 September 1563), BN nouv. aeq, ft, 20,598, fos. 190-96.
42 D'Escars to Charles IX (IS October 1563), BN nouv. aeq. ft, 20,598, fos. 199-201.
43 'Remonstrance &iete au Roy par Ie clerge du pays de Bourdeloys', (4 December 1563), BN ms ft,
15,878, fos. 294-95.
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inconveniens qui s'en pourront ensuivre'i''" However, neither the joint petition, nor
indeed any of the other Catholic petitions, would be successful.
At Bordeaux, the clergy were especially aggrieved at the crown's dismissal of
their appeal, as much of the recent violence committed by Huguenot forces had been
targeted on local priests and their churches. By forcing Catholics to disarm, the
clergy feared that the assaults would increase in ferocity." Such information should
not have surprised the authorities. As early as March 1561, Burie had warn Catherine
de Medici that 'la guyenne ne fut ily a long temps en sy grand trouble qu'elle est a
present'," while in April, the archbishop of Bordeaux, Antoine Prevet de Sanssac,
had appeared before the parlement to chide the magistrates over their inability to
counter the brutality being unleashed against the clergy of Guyenne." Lange did
offer Burie the services of 'la noblesse et autre grand force' to bolster security across
the region, a reference perhaps to the confraternity's own militia force,48 while
Prevot appealed to the crown to dispatch Catholic reinforcements to Guyenne." Both
were turned down. The Bordeaux clergy took the opposite approach, arguing that if
Catholics were to lay down their weapons, then the crown should do more to ensure
that all Protestant were disarmed too, and their communities policed regularly to
prevent further assaults on the clergy. 50
It does appear that the clergy had joined with Prevot and the syndical in
presenting a united Catholic front at Bordeaux. A cursory glance at its constitution,
though, reveals that its allegiance was slightly less definite than may be thought. Of
44 Damville to Charles IX (18 December 1563), HGl, 9, Preuves X, p. 507.
45 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fos. 692-93.
46 AHG, 13, p. 156.
47 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fo. 396. InMarch 1561, a representative of the clergy of Agenais, Dunoyer,
had also demanded that the parlemem do men to arrest and condemn those 'mutiners, heretiques,
schismatiques et seditieux' currently terrorising the Catholic clergy of the province. See AM
Bordeaux, ms 768, fos. 42()"26 .
... AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fo. 495.
49 PrevOt and Catholic clergy to Charles IX (19 June 1561), BN ms ft, 3,186, fo. 153.
50 Clergy of Bordeaux to Charles IX (19 June 1561), BN ms ft, 3,159, fo. 72.
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the 390 benefices of the Bordeaux diocese (217 cures, 150 vicairies-perpetuelles, 23
prieures-curest, for example, the archbishop conferred only 236. The rest were
subject to nomination by diverse chapters, abbes, noble patrons and even the
parlement in a few cases. It was the wealthy families of the region, for instance, that
largely nominated the canons of the chapters at Saint-Andre and Saint-Seurin, while
several Bordelais chapters held close ties with the nobility of Bordeaux, and many
prebendes and demi 'prebendes held by magistrates of the sovereign court. 51 This
meant that Catholic consensus could only be assured if these patrons remained
staunchly Catholic. They certainly did during this period, but had a number
converted to Protestantism, as would happen in other areas of France - especially
eastern Languedoc - then the homogeneity of the clergy, and thus their support of the
syndicat at Bordeaux, would have been lessened significantly.
CathoDc ascendancy: 8uIVeiDance
The third theme evident from archival survivals was the partiality of the
syndicat for the surveillance of known Huguenots and their activities within
Bordeaux, with investigation and prosecution brought to bear where illegal pursuits
were suspected. Again, Lange and Roffignac were the driving force behind this
policy, authorising syndicat affiliates and members of the clergy to observe and
report any suspicious behaviour within the town. One of the first to be accused by
this intelligence network was Mathieu Ie Berthou, the capitaine du guet, who was
interrogated by Catholic magistrates in September 1561, and again in April 1562,
51 Robert Boutrouche (ed.), Bordeaux de 1453 a 1715 (Bordeaux, 1966), pp. 221-28. Hunault de
Lanta, doyen at Saint-Sewin and Saint-Saveur de Blaye, was abbe dwing the ISSOs as well as being
conseiller-clerc au parlement. and was later admitted to the Grand'Chambre at Bordeaux. See
Boutrouche, Bordeaux de 1453 a 1715, p. 226.
I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS - 2 / 70
over claims that he had allowed several Protestant prisoners to escape from jail.
Unfortunately for Berthou, his trial was presided over by Roffignac and Malvin. It
was of little surprise, then, to find that the capitaine was subsequently removed from
all duties.52 In June, these surveillance methods were formalised by the parlement,
allowing Roffignac to authorise Catholic conseillers to visit and search the houses of
suspected Huguenots for hidden arms." Having such a mandate clearly benefited the
syndicat: in one such instance, Beraud, a commissaire of the confraternity, reported
that a stranger 'est habille comme un homme de robe court' had made numerous
visits at night to the house of a known Reformer in Bordeaux. Beraud informed the
parlement, who dispatched several conseillers to investigate. However, before the
visitation could arrive, the two men fled to the safety of Beam." Ducourneau
suspects that the men were tipped off by sympathetic jurats, concerned about the
victimisation of their co-religionists, but also irked by the usurpation of this
traditional remit of the jurade: the searching of houses traditionally fell within the
category of policing the town, and as such was a prerogative of the civic authorities,
not the parlement.55 It is interesting to note that Catholic officials at Bordeaux were
especially suspicious of Huguenots who moved about the town dressed in 'robes
longues ou courts', giving their spies permission to stop and search these men for
concealed weapons at any time.56
The following month, the Catholic leadership attempted their most audacious
move to date. Roffignac ordered Malvin to search the house of Lagebaton, 'pour
veoir mire ouverture de certains bahuts et d'une caisse ... pour savoir s'il n'y avoit
aucunes armes'. To intrude into the sanctum of the premier president was fraught
52 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, £0. 75 I.
'3 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, Co. 582.
,_.AM Bordeaux, ms 767, Cos. 719-25.
55 Ducourneau. La Guienne hislorique et monumentale, II, p. 192.
$6 Registres du parlement de Bordeaux (29 June 1562), BN ms fr, 22,372, fo. 1,045.
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with peril, and Malvin, despite his hard-line Catholic credentials, was shrewd enough
to request that a witness accompany him in this task, no doubt keen to obviate any
recriminations that may follow. 57 This was, in fact, the culmination of concerted
Catholic pressure against Lagebaton, begun the previous year. The syndicat had first
lobbied the parlement to expel 'personnes accuses ou notoirement soupconner
d'heresie, sedition et scandale public, et de s'etre trouve dans des assembles de
religionnaires' from office in June 1561.58 This was aimed specifically at suspect
jurats, and has the hallmark of Roffignac's influence all over it. The Catholic
president was no fan of the jurade at Bordeaux, having long mistrusted its
motivations. In filet, Roffignac had written to the constable Montmorency in April
1559, in an attempt to secure royal backing for the removal of numerous of its civic
powers, and would later countersign an arret requiring all jurats to reside
permanently within the town and to attend their local Catholic church services."
A second motion, submitted in September 1561 by syndicat members
Sauvanelle and Ie Bouhet, aimed to encompass the entire urban bureaucracy under
the Catholic's surveillance umbrella, urging the court to pass legislation condemning
any official whose family members were caught attending local preches or illegal
gatherings.60 This would have immediate ramifications at Bordeaux. The procureur-
general, la Ferriere, lodged a complaint demanding that action be taken by the
parlement against three of its magistrates: de Ferron, de Ciret and Gasc - known
Reformers, whose wives and fiunily members had been seen attending a nearby
57 AD Gironde, IB 247, Am' du par/ement (21 July 1562), fo. 153. Malvin selected Jehan Gauteille,
a clerc du greffe of the court, as his witness.
51AM Bordeaux. Carton II, 17, Election des jurats (29 May 1561). This O17'itwas passed by the court
in July 1561, and only revoked in 2 July 1564, thus in keeping with the terms of the edict of Amboise,
which allowed municipal authorities to elect candidates 'sans avoir egard de la diversite des religions'.
AM Bordeaux, Carton n, 17, Election desjurats (2 July 1564).
59 Roftignac to Montmorency (28 April 1559), AHG, 13, p. 119. For O17'itforcingjurats of Bordeaux
to live in the town and attend church (March 1562), see AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fos. 816-19
60 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fo. 756.
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preche.61 When a second preche, held near the church of Saint-Michel in Bordeaux,
degenerated into wide scale violence in early October, many were killed, and
numerous more injured or arrested. The widow of one of the deceased, a well-known
Catholic noble, Menault de la Grave, laid the blame for her husband's death clearly
at the feet of Lagebaton, who, she claimed, had allowed numerous armed Huguenot
officers and their wives, not to mention his own spouse, to attend. The widow
demanded that the court divulge the religious affiliation of its magistrates and their
wives, and declare the number of its officials who regularly attended such
assemblies.f
The resuhing debate over this issue within the parlement is most interesting.
In December 1561, the court granted Catholics their injunction, preventing all
officials of Bordeaux from attending the preches, only for it to be immediately
contested by two lesser officers: Moreau, a procureur, and le Blanc, an avocat. The
two claimed that at least sixty others had expressed a preference for continuing to
attend such assemblies, and requested that the injunction be rescinded. Lange,
speaking on behalf of the syndicat, challenged their claim., stating that if there was
indeed such strong sentiment within the court, it should be presented in written form.
So on 10 December, Moreau and le Blanc returned to the parlement with a requite,
signed by forty officials, confirming their wishes to continue attending the preches.
But it was a trap. La Ferriere, an ally of Lange, interjected, stating that as all avocats
and procureurs had sworn an oath on taking office at Bordeaux, promising 'd'etre
bons catholicques observans les constitutions de l'eglise n'ayant ete atteindre ne
soupeonner du crime d'heresie', by signing the declaration they had contravened
61 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, Co. 746.
62 AM Bordeaux, ms 767. fo. 755.
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both their oath, and the edicts of the king. La Ferriere moved that all forty be
suspended from office until the court decided their punishment. 63
Catholic ascendaney: relations with Burie
The fourth theme evident within the archival material at Bordeaux is the
deterioration in relations between the syndicat and Burie. Catholic ire at the
lieutenant du rot 's refusal to intervene and halt the violence against the clergy has
been noted already. Burie's reluctance to lead his forces into the Bordelais was
predicated on his troop deficiency, as he explained to that Grand'Chambre: 'cette
ville n'est point comme un chateau et n'a hommes pour garder leur murailles et leur
portes'." Instead, Burie sought to assuage conflict by dispatching Huguenot
dignitaries from Bordeaux to calm the situation, and to ensure that better organisation
of Protestant events was attempted so as to avoid aggravating the Catholic
population. 65 Catholics within the parlement, however, argued that those causing
unrest should be reprimanded, not indulged. Had Burie utilised the militia force
offered by Lange to police the town, then the lieutenant du roi 's personal troops
could have been deployed to counter trouble across the countryside. Instead, the
lieutenant du roi had been forced to co-opt Catholic nobles such as Monluc, Lausun,
Fumel, Bajaumont, and Cassaneuil to police the region, a move not contrary to
63 For this affiUr, see AM Bordeaux, ms 76B, fos. 301-IB. The requite was signed by: (avocats), Ie
Blanc, Labarthe, de Gamardes, de Bignon, Morin, de Rogier, de Bordes Ie jeune, de la Gualterie,
l'Hallet, Lauvergnac, Sauvenelle, de Sarrague, Thibault Ie jeune, Barnaud, Larquier, de Foore, la
Tour, Belliguet, de Losse, de la Vaisserie, Ie Feure, l'Eglise, du Vergieu, Carmel fils, de Montbrun, de
la Marque, de Larieu, Voisin, Carmeau Ie jeune, Maisonneufue, de Termes, Bagen, de la Vie, de
Guinsard, Moncamp, (procureurs), Moreau, Meynard, Jude, la Broute, Ythieu, du Vergieu, Menoyse,
Chassaing, du Chalard, Dupeyras, Ie Double, Atiton. Boirante, I'Eveque, Larquier, de Petit, Arnaud,
Maigen.
64 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, Co. 746.
65 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, Cos. 747-4B.
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Catholic opinion, but one that raised concerns over the legitimacy of the combatants
should armed conflict ensue.66
Matters had been complicated, too, by Burie's response to the activities of the
Protestant noble, the sieur de Savignac de Thouars, who had led an armed escort to
put down violent episodes around Montsegur and Saint-Salvy in August 1561.
Savignac had admitted that such vigilante actions were contrary to the recent edict,
but argued that he was simply restoring order to the region on behalf of the crown
and parlement, and that his forces would disarm once the insurrection was ended/"
The syndicat was incensed at this, accusing Savignac of creating an independent
police force numbering over two thousand strong. Roffignac and Malvin berated
Burie for being incapable of controlling the Reformers in Guyenne. The lieutenant
du rot's reply - that Savignac's force was operating in the senechaussee de l'Agenais,
and thus outside ofhis official jurisdiction - did little to appease Catholic anger.68
Matters came to a head in December 1561, with Lange delivering a damning
indictment against Burie's management of the province before the parlement. The
harangue lambasted the Reform movement and its adherents, claiming that Guyenne
had never been so divided. For Lange, the crown's policy of accommodation was a
disaster, the Huguenot synods and consistories nothing more than breeding grounds
for dissent, hampering effective local government.69 Thomas de Ram, the lieutenant-
general for the senechaussee of Guyenne, joined in the condemnation, asserting that
Burie's inactivity had encouraged Protestants to rebel, and forced Catholics to take
independent measures to defend themselves. Ram informed the court that the
syndicat had fresh evidence that officials continued to frequent local preches, and
66 AM Bordeaux. MS 767, fo. 70S.
67 AM Bordeaux. ms 767, fos. 693-700.
68 AM Bordeaux. ms 767, fos. 711-12.
69 For Lange's speech, see AM Bordeaux. ms 768, fos. 369-96.
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that weapons were being taken from the town hall and distributed among the
Huguenots of Bordeaux, all under the nose ofBurie.7o
The audience, though, was not united in condemnation of Burie. Dubois, a
Protestant jurat, launched a rebuttal of Lange's arguments, adding that the syndicat
was the real problem here; its divisive nature splitting the administration of Bordeaux
in two, creating power struggles within the institutions of Bordeaux. Dubois was
seconded by Bichon, a Huguenot conseiller, who decried the disruptive influence the
patrols of the syndicat's militia were having amid the streets of Bordeaux." The
moderate parlementaires, however, sided with Lange in the debate, and voted in
favour of a draft remonstrance, urging the crown to send Catholic troops to the
province immediately and requesting permission to co-opt greater numbers of the
confraternity's militia to bolster the town's defences in the meantime.72 It seems
clear that the absence of the moderate's de-facto leader, Lagebaton, who had been
called to Paris to consult with the conseil prive the week before, may account for this
decision. Indeed, on his return later that month, the remonstrance was formally
rescinded, and the moderate magistrates rebuked for acceding to Catholic demands.73
The premier president then turned on Lange, censuring the avocat for using
inappropriate rhetoric before the court, and for employing improper pronouncements
in his harangue against Burie, irregularities that contravened the technicalities of
language permitted to an avocat before the Grand'Chambre.74 Despite appeals from
Catholic presidents Roffignac and Lachassaigne, and supporting testimony from la
70 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fos. 399-403.
71 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fus. 444-47; 477-79.
72 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fos. 448-62.
73 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fos. 685-99.
74 Powis has examined the irregularities in this speech to the parlemem, and supports Lagebiton's
claims that Lange's language directly infringed on the privileges of the court. and that his claim to
represent the Catholic populace was in derogation of the rights of the jurade, which claimed sole
representation of the corporation of the city. Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p.
266.
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Ferriere, Lagebaton refused to absolve Lange, and his reprimand was formerly
entered into the minutes."
Burie's exact position at this juncture is open to debate. He clearly felt no
compunction about throwing his hat in with the Catholic party at Bordeaux. but
neither did he overtly favour the Protestant cause. Catholic propaganda painted Burie
as a pro-Huguenot moderate, his support of crown initiatives to implement toleration
confirming this. Such views, though, are dismissed by Brantome, who rejected any
suspicion of Burie's religious orthodoxy, and by Paul Courteault, who maintained
that Burie was 'un bon catholique' right up to his death in 1565.76 Indeed, Burie was
never slow to express his concern at the persistent violence of the Reformers, and
warned the crown on several occasions that the threat posed by ministers returning to
the south-west from Geneva in January 1560 was formidable: 'Et voila, Sire, le ftuict
qu'ont apporte les ministres en vostre royaume, et n'est que Ie commencement du
mal, veu ce qu'ilz ont entreprins de faire,.77 Most telling, perhaps, are the pejoratives
of Monluc, which stress Burie's ineffective command but ignore controversies over
confessional afflliarion."
Denouement
The first months of 1562 saw an escalation in the friction between moderate
and militant officials at Bordeaux. Numerous complaints were lodged before the
" AM Bordeaux, ms 768, Cos. 685-99.
76 Catholic opinion is alluded to in Commentaires, pp. 508-09. For Brant&ne, see Brintome, Oeuvres
completes (ed., Lalanne, 11 vols., Paris, 1864-82). m, pp. 396-97. For Courteault, see Commentaires.
~ 1,189, note 1.
Burie to Charles IX (28 January 1561), AHG, 43, pp. 236-38.
71 Monluc wrote of Burie: 'pour crainte de perdre ... it ne vouloit rien hazarder, qui estoit un grand
deffilut a luy', Commentaires, p. 541; 'si Dieu ne m'eust inspire a m'opposer a eux et &ire pendre
ceux qui tomboient entre mes mains, je croy que tout Ie pays estoit perdu, car la douc:eur de monsieur
de Burie n'estoit pas de saison', Commentaires, p. 521; 'n estoit vieux, et les gens vieux ne peuvent
ester si diJigens que les jeunes' - the latter a rare criticism coming from a man of sixty-two years
himself: Commetuaires, p. 527.
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parlement objecting to the activities of syndicat members, with many calling for this
Catholic corpus to be dismantled. Such arguments brought the legitimacy of the
syndicat into sharp focus. Burie and Lagebaton decided the time was right to launch
a pre-emptive, two-pronged assault on Lange and his affiliates. On 7 March, the
premier president ordered two Bordeaux conseillers, Arnaud de Ferron and Jean
d'Alesme, to undertake a formal investigation of the activities of the syndicat, and to
prepare a report for assessment by the conseil priVe.79 Burie, meanwhile, had
commenced his own offensive against the Catholic activists at Bordeaux. In late
March, he presented an appeal before the parlement, alleging that the lettres-patentes
that had validated the syndicat the previous year had yet to be registered. Lange's
organisation was, thus, an illegal entity and, as such, its members were banned from
assembling in any numbers, as per the terms of recent royal edicts. so By 12 April
1562, the conseil prive had reached a verdict on these matters. Acting on information
garnered from the two connnissioners and from Burie, the king issued an arr2t
ordering the immediate cessation of the syndicat's activities, declaring all previous
resolutions passed by its leadership to be null and void.sl Ducourneau believes that
this was a victory not only for Burie and LagebAton, but also for the moderate city
officials, whose persistence had forced the authorities at Bordeaux, and the crown, to
79 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fo. 763. For letter of consent from the crown to the replacement of Com pain
and Girard, see Charles IX to Bordeauxparlement (March 1562), BN ms fr, 3,210, fo. 49.
80 O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, Il, p. 206.
81 'Arrest sur Ie differant ranvoye au Roy, tant par la court de Parlement de Bourdeaulx, que Ie sieur
de Burie, lieutenant g6neraI dudiet sieur au pays de Guyenne, en absence du Roy de Navarre, touchant
la cassation d'une pr6tendu sindicat wet par aulcuns particuliers babitans de la ville de Bourdeaulx,
COOlDletendant A diviser et desunir les subjects du Roy, apres que M. Jehan de Lange pr6tendant Ie
sindicat devoyr estre auetoris6, d'une part, et M. Jehan Chacin au contrayre, d'aultre; lediet sieur a
declare et declare ledict sindicat nul et de nul effect et valleur, et ordonne que les rolles wet par eulx
en vertu d'icellui, et toutes aultres pieces concernant ce faiet seront mizes par devers ledict sieur de
Burie, et a deffimdu et deffimt aus particuliers tere tels sindicats sur peyne d'estre declares
desobeissans au Roy; tenu A Paris, Ie xii jour d'apvrillS62', 'Registre du clerc de ville de Bordeaux',
AHG, 46, p. 268.
I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS - 2 / 78
intercede: 'Ies jurats se plaignirent au parlement de la conduite de Lange, et grace Ii
leur fermete, ils firent dissoudre l'assemble des syndics' .82
But this would not be the conclusive victory that the moderate party had
hoped for, as events forced the administration at Bordeaux to rethink their decision.
On 26 June, a force of Protestant soldiers, led by the sieurs de Duras, Pardaillan and
Langoiran, attempted to gain entry to the chateau Trompette, apparently with the
collusion of two captains of Burie's company, Savignac and Sadillac, who were to
open the gates under cover of darkness. It was presumed that the castle's
commander, Vaillac, would remain neutral in this affair, as he had recently married
into the Pardaillan family. But Vaillac remained constant in his duties, and ordered
the gates to remain locked.83 This seems to have been an extremely close call for the
Bordeaux authorities. Dupre is in no doubt that had Vaillac not interceded here, then
Duras and his Protestant forces would have used the chateau as a base from which to
besiege the town. If Bordeaux fell, he continues, then the defence of other Catholic
centres across Guyenne would have been almost impossible.84 The Catholic
leadership at Bordeaux grasped the opportunity to voice their concerns at the erosion
of military defence of the town since the suspension of the syndical. They called for
concerted action to be taken against the Reformers: Monluc called upon the Catholic
population 'n'epargner ni leurs biens ni leur sang pour Ie service du roi et 1a bonne
religion ancienne, catholique et romaine', 8S while Roffignac and Malvin demanded
that 'chacque officier du Roy declare publiquement de quelle religion il est afin
12 Ducourneau, La Guienne historique et monumentale, II, p. 192. For Burie's role in the winding up
of the syndicat, see Gaullieur, Histoire de la reformation a Bordeaux, I, pp. 412-17
13 For events surrounding the attempt on the chAteau Trompette of 26 June 1562, see Bordeaux
parlement to Charles IX (4 July 1562), AHG, 17, p. 269. See also AM Bordeaux, ms 769, fo. 662; AD
Gironde, B, Amt du parlement (13 January 1563), fo. 92; Boscheron-Despcrtes. Histoire du
~lement de Bordeaux, I, p. 151; Ducourneau, La Guienne historique et monumentale, II, p. 193.
Dupre, 'Projct de ligue catholique a Bordeaux', p. 373.
IS Commentaires, p. SIS.
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qu'on puisse scavoir et connoitre a quoi ils se voudront resoudre, et de quelle foyet
religion ils sont et veulent suivre et tenir' .86
When, in late June, violent assaults on Catholics in the parish of Saint-Remy
were reported, Burie was forced to dispatch a large concentration of his troops to
augment the guard there, weakening the remaining town defences. As further reports
of unrest filtered through, Burie had little option but to permit Catholics to arm
themselves in readiness.V He then authorised the senechal of Guyenne to permit
Catholics to establish a new corporation, to be administered as an adjunct of the
parlement, whose initial duties would be to boost the town guard and to report on
violent incidents within the town. The court was understandably wary of such a
move, and appointed five conseillers to liaise with the corporation. But while it
required that all Catholic movements be validated by Lescure, the procureur-
general, the parlement did grant limited powers of intervention to the militia over
matters concerning the 'punition des sacrileges, voleries, et autres exces commis par
eux de la nouvelle religion et leur complices,.88 This was a most surprising
development, but shows that a military commander could resort to expedient action
as necessary. There is little doubt that Burie would have preferred not to rejuvenate
the Catholic power base so shortly after securing the termination of the syndicat. But
the security and stability of the town came first, and Burie needed competent militia
to suppress the threat of wide-scale insurrection.
There is little doubt, too, though, that Catholics viewed this as a prime
opportunity to re-establish their syndicat. Within weeks of the creation of this new
corporation, the usual suspects were appearing before the parlemem petitioning for
the legitimisation of this corpus. Central to this manoeuvre was Lange's compatriot,
16 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, Co. 427.
87 BN ms fr, 22,372, !OS. 1,070-74.
88 BN ms fr, 22,372, !OS. 1,070-74.
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the avocat, Ie Melon. On 20 July 1562, le Melon succeeded in gaining permission to
register the 'election, confirmation et execution dudit sindicat en 1a maison de 1a
present ville,.89 He was seconded in this by Malvin, with Lescure, La Ferriere and
Lahet, stalwarts of Lange's former association, confirming to the court that le Melon
had the backing of the clergy and 'la pluspart des meilleurs bourgeois et catholiques
de la present ville,.90 Burie counter-signed the requite the following day,91 and even
some moderate magistrates accepted the necessity of this expedient; one asserting
that 'la cour trouvera que Ie sindicat est utile,.92 Others, however, were alarmed at
the regeneration of such a potent force within Bordeaux politics. Many of the jurats
were especially apprehensive at the ceding of jurisdiction over certain punitive and
police matters to this new syndicat, a decision one jurat labelled as 'une chose inouie
et nouvelle,.93
Yet the moderates at Bordeaux soon began to backtrack over the issue. On 23
July, Burie informed Monluc that the syndicat had been sanctioned 'pour garder de la
ville, et non pour autre chose'," while two days later Lagebaton convened a special
seance of the parlemetu to debate the ramifications of the lieutenant du rot's
decision 95 Burie, Ie Melon, Malvin, and several jurats spoke for and against the
syndicat, after which a vote was held. The result saw a remarkable u-turn, with the
parlement refusing to validate le Melon's lettres patemes on three grounds: firstly,
the syndical was plainly 'contre l'intention du Roy et son arret et execution' - as
such, no exemptions to this clause could be granted without recourse to crown
arbitration; secondly, the concerns of the jurade over the infringement of
89 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, to. 504.
90 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, fos. 514-16. See also Boscheron-Desportes, Histoire du parlement de
Bordeaux, pp. 154-62 for resurgence of the syndicat under Ie Melon at Bordeaux.
91 BM Bordeaux, ms 370, to. 661.
92 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, fo. 523.
93 BN ms ft. 22,372, fos. 1,074-75.
94 BN ms ft, 22,369, to. 137.
9S AM Bordeaux, ms 769, fos. 514-16.
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jurisdictional prerogatives were valid - experience had shown that such a prominent,
well-supported entity would establish a competing body of power within the
administration, and could only prove divisive to the government of the town; thirdly,
if the authorities accepted an official Catholic corpus within the political framework
of Bordeaux, it would find it difficult to reject demands from Huguenots for their
own version - and with two such bodies active within the town, the parlement
foresaw only conflict and contestation.
Le Melon threatened to go over the heads of the parlement and appeal
directly to the crown. 96 Burie accepted this, adding that he would honour his
commitment to allow the confraternity's commissaires license to present minor
denunciations concerning policing matters before the lower courts for the foreseeable
future.97 Lagebaton, though, intervened here, stating that 'la cour n'est besoin ni
necessaire faire et constituer aucun sindic pour faire une simple denonciation'. He
added that the appropriate machinery to deal with lesser claims was already in place
within the structure of the court, and Catholics should follow these procedures if they
wanted to obtain justice through civil suits. Lagebaton urged that it would be wiser to
remove all powers from the syndicat and its officials, a point conceded by Burie.98
The debate closed, then, with the censuring of le Melon's association, and a
prohibition on any further Catholic associations within Bordeaux.
This chapter has traced the birth, life and demise of the Catholic syndicat at
Bordeaux. It has shown how a number of dedicated lesser officials within the
parlement managed to appropriate substantial authority in support of the Catholic
cause. In this, they were patronised and protected by leading Catholic magistrates of
the court and by the clergy of the Bordelais, but opposed vociferously by the
96 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, fo. 551.
97 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, 10. 539.
98 AM Bordeaux, ms 769,10. SSt.
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moderate consensus at Bordeaux, marshalled by the premier president of the
parlement, Lagebaton, and by the province's lieutenant du roi, Burie. The extent to
which the syndicat managed to infiltrate the administrative institutions of the town is
quite impressive, as is their ability to assume influence over Bordeaux's militia and
town guard deployment. The surveillance of Huguenot suspects was most extensive,
while their determination to oppose the crown's policy of conciliation reveals a self-
belief that outweighed any actual legitimacy - they were, after all, merely avocats
and procureurs of the court. But royal and provincial authority would eventually win
the day, with the crown validating Lagebaton's demand that the syndicat be
dismantled forthwith, and the confraternity barred from supporting further Catholic
machinations within the town. Now, with the local magistrates and officials excluded
from such organised collaboration, it would be left to other protagonists, specifically
to the local Catholic nobility, to assume the mantle of protectors of the Catholic
church and patrons of Catholic hegemony across Guyenne. The following chapter
will examine this phenomenon.
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Chapter 3. Catholic activism at Bordeaux: the nobility
The participation of the nobility of Guyenne in the confrontations with moderate
officials at Bordeaux will be the third feature of Catholic activism considered here.
The censuring of the syndicat in August 1562 promised much for the moderates; the
premier president of the parlement, Lagebaton, certainly saw the suppression of
Lange, Ie Melon et al as key to a return to more conciliatory politics. But if this
victory was to deny Catholic activists a legitimate outlet for their grievances, it did
not signal the end of Catholic machinations within Guyenne. Instead, greater
intervention by the Catholic nobility of the Bordelais gave fresh impetus to Catholic
activismacross the region.
Elite intervention at Bordeaux
Isolating the driving forces behind the Catholic nobility's intervention into
affairs at Bordeaux has long divided historians. Confessional issues were
undoubtedly paramount; rarely do Catholic appellants in Guyeme fail to demand the
extirpation of Huguenots or a more vigorous defence of Catholic interests in their
petitions. But other issues were equally prevalent. Social grievances were especially
common, with the disenchantment over the failure of the Bordeaux authorities to end
the rising incidences of violence against local landholders and their property a
common complaint during the early 1560s. Many at Bordeaux still remembered the
Gabelle riots of 1548, in which a leading Catholic official, Tristan de Moneins, the
king's lieutenant, was dragged from the parlement building and beaten to death by a
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rampaging mob. I Powis believes that this event had a profound effect on the
Bordelais nobility, shaking the very foundations of their social structures: 'if such a
high-ranking officer, a symbol of the king's authority, could be overthrown, then the
nobility's own standing, whether as royal officers or as provincial notables - in short
as members of the ruling class - could not long survive'," A similar tension was
evident in late 1561. During a violent seven-month period, nwnerous Catholic nobles
fell victim to violent assaults. In August, the sieur de Levignac was forced to flee his
chateau after an attack from around two thousand 'voleurs', the sieurs de Lestelle
and de Thouars had their homes raided and ransacked, while at Villeneuve-d' Agen,
nwnerous gentilshommes also reported being maltreated by their vassals.' The
following February, the sieur de Rouillac was besieged at his home at Saint-Mezard,
following an attempt to prevent an armed mob from damaging the church on his
land. Rouillac had his throat cut, a fate suffered by his neighbours, the sieurs de Cuq
and de la Monjoye, from nearby Astaffort, after they tried to intervene," Even Blaise
de Monluc found himself confined to his home at Estillac by 'cinq a six cents
hommes qui tenait la campagne', a result of his intervention against the Huguenot
coup at Agen in June 1561. s
The most significant attack on a Catholic noble, however, occurred in late-
November 1561, when the baron de Fumel was murdered in his own home by an
1 Moneins was the king's lieutenant in Guyenne in the absence of the king of Navarre. His other
offices at this time were governor ofNavarrenx and senechal of'Bearn. For the 1548 Gabelle riot, see
Boscberon-Desportes, Histoire du parlement de Bordeaux, esp. Cbapter 3; Gigon, La revolte de la
fabelle, pp. 73-84.
Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 62.
3 Courteault, Blaise de Monluc. Historien, p. 408; Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, pp. 141-42; Crouzet, Les
~"ierS de Dieu, I, p. 516.
Commentaires, p. 483.
5 'Jurade d'Agen sur les enterprises des Pr6tendus Reformes' (4 June, 1560), AHG, 29, p. 11. Manluc
also claimed to be the target of an assassination plot, forged by a secret council of Guyeone refurmers,
an assertion that Burie would later validate before the parlement 'Les r6formes avoient furm61e projet
de I'assassiner, et que leurs ministres excitoient Ie peuple a la molle', Burie to parlement de
Bordeaux (17 January, 1562), Dom Devienne, Histoire de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1771), p. 138.
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armed mob, seemingly intent on destroying his residence and pillaging his estate."
This crime sent shockwaves through the Catholic community. Fumel was a major
landholder in Guyenne, a prominent lawyer, well known at court, and a former
ambassador to Constantinople during the 1550s.7 But he was also renowned for his
dislike of Calvinist ministers preaching on his lands, and many suggested that he was
killed by a mob of angry Protestants seeking vengeance for his continual violation of
their preches. Labenazie, the prior of the college d'Agen, promotes this sectarian
view, claiming that Fumel was: 'tuerent cruellement ... n'estant qu'a l'agonie, ils
depouillerent tout nu, Ie mirent sur son lit avec un carreau derriere le corps qui le
tenoit en son seant; les subjets inhumains tiroient a son coeur palpitant des coups
d'arquebuze, criant: Vive l'Evangilel"
Recent historians, however, have reassessed the events of November 1561
and now posit quite different theories. Janine Garrisson-Estebe portrays Fumel as a
tyrant, his murder 'une revoke populaire, spontanee, sanglacte'." For Garrisson-
Estebe, the killing of Fumel was an act perpetrated by oppressed workers attempting
to h'berate themselves from social subjugation, embittered by the consequences of a
pervasive economic decline. Jules Andrieu sees both social and religious motivations
behind the assault, suggesting that while Fumel's employees may well have wanted
him dead, his flagrant disregard for the sanctity of Protestant worship may have been
the specific trigger for his murder. to Georges Weill, writing in the late-nineteenth
6 For three contemporary descriptions of the events at Fwnel in November 1561, see AM Bordeaux,
ms 768, Cos. 202-4; AHG, 8, pp. 207-21; J. A. de Thou. Histoire Universelle (London, 1734), IV, pp.
370-71.
7. See Pierre Miquel, Les guerres de religion (Paris, 1980), p. 226.
• Labenazie, Histoire de la ville d'Agen and pays d'Agenois (2 vols., Montauban, 1888), I, p. 248.
9 Ganison-Estebe. Les protestants du midi, pp. 166-67.
10 'Le baron de Fumel 6tait profondement d6test6 de ses vassaux et accablait les religionnaires de la
contr6e. Le 21 novembre 1561, il s'6tait permis d'entrer a cheval dans Ie temple des refonnes de
Condat'. Jules Andrieu, Histoire de l'Agenats (2 vols., Agen, 1893), I, p. 218. Andrieu seems to have
borrowed from De Beze here, who wrote that Fumel was 'd6teste a cause de sa craute', and that his
death was revenge for continued disruption of Protestant services on his lands. Beze to Calvin (12
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century, claimed that the Reformers of the south-west were 'more volatile' than their
counterparts across France, highlighting the propensity of popular elements within
the province to allow defiance or resistance to turn rapidly into disorder and riot. II
Geralde Nakam follows this line, adding that the ruthless treatment meted out to
infractors by the forces of law and order in Guyenne, and the harsh conditions that
the poor were forced to survive under, contributed to this volatility. At Bordeaux, for
example, it was commonplace for 'les gahets' to be singled out and forced to wear a
red piece of cloth on their chest, precluding most from entering the town's shOpS.12
Denis Crouzet, on the other hand, states that this was no 'tres breve guerre
sociale', but 'une emeute religieuse' .13 For Crouzet, Garrisson-Estebe's statement
that 'durant ces revoltes, si des paysans Huguenots ont marche, Us l'ont fait en tant
que paysans et non comme huguenots' is too rigid, as much of the violence of the
early 1560s was committed by Protestant against Catholic, and vice versa, not by the
socially or economically disadvantaged against their social superiors." Crouzet
supports this supposition by analysing the social make up of the assailants: of those
arrested in relation to the unrest at Fume}, only sixty-three (less than eleven per cent)
were from the town of Fumel or its jurisdiction. If this had been inspired by social or
economic grievances, he argues, one would expect the majority to be disgruntled
locals or tenants complaining against their landlord. Instead, the bulk of those
arrested hailed from neighbouring towns, from areas well known for their adherence
to the Reform movement, and for episodic unrest and violence against Catholics:
December 1561), Theodore de Beze, Correspondance de Theodore de Beze (26 vols., ed. H. Aubert,
Geneva, 1960-2002), m, pp. 235-38.
11 Georges Weill, Les theories SUI' Ie pouvolr royal en France pendant les guerres de religion (Paris,
1891), pp. 75-76.
12 SeeNakam, Montaigne et son temps, p. 46.
13 Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, p. S17.
14 Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, p. 516.
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seventy-four of those arrested lived at Tournon de I'Agenais; thirty-one at Penne de
l'Agenais; with others from Monflanquin, Cuzorn, Sauveterre and nearby towns. IS
Garrisson-Estebe's eagerness to place the 'lower classes' at the forefront of
agitation in Guyenne during the 1560s is not without corroboration from
contemporary accounts. In December 1560, Fronton de Beraud, conseiller of the
parlement of Bordeaux, observed that the Reformed doctrine had infiltrated 'la plus
grande partie du peupIe, mesmes des rustiques et gens de labeur' in the Agenais and
the Bazadais." Such sentiment was echoed by the court itself the following year: 'en
la dite ville de Perigueux ceux qui font Ies susdictes assemblees sont la plupart gens
artisans et mecaniques' ... it se craint d'une emotion populairet.'" At Agen, the
town's bishop, Janus Fregose, informed the etats de l'Agenais in early 1561 of
evidence of 'des insolences, scandelles et contemnements que les paTsans dudit pais
leur ont faict depuis ung an en ~a',offering the crown the full resources of the clergy
and Catholic nobility of the Agenais to combat this menace: 'toute la noblesse est
indignee de la revoke des paysans ... le roi et la reine peuvent compter sur son
devouement' .18 Predictably, Monluc also blamed lawlessness and brigandage on the
peasants, claiming: 'et desja commeneoient la guerre descouverte contre la
noblesse'." He would later counsel local magistrates to stamp out deviation or
delinquency at its :first appearance, so as to avoid repeating the errors made by the
apparently lenient parlement of 1548 on the eve of the Gabelle riots, warning that: 'si
on donnait licence au peuple ... le peuple print l'autorite' .20
IS Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, p. 518. The figures here are contentious. The Histoire
Ecclesiastique claimed that over two thousand gathered to protest against the baron de Fumel,
whereas Monluc's arret of March 1562 noted that only two hundred and twenty three had been
~t. See HE, I,p. 885; Commentaires, pp. 483·87.
6 Fronton de Beraud to Cardinal de Lorraine (4 December 1560), AHG, 13, p. 143.
17 AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fo. 789.
18 BN Dupuy, 588, fo. 106; Thelin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV, p. 446.
19 Commentaires, p. 483.
20 Commentaires; p. 578.
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Henri Hauser is unhappy with such class-based stereotypes. For Hauser, the
peasantry were rarely pro-Reform in any great numbers, and largely neutral in the
sectarian confrontations of the 1560s. According to Hauser, the menu peuple had far
more to be concerned with protecting their traditions and struggling with the harsh
realities of their life cycle, rather than becoming embroiled in confessional
disputes." That Hauser predicates this view on the nature of the peasantry of France
as a whole could leave him open to criticism, as he fails to explore the specific
sectarian frictions among the lower classes of the south-west. But in this, he is
supported by Paul Courteault, whose detailed understanding of the confessional
activism of the paysans of the Bordelais during the religious wars suggests that they
were neither violent revolutionaries, nor even a homogenous unit - a dynamic whose
absence would tend to preclude any local, let alone provincial, unity of purpose in
this respect.22
Courteault does, however, identifY the collection of obligations and taxes as a
flash point for contention between Catholic nobles, their tenants and the peasantry
during this period. Refusal to pay was often accompanied firstly by punitive
measures against the payee, and then more frequently, by physical violence against
the collector himself many of whom were lesser Catholic genttlshammes of the
region. James B. Collins has highlighted the delicate position these men found
themselves in, especially as the Reformers started to divert funds into their own
coffers.23 Burle was most damning of those refusing to pay taxes: 'lis se vantent... de
ne paier plus les dixmes et droits de l'Esglise, et se vantent aussi publiquement qu'ils
21 See Henri Hauser, 'The French Reformation and the French people in the sixteenth century',
American Historical Review, (January 1899), pp. 222-26.
22 Courteault gives the example of participating peasantry at the commune at Monts6gur in IS60, who
were 'gens m6chaniques et de nulle 1itt6rature ••• amenes a la nouvelle doctrine, les uns par simplicite
et ignorance, les autres plutat par cwiosite que par malice', hardly the revolutionaries of Garrisson-
Estebe's texts. Courteault, Histoire de Gascogne et de Beam, p. 218.
23 See James B. Collins, The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 3-4.
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ne vous paieront plus de tailles, ne les debvoirs aulx seigneurs', reporting all such
instances to the crown/" The Bordeauxparlement was also keen to come down hard
on such evasion, and suspended the Reformed church at Montauban in October 1561
for refusing to pay its obligatlons." Some contemporaries even claimed that many
were embracing the Reform movement simply as a means of avoiding taxes, rents
and other dues. The correspondence of Armand de Gontaut, baron de Biron, a
leading Guyenne nobleman, later to be made a marshal of France, for example, noted
a propensity among local seigneurs to convert to Calvinism in order to free
themselves of their fiscal and social duties.26 Monluc also noted this phenomenon,
though he takes a typically sarcastic view of Huguenot justifications for this: 'quand
les procureurs des gentilshommes demandoient les rentes a leurs tenanciers, ils leur
respondoient qu'ils leur montrassent en 1a Bible s'ils le devoient payer ou non' .27
The extent to which economic hardship channelled members of the nobility of
Guyenne to the Reformed church is explored elsewhere in detail, but certainly, rising
inflation, bad harvests and loss of earnings due to a decline in military sponsorship
were major factors"
The controversy, then, over whether the nobility of Guyenne saw the murder
of their neighbour, Fumel, more as a crime against 'the establishment' than as a
confessional outrage, is yet to be resolved. The subsequent actions of the lieutenant
24 Burie to Charles IX (10 June, 1561), AHG, 10, p. 61. See also Burie to Catherine de Medici (June
1561), BNms ft, 3,186, fo. 142.
~ Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion, p. 43. It should be noted, though, that
these issues were by no means specific to the south-west of France; a royal ordinance, issued at
Dieppe in August 1563, reported that 'plusiers personnes... tant gentilshommes que autres tenant
terres et possessions des prelats et gens d'eglise de nostre Royaume et autres charges de dixmes,
ehamparts, cens, rentes et devoirs, sont refusants et dilayants de leur payer'. Henri Forneron, Histoire
de Philippe //(2 vols., Paris, 1887), I, p. 269.
26 Biron to Catherine de Medici (31 October 1560), Armand de Gontaut, Baron de Biron, The leiters
and Documents of Armand de Gontaul, Baron de Biron, Marshall of France (1524-1592) (2 vols.,
eds. S. Ehrman & J. Thompson, Berkeley, 1936), I, pp. 8-11.
27 Commemalres, p. 487.
21 For arguments over economic downturn and its consequences see Zeller, Les institutions de la
France, pp. 15-16; Henri Hauser, La preponderance espagnole, 1559-1560 (Paris, 1948), pp. 197-203.
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du roi, Burie, however, may provide a useful pointer to determine the true nature of
events. Burie is considered to be a particularly moderate politician of this period, and
repeatedly refused to throw his hat in with Monluc, Lange and the ligueurs of
Guyenne through the early 1560s. Yet Burie appears to have been so incensed at the
attack on Fumel that he personally headed an association of local Catholic nobles in
order to track down and bring the perpetrators to justice. This 'ligue nobilaire', as
Burie referred to it in a missive to the king of Navarre, included the sieur de
Negrepelisse and many from the nobility of Quercy, Armagnac, Rouergue,
Comminges, Perigord and Agenais.29 It proved a most effective vehicle, with many
of the main culprits identified and taken into custody. Once it had achieved its
purpose, however, Burie severed his affiliation, and returned to Bordeaux, never to
associate himself with such ligue ethos again throughout the decade. Burie's actions
show that the threat posed to the Catholic nobility of the province at this time was
not simply confessional in nature, but a complex, multifaceted affair, encompassing
political, social and economic motivations. How, then, did the Catholic elite of the
region respond to such specific provocation, and to the continuing disputes over the
status of the Reform movement in the province? A review of the endeavours of four
of Monluc's military captains - the sieurs de Candalle, Tilladet, Terride and
Negrepelisse - will shed light on this matter.
29 Burie to Navarre (November, 1561), BN ms fr, 3,186, fo. 62. The Histoire Eccles;ast;que asserts
that this ligue nobilaire was also headed by Lalande, the Catholic leader at Agen, and three of
Monluc's captains: Monts, Terride and d'Aussun. HE, I, pp. 885-87. Crouzet, though, can find no
evidence to support this claim. Crouzet, Les gue"iers de Dieu, I,p. 378. For evidence that Catholics
at Bordeaux were aware of Burie's anger at events at Fumel and the perceived threat to the Bordelais
nobility, see Antoine de Noailles to Gilles de Noailles (1561), BN ms fr, 6,910, roo 138.
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Leading Catholic noble protagonists
The participation of leading nobles from across Guyenne would prove
fundamental to the success of Catholic activism during the 1560s. Monluc had
appointed two of his most trusted captains to important offices during February
1562; Francois de Cassagnet, sieur de Saint-Orens, known as captain Tilladet, was
made military governor at Bordeaux, while Antoine de Lomagne, sieur de Terride,
was given command of the Icing's forces across the Bordelais. In early March,
Monluc reported that another of his captains, Louis de Carmaing, sieur de
Negrepelisse, had approached him 'avecq ung bon nombre de gentilzhommes des
pays d'Agenois, Armaignac, Quercy, Perigort, Rouhergue, Commenge... nous offrir
leurs personnes et biens pour Ie service de vostre Majeste'. 30 By granting trustworthy
Catholic captains these important positions within the military infrastructure of the
province, Monluc was consolidating both his personal network and his ability to
counter Protestant threats. Thus, at the outbreak of hostilities in March 1562, he was
able to report to the crown that: 'en faisant sonner la cloche fist assembler quatre ou
cinq mille hommes, parmy lesquelz y avoyt beaucoup de noblesse, de faeon qu'en
vingt quatre heures iIz se sont resduiz a sa mercy', 31 adding in a separate letter to
Catherine de Medici, that: 'il n'y a rien qui ayt tant espovente les seditieux que
I'assemblee de la noblesse'." Each of these captains were granted license not only to
manage their troops independentlybut to arm Catholic inhabitants of the surrounding
countryside to boost the fighting capability of their forces. This was contrary to the
terms of the July 1561 edict, although as lieutenant-general of Guyenne, Monluc was
30 Monloc to Charles IX (13 March 1562), BNms fr, 3,186, fo. 60.
31 AHG, 43, pp. 259-60. See also Commentaires, pp. 548-49.
32 Monluc to Catherine de Medici (13 March 1562), BNms fr, 3,186, £0. 3. Monluc also granted six
other commissions to dependable Catholic captains at this time: three went to captain Charry, his
lieutenant since the 154Os, two to captain Bajordan, one to baron de Clermont, and one to captain
Arne. See Vigneroo, Eloge d'Armand Gontaut de Biron, p. 88.
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allowed licence to employ military expedients as necessary in such matters, and
much to the chagrin of moderate magistrates at Bordeaux, who feared this would
destabilise the situation further. This policy would pay dividends for the Catholic
forces in September 1562 at Terraube, near Lectoure, when militia reinforcements
turned the tide of battle for Catholic troops against their Huguenot opponents. 33
The fourth, and most energetic Catholic captain, was Frederic de Foix, comte
de Candalle. Candalle had long been a controversial figure within provincial politics
of the south-west, a central character in the determined efforts of the house ofFoix to
frustrate the designs of Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, during the 1550s. The
situation was exacerbated in 1558 following Candalle's heroic defence of Dax
against besieging Spanish forces. Now a favourite of the king, Henry II, Candalle
moved into the inner circle of Guise clientele, a situation that threatened Navarre's
position at court. The result was perpetual antagonism between the two, as revealed
in a letter from Candalle to the cardinal of Lorraine in October 1558: 'il ne fault
point que je vous deguize le mal contantement que le roy de Navarre ... et la royne ...
m'a monstre par ses lettres. J'ay veu dedans leurs lettres une vehemance si grande' .34
Candalle was no friend of the moderates within Guyenne either. On his triumphant
return to his home at Cadillac, 45 kilometres south-east of Bordeaux, Candalle
launched a stinging attack on Burie, accusing the lieutenant du rot of incompetence,
negligence and mis-management of affairs in the province.3s He also crossed swords
with Lagebaton, being censured from the parlement in December 1554 for refusing
to lay down his weapon while appearing before the Grand'Chambret"
33 Commentaires, pp. S47.S3.
34 Candalle to Cardinal of Lorraine (16 October 1558), AHG, 24, p. 13.
3~ Candalle to Henry IT(16 October, 1558), AHG, 24, p. 11.
36 BM Bordeaux, ms 370, fus. 343-45. A similar clash occurred between the two tour years later, in
August 1558. BM Bordeaux, ms 370, fo. 428.
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Throughout the sectarian conflict of the 1560s, Candalle would prove himself
one of the leading Catholic activists within Guyenne. He served with distinction in
Monluc's forces during mid 1562, and forged a cooperative relationship with the
veteran general, mirroring his commander's reputation for fanaticism on occasion."
Candalle's first telling contribution to the Catholic cause at Bordeaux came on 12
December 1562, with the presentation of a remonstrance before the parlement,
vilifying the activities of the local Reformers.l" His opening address captured
Catholic sentiment succinctly:
Ie pays de guienne est compose de Ia plus belliqueuese nation qui soit en ce royaume
tachant par tous moyens as' emparer dudit pays et principalement de cette ville
comme capitate d'icelui...leur intention n'est autre que d'entreprendre contre la
couronne du Roy.39
The remonstrance continued with an indictment of the Huguenot's practice of
guarding its preches with armed soldiers, paid for by 'tributs' from its churches and
nobility. For Candalle, the only option open to loyal servants of the crown was to
arm the Catholics of the province, and assemble a Catholic force capable of
confronting and dispersing these illegal gatherings. He concluded with a warning:
'leur enterprise n'est autre que si les choses succedoient selon leur intention de ruiner
tous les catholiques et permet la cour faire etat que si lesdits seditieux prevaloient
trouvant la cour assemblee qu'il tailleroit ceux d'icelle en pieces'. This once more
revived memories of the Gabelle debacle, and Candalle urged both the parlement and
the crown not to fall into the same trap of showing leniencywhen constraint would
be more appropriate.
37 In January 1563, the lieutenant-juge at Castelvieil complained to the Bordeaux parlement that
Candalle had proven 'over-zealous' in his repression of disorders in the town. AD Gironde, IB 254,
A"etduparlement(ll January 1563), fos. 71-72.
38 AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fils. 129-44.
39AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo. 130.
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Candalle's pivotal role in energising the Catholic nobility of Guyenne,
however, was to become most apparent during 1563. In early March. Candalle
invited his closest ally, Louis de Lur, vicomte d'Uza, and senechal of Bazadais, to a
meeting of local Catholic nobles at Bordeaux to debate the progress of the war.
Candalle seems to have respected d'Uza's opinion on matters, writing: 'vous
donnerez voz bons adviz, lesquelz je suivray tant qu'il me sera possible"." D'Uza
suggested that Candalle convoke the etats de la noblesse de Guyenne, to involve
greater Catholic consensus before confronting the Reformers. This prerogative had
rested with the house of Foix since the previous century, but it is interesting that
when, on 6 March. Candalle presented his lettres of convocation before the
parlement, the main sponsor of the petition was none other than Blaise de Monluc."
The two had forged ever-closer relations during the conflict, and when Monluc made
his triwnphant entree into Bordeaux on 10 March. Candalle was at his side. Within
the supporting entourage were other leading Catholic protagonists of the time:
Roffignac, Lachassaigne, Baulon, Malvin, Gaultier, Mabrun, Alesme, and Lange, as
well as Sentout and Fayet, the two remaining Catholic jurats. LagebAton, de Ferron,
and other moderate parlementaires, however, were noticeable by their absence.42
Catholic spirits rose further at the crown's decision to divide the lieutenancy of
Guyenne between Monluc and Burie; Monluc being given charge of the western
province, which included authority over Bordeaux and Agen, while Burie was made
responsible for the countryside east of the river Lot.43
40 Candalle to d'Uza (5 March 1563), AHG, 19, p. 314.
41 'Les choses qui passent maintenant au qui ont passe cy-devant, sont a mon grand regret si
pernitieuses et de telle importance 1\ la noblesse de ce pays de Bourdellois, que pour nous pourvoir des
remedes convenables je suis contrainct, suyvant la vieille et antienne forme accoustumee en ceste
Maison en tel cas, assembler les estatz de la noblesse'. BM Bordeaux. ms 370, fo. 708-12.
42 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II. fo. 455.
43 AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fa. 593.
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On 17 March, Candalle supported Monluc in an emergency session of the
parlement at which the magistrates validated the creation of a 'magasin d'argent' to
finance Catholic soldiers' pay, and of a dedicated grain store to ensure supplies could
withstand periods of conflict. Both measures were to be paid for by a new tax on the
citizens of the town, though as the clergy, nobility and numerous Catholic
bourgeoisie were to be exempted (Catholic shopkeepers and artisans were still
expected to contnbution), it effectively became a tax on the Huguenot population of
Bordeaux." That same day, Candalle presented his requite de la part de la noblesse
de Guyenne before the Grand'Chambre, demanding to know why 'plusiers
presidents et conseillers de la court, notamment Ie premier president, qui a tousjours
porte affection a la nouvelle religion' had failed to take measures against the
perpetrators of recent unrest within Bordeaux, when much of the court and the
captain of the chateau Trompette had urged an immediate response." Candalle
charged Lagebaton and the moderates with protecting the Huguenots from punitive
justice, of entertaining them in their houses, of spying on Catholics, and of twisting
the edicts to favour the Reform movement. The requete also claimed that Lagebiton
was biased in his judgements, deciding against Catholics more than against
Protestants. Its most damning accusation, however, recorded that:
ledit sieur president estant en Ia grand RUe des Fosses anne et a cheval avec aucunes
quy depuis se soot rendus fugitifs et qu'on ~voit estre seditieux et des principaux
de Ia conjuration lesquels consistoriaux estoient a cheval annes et annes decouvertes
faisant ledit sieur president une bande apart avec lesdits conjurateurs fut audit lieu
rencontr6 par Ie corps de ladit cour quy lors estant en annes sans ce que ledit sieur
president se unit aucunement joindre au corps d'icelle cour.
44 AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo. 628.
45 AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo. 634; BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, fos.462.
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To accuse the premier president of the parlement of being armed and
mounted in the Grand Rue des Fosses Sainte-Liege, and in the company of many
Protestant leaders, many of who stood accused of complicity in the attack on the
chateau Trompette in mid 1561, was quite a step. Two separate Catholic historians of
Bordeaux, Dom Devienne and Abbe Patrice-John O'Reilly, suggest that such a bold
move was only possible due to the backing Candalle received from Roffignac and
Malvin within the COurt.46 Indeed, both authors state that, while the requite may have
been penned by Candalle, it was Malvin who actually presented it before the court.
Powis, however, has discovered that it was, in fact, Charles Dada, a procureur of the
parlement, who drafted and presented Candalle's petition. 47 Dada, a client of the
Catholic Pontac family, which featured two court conseillers, Jean and Jaccques II,
and greffier to the confraternity of Saint-Yves, was also a well-known Catholic
supporter at Bordeaux." It is probable, therefore, that both Dada and Malvin worked
in conjunction with Candalle to present this requite before the Grand'Chambre.
Lagebaton's response was typical of the man. After stating that he had always
been a 'tres studieux conservateur de I'autorite et droits du Roy et de l'honneur de la
ditte cour', he proceeded to attack the requite, drawing attention to several falsities
and irregularities. Firstly, if Candalle had indeed assembled the Catholic nobility to
draw up this document, then such a meeting was illegal, outlawed by various royal
edicts, and thus its conclusions invalid. Lagebaton then enquired why, if the requite
was written on behalf of 'toute la noblesse de guienne', did it feature just two
signatures, those of Frederic de Foix, sieur de Candalle, and Vignac, gentilhomme?
46 Devienne, Histoire de la ville de Bordeaux, I, p. 144; O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, II,
r·224.
7 Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 276. Jacques II de Pontac, dean of
cathedral of Saint-Andre. and Arnaud Hunault de Lanta, were co-amhors of the remonstrances drawn
up by the clergy for the etats of June 1561, warning of the imminence of violent unrest and the need to
suppress the Reform movement in Guyenne. Both would also prove tenacious opponents to
Lageb4ton's governance at Bordeaux. See BN Dupuy 588, fus. 19-35; BN ms ft, 3,159, fo.72.
41 AM Bordeaux, ms 769, fus. 204-09.
I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS - 3 /97
Candalle was asked repeatedly to provide the names of other Catholic nobles
supporting the requete but refused to do so. Finally, Lagebaton queried the veracity
of the second signature, that of Vignac. He claimed that the court had no knowledge
of this man, that he was 'un homme totallement inconnu et sans aucune qualite ni
expression'. As such, the requete would be dismissed, with Lagebaton ordering the
procureur-general to lodge a formal counter-petition, censuring Candalle for his
excesses.t"
But Catholic support for Candalle was strong within the parlement. The
conseiller, Jean de Mabrun, intervened at this point, stating that as the recusation of
the nobility accused Lagebaton personally, then the premier president could not
legally sit in judgement over the case. Lagebaton refused calls for a new seance,
though, retorting that: 'il n'etoit point un enfant et qu'il seavoit bien qui avoit fait 1a
ditte requete'. Instead, he informed the court that he had received reports of a
meeting between Candalle and Lange at a house in Bordeaux on 15 March, at which
'on trouvois grand nombre de personnages tant d'eglise que des gentilshommes
traittans quelques affaires que je ne voulus entendre est entr'autres y etoient les
avocats de Lange et RigoUe'. Lagebaton continued that it was during this meeting
that 'Ie seigneur de Candalle entra en propos avec le dit de Lange sur une requete
contenant causes de recusation contre aucuns de messieurs de la ditte cour', implying
that the petition had been fabricated by Lange, Candalle and other leading Catholics
as an attempt to discredit Lagebaton and the moderates within the court. As such, it
should be dismissed. so Indeed, many historians have accepted this argument,
49 AM Bordeaux. ms 771, fo. 642; BN ms fr, 22,369, fo. 145. For more on this contest, see Devienne,
Histoire de la ville de Bordeaux, I, p. 144; O'Reilly, Htstoire complete de Bordeaux, II, p. 225.
so AM Bordeaux. ms 771, fo. 635-48. Mabnm's fiunily also had a history of confrontation with
LagebAton. His brother served as a company commander in Catholic forces of another of the premier
president's nemesis, Antoine de Noailles, throughout 1562. See Powis, The Magistrates of the
Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 278.
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deeming Candalle's requite to be erroneous. They are especially swayed by the
dispute over the 'honune inconnu', Vignac, presuming this nobleman to be no more
than a figment of Candalle's imagination. Analysis of a document held at the
departmental archives at Agen, however, questions such circumspection. The
'Proces-verbal fait par les deputes aux etats de 1a generalite de Guyenne en 1a ville
d'Agen, les 16 et 17 novembre 1561', lists the names of all delegates attending the
local etats that month. It reveals that a 'Gaston du Vignac, jurat de la ville de
Cadilhac', was in attendance for both sessions." This is most probably Candalle's
co-signatory to the requete and, as such, would tend to negate one of Lagebaton's
trump cards in his dismissal of Catholic allegations.
LiglU! at Cadillac, Mareh 1563
In late March 1563, Candalle and his adherents were spurred on to more
concerted action, forming an oath-bound Catholic ligue at Cadillac. Again. the exact
nature of Candalle's association is difficult to determine due to a dearth of extant
material. Historians have made only speculative progress here. Most believe the /igue
to have been a direct response to the premier president's intransigence, placing its
nascence sometime in late March/early April, following the dismissal of the
Catholics' petition. 52 Ruble, though, believes it to have been a consequence of the
meeting between CandaIle, d'Uza and other Catholic nobles at Bordeaux on 13
March, a theory that suggests Catholics intended to establish an organisation
51 AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, CC 65 (17 November 1561).
S2 Briefreviews ofCandalle's ligue at Cadillac are to be fotmd in Lecler, 'Aux origines de la Ligue',
pp. 195-98; Thcmpson, Wan of Religion, pp. 213-17; Th~ Agrippa d'Aubigne, Histoire
universelle (10 vols., ed. A. de Ruble, Paris, 1886-19(9), II, p. 213; Jouanna et aI, Hutoire et
Dictionnaire, pp. 151-52; Memoires de Conde, VI, pp. 290-306. A later copy of the 'articles' for the
association at Cadillac can be fuund in BN ms fr, 15,875, fo. 491 (April 1563).
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regardless of Lagebaton's subsequent obstinacy over Candalle's requete.S3 As
regards its structure, Lecler states that Candalle and leading adherents from the tiers
etats would meet each Sunday to plan the activities of the ligue, but offers little other
evidence of their manoeuvrings, while Ruble attempts an outline of its hierarchy
based on material pertaining to its sister associations at Agen and Toulouse." Only
Thompson and Jouanna offer more detailed proposals, claiming the ligue to have
been pyramid-shaped, with Candalle as supreme chief, assisted by a council chosen
from delegates of the tiers etats. Below this, provincial representatives directed
agents across the region, who, in turn, governed Catholic cells within the
senechaussees, districts and parisbes,"
The ligue at Cadillacwas, in filet, the third such noble-led association created
at this time, following on from those at Agen and Toulouse." All, however, were
immediately censored by a clause within the edict of Amboise, which ended the first
religious war on 19 March 1563. Aiming, among other purposes, to accommodate
rather than exclude Huguenots from the corridors of power, the edict declared all
'Iigues et associations' to be divisive entities, contrary to crown policy, and thus each
should be dissolved immediately.57 But whereas those at Agen and Toulouse were
disbanded within days of its registration (10 April), Candalle made no attempt to
dismantle his association at Cadillac. The Huguenot noble, the sieur de Pardaillan,
made it clear that Candalle's refusal was the prime cause of the current unrest in
Guyenne:
53 Ruble, Commentoires et Lettres, IV, pp. 206 (note) and 214.
,.. Lecler, 'Aux origines de la Ligue', pp. 196-97; Ruble, Commentoires et Lettres, IV, p. 214.
55 Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 216-17; Arlette Jouanna, La devoir de 10 molte. La noblesse
/raTlfoise et 10gestation de ['etat moderne, /559-/66/ (Paris, 1989), pp. 181-83.
56 These two examples will be dealt with at length in subsequent chapters examining Catholic activism
across the Agenais and at Toulouse.
57 For Peace of Amboise (19 March 1563), see Stegmann, Edits des guen-es de religion, pp. 32-37.
For a detailed analysis of the registration of the edict at Bordeaux, see Haucheoome, •Le parlement de
Bordeaux', pp. 329-40.
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Je veux bien vous advertir des men6esqui se font en ceste Guyenne... c'est qu'il y a
une des plus grands du pais qui a faict une assemblee de la plus grand part de la
noblesse de ce pais, Ii Bourdeaulx, leur persuadant de faire association entre eux
avecques une bource commune; depuis la paix faicte it se dresse un syndicat de la
noblesse, capitaines et soldats, pour se guarantir des meschancetes qu'ils ont faictes,
qui me faict pencer et croire qu'ils sont favorises de la plus grand part du magistrat
de ceste Guyenne.S8
Lagebaton concurred, and strongly recommended to the crown that Monluc should
be forced to intevene here and terminate this union.'9 This left Monluc with a
problem: to act against his former captain and the Catholics of Guyenne, or to defy
the crown. He decided upon an expedient bout of amnesia, replying to Catherine: 'Je
vous puis asseurer ... que despuis la nouvelle de la paix, il n'y a eu traite
d'association aucune; que, au moindre mot que j'en ai diet, tout ne soit cesse comme
s'il n'en avoit jamais este parle,.60 He was supported here by the Catholic clergy of
Bordeaux, who were more blatant in their 'disguising' of the truth about Candalle
and the militant Catholics: 'depuis la paix, l'on n'a aulcunement poursuivy ny
parfaict aulcune association, et asseurer leurs majestes que aulcun du corps de la
court n'y ajamais assiste ny poursuivi' .61
It fell, then, to Lagebaton and the moderates of the parlement to act. Candalle
was summoned before the magistrates to explain himself: appearing on 4 May 1563.
At his side was a close confidant, the acting mayor of Bordeaux, la Riviere, who
offered to act as a character witness to Candalle's conduct. Lageb4ton, though,
dismissed la Riviere as 'un catholique fimatique, signataire de l'acte d'association
interdict par Ie Roi', and reminded Candalle that further contravention of royal orders
,. Pardaillan to Catherine de Medici (IS April 1563). ARG. 17. Co. 289.
$9 Lettres de Catherine de Medici. I, pp. 551-53.
60 Mooluc to Catherine de Medici (II April 1563). Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV. p. 206;
Monluc to Charles IX (IS April 1563). Ibid .• p. 214.
61 Clergy of Bordeaux to Catherine de Medici (15 April 1563). Ruble, Lettres et Comment aires, IV. p.
214.
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would be deemed treasonous." Candalle seemed prepared for such a rebuke,
however, presenting a second remonstrance before the magistrates, again in the name
of the convoked etats de la noblesse, and again expounding Catholic grievances
against the premier president and moderates within the court. This new document set
out the justification for recent Catholic activities, demanding that the parlement
legitimise the ligue at Cadillac rather than censure it, as it represented the only body
capable of defeating the enemies of the crown, and of defending the Catholic religion
in Guyenne.63 The crown, however, found in favour of Lagebaton in the matter, and
instructed its two royal commissioners in Guyenne, Antoine Fumee and Jehan
Angenoust, to investigate Candalle.64 But the officials met with hostility from
Catholics across the province and failed to make any headway with their enquiry. At
Bordeaux, they were obstructed by belligerent Catholic parlementaires, angered at
this attack on their co-religionists, and, on occasion, by moderates wary of such
intrusions into the jurisdiction of the court. The clergy of Guyenne also failed to
assist, once more insisting that Candalle and his associates were no ligueurs, but
merely defenders of local Catholic traditions.65 By August, the two commissioners
62 'En vertue de la convocation qu'il avoit fiUte en cette ville de la noblesse pour faire une association
et d'autant que toutes associations par I'edit du Roy sont eassees et que Ie dit seigneur veut que ceux
qui se continueront soient punir comme criminaux de lese majest6 ce neantmoins ledit seigneur de
Candalle vient hier en la oour requeir qu'it plut a icelle ordonner quelque appointment sur la requete
de recusation presentee par luy pour toote l'assembl6e qui est renouveller laditte association et
contrevenir au vouloir du Roy'. AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo. 783. For LagebAton's dismissal of La
Riviere, see LagebAton to Charles IX (27 May 1563), Memoires de Conde, Y, p. 186.
63 For the debate, see AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo. 777; BN ms fr, 22,372, fo. 1,132. Copies of the
remonstrance were sent by Candalle and the Catholic nobility to the crown as justification of their
ligue at Cadillac: Catholic nobility at Cadillac to Catherine de Medici (20 May 1563), BN ms fr,
15,875, fo. 491; Candalle to Catherine de Medici (20 May 1563), BN ms fr, 15,875, fo. 495.
64 BN ms fr, 15,876, fo. 201.
65 For the activities of the parlement regarding this invasion of their jwisdiction, see Ruble,
Commemaires et Lettres, IV, p. 292 note I; Lettres de Catherine de MediCi, I, p. 552 note; Lettres de
Catherine de Medici, II, pp. 114-15.
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informed Catherine that, despite interviewing many of the local nobility, they had
found no evidence of Catholic association or confederation/"
The failure of the commissioners to expose the ligue at Cadillac is surprising,
especially considering that they were present during yet another blistering attack on
the moderates of Bordeaux, on 22 June 1563, by Candalle's second-in-conunand, the
vicomte d'Uza.67 Taking the form of an open letter to the crown and parlement,
d'Uza's requete opened with a vitriolic attack on Lagebaton's competence, urging
the crown 'employer icelluy premier president hors de ceste province en telle chose
que sa Majeste advisera'. It then attacked the peace edict of March, claiming that
Catholics were still being attacked, churches ransacked, with many no longer
confident of receiving justice from the courts. D'Uza finished with a spot of
misdirection. First, he gave an apology for Candalle's association:
la noblesse auroict ey-devant faiet une association de bonne foy et non a au1tres fins,
que pour consaerer leurs vyes et employer leurs biens tant que la force et auctorite en
demeurast au Roy et parce que les callompniateurs ont tousjours pourchasse de faire
paroistre injuste tout ce qui a este introduict pour leur resister.
Then, confirmation that it was validated by none other than Monluc:
pour obvier a toute callompnie, ledict seigneur de Montiuc, representant Ia personne
du Roy, fut present a ladicte association, icelle approuva et eOt agreable, et,
davantage, elle fut faicte sous Ie bon plaisir du Roy et de Ia Royne.
Finally, a statement suggesting Monluc bad since terminated the ligue: 'en telle
facon, connne sy jamais telle association n'eust eu connnencement'. That none of
66 Fum6e and Angenoust to Catherine de Medici (20 August 1563), BN ms fro 15,878, fo. 112. In filct,
the only conclusive report the two were to submit dwing this period concerned a ligue, funned in
August 1563 by disparate factions of Guyenne, which aimed to secure the province against naval
attack following Comic's recent treaty with England. See Ruble, Commentaires et Le«res, N, p. 270.
67 The requite was drawn up in the form of an open letter, to be read before the parlemenl, then
dispatched to the crown. See Vicomte d'Uza to Charles IX (22 June 1563), BN DOUV. aeq, fr,20,598,
Cos. 170-80.
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these details managed to end up in the commissioners' report to the crown two
months later is quite bewildering.
CathoDe nobility and the premier president, Lagebiton
Their presence did, however, see the Catholics of Guyenne close ranks and
collaborate more. On 7 July 1563, for example, a report reached the parlement
claiming that 'ceux de la nouvelle religion avoient delibere de tuer Ie comte de
Candalle, le seigneur de Lauzan, et Ie marquis de Trans', three of the leaders of the
/igue at Cadillac. In response, Roffignac assigned two of his most trusted Catholic
consetllers, Jean d'Alesme and Charles Malvin, to investigate the claims, and to
provide each with an armed escort whilst visiting Bordeaux.68 For once, Lagebaton's
complaints at such 'factious and schismatic' activities received short shrift from the
crown/" Then, on 30 July, Candalle tried once more to have the premier president
arraigned, reporting that Lagebaton had libelled the Catholics of Guyenne, accusing
them before the conseil prive of 'faussete, imposture, calomnie, pillerie et vollerie'.10
But when Candalle stated that the local nobility wished to sue for reparations, the
president of the court, Lachassaigne, and the procureur-general, Lescure, stepped in
to suspend proceedings. Both men were staunch Catholics, and no friends of
Lagebaton, yet were obliged to obey the protocols of the parlement, which deemed
that complaints against libellous assertions were outside the remit of the COurt.11
Candalle withdrew his accusation and exited the chamber in good order, only to
68 AM Bordeaux, ms 772, £0. 12.
69 Lagebiton to Catherine de Medici (21 July 1563), BN ms fro 15,878,10.82.
70 This episode is recounted in AM Bordeaux, ms 772. fos. 72-77. These 'libels' bad, in filet, come to
light quite by accident. The vicomle d'Uza bad also been summoned to Paris, as a delegate of the etats
de la noblesse. to report on the continuing troubles in Guyenne, and discovered the extent of
LagebAton's allegations on arrival.
71 AM Bordeaux, ms 772, £0. 78.
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return within the hour, complete with a second recusation, signed by himself, d'Uza,
Montferrand, de la Riviere 'et autres barons seigneurs et gentilhommes catholiques
de la senechaussee de Guyenne'. This new document alleged that Lange had also
been libelled before the conseil prive, and thus, as an officer of the parlement, was
within his rights to call Lagebaton before the Grand'Chambre to debate the matter."
As if constant antagonism from Candalle, d'Uza, de Trans and Lange was not
enough, the premier president now came under fire from another leading Catholic
noble, Francois de Peyrusse, comte d'Escars, recently named governor of Bordeaux
following the death of Antoine de Noailles on 24 May 1563.73 A local nobleman of
the Bordelais, d'Escars' Catholic credentials were exemplary: he had supported the
syndicat at Bordeaux from its beginnings; had served alongside Monluc throughout
the conflict of 1562, despite a keen rivalry between the two for promotion; had been
present at the secret meetings between Candalle, d'Uza and Monluc at Bordeaux in
March 1563, and had been publicly acknowledged by de Trans, the co-founder of the
/igue at Cadillac, as a stalwart of Catholicism in Guyenne in January 1564.74
D'Escars and Lagebaton, though, had a chequered history. Powis has traced the roots
of their enmity back to the 1550s, when d'Escars, then a high ranking official in the
government of Antoine de Bourbon, was reproached by Lagebaton during his
investigations into the affairs of Navarre on behalf of the French crown. 75 The
enmity had rumbled on over the years until, in September 1563, d'Escars entered the
simmering debate over the recusations of Candalle and d'Uza. Writing to Catherine
de Medici, d'Escars reported intelligence that claimed Lagebaton and the two
72 AM Bordeaux, ms 772, fos. 79-81.
73 ABG, 55, p. 50.
74 De Trans to d'Escars (12 January 1564), BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, Co. 549. For d'Escars' presence
at the meetings between Candalle, d'Uza and Monluc in March 1563, see BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II,
fo.458.
7S Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 140.
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commissioners appointed to report on Candalle's ligue, Fumee and Angenoust, had
met that August to concoct incriminating evidence against leading Catholics of
Guyenne, namely 'le feu conte du Lude, monsieurs de Montluc et Ie feu sieur de
Noailles, I'archevesque de Bordeaulx, Ie seigneur de Candalle et les princippaulx des
estats de ce paYs,.76 When d'Escars entered the parlement a month later to complain
of the premier president's 'animosite' towards him, Lagebaton denied him access,
stating that the governor and his bodyguard must remove their swords before
entering the building. This was a major slight to d'Escars' honour, who, as governor
of the town, had been granted special dispensation from Burie to go anywhere within
the parlement fully armed." At this point, several Catholic magistrates interceded,
demanding that the dispute between the two parties be heard before the mercuriale,
as such a high profile argument was damaging the prestige of the court. But when
d'Escars and his retinue turned up for the hearing on 10 December, they were not
even allowed through the gates, turned away by the huissiers on the orders of
Lagebaton, 78 Both sides appealed to the crown for adjudication, with d'Escars
successful on this occasion. He received authorisation to enter the court at will, fully
armed, with his bodyguard at his side if appropriate - a humiliating defeat for
Lagebaton and the moderates.?" Powis suggests that these bitter exchanges served to
cement Catholic unity at Bordeaux, with d'Escars inviting many of the town's
activists to become his advisors and political allies over subsequent years.80
76 D'Escars to Catherine de Medici (6 September 1563), BN nouv. acq. fr, 20,598, £0. 197.
77 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, fos. 506-15.
71 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, II, fos. 534-39.
79 O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, II, p. 226.
80 Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 170.
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Role of archbishop and ~lergy of Bordeaux
Throughout this period, the relationship between Lagebaton and the Catholic
clergy of Guyenne had been equally strained. The premier president made little
attempt to hide his disparagement of the leading clerics, accusing many of actively
supporting Candalle's /igue at Cadillac. If the clergy had remained relatively quiet
during the first war, in December 1564 they pinned their true colours to the mast,
drafting a justification of the various Catholic associations of the province. This
document, addressed to Catherine de Medici, openly admitted that the clergy was
indeed a contributor to numerous Catholic bodies across Guyenne, but argued that
these were simplydefensive associations, designed to protect Catholics from assault,
as opposed to the subversive nature of the Huguenot's counterparts.t' It ended by
claiming that while Catholics had embraced the peace edict 'a bras ouverts', the
Reformers had persisted with their 'si lamentables meurtres envers toutes personnes
ecclesiastiques'. With the clergy thus fully engaged in the discourse the archbishop
of Bordeaux, Prevot de Sanssac, joined the fray, accusing Lagebaton of
misadministration and perverting the course of justice by continuing to favour the
Reformers over Catholics. Lagebaton dismissed Prevot's allegations, though,
claiming that as the archbishop was known to be in collaboration with Candalle,
Lange, and other Catholic activists at Bordeaux, his testimony would remain invalid
until the controversy surrounding the dismantling of their associations, and the
81 'Madame, considere et poyse la difference entre ce que d'une part l'on appelle confederation et de
l'autre synodes et collocques, et trouverrez que du premier n'en est suceede que toute tranquillite et
repoz et du second pour Ie plus doux ha est6 esmotion populaire et telle que a amene I'innumerable
nombre des pilleries, sacagemens, sacrileges et meurtres inhumains advenuz ces prochains ans, mays
et jours, en toutes les contrees de ce vostre pouvre royaulme'. Clergy of Bordeaux to Catherine de
Medici (December 1564), BN ms fr, 15,881, £0. 381.
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disarming of its militia, was settled.82 Fearing another embarrassing squabble within
the sovereign court, the crown dispatched a maitre des requetes, the sieur de Vouzan,
to oversee conciliation between the two parties, allowing each to voice his concerns
without fear of rebuke or recrimination.83
By May, however, Prevot complained that the pace of the proceedings was
too slow. He presented a new requite before the Grand'Chambre, which sought to
bypass Vouzan's intermediary role. In this, Prevot chose Candalle to act as his
second, with Lange appointed as prosecuting avocat. The petition was blunt;
demanding that the premier president be removed from office for malpractice and
that all libellous claims against Catholics be withdrawn." Lagebaton, though, was
not to be fazed by this Catholic triumvirate, and countered even before the requete
had been registered. He informed Vouzan that proceedings should be halted
immediately while four technicalities relating to Prevot' s application were
investigated. Firstly, as the requite challenged the honour of the premier president of
the parlement, the presence of so many officials 'qui estoient grandz et inthimes
amys dudit archevesque' was inappropriate. The requete could not be debated in
such partial circumstances, and should be rescheduled for a private seance, devoid of
all interested parties except the litigants. Secondly, Lagebaton refused point blank to
be questioned by Lange: oil n'estoyt pas raysonnable qu'ung cappitaine fust combatu
par son soldat, ny ung president par son avocat'. This forum was that of a debate, he
continued, not a trial. As such, all challenges should be submitted in writing, to be
read out by the clerk of the court 'en ladicte maniere accoustumee', not delivered by
an avocat known to be a long-time ally of the plaintiff. Thirdly, Lagebaton was
82 AHG, 13, p. 179.
83 AHG, 13, pp. 180-83.
84 The following debate is to be found in 'Proees-verbal du differand entre I'archevaque de Bordeaux
et Ie premier president du pariement (1565)" BN ms fr, 15,881, Cos. 157-60.
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equally adamant that Candalle should play no part in proceedings, as the court was
technically still investigating Candalle's participation in the various Catholic
associations across the province. Finally, the premier president informed Vouzan
that, as Prevot was known to be 'en la sussitation du president Roffignac et des
conseillers Mabrun, Gaultier, La Ganne, Vergoing et Belcier', these magistrates must
abstain as a matter of protocol. In one go, Lagebaton had removed the leading
Catholic activists from playing a part in the affair, devastating Prevot's chances of
carrying the dispute. The archbishop had no alternative other than to withdraw his
requete and exit the chamber, though not before adding that he would take his case
before the crown and, if nothing came of that, he and his brother, the sieur de
Lanssac, would 'prendre vengeance de luy mesmes'. Such political skill and
dexterity characterises Lagebaton's performances during the early 1560s, explaining
his longevity in the office of premier president in the face of prolonged invective
from Catholic agitators. In August 1566, Prevet, Candalle and Lange tried one more
concerted effort to prosecute Lagebaton, but were again out-manoeuvred by their
nemesis." For the moment, Lagebaton and the moderate party at Bordeaux had won
the day, but matters were soon to change, as the recommencement of hostilities in
1567 saw a more determined Catholic consensus emerge at Bordeaux, one that would
stop at nothing to remove the premier president from office.
This chapter has explored the interaction of the Catholic nobility, magistrates
and clergy of Bordeaux in their opposition to the aspirations of LagebAton, whose
determination to adhere to crown dictate signalled all-out war to several leading
Catholic militants. It has shown that alliances formed within the region's
administrative institutions could bolster Catholic hegemony substantially, so long as
IS 'Requate de 18 clergy et noblesse de guienne et maires et jurats de Bordeaux contre Ie premier
president (August 1566)', BM Bordeaux, ms 369, III, fo. 99.
I: BORDEAUX AND THE BORDELAIS - 3 / 109
these bodies successfully usurped local and provincial authority. But they also served
to arouse and strengthen the moderate consensus within these foundations. at times
inflaming passions to such an extent that deadlock was achieved. The Catholic party
at Bordeaux was aided throughout by the omnipresence of Monluc and his captains:
technically an arbitrary royal force, but in essence. a tool to promote Catholic
superiority. But the intricacies and jealousies that marked formal relations between
the disparate elite bodies of Guyenne meant that even this military machine could. on
occasion, sow seeds of disharmony throughout the administration. The most obvious
such provocation came as a result of Monluc's promotion to lieutenant du roi in
early 1563. Now. the Catholic general was able to convoke emergency military
powers as necessary: to confiscate and sequestrate funds and property; to assume
authority over urban councils; and to overturn the judgements of the various courts as
appropriate. Powis has pointed out that: 'if during the first religious war the
parlement remained amenable to the royal policy of moderation and avoided any
final commitment to the Catholic zealots led by Monluc and Candalle, this was in
considerable measure due to the now ingrained parlementaire fear of the arbitrary
exercise of authority by army commaoders'." This characterises the battle of wills
that raged behind the scenes at Bordeaux during the spring of 1563. with the
parlement and jurade eager to retain control over their traditional jurisdiction, but
facing a military commander whose usurpation of these prerogatives was expanding
by the week, and who was backed by a large Catholic consensus across the region.
Ironically, it is exactly because of this dispute that the edict of Amboise, a
most contentious piece of pro-Huguenot legislation, was validated and registered so
quickly by the authorities at Bordeaux, supposedly the most militant of Catholic
86 Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux. pp. 39-40.
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bastions within France. 87 Despite the large vocal Catholic element within the
populace of the town, concurrent factors would mean that political expediency rather
than confessional grievances determined the voting of the Catholic hierarchy here.
On the one hand, Monluc saw in the edict an opportunity to strengthen his judicial
powers in Guyenne, as its terms allowed greater surveillance of the community, and
confirmed the sequestrating of goods from those contravening its decrees. On the
other, the moderates within the parlement, and some Catholics too, welcomed the
edict as a means of securing peace, as only with a cessation of hostilities could the
urban councils petition for the ending of 'martial law' across the region. With
stability secured, the generals would be relieved of their emergency powers, thereby
allowing the courts and councils to resume full jurisdiction over their affairs, and to
be accountable for the sizeable quantities of seized funds and property still being
sequestered as a condition of the peace."
This study will now turn to the post-Amboise situation in Bordeaux, and
examine the nature of Catholic activism across Guyenne, as the region firstly tried to
recover from such a vicious conflict, and move towards more peaceable confessional
relations, only to be hurled back into crisis as the second and third wars erupted in
1567 and 1568, leaving Catholics with little option other than to return to their /igues
and associations in an attempt to defend their church, their communities and, at
times, their very existence.
87 The peace edict was registered at Bordeaux on 10 April 1563, and confirmed just ten days later. AD
Gironde, 1B 257, A"et du parlement (20 April 1563), £0. 163; BN ms fr, 22,369, £0. 146.
88 The destination of these sequestered funds had long been a contentious issue at Bordeaux. Monluc
claimed that the receipts from the sale of sequestered property should be used to bolster the defence of
the province and to pay his armies, whereas many moderates accused the Catholic captains of simply
diverting swns to their own pockets. See, for example, AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fos. 745-54.; BN ms fr,
15,879, fos. 226-38.
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Chapter 4. CathoDe activism at Bordeaux, 1565-1570
Favorable Bourdeaux, Ie nom de favourable
Se perdit en suivant I'exemple abominable. 1
Agrippa d'Aubigne's commentary on the massacre at Bordeaux in September 1572
laments the fall of the town into the hands of Catholic zealots. For d' Aubigne, the
massacre, one of several provincial episodes mimicking the crown-sanctioned
carnage at Paris on 24 August 1512, Saint Bartholomew's day, was a direct result of
the intolerance and fanaticism of the Catholic nobility and parlementaires of
Bordeaux/ Yet the previous chapter has shown that, by 1566, political affairs at
Bordeaux were characterised by stalemate, not militancy. The profusion of Catholic
associations of the early decade had been largely negated by concerted action from
the moderate party at court, while the premier president of the parlement, Lagebiton,
had successfully frustrated the machinations of the Catholic hierarchy. Both parties
could claim victory: the Catholic networks and alliances were still tacitly functional;
the moderates had gained the upper hand in judicial clashes within the court. But, in
general, a sense of impasse marked political relations during this time, and there was
certainly little indication that, within four years, the Catholic party would emerge as
the town's dominant force.
IAgrippa d'Aubigne, Les tragiques (2 vols., ed. C. Read, Paris, 1896), II, p. 97.
2 For general reading on the 1572 massacres in the south-west, see Philip Benedict, 'The Saint
Bartholomew's massacres in the provinces', Historical Journal, 21 (1978), pp. 205-25.
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Second and Third Wars, 1567-1570
During the two-year lull in the conflict, between May 1565 and August 1567,
the population of Guyenne took the opportunity to rebuild their lives. Across the
Bordelais, both confessions' gentilshommes returned to their lands to salvage what
they could of their former livelihoods, and grudging acceptance of political and
religious differences marked relations between Catholics and moderates of the jurade
and parlement at Bordeaux. The crown placed its faith in improved legislation as the
best hope of maintaining the peace, with former adversaries now encouraged to work
alongside one another to ensure effective government. The Amboise edict of March
1563 was to be the blueprint for recovery, and across Guyenne town councils were
encouraged to implement its clauses fully, some for the first time. This detente,
however, was not to last. In September 1567, Conde was suspected of involvement in
the failed attempt to kidnap the king at Meaux, offering the Guise party the perfect
excuse to resume hostilities in earnest. In the south-west, those who thought that the
recent peace had weakened Catholic organisation were in for a shock. Within no time
its leadership was revitalised, and moves to take control of strategic offices at
Bordeaux were underway.
Pivotal in this regeneration was Blaise de Monluc. Monluc had been
promoted to the office of lieutenant du roi in Guyenne following the death of Burie,
on 10 June 1565.3 By 1567, his influence across the province was enormous,
benefiting from the fact that the province's legitimate governor, the Huguenot Henry
of Navarre, was still a minor. At the outbreak of war, therefore, Monluc became the
chief arbiter of Catholic interests. His first response was to publish a number of
3 Charles IX to Monluc (11 June 1565), AHG, 55, pp. 59-62.
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arrets that sought to subjugate those Huguenots still resident in Bordeaux, and to ban
all Protestant activity within the town. 4 A series of further measures quickly
followed: Monluc ordered all members of the jurade and parlement to profess their
faith before their peers, and to Onedeves permettre que ceulx qui ont faiet profession
de ladicte nouvelle religion assistant aulcunement en vos deliberations'r' In this,
Monluc was supported by Prevot, the archbishop of Bordeaux, who stipulated that
'tons ceulx desdictz sieurs de ladicte cour, qui sont de ladicte religion pretendue,
n'assisteront ni oppineront audictes affaires d'estat et negoces, communs ou
publics'." The Catholic chapter of Saint-Andre also added their weight to
proceedings, dispatching a deputation that promised Monluc the full support of the
clergy, nobility, and etats of Guyenne in his confrontations with the Reformers,"
Shortly after, the clergy itself submitted a remonstrance requesting that Monluc
censure not only Protestant officers, but their wives and families too, many of which,
it claimed, had benefited from immunity from prosecution because of their familial
ties.s
The Catholic party within Bordeaux then turned on their moderate rivals.
They demanded that the captain of the chateau de Blaye, a known Protestant, should
be replaced by a Catholic officer, and urged that the resident Huguenots be forced to
pay 'les frais de la presente guerre', as compensation for the culpability of their co-
religionists." Monluc agreed to this, ordering the jurade to initiate collection of a tax,
and to garrison all new gens de guerre in the houses of Protestants, not Catholics. 10
The clergy then demanded an emergency session of the parlement be convened, to
4 AHG, 13, p. 399.
5 Monluc tOjll1'alS of Bordeaux (4 November 1567), AD Gironde, G 42 (4 November 1567).
6 AD Gironde, G 42 (30 October 1567).
7 AD Gironde, G 287, fos. 249-51.
• 'Remonstrance du clerge de Bordeaux au Blaise de Monluc' (November 1567), AD Gironde, G 42
(November 1567).
9 Clergy of Bordeaux to Mooluc (November 1567), AD Gironde, G 42 (November 1567).
10Monluc tOjll1'ade of Bordeaux (November 1567), AD Gironde, G 42 (November 1567).
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discuss claims that the premier president had fled the town, and was now in hiding.
For Catholics, any official absenting themselves in such times of crisis should be
charged with desertion of office. I I Towards the end of the month, a further letter
from the clergy enjoined the parlement to dismantle the safe refuges that had been
created for Protestants at Bergerac, Mussidan, Sainte-Foyand Montauban following
the Peace of 1563, claiming they were being used as bases :from which rebels could
strike at Catholic forces patrolling the area.12 MonIuc relayed these accusations to
Paris and informed the king he had formed an emergency military council at
Bordeaux to coordinate its defence. He and Roffignac were to head its executive
committee with Malvin, Alesme, Vergoing, d'Escars, la Ferriere, Lahet, and Louis
Roux (a Catholic jurat) representing the officiate of Bordeaux. Delegations from the
clergy of Bordeaux, the senechaussee of Guyenne, the two chateaux of the town, and
the bourgeoisie, were invited to make up the deliberating COrpUS.13 By contrast with
the conflict of 1562, however, the crown was now in no position to object to the
existence of such zealous Catholic bodies. Conde's attempt to seize the king had not
only failed in its objective, it had allowed the Guise to regain power within the court,
thereby stifling accommodation. So at Bordeaux, with Lagebaton still absent, and
crown policy weaker than at any period since 1561, Monluc and the Catholic
hierarchy were free to manage their affairs with a deal of impunity.
The crown did, nevertheless, manage to secure the Peace of Longjumeau in
March 1568, temporarily ending the second period of warfare. This edict, though,
satisfied neither faith. Catholics were incensed that concessions had been granted to
the Reformers, despite recent military reverses - similar in many respects to the
11 Clergy of Bordeaux to Monluc (4 November 1567). AD Gironde, G 42 (4 November 1567); Clergy
of Bordeaux to Manluc (4 December 1568), AHG, 24, p. 454.
12 Clergy of Bordeaux to Manluc (27 November 1567), AD Gironde, G 42 (27 November 1567).
13 Manluc to Charles IX (November 1567), AD Gironde, G 42 (November 1567).
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Amboise compromise of five years earlier, which also followed a series of heavy
Protestant defeats. The edict also advised that acts of Huguenot violence against
Catholics were to be downplayed for the sake of future confessional relations. For
the Catholics of Guyenne, who had suffered more than most at the hands of
Protestant forces, this was an outrage. MonIuc called the edict 'la plus injuste loy qui
rut jamais conseillee a prince du monde', continuing that the manner in which
Catholic victims were being neglected was unforgivable:
A qui demandera-on justice des maisons de monsieur de Sarlaboust, monsieur de
Saint-Orens, du capitaine Parron, Campagne, Campanes, Lartigue et un infmitc5
d'autres? Tout a este brule ... et quand on demande raison, ils disent que ce soot les
belistres, qui n'ont rien.14
At Bordeaux, Catholic resentment ran high. Despite the many references
within the Longjumeau edict to toleration, the Catholic hierarchy moved to bolster its
control over the administration of the town and province. On 27 March 1568, just
three days after the edict's publication, MonIuc appointed his most trusted captain,
Tilladet, as military governor of Bordeaux. IS Tilladet had held this office during the
crisis of 1562, and had played an active role in supporting the associations of Lange
and Candalle. His first act as governor, on 5 April, was very much in keeping with
his reputation as a staunch Catholic: he removed jurisdiction over town security and
policing from the jurade of Bordeaux. 16 This provoked a furious challenge from the
jurats. They argued that control of the police, and of the keys to the gates, had been a
traditional prerogative of the city councillors, a privilege that could be traced back to
14 Commentaires, pp. 658-59.
1.5 AD Gironde, IB 307. Arret du parlemenl (27 March 1568), £0.255.
16 Devienne, Histoire de la ville de Bordeaux. I.p. 154.
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English rule in the thirteenth century.V Monluc ignored such protests, asserting that
the current state of affairs required that military expediency should take precedence
over convention. 18
The loyalty of the jurade had long been an issue for Catholic leaders at
Bordeaux. Many of its officials were known to sympathise with, or be party to, the
Reform movement, despite swearing an oath of office that dictated they 'vivre
catholiquement suivant les constitutions de l'eglise romaine Ii quoy it s'est soumis et
oblige' .19 Suspicious of their loyalty, the Catholic leadership took steps to curb their
powers: in late April, Tilladet decreed that any official of Bordeaux caught
assembling under arms in support of the Reformers would be arrested and punished
as a traitor;20 in November, a leading Catholic conseiller, Francois de Baulon, was
charged with ensuring that all Huguenot officers were excluded from attending the
deliberations of the town council;" and in January 1569, Roffignac and Malvin
counter-signed a declaration confirming that only 'fideles et catholicques' officials
could serve on the jurade.22 This would be no empty legislation. The following
August, three prospective candidates, la Riviere, Goyon and Gourgues, were
disqualified from a ballot for election after an investigation proved they had links to
the Reform movement.23 Roffignac and Malvin oversaw the new elections, requiring
each candidate to prove they were 'catholicque ... idoynes et capables, et hors de
soupcon' .24
17 These privileges were reaffirmed by Louis XII in 1511. O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux.
II,p. 241.
.8 AD Gironde, 1B 308, Arret du parlement (24 April 1568), ro. 231.
19 AM Bordeaux, ms 768, fo. 642.
20 AD Gironde, IB 308, Arret du parlement (27 April 1568), ro. 237.
21 AD Gironde, IB 314, Arret du parlement (22 November 1568). fo. 39 and (25 November 1568). fo,
SO.
n AD Gironde, IB 317,Arret duparlement (31 January 1569), fo. 185.
: AD Gironde, G 287, ro. 275.
AD Gironde, IB 324, A"et du parlement (8 August 1569), ro. 76.
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Meanwhile, leading Catholics at Bordeaux were rewarded for their support
with influential posts within the administration. In May 1568, Lange was promoted
from avocat to conseiller of the court, a major boost to Catholic ascendancy within
the parlement.2s That same month, the sieur de Lanssac, brother of the archbishop,
Prevot de Sanssac, was assigned to the office of mayor, with a remit to bolster the
town's defences - Monluc and TiUadet were still to be consulted over general policy
matters, but the day-to-day organisation of town security now fell to Lanssac.
Jurisdiction over policing was entrusted to Lanssac too, as was command of four
thousand Catholic soldiers, to be deployed across the town to augment the guard." In
November, the vicomte d'Uza, Candalle's associate, was given charge of the royal
navy docked at the port of Bordeaux," while Vaillac, the governor of - and, in
Catholic eyes, the saviour of - the chateau Trompette, was given command of'les
portz et havres de la mer pour surveiller les cotes du Medoc' .28
Then, during late August 1568, power politics at the royal court once more
plunged France into civil war. With the Guise faction continuing to dominate the
king's ear, Conde issued a fresh manifesto attacking the crown for failing
Protestants. In response, the conseil prive revoked the Longjumeau edict, rescinding
all clauses that legitimised toleration. By September, the two sides were again at war.
At Bordeaux, the Catholic government eased back onto a combat footing. The town's
Catholic 'bourgeiois, marcbans et habitans' were required to present themselves for
guard duty, without exception, and strangers were ordered to leave the town within
twelve hours or face arrest.29 An a"et was issued by the parlement ordering
25 Tamizey de Larroque, 'Jean Lange, conseiller', pp. 687-88.
26 O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, II, p. 243.
27 AD Gironde, IB 314, Arret du parlement (5 November 1568), fo. 4.
28 AD Gironde, G 42, 29 January 1569, no folio.
29 AD Gironde, IB 313, An'it du parlement (8 September 1568), fo. 198.
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Protestants to adhere to a curfew between 6pm and 6am,30 reinforced the following
month by an associated law forcing them to carry a passport when moving about the
city in daylight bours." In late December, Monluc decided to replace Tilladet as
governor of Bordeaux with the ultra-Catholic baron de Montferrand.f Historians
have offered several reasons for this change, ranging from allegations of ineptitude to
political infighting within the administration. Whatever the motive, it was met with
resounding approval by the Catholic hierarchy, who were well acquainted with
Montferrand's zeal in confronting Protestants. The new governor's first duty was to
settle the dispute over the absence of the premier president. Monluc had indicated a
willingness to support the clergy of Bordeaux's requite demanding that Lagebaton
be exiled in perpetuity from the parlement for vacating his post, and Montferrand
endorsed this decision. 33
With such a cavalcade of Catholic protagonists holding high office, control of
the governance of Bordeaux was assured. The parlement could now initiate further
crackdowns: all vagabonds and potential troublemakers were to be expelled, as were
any apprentices who refused to serve Catholic masters, while the activities of the
regents and ecoiiers of the college de Guyenne were more rigorously curtailed. 34
Provincial concerns were broached too. In January 1569, Roffignac and Baulon
ordered that those Catholics chased from their homes after the rioting at Blaye should
take possession of houses belonging to Huguenots currently absent from Bordeaux,
adding that, should the need arise, Reformers would be evicted to make room for
30 AD Gironde, 1B 313, Arret du parlement (10 September 1568), £0. 201.
31 AD Gironde, IB315,Am!tduparlement(1l November 1568), fo. 55.
32 AD Gironde, B 38, £0. 74. Montferrand would head the six companies of soldiers that massacred
Huguenots at Bordeaux in October 1572. See Benedict, 'The Saint Bartholomew's Massacres', pp.
205-25.
33 BM Bordeaux, ms 369. Ill, £0. 118.
34 For expulsion of apprentices who refused to serve their Catholic master, see AD Gironde, IB 318,
Arret du parlement (10 February 1569), fo. 69. For restrictions of the activities of the regents and
ecoliers of the col/ege de Guyenne, see AD Gironde, G 287. £0. 261.
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Catholic refugees" In March, the parlement dismissed those Protestant magistrates
serving on the presidial court at Bezas, replacing them with known Catholic
conseillers" Meanwhile, the town councils at Castillon, Lamerque and Guitinieres
were ordered to disarm their Huguenot populations, and to distribute the collected
weaponry to the Catholic inhabitants." Monluc was also active, urging the council at
Casteljaloux to keep firm control over its town guard, and to ensure that its
membership was trustworthy and well organised. Should they require extra
manpower, the council was to contact him immediately."
As the fighting intensified across the south-west, Montferrand tightened his
grip over affairs in Bordeaux. In September 1569, he issued a decree condemning
any Catholic caught giving asylum to itinerant Reformers, and commissioned the
procureur-general to compile a report into the activities of all Huguenots still
resident within the town. 39 The result saw over one hundred suspects, including
many notable military, administrative and clerical personalities of Bordeaux, sent by
Montferrand to appear before the parlement for prosecution. 40 Catholic domination
of Bordeaux was soon complete. Their success was evident at the arrival of fellow
member of the Catholic elite, the baron de la Garde, on 9 October 1569, whose fleet
of eight galleons had brought much needed supplies of food and armaments to the
town. On mooring, de la Garde was welcomed by a committee consisting of
Montferrand, Roffignac, d'Escars, Prevot, Vaillac, Malvin, Baulon and Lange, with
the remaining Catholic officials of Bordeaux forming an honorary guard to escort the
baron to a reception at the maison de ville. Only Mon1uc was missing, his arrival
35 'Arrat du parlement de Bordeaux en filveur des catholicques de Blaye' (IS January 1569), AHG, 12,
fos.77-80.
36 AD Gironde, IB 319, A"et du par/ement (12 March 1569), fo. 74.
37 AD Gironde, IB 319, Ami dupar/ement (19 March 1569), £0. 88.
3S I.-F. Samazeuilth, Histoire de I'Agenais, du Condomois et du Bazadais (2 vols., Auch, 1847), II, p.
149.
39 AD Gironde, IB 325, Arret dupar/ement (24 September 1569), £0. 140.
40 AD Gironde, IB 326, Arret du par/ement (29 October 1569), fo. 110.
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delayed by continuing military operations in Beam.41 This triumph would be
maintained well into the following decade - despite the publication of the edict of
Saint-Germain in August 1570 ending the third war - as throughout the early 1570s
the Bordeaux parlement would insist that only Catholics held office, manned the
gates, patrolled the streets and carried arms within the town. 42
Retum of the Jesuits to Bordeaux
A final, intriguing footnote to the success of Catholic activism during this
period concerns the return of the Jesuits to Bordeaux. While Catholics dominated the
political and administrative functions of the town, Protestant academics still
controlled its three important institutes: the college de Guyenne, and the chapter
colleges of Saint-Andre and Saint-Seurin. This left the town without a major Catholic
school, a lacuna that the parlement viewed as an affront." In response, Baulon
proposed that a number of Jesuits be invited to return to Bordeaux to establish and
oversee a Catholic school, to be supported by the local clergy, but out of reach of the
college de Guyenne and the moderates within the parlement. A consortium of
Catholic magistrates was formed to coordinate this endeavour, led by Baulon and
Lange, both of whom had been in contact with Jesuit dignitaries during the previous
months." Lange, in fact, had played host to Francois Borgia, general of the Society
of Jesus, and cardinal Alexandre, nephew and papal legate to Pius V, on their recent
visit to Bordeaux in 1569, and was subsequently commended to Rome by the
41 AHC, 13, p. 266.
42 AD Gironde, 18336, Arret du parlement (25 August 1570), fo. 227.
43 Even at the height of the sectarian struggle, in 1563, the Bordeaux parlement seemed aware of the
importance of the college de Guyenne for the town, granting additional payment for its upkeep despite
its ongoing problems with Protestant ecoliers. AD Gironde, 18 262, Arret du parlement (22
September 1563), fo. 207.
44 Gaullieur, Histoire flu col/ege de Guyenne. pp. 291-92.
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delegation as a 'personnage seavant, eloquent, et catholique fort zele'.4s What is
remarkable about the make up of this consortium was that it echoed almost exactly
the faction that helped establish the Catholic syndicat nine years earlier: Roffignac,
Malvin, Lange, Baulon and Cazeaux, with Prevot, and his nephew, Charles Dusault,
second avocat-general to the parlement, lending support."
Prevot would be key to subsequent events, persuading the leading Jesuit
theologian in the south-west, Edmond Auger, to leave Toulouse to head this new
college at Bordeaux, which was to be created within the archbishop's palace."
Baulon secured an initial rente of 2,000 livres to facilitate Auger's move, and soon
acquired an additional 24,000 livres to finance his annual keep." The Catholic
consortium, however, had yet to inform the crown of their plans, wary no doubt of
the traditional mistrust between the French monarchy and the Jesuit order. In early
May, Baulon petitioned Catherine de Medici for authorisation, only for his
application to be rejected the following week.49 Dom Devienne recounts that, as a
result, there would be no Jesuit school at Bordeaux until the late 1580s, when the
Catholic League assumed control of the town. so However, an analysis of archival
material at Bordeaux points to a less clear-cut verdict. The proposal to re-establish
the Jesuits may well have been denied by the crown, but, on 20 May, the Bordeaux
parlement agreed to allow Baulon to continue with his scheme." Shortly afterwards,
Auger and several of his followers are recorded to have arrived within the town, and
45 Damal, Chronique Bordelats, Supplement, p. 81. Lange was also cited by Arnauld de Pontac,
bishop of Bazas, as one of the 'boos catholiques' of Bordeaux, in a letter to Rome concerning the
~ibility ofa Jesuit college being established in Bordeaux in 1569. Ibid.
Gaullieur, Histoire du col/ege de Guyenne, p. 296.
47 The Jesuit Edmond Auger was also known in the south of France as Charles Sager. See Dom
Devienne, Histoire de reg/ise de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1862), p. 95.
41 AD Gironde, H 2,512, fu. 5. It would later transpire that Baulon had diverted these funds from the
par/ement's financial expenditure, and not collected from Catholic benefactors as he claimed.
49 AD Giroode, H 2,380, liasse 68-2, Actes de Grandes Personnages (4 May 1572).
so See. for example, Devienne, Histoire de reglise de Bordeaux, pp. 95-96.
51 BM Bordeaux, ms 828, 5, fo. 32. See also AD Giroode, H 2,5 t 2, fos. 1-4.
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to have founded a small hospice for the poor and a refuge for pilgrims. 52 Worthy of
note, here, is the date: 20 May 1572, the day after the feast day of Saint-Yves. It
would be interesting to postulate that, just as the applications for the creation of the
syndicat had been presented before the magistrates during the confraternity's
festivities of May 1558, 1560 and 1561, so this same ceremonial was chosen as the
appropriate occasion to re-establish that most Catholic of sixteenth-century groups,
the Jesuits.
Summary
Part I of this thesis has illustrated the myriad forces driving the Catholics of
Bordeaux to organise in defence of their faith, and in opposition to the Reform
movement. Jacques-Auguste de Thou noted that Catholics clearly recognised the
grave threat posed to their traditional political, economic and social structures as
early as the 1540s, believing their church to be at imminent risk of annihilation from
Protestantism. 53 They were equally as dismayed at the crown's equivocal, sometimes
erratic, approach to this menace. To Catholics, the many royal edicts published
during the 1560s were simply experiments in expediency, attempts to accommodate
and tolerate that merely allowed the Reformers to consolidate and expand, while
forcing Catholics into numerous concessions. When substantial numbers across the
region embraced these initiatives, militant Catholics felt that their best option of
opposing such policies lay in their disengaging from crown and provincial authority,
and the commencement of a private struggle to redress the balance.
52 AD Gironde, H 2,380, Hasse 68-2, Personnel (August 1572); AD Gironde, H 2.380. liasse 68-2.
Col/ege de Jesus. (17 November 1572).
53 De Thou, Histoire universelle, IV, pp. 370-71.
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Yet success in this endeavour would require the consent and support of the
local clergy, nobility and sympathetic municipal officials, a consensus that was
extremely rare within the towns of France at this time. Traditional jealousies and
political infighting had long precluded most attempts at mutual cooperation within
the urban setting, as recent studies of have confirmed. Philip Benedict states that
'contention was more evident than compromise' in local government relations during
the sixteenth century, especially in those centres where political authority was
divided between crown and local officials.54 Robin Briggs adds that rivalries and
antagonism between urban and regional interest groups resulted in a 'kaleidoscopic
series of internal tensions and conflicts..; with the crown seen as the guarantor of
local and sectional privilege, and the arbiter when such privileges clashed',55 while
David Parker contends that the preoccupation of urban oligarchies with the defence
of their privileges and interests saw them regard themselves more as 'rivals rather
than as members of a class bound by common economic interests,.56 Timothy
Watson's study of the town council minutes at Lyon notes a similar absence of
concord from deliberations, as local institutions blamed 'co-existing and overlapping
jurisdictions' for the stalemate in governance there," while Konnert shows that,
despite concerted efforts by the councillors of Ch3.lons-sur-Marne to unite in their
embracing of religious toleration - even in the face of extreme pressure from
representatives of the local Catholic Guise family - dissent and belligerence still
marked civic agendas throughout the period. 51
S4 Philip Benedict, 'French cities', p. 20.
ss Robin Briggs. Early Modern France 1560-1715 (Oxford. 1977), p. 60.
S6 David Parker, TheMaking of French Absolutism (London, 1983), p. 40.
57 Timothy Watson, The Lyon City Council c. 1525-1575: Politics, Culture, Religion (Unpublished
PhD Thesis, Magdelen College, 1999), p. 73.
sa Konnert, Civic Agendas and Religious Passion. esp. Chapter 2: 'Portrait of a city council', pp. 40-
SO.
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Urban relations in Bordeaux were no less fractious. Powis has observed how
a 'tradition of rivalry' marked relations across the Bordelais during the mid 1500s,
with magistrates competing with jurats, crown officials against municipal
councillors, and the urban elites vying for pre-eminence with the noblesse du pais.S9
Yet the onset of the religious wars altered these dynamics significantly at Bordeaux.
Now, rivalries were aligned along confessional lines, with many traditional
jealousies set aside so as to forge consolidated alliances against the 'enemy'. Powis
claims that these tensions were most significant among the town's magistrates, who
found themselves continually challenged by a need to reconcile their obligations as
arbitrators of royal and local authority with their support of either the Protestant or
Catholic cause."
By 1562, a discernible breach between militant Catholic, and crown and
provincial, policy had appeared, reflecting the clashing ideologies of the
protagonists, but also revealing the disharmony that resulted when religious dogma
and conciliatory policies attempted to coexist within an urban administration. The
question now seemed to be: would the crown's determination to implement religious
toleration force the militants - who by now were no longer Powis's 'isolated
bureaucratic caste' of previous decades, but a homogenous entity intent on standing
their ground - onto the defensive? This homogeneity of Catholic activism at
Bordeaux, while rare across France, would become a feature of militant responses in
the south-west during the 1560s. Support from a broad Catholic consensus was
forthcoming across the Bordelais almost immediately: from the Bordeaux syndicat to
Candalle's /igue at Cadillac; from the enterprises of d'Escars, Malvin, Baulon and
Lange to the intervention of Monluc and his captains, and from the ad-hoc defensive
'9 Powis, 'Order, religion and magistrates', pp. 18S-88.
60 Powis, 'Order, religion and magistrates', p. 192.
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measures of the early 1560s to the later ordered Catholic coalition administrations
under Roffignac and Montferrand after 1568.
The syndicat of 1561 is, in met, a prime example of just how successful
Catholic activism could be when it received the backing of the wider community,
with the confraternity of Saint-Yves, the lesser official and higher magistrates of the
court, and the urban and local elites, all rallying to support Lange and his venture.
But the /igue at Cadillac was equally adept at harnessing the collaborative propensity
of Catholics of the south-west, securing support from both administrators and
nobility of the region. It would prove a most robust bloc, with Thompson pointing
out that, while the /igues at Agen and Toulouse were dismantled in 1563, in
accordance with the Amboise edict, Candalle's organisation at Cadillac continued to
expand during the decade, attracting such widespread backing that it would
eventually be termed 'the league of'Guyenne'."
But although Catholic associations could profit from the usurpation of
government, they could also be frustrated, and even censored, by the moderate
consensus within the local centres. Lagebaton and his allies within the Bordeaux
parlement, for example, were instrumental in resisting the syndicat, and constant
thorns in the plans of Candalle, Roffignac and other Catholic protagonists.
Thompson recognises this feature, or rather its absence, when stating that the /igue at
Cadillac owed as much to the crown's inability to censure it, as it did to the tenacity
of its Catholic proponents in defending it.62 The controversy at Bordeaux, though,
was by no means restricted to discord over religious policy, but encompassed
arguments over political jurisdiction, economic and social prerogatives, and the
struggle to validate identity. For Catholics, for instance, the defence of social and
61 Thompson, Wano/Religion, p. 216.
62 Thompson, Wars0/Religion, p. 254.
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religious traditions was paramount, while for Protestants, a desire for legitimacy,
often in opposition to Catholic customs, fuelled their passion. In the middle of this
were the moderates, keen to uphold royal and provincial authority, to keep the peace,
and to maintain the status quo across the communities of the south-west. Mark
Greengrass's precis that jurisdiction conflict during this period meant that the
struggle between the faiths was shaped 'by rights as well as by rites', is thus a most
accurate assessment.f
63 Greengrass, 'The anatomy of a religious riot', p. 390.
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Chapter 5. Catholic adivism at Agen, 1560-1563
Part II will concentrate on the second major arena of Catholic activism in Guyenne:
Agen. Chapter 5 will examine the rise to prominence of an ad-hoc, pan-Agenais
coalition of Catholic delegates, drawn from the secular and clerical institutions of the
region. Historians have tended to overlook Catholic reaction to the events of the
early 1560s at Agen, content to focus instead on the efficacy of Protestant coups
within several local towns. So while the aggrandisement of the Reform movement in
the south-west, and especially the assaults by Huguenot forces during 1560 and 1561
on Agen, Montauban, Castres and other centres, is well documented, the response of
Catholic authorities and inhabitants to the insurrection is rarely broached. Even the
leading commentators in this subject: Jules Andrieu, Abbe Joseph Barrere, Labenazie
and J-F. Samazeuilth, have inclined to detail Catholic rejoinders merely as a counter-
weight to their narrative of Protestant endeavours. 1Only Georges Tholin provides an
account of independent Catholic activities at this time, analysing the confrontation
that occurred within the administration as Huguenot officials attempted to infiltrate
the corridors of power at Agen, and the military battles that took place between
Protestant and Catholic forces across the Agenais.2 The following two chapters aim
to explore the veracity of Tholin's commentary, and to expand on his limited study
of Catholic resistance by providing new insights into their military and political
1 Jules Andrieu, Histoire de rAgenais (2 vols., Agen, 1893); Abbe Joseph Barrere, Histoire religieuse
et monumentale du diocese d'Agen, depuis les temps les plus recules jusqu' a nos jours (2 vols., Agen,
1855-1856); Labenazie, Histoire de la ville d' Agen et pays d'Agenois, I, (Montauban, 1888); J-P.
Samazeuilth, Histotre de rAgenais, du Condomois et du Bazadais (2 vols., Auch, 1841).
2 Georges Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen pendant les guerres de religion du XVIe sieele', Revue de
rAgenais et des anciennes provinces du sud-ouest. XIV - XVI (Agen, 1887-1889).
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recovery of the region. They will reveal how officials from within the jurade and
presidial at Agen, and from the senechaussee d'Agenais, would amalgamate with
pro-active senior figures from the town's Catholic church to form a coalition
administration. This body aimed to resurrect Catholic fortunes within the Agenais:
coordinating the military recovery of defeated towns, restoring Catholic officials to
office, securing political alliances to maintain Catholic ascendancy in the face of
sectarian and crown pressure for greater liberties for Protestants. At Agen, just as at
Bordeaux, Catholic hegemony would be achieved by uniting sympathetic urban
magistrates and disparate local nobles, creating concord among an affiliate usually
characterised by contestation, jealousy and rivalry. But as the coalition became the
fulcrum of Catholic activism in the region, its debt to the military weight offered by
Blaise de Monluc was immeasurable. The organisational and martial skills employed
by this experienced campaigner frequently exposed deficiencies in the policy and
performance of Protestant forces. An independent stalwart of Catholic security
during 1560 and 1561, Monluc's appointment to the post of lieutenant-general of
Guyenne in January 1562 formalised Catholic military superiority throughout the
decade. Now, Monluc was able to deploy his troops, and to enforce punitive
measures against Huguenot communities, under the tacit authority of the crown,
although the extent to which these actions concurred with or went against royal
dictate will need to be qualified at each step. Also an advantage for the Catholic
party at Agen was Monluc's awareness of urban defensive strategy, specifically the
primacy of concerted resistance that utilised the entire community. This ethos had
been fine-tuned during his service in the Italian campaigns of the 1550s, and would
prove invaluable in limiting Protestant successes to a minimum after 1562.
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Chapter 6 will assess what can be seen as a 'second phase' of Catholic
activism at Agen: the definitive support of the local nobility and committed clergy of
the etats d'Agenais. This originated in the promulgation of sympathetic dictates by
the etats in support of the coalition and continued with the formation of an oath-
bound, elite-led ligue at Agen, engineered by Monluc and endorsed by all significant
local Catholic activists. With the coalition augmented by wider participation of the
elites of the Agenais, the Catholic modus operandi - employing punitive legislation
to denigrate Huguenot resources - looked to incorporate overt military action,
executed by noble retinues, into its remit. The crown, though, was quick to see the
potential dangers in such developments and censured all such associations through
the edict of Amboise in March 1563. But, while Monluc and the Catholic nobility
were forced to comply, the die had been cast. Even though the ligue was disbanded,
the esprit de corps generated among Catholic adherents over the preceding months
served to underpin and define Catholic activism for the coming years. The period
1564-1570, then, sees the domination of events by Monluc and his military forces,
with coalition legislation, confirmed and supported by the etats, continually eroding
Huguenot potential within the towns. The Catholic leadership of the Agenais was
thus able to maintain control of urban government, defending their prerogatives with
a vigour and resourcefulness that perplexed both crown and Reform movement alike.
The final years of the decade would see a concerted attempt by Conde and the
Huguenot grandees to triumph in the south-west of France, moving much of its
forces into the region under the comte de Montgomery. Key to this strategy was
control over the towns of the Agenais, and the conflict would be fierce. Yet the
homogeneity of Catholic parties by this point was complete, and, under the guidance
of Monluc, the key centres of the region held out against the Protestant onslaught.
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The success of Catholic resistance epitomised the progress that Catholic activism had
made over the decade. While Monluc and his captains deployed their professional
forces to the front line of urban defences, the Catholic population was now roused
into joining the struggle, with whole communities energised by the coalition into
manning the barricades in the defence of their religion, their towns, their lives and
livelihoods.
Jurisdictional conflict and concord between Agen and Bonleaux
Situated 110 kilometres south-east of Bordeaux, the town of Agen had a
population of nearly 7,000 by 1560.3 Its robust walled defences and commanding
position at the bend of the Garonne river offered strategic superiority to whoever
controlled the town, while its location, midway between the two Catholic bastions of
Bordeaux and Toulouse, ensured it would playa pivotal role in the ensuing struggles.
Both faiths viewed Agen as a vital asset: for Catholics, it would provide a secure
base from which to oversee control of the surrounding countryside, and an important
staging post in the reciprocal flow of troops, munitions and resources between the
two capitals; for Protestants, Agen offered the promise of severing this umbilical
cord, and of creating a vital satellite for the support and revictualling of its forces
across Guyenne. Agen was thus the logical choice as command centre for military
generals serving in Guyenne. Troops stationed there could be deployed rapidly
across the province, and its compact nature offered certain advantages over the
sprawling capital, Bordeaux, as its later adoption as headquarters for Henry of
Navarre, and marshals Biron, Villars, and Matignon attests. Monluc, too, had little
3 Boutrouche, Bordeaux de J453 a J 7J5, p. 243.
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hesitation in residing at Agen during his tenancy as lieutenant-general, setting up
camp at the town's hOtel de ville. Paul Courteault suggests that Bordeaux's large
Huguenot population, which posed a threat to internal security, was a factor in this
decision, as was the propensity of the Bordeaux elite to fragment into disparate
alliances and conflicting interest groups, whose insidious webs of patronage and
faction repeatedly frustrated local government and exasperated its commanders,"
The beginnings of Catholic activism at Agen can also be found within this
contrast with the provincial capital. specifically a desire of the town's councillors to
defend their civic prerogatives against the increasing demands of their superiors at
Bordeaux. The argument centred on the ability of urban councils to legislate against
Protestant activity, independent of the sovereign court. The dramatic growth of the
Reform movement in Guyenne during the late 1550s had fuelled an intense debate
within the parlement, which attempted to unify the policy responses of Catholic
magistrates across the province. Initially, the Agen council had been content to be
directed in all such legislation: in July 1558, the jurade confirmed an arre; du
parlement banning all preches that had failed to secure the consent of the royal court
or local bishop, and enforced a fine of 10,000 livres for those contravening it.s
Importantly, the jurade also confirmed new extradition procedures, whereby all
locally incarcerated heresy suspects were to be transported to Bordeaux for trial and
punishment." In return for their cooperation, the town council expected the parlement
to approve reciprocal legislation, allowing them greater remit to confront Huguenot
activity. Thus, on 13 March 1559, thejurade's request to be allowed to arrest anyone
4 Courteault, Blaise de MonJuc. Htstorien, p. 404-05. See also Powis, 'Order, religion and
magistrates', p. 192.
5 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 26v.
6 Such was the case for Pierre Lacheze, a cordonnier at Agen, who had been arrested in December
1558 for having 'voleu ruer ung coup de pierre et ung coup de poing a ung ymage du crucifix en
pappier'. Where Agen magistrates would previously have interrogated Lacheze themselves, under the
new agreement he was now dispatched to Bordeaux for trial. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen. BB
30, fo. 31.
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'qui parle mal de la foyet religion chrestienne' was ratified by the parlement.' The
following month, a complementary ordinance was endorsed, requiring the lieutenant-
criminel of the senechaussee d'Agenais, Antoine de Tholon, 'proceder par une
pugnition exemplaire contre les hereticques d' Agen qui ont profane des images'. 8
There was even consensus between Agen and Bordeaux over the censuring of
the more general communal assemblies which, on occasion, resulted in disorder. The
parlement had long been aware of the potential for unrest at feast day celebrations
and public gatherings such as burials, processions and the charivari, and had
successfully legislated against many such activities within the capital. Where these
ceremonies continued, however, and especially when sectarian congregations came
into close proximity with one another, hostility often led to fighting.? The parlement,
in cooperation with the jurade at Agen, moved to end these violent outbreaks. In
May 1559, it revised a previous a"et, which simply banned illegal Huguenot
gatherings, to make it 'defense de faire des assemblees et charivaris ... avec son de
taborin, insolances et chalibari soyt pour Ie premier, second et troisieme mariage; et
ce a peine de dix millivres' .10
Yet there would be an unexpected opponent of this essentially anti-Protestant
legislation: the provincial governor, Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre. Navarre
had been absent from Guyenne for some time, attending court in Paris, so it was only
in March 1559 that he learned of the parlement's crackdown. He inunediately made
his reservations clear, ordering the suspension of all relevant legislation until his
return. This missive further charged Tholon and Bernard d'Aspremont, lieutenant-
7 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 35v.
821 AprillSS9. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 43. For Antoine Tholon's career, see
Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XN, p. 214.
9 Claude Haton blamed the massacre at Sens in 1562 on Protestant refusals to acknowledge the feast
day processions and masses as per the terms of the Edict of January, instead openly taunting and later
tiring upon the Catholic worshippers. Claude Haton, Memoires de Claude Haton (J 553-1582) (2 vols.,
Paris, 2001), I.pp. 403-06.
10 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 20.
II: AGEN AND THE AGENAIS - 5/ 134
particulier of the senechaussee, to ensure the compliance ofthejurade in this matter,
requiring them to suspend all heresy trials subject to the recent arret:" The first to
gain from this was a cordelier from Agen named Melchior, who was removed from
prison and placed under the jurisdiction of Navarre's entourege." Navarre's
intervention is surprising, considering his subsequent staunch defence of
Catholicism. Indeed, at his death in late 1562, Navarre was widely regarded as the
epitome of orthodoxy in France.13 There are two possible explanations for this.
Firstly, Antoine's religious standpoint during the late 1550s appears to have been
equivocal, more in tune with the overt affiliation shown by his wife, Jeanne d' Albret,
to Calvinism in Beam and Navarre. Paul Courteault certainly adheres to this theory,
stating that, at this time, oil favorisait alors ouvertement les reformes' .14 Secondly,
Navarre was simply asserting his prerogative as governor over Guyenne, making it
clear that the various over-mighty councils of the region should have consulted him
before employing such vigorous anti-Protestant legislation.
Catholics were exasperated at the governor's stance, especially as it coincided
with a most dramatic period of Protestant expansion across the region. Analysis of
the records of the parlement reveals the explosion in complaints reaching the courts
from anxious Catholics, concerned at rising levels of intimidation, civil unrest, illegal
armed gatherings and violence against their priests, churches and communities. IS At
Agen, Catholics were further alarmed by the insurrection at nearby Montsegur in
IIAntoine de Bourbon to jurade d'Agen (24 March 1559), Marquis de Rochambeau, Lettres d'Antoine
de Bourbon et de Jehanne d'Albret (Paris, 1877), pp. 175-76.
12 Rochambeau, Lettres d'Antoine de Bourbon, p. 176.
13 For a history of Navarre's convoluted religious affiliation in the ISSOs and early 1560s, see
Sutherland's chapter, 'Antoine de Bourbon, King of Navarre and the French crisis of authority, 1559-
1562', in Nicola Sutherland, Princes, Polttics and Religion 1547-1589 (London, 1984), pp. 55-72.
14 Paul Courteault, 'Notes et Variances', in Commentaires, p. 1,178, note 7.
U The registres du parlement at Bordeaux highlight the numerous reports of illegal preches and illicit
and armed assemblies. See AM Bordeaux, ms 766, fos. 1-68 for November 1559; fos. 69-77 for
December 1559; fos. 178-256 for January 1560; fos. 257-326 for February 1560; fos. 327-373 for
March 1560; fos. 374-427 for April 1560; fos. 428-554 for May 1560; fos. 555-632 for June 1560;
fos. 633-707 for July 1560; and fos. 708-89 for August 1560.
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February 1560, where a commune had been proclaimed." With allegations that
partisans sympathetic to the rebels were active within Agen, civil unrest became a
genuine concern for the jurade. Even Navarre appeared to cool his support for the
Reformers at this, ordering the consuls of Agen and neighbouring Condom to place
their guard on the highest alert in case Protestants troops tried to take advantage of
the situation. 17
The deteriorating situation forced magistrates across the Agenais to address
the defence of Catholic interests as a matter of priority. Determined leadership was
called for, and two prominent Catholic councillors, Martial de Nort, consul of the
jurade, and Clement de Lalande, canon of the church of Saint-Caprais, stepped
forward to direct the Catholic response. Their first success was in persuading the
jurade to recall Monluc, then in retirement at his chateau at Estillac, to Agen as
advisor on military security. Monluc arrived on 19 February and immediately urged
each jurat to take a tum guarding the gates to ensure that all agitators were kept out.
He then advised the council, now dominated by Catholics, to maintain a watchful eye
over all activities within the town so as to pre-empt any unrest. At a separate
meeting, the council determined to reclaim its prerogative to impeach heresy
suspects so as to allow itself greater scope inprosecuting Huguenot rebels across the
Agenais.18 That such action risked distancing Agen from the Bordeaux parlement,
thereby weakening ties with Lange and the Catholic syndical, shows the importance
placed on securing jurisdiction over independent prosecution by the council. The
resuhs were immediate. That same day, Philippe Levi, a local schoolmaster, arrested
'pour l'avoir trouve charge de faire assemblees et presches secretz en maisons
16 See Nakam, Montaigne et son temps, p. 46.
17 Andrieu, Histoire de rAgenais, I, p. 211.
'I AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, SS 30, fo, 55.
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privees dans ladite ville de Villeneufve', was brought before the Agen for
sentencing, and not transferred to Bordeaux, as was required by statute."
If the jurade expected a torrent of complaints from Bordeaux at this decision,
they never materialised. Buoyed by this apparent success, the Agen magistrates
presented an application to the king requesting that jurisdiction be formally
transferred back to the counci1?OBut the jurade would soon find that authority over
heresy trials could also be a major inconvenience. In May 1560, two high-profile
Calvinist ministers, Jean Voisin and Jacques Lafontaine, were arrested, accused of
over-zealous preaching and of inciting followers to assault members of the presidial
court at Agen. On imprisonment, an armed mob assailed the jail demanding their
release. Lalande and de Nort were forced to deploy Catholic guards to maintain
control, but in the furore, both ministers managed to escape, although Lafontaine was
quickly recaptured? 1 Monluc was recalled to Agen to quell the unrest, and to
adjudicate over the controversial imprisonment of the ministers.22 He determined that
the original judgement was correct, as the inflammatory rhetoric of the two had
clearly contravened a recent royal edict.23 This judgement not only aggravated the
mob, who now besieged Monluc's home at Esti11ac, but also incurred the wrath of
the provincial governor, Navarre, who, aware that the jurade had acted without
crown authority, rebuked them for acting outside their jurisdiction. When Navarre
informed the king of his grievances, Monluc deemed this to be a most serious rupture
19 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 13 (16 March 1560).
20 To validate this, the council proffered detailed interrogation techniques proving their competence,
promises of exhaustive searches to track down all accomplices, and an assertion that any Protestant
acquaintance of an accused would be treated as a suspect lDltil proven innocent. To demonstrate their
zeal in such matters, a case report on the successful trial of Pierre Brune, a Huguenot charged with
possessing the banned book, La Legende Done, was included. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF
31 (1 June 1560).
21 Commentaires, p. 473.
22 Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV, p. 43S.
23 Commemaires, p. 473. Burie had similar occasion to admonish a Protestant minister, La Teulade, in
November 1561 for excessive proselytising in Beam in contravention of the Edict of July. See Ruble,
Jeanne d'Albret, p. 22.
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between the twO.24 Yet despite Navarre's diatribe, the Agen council proceeded with
the prosecution of the ministers, pending a verdict from the crown. 25 On 10 June, the
matter was taken out of their hands, with the arrival of royal lettres ordering
Lafontaine's immediate transportation to Bordeaux for trial before a commission of
'ung des presidens et cinq des plus anciens conseillers de la court de parlement' .26
Beginnings of Catholic consensus at Agen
While the prevalence of anti-Protestant legislation and contention over
jurisdiction of heresy trials may indicate the presence of a pro-Catholic consensus
within the magistrature of Agen, and, while de Nort and Lalande certainly began
assuming greater authority within council meetings, there is, to this point, little
evidence of any formal Catholic association having been established within the
town. This was about to change. On 1 June 1560, the jurade at Agen received
intelligence claiming that a Protestant force from Nerac was approaching the town,
intent on gaining entry and desecrating the churches and cathedral." The jurade
consulted with members from the presidial court, and decided that an urgent meeting
of all local Catholic notables be held to determine a response. De Nort and Lalande
convened this assembly at the matson commune on 4 June. Monluc was again called
to attend, as were prominent Catholic officials from the region." Also present were
24 'Le roy de Navarre me sentit si mauvais gr6 de ce queje tis qu'i1 m'en voulut mal mortel, et escrivit
au Roy que je l'avois despossed6 de I'estat de lieutenant de roy, Ie priant de luy mander s'il m'en
avoit donn6la charge; de quoy il deliberoit de se venger, a quelque pris que ce fust'. Commemaires, p.
473.
2S Tholin, 'La ville d' Agen', XIV, p. 435.
26 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fos. 67v-68.
27 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (I June 1560).
21 The m~e prominent Catholics jurats were Antoine de Nort, de Goudilh, BourgoigniOl1, Cambefort,
de Cahusieres, Berard, Michel, and Galdemary. Also in attendance were 11101011, d' Aspremont and
Pierre Redon, officers of the ser.echaussee d'Agenais. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (4
June 1560).
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Nadal and Lobatery, senior canons of the cathedral of Saint-Etienne, representing the
clergy - the first explicit cooperation between secular and clerical institutions of the
Agenais in opposition to the Reform movement. As Georges Tholin correctly states,
this was a pivotal moment: it witnessed the creation of a pan-Agenais coalition of
Catholic delegates, an alliance that would define Catholic activism for the coming
decade.i"
The first directive issued by the coalition was the formation of a committee to
oversee the defence of Agen.30 The panel was drawn from the attending delegates,
with Lalande appointed to its chair. Based within the maison commune, its primary
concern was the surveillance of all Huguenot activity within Agen. The coalition also
determined that a sizeable force of Catholic townsfolk be made available to Lalande
in emergencies. Experienced Catholic captains were to be sought to command these
new units, with arms and artillery made available as necessary from the town
arsenal. 31 This clearly contravened the recent royal edict prohibiting the carrying of
firearms, a consequence of the recent Conspiracy at Amboise. But evidently the
coalition felt the scale of the Protestant threat justified such an expedient policy; yet
mindful of crown sensitivities, it simuhaneously registered the disarmament edict as
a precaution.f
Monluc, too, was keen to stress the importance of ensuring Catholic actions
remained legitimate where possible and advised the coalition to seek permission
from the crown for its recent initiatives.33 Lalande concurred, and dispatched his
delegate, d' Aspremont, to Paris to inform the king of events. Two letters of reply
were received, from Francis II and the Cardinal of Lorraine, both revealing
29 Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV, p. 435.
30 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (4 JW1e 1560).
31 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (4 JW1e 1560).
32 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, SS 30, fo. 60.
33 Andrieu, Histoire de I'Agenais, I, p. 212.
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overwhelming crown support for Catholic actions at Agen " The letters thanked the
magistrates for their zeal in tackling sedition across the region and their defence of
the towns against the threat of insurrection. The king then remarked that in order to
preclude any further contentious Protestant activity within Guyenne, Navarre would
soon lead a royal force into the province. In this, the officers of the senechaussee
d'Agenais would be required to assist the governor fully, with Tholon named
personally as liaison between the two parties.3s
Yet despite its support of the Catholic coalition, the crown continued to
employ a conciliatory tone in its dealings across the country. Attempts to implement
dual-faith council chambers, or chambres mi-parties, within the town councils of
France were stepped up throughout 1560, although many resulted in disputes over
power sharing and degenerated into sporadic violence." At Agen, Protestant
demands for a mi-partie chamber had been so frequent that, in January 1561, the
coalition sought to end the matter once and for all. Rather than simply rejecting the
latest petition, they voted to revert instead to the terms of the Edict ofCbateaubriant
of 1551, an intolerant edict that severely limited Protestant conduct." This incensed
the Reformers at Agen, who accused the Catholic leadership of bias. They claimed
the decision was an act of open provocation and took to the streets, attacking
Catholic homes and forcing their way into the church of Saint-Fiary to destroy its
statues. 38 Francois Raffin, the senechal de I'Agenais, struggled to restore order with
his limited resources. He advised the coalition that such large-scale unrest could only
34 Francis II to Consuls d'Agen (20 June ]560), AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, 88 30, Co. 67;
Cardinal of Lorraine to Consuls d'Agen, Ibid, Co. 67v.
35 Francis II to Antoine Tholon (10 June 1560), AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, 88 30, Co. 66v.
36 For a detailed analysis of the chambers mi-parties of France during the religious wars, see Eckart
8imstiel, 'Les chambres mi-parties: les cadres institutionnels d'une juridiction sp6ciale', Jacques
Poumarede and Jack Thomas (eds.), Les parlements de province. Pouvoirs,justice et societe de XYe
auXVIIIe steele (Toulouse, 1996), pp. 121-38.
37 AHG, 29, p. 22.
38 Ibid.
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be effectively confronted by an experienced military officer, and recommended his
old friend, Monluc, under whom he had served 'with honour' at Thionville in June
1558.39
So Monluc was once more recruited to Agen, despite holding no official
position within local or crown government. His first act was to deploy the consuls to
guard the gates." This was far more than a gesture. By employing the elites as well
as the citizens in the defence of a town, Monluc was emphasising the value of
collective responsibility that had proven so successful in his military operations in
the Italian Wars, epitomised in the coordinated defence of Siena against
overwhelming odds in 1555.41 His affinity for communal defence would, in fact,
become a hallmark of Catholic activism across the Agenais during the 1560s, and
would serve to energise the clergy, noblesse, bourgeoisie, and townsfolk alike. The
coalition cooperated with Monluc' s requests, expanding the militia and arming the
new recruits from the arsenal. This force was then divided into smaller units, with
members of the coalition appointed to act as captains for the patrols of the streets and
gates.42 Lalande, who had personally established a garrison of troops at the collegial
church of Saint-Caprais the previous year, was able to deploy these in the first
instance to guard the numerous churches of Agen. Lalande also assigned members of
his personal guard to remove the treasures of Agen's cathedral and other decorated
churches, and to hide them at his nearby chateau for safekeeping."
Once the town had been re-secured, the coalition launched a scathing
condemnation of crown policy, which, it claimed, had allowed Protestants time and
39 Courteault, Blaise de Mon/uc. Historten; p. 363.
40 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (no folio).
41 For Monluc's actions at the siege of Siena in 1555, see Commemaires, pp. 280-358; A. W. Evans,
Blaise de Mon/uc (London, 19(9), pp. 194-365; Roy, Blaise de Mon/uc, pp. 132-78.
42 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (no folio).
43 Tholin, 'La ville d'Agea', XIV, p. 444; Abbe Joseph Labrunie, 'Abrege chronologique des
antiquites d' Agen', Revue de rAgenais et des anciennes provinces du sud-ouest. XV (Agen, 1888),
pp. 174-77.
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freedom to consolidate their military presence in Guyenne. Specifically, it cited the
organisational reforms implemented by the Synod of Clairac as the main factor
behind Huguenot military strength at this time. Clairac has been widely discussed in
Chapter 1, but its impact on the balance of confessional potential across the Agenais
should not be overlooked. The division of Guyenne into seven colloquies had left the
Agenais with nineteen constituent centres, by far the largest number within the
province, while the policy of appointing experienced military veterans to captain
these communities ensured that each benefited from superior strategic organisation."
The coalition was unequivocal in its concern over the threat posed by the impact of
Clairac:
il a este cree vingt nouveaulx ministres, lesquels ne font jour et nuict que courir pour
prescher et seduire Ie peuple... ceulx de ceste religion ont commandement de
quelque grand de prendre les armes... Ie synode a este resolu de faire mourir ledit
sieur deMoaluc."
The emergence of such well organised Protestant forces threatened to
destabilise the Agenais. The crown responded by imposing a general truce on the
region. At first, this declaration was accepted with little complaint. Raffin agreed to
stand down the militia in Agen, Protestant delegates were allowed to attend meetings
of the jurade and presidial, and Monluc withdrew with his men to his chateau at
Estillac. Other coalition members, however, were far from happy at the inclusion of
44 The seven colloquys were: Condommois, les Landes, Beam, Agenais de la Garonne, Agenais vers
Sainte-Foy, Bourdellais et Bazadois, Quercy et Rouergue. The nineteen constituent towns of the
Agenais were: Agen, Ie Port, Tonneins, Mannande, Gontaud, Grateloup, Saint-Barthelemy, Verteilh,
Laparade, Monclar, Montftanquin, Villeneuve, Castelsegen, Cassenel, Sainte-Livrade, Castelmoro,
Laflite, Clayrac and Lemousin-sur-Lades. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 201, £0. I .
•, 'Instruction au cappitaine Monluc de ce qu'il dira a la Rayne et au Roy de Navarre, de la part du
sieur de Monluc, toucbant I'estat de la Guienne (25 March 1562)', BN Dupuy, 588, £0. 106. The
coalition concluded this letter by leaving little doubt as to who they suspected of orchestrating the
recent Protestant insurrection: 'I 'abbe de Clairac soutient toute la sedition d' Agenoys et de Nrigort'.
Ruble suggests the abbe in question was the protonotaire of Caumont, whereas the Memoires de
Conde claim it was Genrd Roussel, the former bishop ofOloron. See Ruble, Lettres et Commenlaires,
IV, p.l18; Memoires de Conde, III, p. 186.
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an amnesty within the lettres de cachet, which ordered the Agen council 'mettre en
liberte tous les prisonniers detenus pour cause de la religion'." So when the
Reformers renewed their demands for the instigation of a mi-partie chamber at Agen,
the coalition revived its surveillance committee, forwarding all incriminating
evidence to the crown to support their claim that mi-partie government would prove
impossible at Agen while illegal Huguenot activity continued unabated. Two such
reports were particularly damning. The first detailed numerous illegal gatherings at
the house of Jehan La Salle, a wealthy Reformer at Agen, where it was observed that
'telles assemblees et preschemens sont continues et y font baptesmes et nopces'."
The second reported numerous Protestant assemblies across the region, at which
armed nobles and their retinues were frequently present." The crown had little
option other than to accede to Catholic demands, and on 14 May validated an
ordinance that banned all preches and large gatherings at Agen under pain of a fine
and imprisonment," Protestant demands for mi-partie representation were thus
buried under the weight of Catholic remonstrations to Paris.
By August, though, complaints of armed assaults by Huguenots were still
dominating affairs at Agen. The crown was forced to intervene further, instructing
Herman de Sevin,juge-mage of the presidial, and Gratien Delas, procureur du roi, to
issue an ordonnance banning the carrying and use of all firearms in the senechaussee
d'Agenais, even those used for hunting. so Burie was also ordered into the region, a
move that initially placated Catholic anxieties." Tholin suggests that the coalition
fully expected Burie to exact 'une justice exemp1aire' against the rebels, and Lalande
46 Paul Courteault, 'Notes et Variances', in Commemaires, p. 1,178, note 3.
47 Jurade d'Agen to Charles IX (17 February 1561), AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, SS 30, fo.
72v.
41 1 April 1561. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, SS 30, fu. 79v.
49 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, SS 30, fu. 79v.
soTholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV, p. 448.
51 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, SS 30, fo. 83v.
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certainly seems to have anticipated a major disarmament of Protestants, as he
organised a committee of 24 'hommes de bien' to expedite the confiscation and
storage of illicit arms within the maison de ville.52 But Burie was following his own,
very different, agenda. Instead of proceeding directly to Agen, he criss-crossed the
Agenais, halting frequently for talks with representatives of both faiths, not arriving
at the town until 3 October. Accompanied by an up-and-coming councillor from
Bordeaux, Etienne de la Boetie, Burie counselled conciliation rather than
confrontation, and where direct interventionwas necessary, he ensured that it was the
forces of the senechal d'Agenais, Raffin, that were deployed, rather than his own,
mindful perhaps that both communities continued to accuse the crown of intervening
on behalf of their opponents.53 Yet this approach encountered two problems. Firstly,
Catholic patience with official policy was rapidly running out as more and more
churches and priests came under attack. Secondly, Burie made a major diplomatic
blunder by appointing a renowned local Protestant captain, the sieur de Mesmy, to
head one of his patrols. Mesmy was so despised by Catholics that many rejected
Burie's intervention out of hand. Indeed, when Mesmy was captured the following
year in Beam, he was summarily executed by order of the Bordeauxparlement.54
Burie's efforts to pacify and accommodate would fail, and the violence across
the Agenais intensify. The communities at Clairac, Tonneins, Montt1anquin and
Sainte-Livrade all reported their local Catholic priests to have been chased from their
parishes, while at Villeneuve, Penne and Nerac the cordeliers were evicted from
their monasteries, which now became sites of Reform worship.55 The crown was
once more forced to act. But instead of bolstering its military presence in the region,
52 Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV, pp. 449-50; AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 75.
53 Estienne de la Boaie, Memoire sur la pacification des troubles (ed, M. Smith, Geneva, 1983), pp.
11-12.
54 Andrieu. Histoire de l'Agenais. I.p. 217.
55 Andrieu. Histoire de rAgenais, I, p. 213.
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it gambled on pursuing its policy of accommodation to break the impasse.
Instructions were sent to Agen ordering the creation of a mi-partie chamber, causing
consternation among Catholic magistrates. Burie, who had finally reached Agen,
needed ten days of debate with the council to elicit agreement, but eventually
succeeded.56 Such acquiescence by the coalition is surprising, especially considering
the levels of recent violence endured by the Catholics of the Agenais. Also
unexpected was the coalition's acceptance that the mi-partie chamber would fall
under the jurisdiction of the senechaussee and not the jurade, although it can be
argued that Catholic domination of each body was equally extensive. So, on 20
October, after two years of continually refusing all Huguenot appeals regarding mi-
partie government at Agen, the motion before the council was passed by a majority
verdict.57
Yet whatever the rationale behind Catholic compliance, the followingmonths
saw many lose patience with proceedings. By 21 December 1561, some of the
leading magistrates of the jurade and presidial court felt compelled to protest to the
king that Protestants were continuing to contravene royal edicts.58 They also
complained that the mi-partie experiment was fiilling Catholics, as the split-chamber
was too lenient on Huguenot suspects. But while the crown pondered its position,
local leaders sought alternative means by which to end this experiment. In mid-
January 1562, the coalition, backed by Monluc - newly appointed as lieutenant-
general of Guyenne - appealed to the senechal, Francois Raffin, for a judgement. To
his credit, Raffin, who was a known devotee of the Catholic cause at Agen, appears
~ AD Lot-et-Oaronne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 83.
57 'Monsieur Ie seneschal estant en la present ville pour recepvoir vingt-quatre hommes pour tenir la
main forte • la justice, suyvant ordonnance de monsieur de Burye, desquelz vingt-quatre i1 entand
prendre douze de ceulx quy ee disent de l'egJise refunn6e et les autres douze de I'eglise romaine, a
presente ausdits sieurs consulz ung rolle que ceuIx de ladite eglise refonne luy met nomm6s et lequel
a presente ausdits sieurs coosulz pour en choisir douze'. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (20
October 1561).
51AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. S3v.
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to have examined the case before him with exemplary neutrality. His demand that the
coalition should validate its policy of excluding Protestants from office before mi-
partie government could be rejected was met by Lalande, who replied that the
council was simply adhering to royal policy, employing 'la costume de ladicte ville
qu'est tres sainte, catholicque et chrestienne, escripte et confirmee par les feuz roys
de France de bonne memoire,.S9 Raffin was won over, and declared that all
'personnaiges nottes d'aulcungs vices ni de religion differante' were excluded from
serving in the jurade or presidial courts/" This insistence that only 'loyal' and
'orthodox' candidates could be considered for local and crown office would become
another feature of coalition rule over subsequent years,"
Catholic nobility and the hills d'Agellllis
The appraisal of Catholic activism to date has largely concerned the struggle
for pre-eminence within town government and regional council. It has shown that it
was the local administrators and royal officials themselves - Lalande, de Nort,
Raffin, Tholon and others - who had assumed the mantle of activists. But to what
extent were the Catholic nobility of the Agenais involved in these developments?
The first evidence of their participation in the defence of Catholicism can be seen in
the minutes of the regional etats. Tholin bas shown that, in general, the etats
d'Agenais were quite unlike the traditional tri-party gatherings in other provinces.
Here, the nobility had such a stranglehold on affairs that the assemblies were little
.59 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. AgeD, BB 30, fo. 84v.
60 Ibid.
61 AD Lot-et-Oaronne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, roo86v. It would also become a feature of wider Catholic
domination. Similar exclusions were carried out at Bordeaux in March 1562, where the parlement
passed an ordinance preventing any non-Catholic from standing for, or holding, office. At Toulouse,
following the uprising of April 1562, similar injunctions were implemented, though in many cases
suspected Protestant councillors were not only expelled from government but were also chased from
the town.
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more than a forum for elite grievances.62 It is evident from the cahiers generaux of
the etats, however, that wider issues were concerning the delegates in 1560. Of chief
concern was the threat posed to noble prerogatives by Protestant incursions across
the Agenais. A remonstrance, addressed to the queen mother, urged the crown to
boost its forces in the south-west, to be paid for by diverting royal taxes into a
military fund.63 The etats also complained that Burie was doing little to safeguard
Catholic lands, churches and communities in the Agenais, as he rarely ventured
outside his base at Bordeaux.
That a second appeal was issued by the etau of 12 March 1561 suggests that
Catholics were far from satisfied with the crown's initial response. But this docwnent
would prove more than a simple remonstrance. It was a manifesto of Catholic
demands, in the form of an open letter to the crown, laying out the administrative and
military counter measures that should be forced upon all Huguenot communities
threatening civil disobedience." It would become a blueprint for elite Catholic
activism in the Agenais, signed as it was by many of the region's more prominent
Catholic nobles: Monluc, the comte de Villars, and the sieurs de Lauzun, d'Estissac,
de Caumont, de Negrepelisse, de Toneins, and de Biron. The opening address would
become a standard feature of Catholic association oaths during this period,
promising that 'tous les gentilshommes emploieront leurs biens et leurs vyes pour
leur faire tres humbles services'. It continued by emphasising the desire of the
authors to dictate events themselves. The crown would be far better served, the etats
claimed, utilising the local Catholic nobility to maintain stability than by sending in a
royal army. As such, if the king would grant Monluc 400 arquebusters a pied, with
full authority to deploy them as necessary against any Huguenot activist, then order
62 Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV, p. 213.
63AD Lot-et-Garmne, E Sup. Agen, AA 43.
64 BN Dupuy, 588, fo. 106.
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would be restored within 'deux ou troys moys'. As an exemplar, the letter urged all
leading seigneurs to return to their chateaux, to disarm their subjects, and to arrest
and hunt down Protestant rebels. They ended by advising the king to expel all
ministers, 'lesquels sont la source et origine de tout ce malheur', and to punish those
disloyal towns currently harbouring evangelists.
Within months, the fears expressed at the etats were realised, with a series of
violent assaults on leading Catholic noblemen. On 20 October 1561, the seigneurs de
Coq and de la Montjoie were murdered at Astafort, near Agen, while five days later
the seigneur de Rouillac was besieged at his chdteau at Saint-Mezard, only rescued
when a force of Catholic neighbours charged his assailants. But it would be the
murder of Fumel in late November that would shock Catholics into a new sense of
urgency. When the two Paris commissioners appointed to investigate the affair,
Compain and Girard, complained at the lack of objectivity from Catholic officials
assigned to the case, Monluc dismissed them and subpoenaed eight coalition
members from Agen to judge the case. Tholon would preside over the trial, with
d' Aspremont, Gervais Heraudeau, the prevot-general, and fellow Catholic presidial
councillors, Robert de Raymond, Jean Jourdan, Florens du Repaire, Antoine de Nort,
and Saux Dupin, also serving on the panel. There would be no room for 'moderate'
politics here. All eight judges had known Fumel and, in late March 1562, returned
fifteen guilty verdicts. Monluc' s personal guard summarily executed the men, while
orders were given that the houses of 200 others suspected of taking part in the killing
were razed to the ground. The town of Fumel suffered too. Stripped of all privileges
and ordered to pay an indemnity of 320,000 livres, its gates and walled defences
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were dismantled, as if to warn offenders that there was no place to hide from
Catholic ire.65
Catholic responses to the outbreak of war
Six days after the executions at Fumel, the prince of Conde raised the
Protestant banner at Orleans. Huguenot communities across France rose in support,
and quickly gained control of important centres such as Toulouse and Lyon among
many others. At Agen, the Catholic magistrates were taken completely by surprise:
Ie vandredy 17 apvril 1562, la presente ville et cite d' Agen fut prinse, saisiee par
ceulx de la nouvelle pretendue religion, lesquels ledict jour levarent et prindrent les
armes contre Ie Roy, les catholicques bon et loyaux subjects et serviteurs de Sa
Majeste, ce emparent des clefs des portes de ladicte ville, firent prisonniers les
magistrats."
Only Lalande among the members of the coalition evaded capture, having fled to his
fortified chateau. The scale of Protestant successes bore grim reading for Catholics.
At Agen, seventeen churches had been sacked and occupied by the Reformers within
the first week; all Catholic ceremonial had been prohibited, and the cathedral was
now used as a site for numerous preches. The situation was little better across the
Agenais, with Lectoure, Toneins, Villeneuve-d'Agenais, and Nerae all falling to the
Protestant forces ofCaumont and Duras.'" The town of Condom, however, managed
to resist, due to the initiative of its lieutenant-sb,echal, Dufrane. Dufrane had spent
the weeks leading up to the coup at Agen trying to persuade Monluc that wide scale
6S Andrieu, Histoire de rAgenais, I, p. 220. For the original sentence of the royal commissiClllel'S
regarding the murder ofFwnel, see AHG, 8, pp. 207-21.
66 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 87v. A comprehensive Catholic account of the seizing
and occupatioo of Agen by Protestants in April 1562 exists in the records of the jurade, written in
November of that year. See AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fos. 96-99.
67 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fos. 88-91.
II: AGEN AND THE AGENAIS - 5 / 149
unrest was imminent. In lieu of a response, he had taken the precaution of arming the
Catholic elite of Condom in the name of the king and had closed the gates to all
Huguenots. Such pre-emptive action undoubtedly saved the town from falling to the
rebels, a deed MonIuc was especially impressed by. He subsequently often cited
Dufrane's initiative at Condom as the model for Catholic governance of a town under
threat."
The crown's response to these uprisings required that Bordeaux be secured
first and foremost. MonIuc and Burie were thus ordered there, a move that did not sit
well with the nobility of the Agenais. In his Commentaires, MonIuc describes how a
delegation of Catholic notables, including Francois de Durfort, baron de Bajaumont,
and the sieurs de Cancon and Montferrand, petitioned him to remain at Agen."
While such testimony oozes self-importance, it should not be dismissed lightly.
Tholin certainly has no doubt that this meeting saw a resurgence in Catholic fortunes
across the Agenais in Guyenne, both in securing MonIuc' s continuing presence in the
region, and in the formulating of Catholic responses to the COUpS.70As a result of this
meeting, messengers were dispatched to inform the king of this change in events.
MonIuc ordered six new commissions to be distributed among his captains to boost
troop numbers. Many of the nobles placed their personal retinues at MonIuc's
disposal, and a council of war was called for 22 May. Alongside MonIuc, Bajaumant,
Cancon and Montferrand, the council was attended by the sieurs de Terride, Tilladet,
Besoles, Gondrin, Jean de Narbonne, the marquis de Fimarcon and 'plusieurs autres
gentilzhommes'. This 'bonne compagnie de noblesse' would prove the backbone of
68 Commetuaires, p. 499.
69 'La noblesse d' Agenois catbolicques s'estoyent rendus aupres moy ... et en la salle commansarent a
murmerer les uns et les autres que, si je les abandonnois, ils estoit perdus, et leurs femmes, enfans et
leurs maisons en ruine et perdition'. Comment aires, p. 498.
70 'Le concours de la noblesse facilita sa tiche; ce fut a deux heures de marche d'agen, au chateau de
Lafox, qu'il s'aboucha avec toute we assemblee de gentilshommes du pays. Affol6s, isol6s et
menaces dans leurs domaines, ceux-ci se jetaient dans ses bras, ne voyant salut qu'en lui'. Tholin, 'La
ville d'Agen', XIV, pp. 506-07.
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elite Catholic activism in the Agenais for the coming decade, of which, Monluc
noted: 'et comme nous y fusmes, les fismes bons amis'. 71
The significance of this testimony is the undertaking of Catholic nobles to
'faire amis', an act that alludes to the formalising of relationships between attendees.
This would also be observed the following day at a meeting hosted by Monluc and
Gondrin at Sampoy, where the two 'conclusmes de faire amis tous les gentilshommes
catholiques, afin que nous fussions tous unis ensemble,.72 Sarnazeuilth has concluded
that these were formal events in which the nobility swore to unite in the defence of
Catholicism, essentially witnessing the constitution of an 'association de noblesse' in
the Agenais." While this may be too stark an analysis, there are clearly antecedents
in the act of 'faire amis' that appear in the soon-to-be-introduced oath-bound
associations of the following year. But there should be a qualification too.
Gatherings of esteemed local noblemen were rarely straightforward affairs.
Traditional rivalries could often surface, and conflicts over precedence marred even
the most cordial of encounters. So where Monluc depicts the assembly at Faudoas as
harmonious, Courteault states that contention and dissension in the ranks were never
far away: 'Le seigneur de Gondrin et luy [Terrlde] estoient bons amis et de bonne
intelligence; mais Ie marquis de Fimarcon ne Iuy voulut point deferer' .74
Nevertheless, with the coalition temporarily powerless. Catholic activism in
the Agenais was sustained as a consequence of the council at Faudoas. And once
Monluc's forces had relieved Agen, in August 1562, the coalition and the nobility
were able to combine to greatly enhance Catholic potential across the region. The
repercussions were immediate and effective. At Agen, Lalande was appointed the
71 Commemaires, p. 499.
72 Ibid.
73 Samazeuilth, Histoire de rAgenais. II, p. 99.
74 Courteault, in Commenlaires, p. 1,198, note 4.
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town's military governor, and set about implementing a series of reprisals. Under the
auspices of Monluc's prevot, Helie de Penchery, sieur de la Justinie, Lalande ordered
over one thousand Protestant suspects be arrested and tried for insurrection, with
around half hanged on town gibbets between 13 August 1562 and 12 March 1563.75
The coalition then turned its attention to the sequestering of Protestant goods. On 9
September 1562, the jurade met to compile a list of prominent Huguenots whose
houses were to be searched. This meeting, recorded in the council register as
'Deliberation du conseil de guerre d' Agen sur Ia saisie des recoltes des Pretendus
Reformes', was attended by the usual coalition members, with new delegates Gratien
Delas, procureur du roy, and Dominicque Cabasse, vicaire-general to the bishop of
Agen, present for the first time.76 These sequestrations do not seem to have been
illegal, as the magistrates closely imitated a recent ordinance promulgated by Burle
and Monluc, which authorised the seizing of Protestant rebels' harvests so long as it
was 'mys et employe pour les atfaires du Roy... et repparation et fortiffication de
ladite ville'.n In January 1563, the order was extended to encompass 'Ia vente des
meubles et des fruits des vigne appartenant a ceux de la Religion Pretendue
Reforme' , with Lalande and fellow coalition members de Nort, Thibault and
Miramond in charge of its implementation. 71
The coalition also revived its policy of expelling all suspicious persons from
the towns. This had recently become a contentious issue, with the edict of Amboise
permitting anyone accused of a crime to remain at their place of residence until trial.
At Agen, Bordeaux and Toulouse, though, Catholic councils were less than
enthusiastic about implementing this, preferring instead to adhere to Monluc' s
75 Andrieu. Histoire de I'Agenais, I, p. 226.
76 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen. CC 6S (9 September 1562). For list of prominent victims of this
confiscation, see AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, CC 304 (Comptes des Consuls).
77 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, CC 65 (9 September 1562).
71 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, CC 302 (1563).
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'communal defence' ethos, which demanded the expulsion of any threat to internal
security. This was also the case at Casteljaloux, a sizeable town 30 kilometres north-
west of Agen. Once Catholic forces had defeated its Protestant garrison, on 14
August 1562, Monluc appointed his captain, Xaintrailles, as town governor, and
ordered that the entire population be immediately disarmed. A force of Spanish
troops was billeted within the walls to bolster Catholic military presence, and all
Protestants suspects were expelled." Yet Catholic domination of Casteljaloux was
rarely absolute. There remained a fairly robust Huguenot presence within the
administration, its consuls refusing to hand over the keys to the gates until their
appeal had been heard at Bordeaux. They argued that the defence of Casteljaloux had
traditionally been the prerogative of the town council, and that external military
commanders held no authority there, adding that the billeting of Spanish troops
within their houses had caused more harm than good." In response, Xaintrailles
accused the consuls of not paying their dues to the crown, but of diverting taxes to
the Protestant cause. The reply stated that as Casteljaloux was technically within the
senechaussee of Albret, a territory of Jeanne d' Albret, financial matters were a
concern for the queen of Navarre, and not Monluc."
This standoff was characteristic of many disputes facing the coalition as it
sought to reassert Catholic hegemony across the Agenais. The creation of a formal
ligue at Agen in February 1563 did weaken Huguenot belligerence somewhat, as
Casteljaloux came under intense pressure from neighbouring towns to sign up to the
Catholic association.82 But the publication of the edict of Amboise vented this
pressure, with Casteljaloux designated as a specific site for Reform worship in the
19 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (August 1562).
80 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (December 1562).
II AD Lot-et-Garonne. E Sup. Agen. 2.386 (1563).
12 AD Lot-et-Garonne. E Sup. Agen, 2.429 (March 1563).
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senechaussee of Albret. This allowed Jeanne d'Albret to offer formal protection to
the Huguenot community there, much to the chagrin of Monluc and the Catholic
garrison forces.83
The polarisation of attitudes of town councils is to be expected at this time,
for the first months of 1563were to witness both a zenith for Catholic activists across
the Agenais, and the victory of crown intentions to pursue its policy of toleration
across France. It would be a watershed for Catholic urban and regional organisation.
Catholic activism at Agen had developed from meagre beginnings, an ad-hoc
alliance of disparate factions, through to the creation of a formal, authoritative
coalition. It would now culminate in the participation of the etats d'Agenias, and the
formation of an oath-bound, elite-led Catholic ligue in February 1563, energising the
wider nobility of the region, and complementing the work of the administrative
councils of Catholicmagistrates and clergy.
83 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, 2,385 (9 March 1563); E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (June 1563); 2,386
(21 August 1563).
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Chapter 6. Catholic activism at Agen. 1563-1570
In October 1562, the French crown issued several lettres de grace et pardon,
granting an amnesty to all religious prisoners captured during the recent conflict. 1
These were greeted with derision by Catholics of the south-west, who were outraged
at a policy which not only seemed biased towards Protestants (only a minority of
prisoners eligible for the amnesty were Catholic), but which also appeared to blame
Catholic excesses for much of the troubles. Many feared the crown was distancing
itself from its loyal, Catholic servants in favour of the Huguenot faction at court.
Catholic invective against the lettres was expressed most vehemently at the assembly
of the etats de l'Agenais, which met on 3 January 1563, with delegates drafting a
proces-verbal to the crown, expressing their sense of anger and betrayal at royal
policy.i The remonstrance derided the amnesty as little more than the appeasement of
Protestants, demanding that those guilty of sedition and rebellion be tried once more
before the courts. Exception was also taken to the wording of the amnesty, arguing
that its address made no distinction between communities, and so tarred the Catholic
population with the brush of Protestant sedition.' Further, the assembly pointed out
that by pardoning prisoners already held in custody, the lettres denied the victims of
the crimes their right 'demander reparation et satisfaction de faire poursuite desdaes
1 HE, III, pp. 48-54.
2 This document, the 'Proees-verbal des d6liberations de "assembl~ des 6tats du pays de l'Agenais',
survives in its entirety within the archives at Agen, allowing historians to access directly
contemporary Catholic sentiment AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, 00 201, fo. 2. For secondary
sources discussing these deliberations, see AHG, 39, pp. 28-29; Thelin, 'La ville d'Agen', XV, pp.
196-7; Courteault, Blaise de MonJuc. Historien, p. 471.
3 '.La plus grande et saine partie d'icelle en corps ... comme les gens d'eglise, nobles, les officiers du
rot, et de la justice, coosulz, juratz, et la plus grand et saine partie des aultres habitaDZ dudit pays
n'ayent commis ledit crisme ... soyent et veullent estre boos et loyaux soubjetz et obe)'SSIDs au Roi'.
AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 201, fo. 2.
II: AGEN AND THE AGENAIS - 6 / 155
despences, biens prins, transportes, gastes, baptemens, homicides, injuries, pillaries,
sacagemens des eglises, maisons, et autres tortz et grefz faict par lesdites seditieux et
rebelles'. This process of recompense had traditionally been the remit of the
Bordeaux parlement - another reason, Catholics claimed, why the trial of prisoners in
provincial courts should be reinstated and the amnesty, with its legal implications, be
retracted.
The etats then moved to bolster unilateral Catholic jurisdiction within the
Agenais, enabling local officials to by-pass crown restrictions and recommence
prosecution of suspects. It confirmed the practice whereby Catholic magistrates
could confiscate Huguenot possessions to finance urban defences, and voted to
withhold all gages due to the prevot-general de l'Agenais, whose sympathy for the
Reformers was well known to Catholics." Helies de Penchery, Monluc's ownprevDt,
was given control over 'l'estat et l'exersise de justice que ledit prevost general
devoyt fake', with the redirected gages diverted to finance Catholic defensive
measures at Agen. 5 Jules Andrieu suggests that some delegates were concerned at the
degree to which these measures rejected royal authority and usurped the
jurisdictional prerogatives of the Bordeauxparlement, but Catholic domination of the
etats was such that no controversies arose, and all motions were carried
unanimously," A brief look at the roll call of delegates attending the January 1563
etats will explain this, with Lalande and de Nort once more presiding over
proceedings, and fellow coalition members Berard, Michel, Thibault, de Nadal,
4 Monluc had, in filet, urged the elms of 1561 to seek royal approval for the limiting of the judicial
~ of the prevole in the Agenais. AD Lot-et-Girmde, E Sup. Agen. CC 65 (17 November 1561).
AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 20 I, fo. 2. Penchery and his staff were renowned Catholic
zealots. and had been hand picked by Lalande the previous August to oversee the execution of
suspects found guilty at Fumel. The etats wrote of them: 'i1s exerc:ent une repression active dans Ie
pays de I'Agenois... [Iequel] ordinairement a vacque d vacque enc:orez avec deux au trays ses
Iieutenans. greffiers et archiers, tant dans la presente ville que par tout ledit pays d' Agenois' . AD Lot-
et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, CC 65 (3 January 1563).
6 Andrieu, Histoire de rAgenais, I, p. 227.
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Galdemary, Boissonade and Daube, joined by leading Catholic nobles, de Lausun, de
Montferan, Montegut, de Carbonniers, de Mouthefer, de Cadres, de Cours,
Castelgalhard, and de Paulliac,? Combined with Monluc's military ascendancy, and
the control exerted by the coalition, the participation of the etats in provincial affairs
meant that Catholic hegemony in the region was even more extensive.
'Confederation et association entre Ies habitants de Ia ville et cite d' Agen, et des
autres viJIes et jurisdictions d' Agen', (February 15(3)
The culmination of Catholic sentiment, however, would arrive in the form of
the 'confederation et association entre les habitants de la ville et cite d' Agen, et des
autres villes et jurisdictions d' Agen'. This Catholic ligue, founded by Monluc, and
validated by his ordinance of 4 February 1563, would be the first example in the
period of an oath-bound Catholic association that fully incorporated both the
provincial nobility and the urban bureaucracy in its structure.' It had the full support
of all key Catholic protagonists of the Agenais: noble, clergy and bureaucrat, who
each countersigned the contract and swore an oath of allegiance at the altar of the
cathedral of Saint-Etienne at Agen. A standard preamble, declaring the unswerving
loyalty of all adherents to the crown, was followed by a lengthy assault on the
machinations of the Reform party across the region, with Catholics pledging to
defend the king, province and the Catholic Church with their lives.
The significance of this /igue has largely been downplayed by commentators,
mirroring the contention over the validity of the syndical at Bordeaux. Historians
7 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 201, fo. 3.
• 'Ordonnance de Blaise de Monluc, chevalier de I'ordre et lieutenant du roy en <Juyame, sur
I'opinion qui devoit estre entre les sujets fideles a sa Majest6 en la sen6chausscSe d' Asenois et sur
I'ordre qu'its devoient tenir pour resister aux enterprises des sujets rebelles (4 February 1563)', Ruble,
Commemaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 190-95.
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have tended to dismiss both as political non-entities, knee-jerk reactions to specific
Protestant threats, although the Agen /igue is further decried as a whim of Monluc, or
a trial run for the more high profile association created at Toulouse the following
month. Those that have examined its formation more closely, however, such as
Andrieu and Tholin, believe that Monluc was making a conscious effort with this
body to create an infrastructure capable of imitating, if not surpassing, the military
model established in 1561 by the synods of Clairac and Sainte-Fey." Specific terms
within the ordinance tend to support this supposition, with the Catholic population
urged to be ready to report for pre-determined duty at a moment's notice. By placing
each cell, district and town within a well-administered, quasi-military network, with
experienced captains assigned to each locality, Monluc aimed to harness the vast
potential of disparate Catholic communities, previously too dispersed to guarantee a
unified force." The intention may well have been to oppose further Protestant
aggression without recourse to crown intervention, and it is arguable that the ligue
ordinance read much like a blueprint for the foundation of Catholic defensive and
offensive strategy in the Agenais: its basic premise was to energise noble retinues,
civil militia and government officials into a homogenous entity, thus combining
Catholic resources and facilitating cooperative action where none had existed before.
Monluc's core ethos - communal, integrated urban defence - was as prevalent as
ever, and came with a warning to those who declined to be involved or failed to
9 Andrieu, Histoire de rAgenais, I, p. 227; Thelin, 'La ville d' Agen', XV, p. 198.
10 'Les dits habitans d'Agenois fairont garder et accomplir et observer, chacuns en son endroit ... si
donnons pennission et mandanent aux dits habitans d'Agennois soy assembler, chacun en son
viguier, et presler commandement a faire et tenir la dite association et confed«ation, jura' et garder
les dits articles, constituer capitaine, lieutenant, sergens de bande, corporaulx, et autres estats requis a
les conduire en armes, tant que besoing sera, creer en chacune des dites juridictions d'eux ou autres
nobles des notables personnages, pour venir avec bonne et suffisante charge des habitans d'icelle'.
'Ordonnance de Blaise de Monluc', in Ruble. Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 191.
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support their Catholic neighbours. I I However, while the /igue claimed to exist 'sous
le bon plaisir de sa Majeste', in reality, the crown had little control over its function.
It was Monluc who held authority, with jurisdiction over administrative functions
assumed by Lalande and the coalition at Agen inhis absence. 12
It would be difficult to conclude, then, that the ligue was anything other than
a pivotal moment in the development of Catholic activism in the Agenais. It would
be the first oath-bound association of the period to unite Catholic nobles and urban
councillors under a single banner, and to provide a forum for the concerns of the
etats. As such, it would define the political and military relationships between these
disparate groups for the coming decade. It should not be forgotten, either, that the
ligue was a profoundly religious entity, its ceremonial subsumed within the Catholic
traditions of Agen's historic cathedral, its ethos exhorting the defence of the 'true'
religion in the south-west.'? Further, was the ligue wholly a result of Catholic anxiety
at the crown's apparent rush towards coexistence - a manifestation of the etats of
January 1563 - or were there broader motivations urging it into being? Ruble has
concerns over the chronology here. He agrees that the deliberations of the etats
certainly influenced the coalition to expedite the creation of a defensive ligue at
Agen, but suggests that Catholics had been thirsting for such a body ever since
II 'Que toutes fois et quantes que les dits associes et conre<i6res seront advertis que les dits rebelles et
seditieulx au roy se assembleront avec annes ou autrement, pour troubler Ie repos public, invader, soy
saisir aulcungz des villes, eglises, bourgs, bourgades, chateaux. maisons des dits conre<i6res, commes
its ont mit cy-devant, en advertiront chacun en son quartier, les autres quartiers plus proches, pour
s'assembler en armes, resister et courir sus aux dits sedicieulx et autres conturbateurs de la dite
r6publique, emp&her leurs enterprises, afin que Ie meilleur en demeure aux dits confreres pour Ie
service du roy... Et oil les dits seditieux vouldroyent resister aux dits conre<i6res, estans assembles
lesdits confederes pour Ie service du dit seigneur, comme dit est, oil marcheroot Ie jour ou nuit en
armes, et seront defilits et mis en pieces par les dits conreder6s'. 'Ordonnance de Blaise de Monluc',
in Ruble, Commentaires et Iettres, IV, p. 193.
12 'Ordonnance de Blaise de Monluc', in Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 191.
13 Nowhere was this more clearly stated than in the opening clauses of the ordinance: 'Premia-ement
qu'ils seront boos, fideUes subjets au dit seigneur et ses lieutenans et officiers; qu'ils tiendront et
vivront selon la religion du dit seigneur, eglise CathoJique Romaine, et selon icelle feront administrer
les sacrements, dire messe et celebrer Ie devin service'. 'Ordonnance de Blaise de Manioc', inRuble,
Commentaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 192-93.
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Conde's rising in April 1562, long before the controversial amnesty of November. 14
It seems more probable, though, that the ligue was born out of secret meetings
between Monluc and the Catholic hierarchy of Toulouse in December 1562 and
January 1563, at which it was determined that an association at Agen would be part,
if not the vanguard, of a Catholic counter attack, to stem Huguenot aggrandisement,
and to defend orthodoxy and traditions in the south-west. Such a strategy would
require a number of ligues to be formed across the region, with each extending
jurisdiction across its hinterland. Such was the case at Agen, where its articles of
association were distributed to, and published in, every neighbouring town. IS The
response from sympathetic councils was positive, with Quercy, Perigueux, and
Condom affiliating with the Agen ligue. Even at troublesome Casteljaloux, Catholics
were permitted to ally themselves with the ligue, although at Bazas, Monluc was
forced to send in the senechal of Bazadais, the vicomte d'Uza, to supervise this
compact."
Yet, with the ligue promising to regenerate the Catholic position in 1563, and
with Monluc extending his authority across the region as a result, it is ironic to note
that this innovation was to last a mere two months, censured by the terms of the edict
of Amboise." While the coalition accepted this missive, and terminated their project
immediately, it can be argued that the ligue had already achieved a major objective:
facilitating the unification of disparate bodies (the euus, noble retinues, civic
.4 Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 190 note l.I' 'Mandons a tous les seigneurs justiciers, juges, consuls, capitaines, et autres administrateurs des
villes, villages des dites jurudictioos, mire mire les dites assembl6es et en mire leurs proces verbaulx,
et au premier huissier ou sergent royal publier nostre presente ordonnance et article par tous les bourgs
et villes d' Agenois, icelle signifier A tous seigneurs et autres, dont est requis, leur misant
commandement de par Ie roy de mire garder et entretenir, oi donner aucun empeschement, sur peine
de desobeissance et d'estre declares rebelle a sa Majest6'. 'Ordonnance de Blaise de Monluc', in
Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 192.
16 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, 2,429. A15 (February 1563).
17 Monluc wrote to Catherine de Medici in April 1563 that he had ended this association at Agen. See
Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 205.
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corporations etc) under Monluc's schema of communal, inter-dependent defence.
The machinery of activism had thus been cemented in place, and the ethos impelling
loyalty to the Catholic cause reinforced by the various oaths of allegiance. Whether
or not the vehicle that allowed these achievements survived or not, the blueprint had
been drawn up. The Catholic leadership simply had to maintain a momentum to
benefit from these events.
Opposition from moderate offic:ials
To what extent, though, were the Reformers and moderate royal officials able
to resist this seemingly inexorable march towards Catholic hegemony at Agen? The
edict of Amboise had dictated that Huguenot consuls should be free to return to
office, and that chambres mi-parties should be installed to accommodate Protestant
voices with the administration. When Monluc reconvened the presidial in April
1563, though, consensus over policy and procedure stalled, with the court divided
along confessional lines. There were now effectively two bodies within the presidial:
the Catholic mi-parti council, headed by Antoine de Tholon, and backed by the
coalition, the Bordeaux parlement, and by Monluc; and the Huguenot delegation, led
by Sevin, and sponsored by Duras and other Protestant nobles of the area. 18 Each
embarked upon policies quite contrary to the spirit of the edict. Catholics sought to
prosecute those guilty of attacks on their clergy and churches over the previous
months, while Protestants attempted to secure recompense for the vast sums and
property confiscated by the coalition.
18 Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV, p. 217.
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The result of this dual-track system was a glut of fines and imprisonments,
with appeals and counter-claims directed through sympathetic mi-partie chambers.
This choked the courts and caused bureaucratic chaos. Monluc and Lalande informed
the crown that orderly governance was threatened by the actions of the Huguenot
magistrates, who were bypassing many of the functions of the presidial court, often
judging in favour of their co-religionists despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.l" Sevin retorted that the coalition should not monopolise jurisdiction within
Agen, and that the mi-partie chambers should be free from thejurade's interference.
He continued that Monluc and the Bordeaux parlement were too influential at Agen,
to the detriment of equitable justice, and accused Monluc of corruption,
mismanaging affairs across the Agenais, and of repeatedly arming the Catholic
militia, in disregard of the recent edict.20 Sevin was also angered at Monluc's
continuing support of Lalande, who had been confirmed as governor of Agen on 17
April 1563. This, he claimed, was an abuse of Monluc's powers, as the exercising of
military prerogatives was no longer valid following the peace. Sevin demanded a
new governor be appointed, and suggested several highly placed Huguenot nobles
for the office."
Catholic attempts to counter these accusations were dealt a blow when Sevin
left Agen for Paris to present his complaint personally to the king's council. Across
the region, tensions once again rose between the faiths, resulting in episodes of
sporadic violence. In May, Monluc informed Catherine de Medici that he had
evidence detailing Protestant plans to assault the town, and urged Lalande to place
19 'Proces-verbal des Etats' (27 to 28 June 1563), AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, EE S6 (28 June
1563).
20 Tholin, 'La villed'Agen', XIV, p. 217. See also AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 32 (no folio).
21 AD Lot-et-Geronne, E Sup. Agen, EE S6 (17 April 1563).
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the guard on twenty-four hour alert as a precaution.f Lalande also re-formed the
coalition committee, and resumed the confiscation of suspect Huguenot property.
Monluc then attempted to break the administrative impasse by recalling the etats de
I'Agenais. The assembly met on 28 June at Agen, although Catholic delegates
refused to address the issue of bi-partisan contlict within the administration.P
Instead, they began compiling a cahier, detailing recent Protestant violence, to be
delivered to the king as proof that mi-partie politics was untenable in the Agenais. Of
immediate concern was the activity of several Huguenot prevots, recently reinstated
by the edict, but now accused of impeding the course of local justice at Agen. 24 The
delegates demanded that each suspect be removed from office, citing Monluc's
recent revocation of the commissions of four Protestant prevots de marechaux de
l'Agenais as a precedent."
The etats concluded by returning to the dispute between Sevin and Monluc
over the governance of the Agenais. The assembly offered a glowing endorsement of
Monluc's administration during the conflict, by which 'ledit pays auroit este remis en
la vraye et legitime obeissance du Roy'. 26 By contrast, they highlighted the 'picques
et contention' that marked the dealings of the presidial since Sevin's appointment,
claiming that 'despuys qu'il est absent il y a en ladite ville grand paix, union et
concorde entre tous lesdits habitans, de quelle religion que ce soyt' .27 An enquiry
22 Ruble, Commemaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 255-62.
23 The usual coalition leaders were in attendance: Lalande, de Nort, de Nadal, Michel, Thibault, and
Galdemary, with Hermand de Mathes and Jeban Sendat representing the consuls of Villeneuve, and
Gabriel de Lausun, viscome de Lausun, Jeban de Montferand, sieur de Cancon, Fran~is
d' Aspremont, steur de Labarthe, and la Chapelle, Carbonniers and Causae swelling the ranks of the
Catholic noble signatories. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, EE 56 (28 June 1563).
24 'lis ont prins et pose quelque prevost de leur secte, lesquels, en vertue du certaines pretandues
commissions, entreprennent contre lesdits bons et fidelles subjects du Roy... plaira a sa majest6
revocquer toutes telles commissions et leur interdire la cognoissance'. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup.
Agen, EE 56 (28 June 1563).
2S The four ptivOts de marechaux dismissed were: de Foumeau, Courillaud, de Combes and de I.
Courade. Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 256.
26 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, EE 56 (28 June 1563).
27 Ibid.
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was then initiated to investigate the extent of Sevin's misdemeanours, to be headed
by Estienne Thibault. It is hardly surprising that Sevin was found guilty in his
absence of abusing his office, and of calumny against Monluc, seeing as Thibault had
been a leading force in the Agen coalition for the past year.28 Catholic claims that
Sevin had used his position as president du presidial to acquire the office of
lieutenant-criminel de la senechaussee, previously held by his chief rival, and head
of the Catholic mi-partie chamber, Antoine de Tholon, were also investigated. The
enquiry found against Sevin, and ordered that he be stripped of his status, and
censured for libel. Tholon should then be re-instated to his former post as soon as
possible.i" Georges Tholin, however, believes that the etats erred in their judgement
here. He claims that Sevin had indeed usurped the office of lieutenant-criminel, but
by quite legitimate means. The Catholic etats were simply wary that Sevin now held
two of the more powerful offices in Agen; that of lieutenant-crtminel and president
du presidial, placing him as a serious threat to Catholic schemes across the Agenais.
To prevent Sevin from interrupting Catholic plans, the etats had no option other than
to move against him and secure his disgrace.l"
Thibault's report stands as an overt example of how the various Catholic
bodies of the Agenais could combine to further their mutual aims. Georges Thelin
concurs: "le consu1at d' Agen, les etats du pays, les trois etats, furent absolument
devoues a la cause catholique'." As a cooperative, they were able to dominate the
region's institutions and attack any threat to their hegemony. This is reminiscent of
affairs at Bordeaux, where Catholic magistrates united to minimise the attacks by
moderate voices within the parlement on Lange and the syndicat. In both instances,
21 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 201, fo. 3.
29 AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, EE 56 (30 June 1563).
30 Tholin, 'La ville d' Agen', XIV, pp. 214-16.
31 Tholin, 'La ville d' Agen', XIV, p. 213.
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relations between Catholics and moderates were characterised by vitriolic exchanges,
complaints and counter-complaints to the crown. By contrast with Bordeaux. though,
where Lagebaton had successfully negated Catholic expansion, the coalition at Agen,
supported by the nobility and the etats, was victorious. The main distinguishing
factor here was the explicit support offered by Monluc to the Catholics at Agen: his
dual role as defender of the town and as lieutenant-general of the province adding an
extra degree of legitimacy to the coalition's actions. At Bordeaux. by contrast, his
influence was always diluted by the presence of Burie and Lagebaton, With Sevin's
continuing exile, there would be no prominent opposition voice within the
administration at Agen, This meant that few challenges to the coalition's authority
would succeed. Huguenot complaints over Catholic interference in their daily lives
thus tended to be dismissed well before they ever reached the chambers of the
jurade, presidial or senechaussee courts, while those that were heard were usually
judged by a majority Catholic bench.
By early 1565, however, intelligence that illegal Protestant military activity
had reswned became the prime concern of the courts. In February, the regional synod
of the Agenais convened and named new ministers for its churches at Sainte-Foy,
Clairac, Tomeins and Nerac. Such appointments had been outlawed by the edict of
Amboise, and Catholics feared the imminent return of hostilities. Lalande recalled
Monluc to Agen to bolster the town's defences, doubled the town guard, and
prohibited the carrying of all weapons, 'a penne de cinq cens livres et autre esmende
corporelle' .32 With armed incidents increasing at Agen, Lalande was forced to appeal
directly to Bordeaux for assistance. On 22 June, the parlement issued an arret
32 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 138.
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prohibiting further Protestant activity, openly blaming them for recent clashes.33
Reports that Protestant communities were stockpiling weapons further exasperated
Catholics, and when d' Aspremont delivered a letter to the jurade from Domein
Rochon, consul at Tonneins, detailing a large arms cache discovered there in August
1565, Catholic leaders were forced to consider their next moves. 34
With Monluc absent from the region, the coalition decided to delay any
response. It was thus November before a 'conseil de guerre' was convened to
determine Catholic counter measures." Georges Tholin states that this is the first
time the term 'conseil' is used to denote such an extraordinary Catholic committee.
He claims it is a significant moment in the configuration of Catholic organisation at
Agen, a refined version of the coalition, comprising only of select, trusted
magistrates.l" There may be some validity to this, as only Monluc, Lalande and five
other coalition magistrates attended the 'conseil'. Its resolutions, though, were little
different from previous meetings. The full machinery of Catholic authority was
deployed to defend the town, with Monluc's captain, Jehan Gasc, appointed to
oversee military control. 37 Lalande revived the special committee, which had been
dormant since 1563, ordering its consuls 'faire et tenir bonne garde aux portes ...
davantaige de visiter les maisons de ceulx de la nouvelle religion pour savoir quelles
33 'La court ... a met et met inhibition et deffimces soubz les peones contenuez par lesdites edicts a
ceulx de la religion qu'on diet reformee de non chanter psaulmes en lieux publicz, rues ny en
bouticques ouvertes, ains seuIlement en leurs maisons privees, avec leur fiunilhe et sans assembl6e, et
a tous de non chanter chanssoos de mallediction ny impudicques et non blasphemer, renier et jurer Ie
nom de Dieu. Et, pour Ie regard de I'observation des festes, wet parelhes inhibitions et deffanees
suyvaot lesdites edictz de non besoigner ny trebailler aucunement Ie jour des dimanches et festes
solemoes ne autres jours de festes moings solemoes • huys et bouticques ouvertes'. AD Lot-et-
Garonoe, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 156v.
34 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 32 (25 August 1565).
3' AD Lot-et-Garonoe, E Sup. Agen, FF 32 (16 November 1565).
36 Tholin, 'La ville d' Agen' , XV, p. 215. There had been previous Catholic collectives which had been
tilted as 'un conseil de guerre', but these do not appear to have had the formal structure of this latter
association. See, for example, 'D6lib6ration du conseil de guerre d' Agen sur la saisie des reeoltes des
Pretendus R6formcSs', AD Lot-et-Garonoe, E Sup. Agen, CC 65 (9 September 1562).
37 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 32 (16 November 1565).
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annes ilz auront et icelles prendre et saisir' .38 The following week, Monluc issued a
further ordinance requiring the police to expel all vagabonds and to fine anyone
guilty of blasphemy, playing games or debauchery. 39
This pre-emptive posturing by the coalition appears to have paid off, with the
towns of the Agenais remaining secure temporarily, despite continuing tensions. But
the peace would not last. In September 1567, a Protestant army under the comte de
Montgomery, boosted by reinforcements for Conde and the leading Huguenot nobles
at court, took to the countryside. Hostilities were resumed, and the Catholic defences
across the Agenais braced themselves to resist Montgomery's forces. It would be at
this point that the coalition turned to Monluc to influence affairs. His subsequent
actions to defend Agen and the Agenais would prove unequivocal.
The Second war, 1567-1568
In September 1567, hostilities were renewed across France, following
Conde's unsuccessful attempt to seize the king at Meaux. Catherine de Medici
wasted no time in authorising Monluc to convoke the arriere-ban in the Agenais, to
stave off immediate Protestant aggression, 40 while Lalande, now governor of Agen,
was ordered to draw up a rota of the twenty-four trusted consuls to accompany the
nightly patrol of the town. 41 Those guarding the gates were ordered to admit only
those with valid identification passes, and who could be vouched for by recognised
Catholic inhabitants.42 Such integration of Catholic consuls with the town guard
would also be witnessed at Bordeaux and Toulouse during this time, revealing that
38 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, FF 32 (24 November 1565).
39 December 1565. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30,10. 140.
40 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 194.
41 Barrere, Histoire religieuse et monumenta/e du diocese d'Agen, I, p. 30S.
42 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 147.
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the Catholic authorities of the south-west had clearly learnt from their experiences
during 1562.
By late September, the Reformers were in open rebellion. A report to Lalande
from Francois de Caumont, baron de Lauzan, testified that fierce fighting bad broken
out across the region. Bergerac, Montauban, Moissac and Lectoure had already fallen
into Protestant hands, it claimed, while the lands of the marquis de Trans, one of
Candalle's right-hand men in the Bordelais, were currently under siege.43 Lalande
informed Monluc, who despatched his two nearest captains, Mauriez and Jean
d' Agen, to Agen, with Tilladet and la Cassaigne ordered to Lectoure with orders to
quell the unrest there.44 In the countryside, though, the Catholic nobility bad rallied.
On 29 September, the senechal of Bazadois, the sieur de Verduzan, dispatched
'plusieurs autres gentilshommes ses voisins' to secure the lands around Bazas, where
reinforcements under the captain Tibauville, and a band of local nobles from the
Sampoy region, soon joined them. 4S On 2 October, Monluc ordered one hundred
Catholic soldiers to garrison Casteljaloux, demanding they be housed and fed by the
town's Huguenot population. 46
With the tide stemmed momentarily, Monluc returned to Agen to organise its
defences. On 7 October, the new coalition conseil met to decide the Catholic
response. It determined that the nobility of the Agenais should be mobilised and put
into the field to augment Monluc's forces." In his Comment aires, Monluc claims
that to facilitate this as rapidly as possible he, Antoine de Nort and Gratien Delas,
together with a greffier and two secretaires, sat up all night writing and signing over
43 Commemaires, p. 596.
44 Labenazie, Histoire de la ville d'Agen, I, p. 263.
45 Commentaires, pp. 596-98.
46 AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (2 October 1567). Monluc further strengthened Catholic
control ofCasteljaloux in December 1567, ordering thejurade to hand over the town's keys to his
captain, Sendat, and requiring all inhabitants to swear on oath that they would not harbour Protestants
within the town. AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (December 1567).
47 Labenazie, Histoire de la ville d' Agen, I, p. 264.
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two hundred dispatches containing the orders for mobilisation, while Pierre de Naux,
Antoine's elder brother, spent the evening searching for sufficient numbers of
messengers to deliver them. 48 As well as targeting the leading nobles of the Agenais,
copies were also addressed to the parlements at Bordeaux and Toulouse to inform
their Catholic allies of the mobilisation. 49
The conseil met again the following day, and ordered the sequestration of
'plusieurs meubles, fruictz, betailz, armes et autres choses en leurs maisons' of those
Protestants who had recently left Agen to join forces with their co-religionists at
Montauban and Bergerac. so This council was attended by all Catholic magistrates of
the coalition, rather than just the elite conseil members, a sign that the Catholic
hierarchy sought consensus from all delegates before proceeding with such a harsh
policy. Monluc and Lalande chaired the congress, and confirmed the validity of such
a move, stating that all funds raised from the sale of confiscated goods would be used
to buy munitions for Catholic troops in the town and to finance repairs to the
defences. As such, engineers were instructed to begin an immediate survey of the
current state of the town's fortifications.
At a third meeting of the conseil, two days later, a further ordinance was
passed, authorising a one-off fine of 500 ecus on all wealthy Huguenots of Agen, and
the introduction of a new tax, to be paid by all other Reformers of the town, to
finance the recently arrived garrison soldiers' pay.51 An analysis of surviving
archives reveals that the total raised from sale of sequestered Protestant goods during
48 Commentatres, p. 606. For transcript of the letter, see Paul Courteault, Douze lettres inedites de
Blaise deMonluc, publiees et annotees (Toulouse, 1898), pp. 12-17.
49 Oftbe actions ofbis trusted mends, de Nort and Delas, at this juncture, Monluc later wrote: 'i1s me
servirent tousjours en toutes mes despecbes, et estoient de mOD conseil en toutes choses'.
Commeniaires, p. 606.
50 Ordinance on OctobeF 1567. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 202, fo.2.
,. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 202, fos. 2v-S.
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the period October to December 1567 amounted to 1,178 livres, S2 while the
confiscation of grain and wine realised 1,014 livres, 7 sous.S3 These same records
also confirm that the majority of the sequestered money did go towards the
strengthening of the town's fortifications, and was not, as Sevin later claimed,
diverted into the pockets of Catholic generals. Unfortunately, the sources do not
detail the totals raised from the fining and taxation of Protestants, although the filet
that the jurade was able to vote a gift of 200 ecus to Monluc in December 1567 - for
'services to the Catholic cause' - suggests that the coalition had access to fairly
substantial sums. S4
With the policy of sequestering goods and property greatly enhancing the
funds available to the Catholic leadership, it was predictable that when Monluc and
the coalition reconvened in early January 1568, they authorised a continuance of this
policy for the foreseeable future. 55 The defence of Agen was the most obvious
beneficiary. On 10 March, Monluc was able to increase the garrison there by eighty
per cent, employ a professional soldier, captain Raphael, to command them, and to
pay the troops' wages directly from such income. S6 Similar schemes were
implemented across the smaller towns of the Agenais, but often met with fierce
opposition. The dissent, though, was not always from the expected source. At
Casteljaloux, it was the Catholic council that was forced to intervene, urging Monluc
to repeal his edict as soon as possible. When the Huguenots had refused to pay the
new tax, Monluc had ordered the council to dismiss all Huguenot officials within the
town, to appoint Catholic officials to the vacant posts, and to commence the forced
52 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 202, fos, 2v-5.
53 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, CC 302 (1567).
S4 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, aa 30, to. 195.
55 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, aa 30, to. 195v.
56 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, aa 30, £0. 199v.
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collection of all unpaid revenues. As a consequence, the Huguenots withdrew all
contributions to the gages, thereby compromising the town's administrativebudget."
At other centres, the 'tax and sequester' policy brought different problems. At
Francescas, an important strategic town close to the Calvinistcitadel ofNerac, a one-
off tax of Reformers in January 1568 generated sufficient funds to allow Monluc to
garrison a large force of Catholic troops within the town, ostensibly to secure the
main road south from the Agenais to Beam. Within two months of its deployment,
however, the Catholic council at Francescas pleaded with Monluc to remove the
troops, claiming that the soldiers were causing havoc in the town. The town fathers
seemed unconcerned at losing any financial advantage the policy had offered, so long
as order was restored. They even offered to buy back the town's 'freedom',
informing Monluc that, should the garrison be withdrawn, they would continue to
collect the tax, but would forward the funds to Agen."
The boon of such financial expedients came to a temporary end with the
peace of Longjumeau in March 1568. Despite Catholic domination of the
administration of the Agenais, the terms of the peace required that restraint be
employed towards Protestants. The immediate result was that some towns now
struggled to meet their high expenditure on manpower and fortifications. Without the
income from emergency taxation and sequestration, councils found their budgets
overstretched. At Agen, the coalition was forced to borrow to maintain its
expenditure at pre-peace levels. The registres de jurade for April 1568 reveal that
Lalande and his fellow Catholic consuls, Boissanade and de Nort, obtained a total of
1,423 livres from two loans: the first, from Madame l'Infanta de Portugal, of 1,000
57 AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (J568).
sa AD Lot-et-Gircnde, E Sup. Agen, 2,630 (jurade of January 1568).
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livres;S9 the other from a local merchant, Jean de Vaus, of 423 livres.60 The registres
also list the destination of some of the outgoings from these loans: 'fournitures aux
corps de garde ... soldes des messages ... etablissements des gabions ... restauration
des fosses ... construction de murailles', showing that military matters were still a
high priority for the coalition."
That Catholic towns continued to garrison and fortify despite the truce says
much about the negative perception of the peace held by contemporaries. Both
Catholics and Protestants seemed dismissive of its ability to secure accommodation
and end conflict, expressing especial concern over the clause declaring the crown's
willingness to forget past misdemeanours, so long as 'tous les sujets du roi se
trouvassent reunis dans la profession d'une seule et meme religion,.62 For
Huguenots, the reference to 'One Religion' proved unacceptable. They would agree
to demands for a cessation of hostilities, but realised it would only be a matter of
time before their theorists called for its rejection. Catholics met the peace with the
same mixture of anger and resignation that had characterised their response to the
Amboise edict five years earlier. The Bordeaux parlement ridiculed the treaty as 'la
petite paix', claiming that it resolved nothing, and predicted a resurgence of the
conflict within the month. 63 Monluc, who was assisting the royal expedition to re-
take the lIe de Re when the peace was published, was similarly dismissive of its
ability to reconcile the faiths and bring stability to France, believing it to be nothing
more than 'une paix pour prendre ba1aine et temps pour se pourveoir d'autres choses
necessaires pour la guerre, et non pour la faire durer'. 64 Indeed, several historians
'9 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, ro. 199.
60 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, CC 306 (April 1568).
61 Ibid.
62 De Thou, Histoire Universelle, V, p. 416.
63 Commentaires, p. 629.
64 Commentaires, p. 628.
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have even viewed the Longjumeau edict as a catalyst for further conflict rather than a
mediatory event. Paul de Felice is especially damning of any pretensions the edict
may have had of securing a cease-fire or resolving the warfare: 'la guerre ne cessa
pas ... elle devint guerre cachee ... on encouragea les ligues des ultra catholiques; on
voulut, enfin, diviser les protestants'." Similarly, Mack P. Holt suggests that by
continuing in its adherence to accommodation - deemed by Catholics to be little
more than a ruse to defend Protestant grandees at court - the crown was in fact
'fuelling the flames of civil war,66 Holt continues that the most visible sign of
Catholic unease at this strategy was the 'burgeoning number of lay confraternities
that emerged in the towns throughout the kingdom' after Longjumeau/"
While the growth of the confraternities and their impact on this study is
addressed in Chapter 9, Felice and Holt's observations, that the peace served to
encourage ultra-Catholic groupings to greater political and military activism,
certainly find resonance at Agen. By mid 1568, the coalition was so inundated with
complaints over continued Huguenot violence that Lalande felt obliged to draft a
lengthy remonstrance to the king. In it, he complained of the failure of the peace
treaty, and detailed the 'pillage et incendie des maisons ... destructions des esglises ...
interruption du service devin ... assemblees en armes des Protestants' as evidence of
the turbulence of affairs across the Agenais.68 The threat appears to have been so
great that Catholics soon embarked upon unilateral action to reinforce their defences
at Agen, irrespective of the edict and crown requests for moderation in attitudes
towards Protestants. In a confidential ordinance, dated 18 May 1568, Monluc and
Lalande ordered that the town guard be vetted, so that only 'hommes de qualite' were
65 Paul de Felice, Proces-verbaux de la prestauon du serment de ./idelile au Roi Charles IX par les
Huguenols d'Orleons en /568 (Orleans, 1882), p. 6.
66 Holt, The French Wars of Religion, p. 67.
67 Holt, The French Wars of Religion, p. 68.
68 AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, EE 56 (1568).
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deployed at the gates. Strict new routes and schedules for patrols were dictated, and
no strangers or Huguenots were to be allowed to enter the town, regardless of their
objective.69 This was both a contravention of the terms of the edict and a blatant
disregard for Protestant liberties.
This ordinance, though, was important for a further reason. One of its clauses
gave Lalande authority to 'interdict et deffandeu au jugemage et juges presidiau1x
dudict Agen et a tous autres prendre aulcune jurisdiction ny cognoissance de ladicte
police et reiglement par nous faict,.70 Monluc had not only set out the parameters of
Catholic authority at Agen, but also sought to legislate against external interference
from other administrative bodies in Agenais, regardless of their legitimacy." It is
evident that the spectre of the incumbent, if still absent, juge-mage, Sevin, worried
the Catholic government at Agen to the point that they were willing to exclude
legitimate presidial officials in an attempt to retain political control over the town.
By following such protectionist policies, the coalition clearly flew in the face of
royal policy, which sought to re-integrate Huguenots within local government. The
position of Monluc, then, is pivotal here. It was one thing to exclude Protestant
officials during times of conflict, as he did in 1562-63, and would do again in
November 1568, but during the peace Monluc, as the king's chief official in the
Agenais, should have been promoting crown policy - that is, accommodating
Protestants rather than supporting the exclusionist policies of the coalition. 72 By
facilitating the removal of all opposition to Catholic control at Agen at this juncture,
Monluc was treading a fine line between the employment of acceptable initiative,
69 AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, BB 60, fo. 210.
70 Ibid.
71 The ordinance was revised in July 1568 to include a one thousand livres fine for anyone
countermanding the order. AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, aa 30, ro.216.
72 Monluc's ordinance of 29 November 1568 stripped all Protestant 'magistrats, avocats, procureurs,
huissiers, sergents, notaires et receveurs' of office, revoking all acts and pronouncements made by
them, in line with the similar exclusionist ordinance published by the Bordeaux pariement on 10
November, 1568. See AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, GO 201, ro. 5.
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and stepping outside of the channels of legitimate authority. Of course, the remit of
his office of king's lieutenant allowed a degree of independent action. Monluc could,
and did, claim that any expedient that preserved the security of the region - and the
exclusion of Protestants from government fell into this category - was well within his
prerogative.
Yet if Monluc was deliberating over his actions at this point, there is no
reference to it in his writings. If anything, archival material suggests that Catholic
unity became more coherent after this episode. At the assembly of the etats de
I'Agenais, between 12 and 30 June 1568, Catholic delegates reinforced the
coalition's domination of the political arena by fully endorsing all recent
pronouncements, offering to increase their contributions to the fortification of
Catholic-held towns of the region as a gesture of solidarity." Their unity had become
more overt too. In March 1568, the full paraphernalia of Catholic pageantry had been
on display at Agen, as local Catholic captains were presented with honours from the
king. All the leading coalition members were present for this ceremonial, held in the
town's cathedral of Saint-Etienne, with Monluc and Lalande distributing the awards.
The festivities lasted ten days. On 9 March, Monluc's right-hand man, Tilladet, and
two of his captains, de Laussan and de Pausas, were awarded l'ordre du roi. The
following day, two more captains, de Cassaniels and de Cieurac, received the same
honour, with captains de Labories and de Cancon, and de Berdusan, the senechal of
Bazadois, honoured on the 18 and 19 March respectively.74
73 Andrieu. Histoire de I'Agenais, I, p. 241.
74 Labenazie, Histoire de la ville d' Agen, I, pp. 264-65.
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The Third war and its ramifi~ations, 1568-1570
At hostilities resumed in September 1568, the coalition benefited greatly from
the strong ties created between the Catholic institutions of the Agenais. They were
also assisted by astute military leadership. With Protestant forces in the south-west
boosted by Conde's personal involvement in affairs, Monluc was forced to re-
evaluate Catholic strengths. He determined that a large Catholic force would be
maintained at Agen, one capable of meeting the Protestant army in the field. By
concentrating his available forces, though, Monluc realised that many towns across
the countryside would be defenceless. In an attempt to bolster these weak points in
Catholic defences Monluc divided the region into individual cells, with small units of
experienced soldiers coordinating local Catholic militias. He spelled out his strategy
to Lalande in a letter, dated 16 February 1569:
Monsieur mon cousin, si vous avez eu jamais besoing de faire bon goet dans Agen, it
est a present temps que vous Ie faictes, pour vous garder de surprinse. Par ainsi, je
vous prye, incontinent la presente receue, advertir toutes les villes et villages que
incontinent que l'ODS verra que ceulx des ennemis qui font ainsin des courses sont en
campagne, que l'on face Ie tocsing partout, et leur courir sus, et leur mander que
chaque paroisse esglise ung chef, afin que, quand I'on viendra a faire Ie tocsing, its
ne s' esprisent point, et que leur chef leur donne courage. 75
This emphasis on community-based defence was most practical, and in many
ways echoed the Huguenot tactics devised at Clairac in 1561 - although, as bas been
stated repeatedly, Monluc's predilection for invigorating the wider community into
defensive postures, and not simply relying on experienced soldiers, had been a
favoured tactic of his during the Italian campaigns of the 1550s. On 27 February
1569, the ordinance detailing these developments was read before the coalition
" AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, £0. 210.
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council and confirmed." In May, a similar edict was authorised, permitting Catholics
'thuer, massacrer, et tailler en pieces aultant ceulx de ladicte pretendue religion ... les
faire ransonner et prendre leurs biens'. 77 This effectively signalled an escalation in
affairs at Agen. Where previously, the sequestration of Huguenot goods had been the
remit only of Catholic magistrates, Monluc was now granting all Catholic citizens
the authority to seize and ransom unruly Protestants. While the consent of the
coalition was still preferred, the wider elements of Catholic society were being
energised in the confrontations between the faiths. 78
As the war intensified during 1569, Protestant troops acquired a substantial
numerical advantage over Catholic defenders for the first time since 1562. Their
defensive networks began to buckle under the strain as the south-west became the
focal point of the conflict. The Catholic nobility were subdued by the Protestant
forces under Montgommery and the vicomtes, and by mid-November Agen was on
the brink of being overwhelmed. Monluc, at Lectoure with his old captain, La
Mothe-Gondrin, preparing to confront Montgommery's forces at Condom, received
an urgent communique from Lalande stating that 'toute ]a ville estoit en effroy', and
that many were fleeing the town for the safety of Toulouse and Bordeaux. Lalande
claimed that the situation was so dire that 'les marchans commencoient a vouloir tirer
76 'Blaise de Monluc ... a tous chefs et conducteurs de gens de guerre, maires, jurats, consuls,
justiciers, officiers, communes de villes, bourgs, villages et communaultes, tant d' Agen que
Gaseogne, salut. Cooune DOUSsoyons dernierement advertis qu'il ya plusiers des ennernis de sa
Majeste qui sont venus du camp de M. Ie prince de Conde, se retirant deca en plusiers endroicts,
pillant, saccageant, et exercant plusiers exces sur les bons subjects de sadite Majeste, DOllS,pour ces
causes. VOUSavons pennys que en quelque lieu aU vous ~urez que lesdits ennemys seront, vous
assembler et &ire Ie toquesin partout, leur oourir sus, mectre et tailher en pieces sans Dulle r6mission;
et pour ce faire, comm6trez en cbasque paroisse ung cappitaine tel que adviserez, pour conduire ladite
commune. De ce faire vous avons donne plein pouvoir, auctorit6, puissance et mandement par ees
~esentes'. AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fo. 211.
AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, BB 30, fos. 238-40.
71 A similar phenomenon occurred at Bordeaux, where a number of the Catholic populace were
assigned civil guard duties, thus freeing experienced soldiers to join Tilladet's main units outside the
walls. Monluc even closed down the parlement for 8 days (4-12 November 1568) to allow all court
officials to take a turn guarding the town gates. Commenta;res, pp. 652-53.
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leurs marchandises dehors', forcing the governor to deny many permission to leave
the town to prevent the economy from imploding.I"
Monluc left at once for Agen, placing the main Catholic army under La
Mothe-Gondrin's command. He arrived at Agen in mid-November, short of troops
and facing a population on the verge of flight. His subsequent actions epitomise the
extent to which Catholic unity had been cemented over the previous years. Certainly,
care must be taken in reading Monluc's personal version of events, but his account of
the measures employed by the coalition to secure the town at such a critical point is
accepted by Courteault. It reveals a synthesis of key developments in Catholic
activism to this point: the utility of close relations between the hierarchy and
institutions of Agen; an affirmation of the merits of 'communal defence'; and the
realisation that mutual support and concerted action could succeed in the face of
overwhelming odds.8o On arrival, Monluc convened an assembly of 'tous les
principaux, et toute l'eglise, et la justice d' Agen', at which 'tout Ie monde y couroit
pour me veoir et pour entendre quel conseil je leur donnerois'. In this, Monluc
seemed to be employing the medieval tradition whereby a leader would make a
personal appearance before the citizens in order to confirm his presence among them,
or, as he himself had done at Siena, to stem the fears of the troops and galvanize
them into action. He then dismissed rumours that the leaders of Agen had deserted
the town, urged the populace to be diligent and resolute, and swore 'vivre et mourir
avec vous autres'. This pledge, made in the face of such adversity, gained Monluc
instant renown across the region, and was reported before the Bordeaux parlement
within the week."
79 Commentaires, p. 739.
80 The following account of the securing of Agen in November 1569 is taken from Monluc own
words, see Commemaires, pp. 738-47.
81 BM Bordeaux, ms 369, III, fo. 316.
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Following Monluc's address, Lalande and Bertrand de Lacombe, abbe of
BJasimon, offered the support of the clergy, pledging 'leurs vies et biens pour se
deffendre et pour accomplir ce que je [Monluc] demanderois'. This seems to have
invigorated the assembly, for the bourgeoisie, town guard and 'messieurs de justice'
all followed suit in declaring their allegiance to the defence of the town, with Martial
de Nort, one of Monluc's oldest allies at Agen, assuring the general that 'tous ceux
de la ville, riches et pauvres, femmes et enfans, et sans espargner, y mettroient la
main'. Even if this statement is embroidery on Monluc's part, it still reflects his
belief in the validity of defending an urban centre by energising the whole
community rather than simply deploying troops.
Of particular importance was Monluc's creation of an extraordinary conseil
de guerre to oversee the mechanics of defence. This would comprise 'huict de vostre
ville, que vous obeirez entierement', to be chosen by MonluC.82 The same measure
had been tried at Casteljaloux the preceding January, to stave of Huguenot unrest.
Under the auspices of Monluc's captain, Sendat, the conseil at Casteljaloux had been
granted extensive, autonomous powers to organise the town's defences, even to the
point where Sendat was able to refuse a request from the governor of Bordeaux to
dispatch two companies from the town to bolster Catholic forces in the provincial
capital, although Sendat did offer to pay 150 ecus in compensation to sweeten any
displeasure within the parlement.83 But at Casteljaloux, there had been an obvious
need for the creation of such a conseil de guerre: Huguenot sympathisers were still
active on the town's civic council, and a sizeable Protestant party existed within the
locality, with the result that internal security was often compromised. What is
surprising about the establishment of the new conseil at Agen is that the town already
12 Commentaires, p. 742.
13 AD Lce-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (19 January 1569). For Sendat's attempt at conciliation
with the Bordeaux pariement, see AD Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (3 April 1569).
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had such an entity: the coalition. This had proven a triumph for Catholicism in the
Agenais, maintaining tight control over the region's affairs, and raising Agen to the
status of bastion of Catholicism, similar to that of Bordeaux and Toulouse. Why,
then, would Monluc require an additional body to coordinate Catholic defiance in
1569, especially when many of his assembled audience were veterans of the
coalition? The answer lies in Monluc's modus operandi when defending a besieged
urban centre. It was an idiosyncrasy of his operations in Italian towns during the
1550s to entrust authority to an elite cell of dependable companions, irrespective of
the presence of any established urban councils. This was a logical move, aimed at
reducing the number of officers with authoritative power to a minimum, to obviate
miscommunication. At Agen, it appears the Catholic hierarchy did not resist this new
corpus, nor question its independence from the coalition, as the gathered delegates
confirmed the conseil that same day, and swore an oath of support to its officials. 84
If the command structure of the conseil was more focussed than the previous
Catholic consortium, its dictates adhered to standard Catholic defensive principles.
The townsfolk were enlisted to man the guard, with magistrates taking turns to head
the patrols and secure the gates. Monluc's engineer, captain Toppiac, was ordered to
demolish a number of houses and internal walls so that existing defensive works
could be reinforced, and several new forts built around the town's perimeter.
Catholics whose homes had been knocked down during this programme of
reconstruction were authorised to seize the houses belonging to fugitive Huguenots,
while those Reformers that remained in the town were forced to share their home
14 Labenazie, Histoire de la ville d'Agen, I, p. 268. Although there does not appear to be any surviving
record of the oath referred to by Labenazie within the archives, in view of the tendency of Catholic
associations and alliances to seal their compacts with such pledges, it is certainly feasible that a
ceremony to celebrate the unity of delegates at Agen followed Monluc's address.
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with garrison soldiers and construction workers.f These were standard coalition
practices, repeated many times over the previous years. The conseil may well have
added a tighter grip on authority at Agen, but in its determinations and routines it
preferred to make use of the tried and trusted methods that had been employed with
efficacy by the coalition for the previous six years.
Summary
The establishment of an extraordinary military conseil at Agen in November
1569 exemplifies the progress made by Catholic activists across the region. Such
ascendancy would have seemed a distant goal in 1560. Then, Catholic activism was a
rarity, practised only by a few determined individuals. Over the following years, ad-
hoc, if disparate, bodies would be formed, eventually unified under a coalition of
magistrates, clergy and representatives of the wider institutions of the Agenais. In
mid 1562, Catholic officials from the jurade, presidial and senechaussee united in
opposition to continuing Huguenot incursions. They were boosted by the support of
the etats de l'Agenais, dominated at this time by the Catholic nobility and clergy and
nobles who, as major landholders, were just as eager to halt Protestant attacks on
their property. The etats would prove an important buttress for the Catholic
leadership at Agen, supporting their political decisions, and endorsing the diversion
of regional finances into Catholic coffers. The following year, in February 1563, a
formal oath-bound association was created at Agen, formally unifying these parties -
magistrates, clergy, and nobility - for the first time. Although the crown successfully
banned this ltgue, it could not proscribe Catholic sentiment. Collective action to
., AD Lot-et-Garonne, E Sup. Agen, EE 16 (16 December 1569).
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facilitate communal defence became the new catholic ethos, inspired by Monluc's
previous experiences of rearguard action.86 Agenais Catholics of every social
standing were expected to rise to the challenge, to forge protective cooperatives
capable of rallying to any threat. And rise they did.
Catholic successes were also founded on the amitie shared by key individuals
within the institutions of the Agenais, whose association allowed them to dominate
the machinery of local government. Three of the most prominent of these officials
were Clement Lalande, Martial de Nort and Antoine Tholon, each the leading
Catholic representative of the clergy, jurade and the senechaussee respectively.87
The de Nort family, in met, appears to have spawned a quasi-dynasty of Catholic
activists at Agen: Martial, an old and trusted friend of Monluc, held offices in the
jurade and prestdial courts throughout this period; his eldest son, Pierre, followed his
father onto the jurade; Antoine, the second son, served with distinction as an officer
of the senechaussee de I'Agenais, while the husband of Martial's eldest daughter also
served on the presidial. Martial and Antoine were often cited as members of
Monluc's 'inner circle', while Pierre was trusted subordinate of the general's
household staff.88 Protestant sources, however, vilified the de Norts for their zeal.
Theodore de Beze denounced Martial as a 'tres mauvais homme... sans foy ne
conscience... capital ennemi de ceux de la religion', while Pierre was accused of
committing numerous excesses against Protestants at La Plume during 1561.89 While
86 Abbe Joseph Labrunie encapsulates Mooluc's decade at Agen: 'Il se retire a Gascogne, oil il
emploie a pacifier les differents de la noblesse cathoJique, qu'il enrOle dans un sorte de ligue pour la
defense commune'. Labrunie, 'Abrege chrooologique des antiquites d' Agen', p. 174.
17 Labrunie also identified Lalande, Tholon and Martial de Nort as 'les conseillers les plus estimes de
Mooluc'. Labrunie, 'Abrege chrooologique des antiquites d' Agen', p. 177.
II Labenazie cites a dedicational epistle of 1581, penned by the Jacobin writer, Lacoste, which states:
'MM. de Nort... ayant ete les appuis de la religion cathoJique dans la ville d' Agen'. Labenazie,
Histoire de 10 ville d'Agen, I, p. 275.
19 HE, I, pp. 874-77. The Histoire Ecclesiastique also had stern words for the bishop of Agen,
Fregose, who was berated for his repeated provocation of Protestant citizens at Agen, while Lalande
was alleged to 'partoit sous sa longue robe de damas une espee et une rondelle'. HE, I, pp. 238; 367.
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there is little doubt that the de Norts were at the centre of Catholic activism at Agen,
there is one important qualification: the household had its very own black sheep of
the fold - Odet, Martial's third son. Odet had turned to Protestantism in 1558,
preaching regularly at local preches across the region. In 1560, he was appointed
minister at the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle, where he gained a reputation as
a charismatic orator. His ability to rouse Protestants troops before battle brought
condemnation from Catholics at Agen: Burie claimed that the unrest of January 1561
in the Agenais had been 'emue par les predications de Odet de Nort', while Tholin
would later assert that 'la jurade d' Agen avait son Brutus'. 90 In April 1561, Odet' s
brother, Antoine, reported his sibling to the Bordeaux parlement, requesting that
action be taken to silence such provocative activity, even claiming that his brother
had been active in the sacking of several churches at Agen. 91 This family split proved
that even the most devout Catholic fiunilies could be divided along confessional lines
by this struggle, an example that would be repeated many times across France during
the religious wars.
The role of Monluc in these developments was, as ever, central to Catholic
affairs. His support of Catholic luminaries during the initial troubles, his military
intervention, and the reinforcing of coalition authority through accommodating
ordinances, all proved vital. And it was Monluc who provided the impetus and
channels of communication that allowed the fusing of the local nobility with the
Catholic body politic at Agen. His evolution from a utilitarian military officer into a
zealous defender of Catholic rationale within a few short years is remarkable. There
is little doubt that the general maintained a 'chameleon-like profile' in his dealings
with the crown during the decade, but by 1563, the speculation that had surrounded
90 Burie to Catherine de Medici (24 January 1561), AHG, 13, p. 151; Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen', XIV,
~.442.
IAM Bordeaux. ms 767, foe 366.
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his Calvinist sympathies in the late 1550s was long gone.92 Now, Monluc was named
regularly alongside militants such as Lange, Candalle, Roffignac and Prevot as a
belligerent influence on the stability of the province." and derided by Protestants as
the 'king's butcher', a label he appears to have delighted in, if the tone of his
Commentaires is anything to go by.94A. W. Evans has defended Monluc's reputation
here, stating that brutality was a necessary expedient of a military leader: 'He was
constrained, contrary to his own nature, to use not only severity, but even sometimes
to be cruel' .95 For Evans, this was a degenerate civil war, a world turned upside
down, and the king's lieutenant was quite legitimate to employ both the carrot and
stick as necessary. Monluc reflects on such themes himself:
Ce n'est pas comme aux guerres estrangeres, oil on combat comme pour I'amour et
I'honneur; mais aux civiles it faut estre ou maistre ou valet, veu qu'on demeure sous
mesme toit. Et ainsi il faut venir a la rigeur et a la cruaute; autrement la friandise du
gain est telle que on desire plustost 1a continuation de la guerre que la fin.96
Ruble, however, has detected incongruities within these texts. He shows that in the
early editions of the Commentaires, Livre Vbegins: 'Je me deliberay d'uzer de toutes
cruauties .. .'. However, the original manuscript reads: 'Je me deliberay d'uzer de
toutes les craintes ... '. The replacement of the word cruauties for cratntes - cruelty
92 Monluc had remarked of Calvinism in 1557, that: 'i1n'estoit pas fils de bonne mere qui n'en vouloit
gouster', and was known to have attended a Reformed service at N6rac, under de Beze, during 1560.
See Commentaires, p. 481.
93 See especially two anonymous letters ftom Huguenots at Bordeaux to Catherine de Medici,
claiming that Monluc, PrevOt, Lachassaigne, Candalle and Lange intended to re-arm the Catholics of
Guyenne, and to systematically victimise the Huguenot communities around Cadillac. Anon to
Catherine de Medici (11 April 1563), BN ms ft, 15,879, £0. 173; Anon to Catherine de Medici (13
April 1563), BN ms ft, 15,879,10. 195.
94 The Histoire Ecclestastique talks of the savagery of the 'Monlucoise', after the massacre of the
defenders ofMontsegur on 1 August 1562. HE. Il, pp. 910·11. Monluc wrote of his military conduct
in 1562: 'on pouvoit cognoistre par Ii aU j'estois passe, car par les arbres, sur les chemins, on en
trouvoit les enseignes. Un pendu estonnoit plus que cent tuez', and, 'moo naturel tendoit plus i renuee
les mains qu'i pacifier les afTaires, aymant mieux ftapper et jouer des cousteaux que mire des
harangues'. Commemaires, pp. 529; 579. Roy iterates that the anger of the Reformers at Monluc
should be seen in the widest context. After all, he had once worshipped in their church; now he was
their great enemy. To Beze, in filet, Monluc was an 'apostate'. Ian Roy, Blaise de Mon/tIC (London,
1971), p. 7.
9S Evans, Blaise de Mon/tIC, p. 19.
96 Commentaires, p. 519.
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for fear - fundamentally alters the tone of Monluc's argwnent, a modification
probably made by later editors keen to spice up the Commentaires.97
Monluc's skills as a leader - his organisation of urban defences, chiding of
town councils over security matters, maintaining of local Catholic under arms,
garrisoning strategic centres with large complements of soldiers, and his liking for
judicial tours to reinforce authority - were important attributes, but were undoubtedly
assisted by Catholic domination of the political and administrative infrastructure of
the region. His predilection for the sequestration of goods and lands from Huguenot
rebels also helped the Catholic cause. Not only did it diminish Protestant resources,
but it also secured financial bonuses that would fund additional garrison troops and
militia patrols across the Agenais, and allow extensive fortification of gates, walls
and ramparts. And when the once-disparate Catholic bodies of the Agenais had
melded into a unified corpus by 1569, it was under Monluc's protective wnbrella that
they were placed.
The extent to which the lower classes were active in Catholic designs here is
difficult to assess. The deliberations of the euus could have offered a window into
the popular, representative voice in the Agenais, but its domination by the nobility
and clergy precluded such consensus from being recorded. This is in contrast to
events at Bordeaux, where significant surviving paperwork on the basoche and
confraternity of Saint-Yves allows the historian access to the sentiment, as well as
the activities, of these lesser officers of the parlement. The Huguenot perspective at
Agen is also less apparent. Protestants had few opportunities to express their
dissatisfaction within the town, and where their voices are heard within the archives,
it is usually as appellants or defendants in litigation. Debate between the two filiths
97 Ruble, Commemaires et Lettres, I, p. iv.
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was minimal, with the exception of a brief interlude after the peace of Amboise in
1563, where the re-introduction of mi-partie chambers within the presidial offered
the Reformers a momentary platform from which to speak out or raise issues
ordinarily suppressed by Catholic censorship. This success depended greatly on the
indomitable spirit of Herman de Sevin, juge-mage and president of the presidial,
whose defence of Huguenot rights at Agen mirrored Lagebaton's struggle to protect
moderates within the Bordeaux parlement. Both men were harassed as 'enemies of
the state' for their position, but both countered that they were simply adhering to
crown dictate.
Finally. the coalition's success in securing Catholic hegemony in the Agenais
during the 1560s is impressive: administrative monopoly was maintained by Lalande,
de Nort, Tholon and others, the etats were effective in validating Catholic policy and
financial assistance, while Monluc and his captains repelled the military designs of
the Reformers. Given the high concentration of Huguenot communities within the
region, and that the Reform ministers and Protestant nobility specifically targeted the
area after 1567. this achievement appears all the more notable. Historians tend to
marginalize Agen when analysing proceedings in the south-west during the religious
wars, deferring to the impact of events at the major citadels of Bordeaux and
Toulouse. With the level of Catholic successes at Agen, its strategic position, its
military and political significance for both communities, and the omnipresence of
Monluc, the leading personality of the region throughout the decade, it is justified to
proclaim Agen as the third bastion of Catholicism in the south-west, a
complementary sanctuary to the two more illustrious custodians of orthodoxy:
Bordeaux and Toulouse.
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Chapter 7. Wider Catholic activism: Toulouse. 1560-1563
This study now turns to the third centre of Catholic activism in the south-west during
the 1560s: the Languedocian city of Toulouse. Catholic intrigues in and around
Toulouse would prove just as significant as its counterparts at Bordeaux and Agen;
extensive networks and alliances were forged across the region, some predating the
religious wars, others underpinning Catholic exploits throughout the decade, with a
high degree of reciprocity existing between the centres. Four main episodes of
Catholic activism will be addressed here. The first mirrors the initial study of
Bordeaux by exploring possible antecedents to the formal associations of the 1560s:
the growth of an active confraternity representing minor officials within the
parlement; a pro-active group of street performers affiliated to the confraternity, who
energised the Catholic community on the streets of the town; and the growing
involvement of royal officials in the defence of Catholicism in the face of pressure
from the crown to implement toleration of the Reformers. The second examines
events during the initial stages of the war: the Protestant coup of May 1562, which
forced the Catholics of Toulouse into military action; and the /igue of March 1563,
by which Catholic elites of the region consolidated their successes. Here, the close
ties of the Catholics of Toulouse with their Guyenne allies will be exposed; both
fought at the barricades to eject Protestant forces from the town, and both were party
to the formal association formed at the cathedral of Saint-Etienne the following year,
under the auspices of MonIuc, cardinal Armagnac and members of the Toulouse
parlement. The third theme analyses the reinvigoration of Catholic activism at
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Toulouse following the reswnption of hostilities across France after September 1567.
This focuses on the bureaucratic weapons employed by a now dominant Catholic
party: the sequestration of Protestant goods and property; the surveillance of
Huguenot movements across the town and countryside; and the use of taxation and
fines both to penalise the Reformers. and to finance the Catholic war effort. The
fourth and final aspect to be examined is the somewhat anachronistic phenomenon of
the crusade at Toulouse in August 1568. validated by the papacy. backed by the
parlement, and supported by leading nobles of the senechaussee. Although the
crusade will be shown to have been enigmatic at best, the fact that it was considered
and created by Catholics in the first place reveals the depth of sentiment felt by many
to protect their faith from the ever-present threat of Protestantism. These two
chapters. then, will examine these instances of resident and external activism at
Toulouse. assess their composition and contribution to subsequent events. and detail
the extent of the various networks and alliances involved in securing Catholic
hegemony across the region.
Toulouse: city and government
To begin with, a review of the demographic and administrative make up of
Toulouse at 1560 will be made. revealing the milieu in which the ensuing sectarian
conflict was played out. The first thing that strikes the historian of the south-west is
the similarity between Bordeaux and Toulouse. The comparisons existed on many
levels; each was sited strategically on the Garonne river, protected by immense walls
and fortifications, with analogous population estimates of 40,000 by 1560.1 As the
1 Boutrouche, Bordeaux de J453 a J 7J5, p. 243; Greengrass, 'The anatomy of a religious riot', p. 368.
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two great trading centres of the region, both towns boasted a diverse social and
ethnic demography, although Toulouse tended to accommodate more Catholic
merchants from Spain and Italy than did Bordeaux. There were parallels, too, in their
reception of the Reform movement: both towns opened their gates freely to
Protestants during the 1550s, only to slam them shut at the commencement of
sectarian conflict in 1562. However, both Bordeaux and Toulouse maintained a
resident Huguenot community of between 7-9,000 throughout the 1560s, although as
each became a haven for local Catholic refugees, fleeing from persecution, the
Protestant inhabitants faced ever-increasing levels of punitive taxation, harassment
and discrimination. 2
The structures of core government of each town were also similar, with
traditional families, staunchly provincial in their attitude, dominating local offices.
The civic corporation of Toulouse comprised eight elected city fathers, or capitouls,
representing each of the town's eight capitoulats: Daurade, Saint-Etienne, Pont-
Vieux, la Pierre, Dalbade, Saint-Pierre, Saint-Barthelemy, and Saint-Sernin. Its
jurisdiction over finance, justice, security, and police dated back to royal consent
granted in the early thirteenth century, the only significant change being the creation
of a parallel body, the conseil de seize, or conseil de bourgeoisie, in 1515, to deal
with petty matters and relieve the town authorities of a growing administrative
burden. As at Bordeaux, however, the city councillors of Toulouse were renowned
for their sympathy towards Reform ideology, and were often perceived as being
innovators of religious change within the town. 3
Catholic interests within Toulouse were centred on the town's parlement. The
parlement had been established in 1444, following a decree by Charles VII that a
2 See especially, Robert A. Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse (London, 1989), pp. 12-43.
3 By 1650, the conseil de seize numbered over one hundred officials. Henri Ramel. Le capitole et Ie
parlement de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1926), pp. 28-29.
III: TOULOUSE - 7 / 190
sovereign court be established within the chateau Narbonnais to ensure royal justice
was administered, and royal authority upheld, in this most distant outpost of France.
As at Bordeaux, it began life as a single chamber, in 1451, formally titled the
premiere chambre des enquetes. Between 1491 and 1519, a chambre criminelle, or
tournelle, was instituted, followed by a chambre des requetes in 1543, and a seconde
chambre des enquetes in 1553.4 By 1560, though, the rising number of cases dealing
with religious offences forced the creation of a new, temporary chamber at Toulouse,
the chambre extraordinaire, which, at times, sat during vacations to clear the backlog
of pending prosecutions. 5
As the parlement grew in size and prestige, it began to encroach inexorably
upon the jurisdiction of the town council," Initially this was limited to hearing
appeals against the verdicts of the capitouls, and intervening in the nomination and
election of civic councillors. But as the capitouls began to reveal sympathetic
tendencies to the Reform movement during the 1550s, it placed them at odds with the
generally censorial policies of the parlement, provoking a volatile reaction from
Catholic magistrates that would exceed even the turbulent relationship between
jurade and parlement at Bordeaux. By 1562, the parlement was challenging the
capitouls' sympathies directly, and it was of little surprise that it commandeered
jurisdiction from the council following the Protestant coup of May 1562, removing
suspect officials from office, and replacing them with trustworthy Catholics. Ramet
4 Ramet, Le capitole et le parlement de Toulouse, p. 137. In 1549, the old chateau Narbonnais was
dismantled to make way for a new grand polais, constructed under the guidance of Nicolas Bachelier.
s 'Sur la requeste verbalement faicte par le procureur general du Roy, a ce que attendu les grands
troubles que sont par tout Ie royaume pour Ie faict de la religion, emotions et seditions du peuple en
plusieurs villes et lieux de ce ressort, et Ie craincte qu'estoit en ceste ville d'en yavoir, feust Ie bon
plaisir de la cour que, oultre messieurs ordonnez pour servir en la chambre criminelle durant les
vaccations, demeurast une autre chambre pour pourveoir au faict desdites troubles, emotions et
seditions', (16 September 1560), AD Haute-Garoone, B 53, fo. 969.
6 By 1547, the parlemenl boasted four presidents, fifty-six consetllers (among them one George
d'Armagnac, bishop of Rodez, soon to be cardinal and lieutenant of Toulouse), aprocureur-ger.eral
and two avocats-generaux. See Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I, p. 324.
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shows that by 1563, the parlement had redefined the town council as a tool of the
Catholic party, rather than the irritant it had tended to be previously. 7
Three further bodies moved towards Catholic consensus at Toulouse during
the 1560s: the courts of the senechaussee and viguerie; and the etats de Languedoc.
By the sixteenth century, the office of senechal at Toulouse was no longer restricted
to independent royal officials, but open to local noblesse de robe. As a result,
Catholic militants such as Pierre de Saint-Lary, baron de Bellegarde, would hold the
post, an important cog in Catholic attempts to dominate the administration at
Toulouse. The viguerie, a court subordinate to the senechal, dealing with petty civil
and criminal cases at local level, was also important for Catholic fortunes, as it
assisted in matters relating to policing and security around the region. The officers of
the viguerie would become important supporters of the ligueurs at Toulouse after
1563.8 The third body, the representative assemblies of the provincial etats de
Languedoc, comprised largely of the senechaussees of Toulouse, Carcassonne and
Beaucaire, also tended to be dominated by Catholics, in this case mainly members of
the local clergy and nobility. As they met only infrequently during the religious wars,
however, their influence was not as dramatic as it could have been, given the
overwhelming Catholic consensus expressed at most assemblies during this period. 9
There was one body, though, that was rarely dominated by Catholic sentiment
at Toulouse: the presidial. These new royal courts were introduced in 1552 to
augment the work of the parlement. The ressort of Toulouse contained seven
presidiaux, dealing ostensibly with criminal cases, appeals of royal judges, and civil
7 Ramet, Le capitole et Ie parlement de Toulouse, p. 29.
8 The viguerie at Toulouse comprised the viguier, two lieutenants, several conseillers, a procureur,
two avocats du roi, and numerous docteurs and greffiers. See Ramet, Le capitole et Ie parlement de
Toulouse, p. 120.
9 For the role and influence of the etats de Languedoc during the religious wars, see Zeller, Les
institutions de la France, pp. 57-70.
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litigation up to 2,000 /ivres, though lacking any jurisdiction in appellate litigation.
Much like its counterpart at Bordeaux, the presidia/ at Toulouse tended more
towards moderate than militant politics, and would be the focal point of numerous
clashes between advocates of each faith during the decade. Its importance to both
faiths is evident from the ferocity of the struggle for ascendancy within its chambers,
and it is telling that, at the height of Catholic hegemony in Toulouse, between 1563
and 1568, Catholic officials gained control of the region's presidiaux, albeit
temporarily. 10
Such was the demography and administrative structure at Toulouse. They
reveal a conurbation initially receptive to Reform ideology and innovation, but one
that would come to engage in the defence of Catholicism following the insurrection
of 1562. There are many points of comparison with Bordeaux, and it would be
intriguing to see whether the Catholic community of Toulouse also had a history of
engagement with Protestants preceding the conflict of the 1560s. A study of the
activities of the confraternity of Saint-Yves at Toulouse between 1530 and 1560 will
thus be undertaken, in order to examine the nature and evolution of Catholic activism
at Toulouse during these early years, and to assess the extent to which the
endeavours of the confreres influenced the ability of Catholics to respond to events
during the religious wars.
Confratemal and basochien activism at Toulouse
There was, indeed, an active confraternity of avocats at Toulouse dedicated to
Saint-Yves, and a vibrant defence of the Catholic faith on its streets during the 1540s
10 Zeller, Les institutions de la France, pp. 175-77. The presidial at Toulouse was well staffed,
consisting of ajuge-mage, seven conseillers, a lieutenant-principal and lietaenant-pantculter; ajuge-
criminel and his lieutenants, around thirty serving avocats, procureurs and hulssiers, a procureur du
roy, an avoca/ du roy and six greffiers. See Ramel, Le capitole et Ieparlement de Toulouse, p. 120.
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and 1550s by performers of the basoche. But there was a subtle difference too. At
Bordeaux, the basoche shared a symbiotic relationship with the confraternity of
Saint- Yves, intertwined in its affairs through its monopoly on performing at feast day
ceremonials. At Toulouse, though, the basoche was independent from the
corporation of avocats, having been established as a feature of town life long before
the birth of the confraternity. They had instituted their own traditions and
ceremonies, separate from the confraternal environment, so that, while they were still
the sole performers at the festivities surrounding Saint-Yves' feast day, they were far
from a subsidiary group of any corporation. II
There was a further important distinction between the basoche at Bordeaux
and Toulouse: at Toulouse, there were two discrete groups of players. Until 1908,
historians of the basoche bad preswned that the various performers of Toulouse were
bound to a single governing body. The discovery, by Abbe Cau-Durban, of Statuts
governing basochien protocol within the Toulouse archives, however, changed this
view. Cau-Durban discerned that two distinct corporations of basoche existed within
the town: the basoche du palais, represented only byprocureurs, clercs du greffe and
secretaires des conseillers of the parlement, and the basoche de la senechaussee et
de la viguerie, composed mainly of lesser 'clercs ... et stagiaires impatients de
prendre robe et d'etre enfin practiciens' .12 Further research by Boyer has suggested
II As stated above, it was traditional that the basoche of French towns provided the music,
performances, and even cakes and hats of flowers for those attending the festivities surrounding Saint-
Yves. This tradition was adhered to at Toulouse. See AD Haute-Garonne, E 1,013, piece 1. For an
informative history of the corporations of avocats and procureurs within the parlement of Toulouse,
see Andre Viala, Le parlement de Toulouse et l'administratian royale latque, 1420-1525 environ
(Albi, 1953), pp. 30 I-57. For informative histories of the basoche at Toulouse, see G. Boyer, 'La
basoehe Toulousaine au quinzieme siecle, d'apres les archives du parlement', Memoires de la societe
orcheologique du midi de la France, 18 (1932), pp. 64-71; Abbe Cau-Durban, 'Statuts de la basoche
du seneehal de Toulouse', Memo;res de la societe archeologique du midi de la France, XVI (1908),
pp. 166-84; Rene Glangeaud, La basoche de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1912); E. VaYsse-Cibiel, 'Notes
retrospective sur la basoche Toulousaine', Memoires de I 'academie imperiale des sciences,
inscriptions et belles-leares de Toulouse, 6 (1868), pp. 221-43.
12 Cau-Durban, 'Statuts de la basoche', p. 168.
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that this differentiation was perpetuated by the exclusionist sentiments of the basoche
du palais who, having a high concentration of 'bonne bourgeoisie' and rising nobility
among their corpus, were keen to maintain separation between themselves and the
lower ranking officials of the senechaussee and viguerie,"
While both corporations of basoehe were able to trace their formation back to
the registration of the Toulouse parlement itself in 1444, their customs and devotions
had developed in quite varied ways. The basoehe du palais were based within the
parlement chapel, and were dedicated to la Sainte- Trinite, celebrating their feast day
on Trinity Day, at the end of Easter. The basoehe de la senechaussee held Saint-Jean
l'Evangeliste as their patron, taking mass at l'eglise collegiale de Notre-Dame de la
Caree in the couvent des Grand Cannes. Its feast day had initially been 27
December, but was changed by decree after 1516 to 25 November, the feast of
Sainte-Catherine.l" As at Bordeaux, the basoche du palais elected a roi annually, to
represent his corporation before the parlement, an office the basoche de la
senechaussee had been refused. Instead, they were allowed to nominate a titular
senechal each year, who would speak on behaIfofhis members before the court, but
who lacked the cachet associated with the roi de la basochel? Despite these
differences, the two corporations were governed by remarkably similar regulations,
or statuts, which standardised practices and performances at religious ceremonies,
masses, and grandes fetes, and ensured that any affiliate who required counsel would
receive representation from his corporation. 16
13 Boyer, 'La basoche Toulousaine', p. 64.
14 The basoche du palais, in fact, claimed an unbroken lineage back to king Dagobert. See Boyer, 'La
basoche Toulousaine', p, 64; Glangeaud, La basoche de Toulouse, p. 5.
IS Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I, p. 311.
16 The statuts also ensured that any affiliate who had fallen on hard times would be looked after
temporarily from a central fund. See Cau-Durban, 'Statuts de la basoche', pp. 169-74.
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Another feature that mirrored the basoche at Bordeaux was the numerous
reprimands against the Toulouse players for 'over-exuberance'. As early as May
1478, and again in May 1480, the farces and morality plays of the basoche were
censored for insulting the parlememairesl ' while in February 1524, the rot was
summoned before the Grand 'Chambre to explain recent disturbances by unruly
basochiens on the parquet of the court during a feast-day ceremony.IS In January
1537, the parlement took the unusual step of issuing an arret against Bernard de
Laroche, the incumbent roi de la basoche, to prevent his leading of the charivari
through the town, as recent sorties had ended in violence.l" Yet overall, the
parlement treated the basochiens lightly, a temperate approach that Glangeaud
attributes to the magistrates' affinity with such a 'jeunesse exuberante'.20 Dubedat
concurs, arguing that many parlementaires had been basochiens in their youth, and
thus had been guilty of this same high-spiritedness, and so were generally lenient
regarding their misdemeanours.i!
But, as the Reform movement began to make inroads across Languedoc,
other important factors began to influence the pro-Catholic parlement's acceptance
of the basoche in Toulouse. As a cumulative body, the two corporations offered
much to the court in terms of manpower, additionalmilitia in times of danger, and, of
course, finance from the various contributions paid by their affiliates. And, as a
Catholic body, the basoche could counter-balance the overt aggression of Protestant
groups within Toulouse, such as the ecolters of the local university. Again, as at
Bordeaux, the ecoliers of the university of Toulouse had gained a reputation for
17 AD Haute-Garonne, B 4, fo. 421 (17 May 1478); AD Haute-Garonne, B 5, fo. 320 (2 May 1480).
'La Farce de Maistre Pierre Pathelin' was a particular favourite of the basoche during the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, a cutting satire and caricature of royal magistrates. See Harvey, The Theatre o/the
Basoche, pp. 144-72.
18 AD Haute-Garonne, B 20, fo. 73 (8 February 1524).
19 AM Toulouse, FF 609, Il, (Arret du parlement, 28 January 1537).
20 Glangeaud, La basoche de Toulouse, p. 4.
21 Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I, p. 314.
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religious agitation within the town. In fact, the parlement had been forced to issue an
arret abolishing their confraternities as early as February 1531 to prevent any further
rise in confrontations with the basoche, followed three years later with a ban on
ecoliers from carrying arms.22 By the 1540s, the activities of the ecoiiers were
causmg real concern for the parlement. Despite a long-standing arret that
condemned all those culpable of 'sedition, violences et boutement de feu aux
estudes', gangs of ecoliers would frequently fight running battles with Spanish
residents of Toulouse.f On one occasion, in 1542, the scale of the violence was so
great that the armed huissiers from the palais failed to halt the unrest. It was only
when a band of aggrieved artisans, intent on seeking revenge for the damage done to
their homes during the fighting, joined the guard that the ecoliers were subdued, but
at a cost: two of the town's gates were badly burned and needed replacing, and many
facades on the nearby houses were ruined.24
It was during the 1550s, though, that the ecolters became a veritable threat to
the stability of Toulouse. In 1555, four young students were condemned to be burned
for inciting riots in the name of Calvinism. 25 Then, in May 1556, the parlement was
informed that the ecoliers had organised themselves into 'nations', and had elected
'prieurs, sous-prieurs, capitaines et autres officiers' to coordinate their defences,
22 Arret du parlement (27 February 1534), AM Toulouse, AA 17, no. 55. The 1530s would also see
the first of numerous ecolters burned alive for heresy. See Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de
Toulouse, I,p. 174.
23 Arret du parlement (14 May 1540), AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 35.
24 Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I, pp. 192-93. In the subsequent inquiry, the parlement
ordered several students to be executed, with many more exiled from the town, but within two years,
the court was once more forced to ban ecoliers from congregating in numbers, from carrying
weapons, and from disseminating sedition among the population. AD Haute-Garonne, B 37, fo. 458v
(31 May 1544). For similar confrontations between ecolters and Catholics at Avignon, see Venard,
Reforme protestame, pp. 438-41.
2' AM Toulouse, BB 269, fo. 74. Joan Davies has shown that the university of Toulouse had been an
important seat of Huguenot learning since the 1540s. Davies, Languedoc and its Gouverneur. p.28;
WoltJ: Histoire de Toulouse, pp. 264-69.
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discipline and rearmament, just as their counterparts in Bordeaux had done.26 The
court immediately ordered they desist from such activity, and disassemble their
'nations'. Instructions were also sent out to the clergy of Toulouse requiring that they
refrain from accommodating gatherings of ecoliers within their churches, and
demanding that all hoteliers and innkeepers report similar activity as a matter of
urgency" As the archives reveal, these orders met with only limited success.
Throughout 1560, armed bands of ecoliers roamed the streets of Toulouse with
impunity, disrupting Catholic ceremonials and damaging property." In September,
the full menace of the ecoliers was brought home to Jean de Mansencal, the premier
president of the parlement, when over four hundred ecoliers gathered outside his
house, demanding they be granted a specific place of worship within Toulouse.f" The
capitouls and parlement responded with a series of arrets aimed at restricting the
movement of the ecolters. But these had little affect. The town guard also struggled
to cope with such congregations, requesting that the basoche militia be co-opted to
help disperse the crowds on more than one occasion." Even with a more militant
Catholic government in power after 1562, the ecolters remained an irritant to the
authorities. In January 1563, cardinal Annagnac informed the crown that numerous
villains were 'vestus de la robe scolastique', making use of the ecoliers' poor
reputation by disguising themselves as students before breaking the law,3} while at
the Pre des Etudes, in July 1563, it was most definitely the ecolters who gathered in
26 AM Toulouse, AA 17, no. 210. For the organisation of nations at the University of Toulouse, and
an overview of student life there, see John Charles Dawson, Toulouse in the Renaissance (New York,
1966), pp. 95-140; Philippe Woltt: Histoire de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1974), pp. 266-67.
27 AM Toulouse, AA 17, no. 210.
28 For the unrest of 4 May 1560, see AM Toulouse, CC 1705, fo. 22. For the unrest during the
Toulousejour desjeuxfloral in 1560, see AM Toulouse, BB II, fo. 182v. For the illegal assembly of
ecolters at a prSche on rue des Vigoreux on 10 March 1560, see Germain de Lafaille, Annales de la
ville de Toulouse (2 vols., Toulouse, 1687; 1701), II, p. 207.
29 HGL, 11, p. 333.
30 Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, p. 208.
31 AM Toulouse, BB 269, fo. 89v.
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their hundreds to fight with members of the basochet" Such activity continued
intermittently throughout the decade, with further reproving arrets issued in 1565
and 1568, and numerous ecoliers brought before the courts for assembling under
'nations', electingprieurs, carrying weapons, and various other illegal activities.V
With the ecoliers ever ready to defend the Reform movement, it would be
important for the Catholic cause to find an effective champion to combat such
resilience. As at Bordeaux, this role fell to the basoche, who fought the Catholic
comer, often quite literally, on the streets of Toulouse. To counter the Calvinist
propaganda, the basoche saturated their performances with Catholic doctrine. By
contrast with Bordeaux, though, the Toulouse basoche were not drawing on the
religiosity of the confraternity of Saint-Yves for such statements of Catholic dogma.
Here, the players were very much their own masters; indeed, the basoche de la
senechaussee had possessed its own dedicated confraternity of the Holy Trinity since
1516.34 The basoche du palais would follow suit somewhat later, being granted
permission by the conseil prive to establish its own brotherhood in 1560. Vaisse-
Cibiel claims this was an overt attempt by the basoche to confirm their obedience to
the Catholic religion before the Toulousains, presumably a response to the increasing
threat of the Reform movement across the south-west."
32 Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, p. 259.
33 Arret du parlement (1565), AD Haute-Garonne, B 58, fos. 461-62; Arr~t du parlement (18 January
I 568), AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 173.
34 This confraternity of the Holy Trinity was established in November 1516, and was registered by the
senechal of Toulouse, Antoine de Rochechouart. See AD Haute-Garonne, B 20, fo. 110. See also Cau-
Durban, 'Statuts de la basoche', p. 167.
35 VaIsse-Cibiel, 'Notes retrospective sur la basoche Toulousaine', p. 227. Dub6dat reports that the
basoche du palais did, however, frequent the ceremonies of the confraternity of Saint-Yves from time
to time. They were, in fact, instrumental in decorating the chapel walls of l'eglise de Notre-Dame de
Nazareth, just inside the Porte de Montgaillard, the focal point of the veneration to Saint-Yves. One
inscription, signed by clercs de la basoche, reads: 'Sanctus Yves erat Brito, Advocatus et non latro,
Res miranda populo'. Dub6dat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I, p. 263. In an eighteenth-century
sermon dedicated to the greatness of St-Yves and his work, an avocat of the Toulouse parlement
revealed that the avocats of the confrerte de Saint- Yves were still using the church of Nazareth for
their ceremonials in 1760. See N. Ricard, Panegyrique de Saint-Yves, Patron de MM. lea Avocats
(prononce dans l'eglise de Nazareth) (Toulouse, 1764).
1II: TOULOUSE - 7/199
A further important distinction to be made between the character of
basochien and confraternal activism at these two citadels is the absence of any overt
politicisation of the confraternity of Saint-Yves at Toulouse. While Catholic
sentiment at Bordeaux was very much orchestrated by the confreres, with the
basoche essentially a cog in their machinery, the avocats at Toulouse were not so
prominent. The strong reciprocity between parlement and confraternity, so evident at
Bordeaux, was lacking; indeed, the last time the court sessions were halted for
officials to attend and participate in the Saint Yves festivitieswas May 1544. During
the 1560s, it would be the feast days of Saint-Joseph and Saint-Nicolas that saw the
court retire in respect." Thus, at Toulouse, there would be no Jean de Lange figure,
no direct intervention by the confreres in the town's affairs, and little confraternal
militancy. It would be the basoche, then, that energised the Catholic community, that
opposed the Reformers of the town, and that augmented the guard as necessary.
ConOid 1561-1562
The management and deployment of the town guard was always a
contentious issue for urban authorities during the religious wars. At Toulouse,
control over policing, security and guard patrols had traditionally been the remit of
the capitouls. Throughout the 1550s, the size of the guard at Toulouse had remained
constant: between forty to seventy men, commanded by a capitaine du guet, two
lieutenants, and eight sergents, each lodged in permanent accommodation near the
36 The feast day of Saint-Nicolas fell 00 9 May each year. For parlement observing these feasts, see
AD Haute-Garonoe, B 40, fo. 333; AD Haute-Garoone, B 54, I, fo. 282. For the last recorded
suspension of the court to respect the feast of Saint-Yves (17 May 1544), see AD Haute-Garonne, B
37, fo. 406v.
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town's prison and treasuryr" Lamouzele states that this was organised 'sur Ie modele
de l'armee royale', in that the capitouls selected the capitaine du guet, but trusted in
his judgement to elect suitable subordinates and capable soldiers." By September
1560, though, the guard was struggling to cope with the rising instances of violent
confrontation on the streets of Toulouse. The basoche had proved helpful in
emergencies, but the capitouls realised that a larger 'official' force would be required
to stave off further disorder. Thus, a subsidiary force of one hundred townsfolk was
raised, still placed under the jurisdiction of the capitaine du guet, but to be selected
by the dizainiers, twelve of which would accompany the guard in its duties each
day.39 As the scale of the unrest accelerated, though, even this measure failed to meet
the demands. By March 1561, over eighty men were being dispatched each evening
to augment the patrols, with a committee of two capitouls and several dizainiers
forced to oversee their deployment from the maison de ville.40
The Catholic parlementaires, however, took issue with these developments. It
complained to the crown that Protestant capitouis were co-opting a disproportionate
number of Huguenot citizens into the guard, who were, in turn, allowing greater
numbers of their co-religionists through the town gates." They claimed that the
crown's arrets, which aimed to prevent illicit preaching, anned assemblies, and the
distribution of seditious propaganda across Toulouse, were being compromised by
these activities, and requested that the council be forced to vet more carefully those
deployed to guard the town. 42 In response, the crown appointed a local Catholic
noble, Antoine de Lomagne, the sieur de Terride, as military governor of Toulouse
37 AM Toulouse, CC 1,705, fos. 16; 26.
38 Edmond Lamouzele, Essai sur I 'organisation et les fonctions de la compagnie du guet et de la
~arde bourgeoise de Toulouse au XVIIe au Xv/IIe steele (Tulle, 1906), p. 14.
9 Deliberations du conseil (26 September 1560), AM Toulouse, BB 11, fo, 199v.
40 AM Toulouse, BB II, fo. 224v; CC 1708, fo. 31; CC 1,699, fo. 462.
41 AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 80.
42 Specifically the two arrels of 15 January 1561, AD Haute-Garoone, B 54, I, fo, 72, and 2 May
1561, AM Toulouse, AA 18,00.71.
III: TOULOUSE· 7 / 20 I
on 1 September 1561. His remit was twofold: to act as mediator in the dispute
between parlernent and capitouls over policing and security, and to bolster royal
authority by ensuring that the crown dictates were implemented fully.43By October,
Terride had garrisoned his entire force within the walls of Toulouse, and assumed
complete authority over the town guard until further notice. The capitouls were
outraged at such an affront to their traditional prerogatives. Two of their number,
Jehan de Therunde and Bernard Puymissin, argued that the civic charter of Toulouse
placed the right to deploy and manage the town guard irrevocably in the hands of the
capitouls, and had even precluded the appointment of a town governor, or the
garrisoning of royal troops, without the consent of the town council itself." They
were unhappy, too, about the appointment of such a staunch Catholic to the
governorship. Terride had been an active supporter of the Catholic party at
Bordeaux, had served as a captain under Monluc since 1560, and had frequently
attended the councils held by cardinal Armagnac during 1561. So, with opposition
from Protestant voices within the administration growing daily, the crown was forced
to recall Terride in December 1561. His replacement, the comte de Crussol, proved
equally unpalatable to Catholics, his defection from royal office to assume the role of
Huguenot military protector in Languedoc the following year an unmitigated disaster
for the crown's reputation. 45
One factor that had made Terride's tenure at Toulouse so untenable was the
constant vitriol emanating from the polemicists of the Reformed church. With
Calvinist ministers expounding their rhetoric from the market squares, ably
supported by the chanting and parades of the ecolters, the authorities had been forced
43 AD Haute-Garonne, B 54, II, fos. 760-61; 802 .
._.AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 76.
4S Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I, p. 371; Lafaille, Annales de 10 ville de Toulouse, II,
p.210.
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to step up the policing of the streets. When Catholic polemicists responded in kind,
censorship was deemed necessary to preclude widespread violence breaking out
across the town. Here, Catholics complained that the capitouls were showing bias in
their decisions, for while very few Protestant ministers were reproached during this
time, many vocal basochien speakers were arrested for incitement, along with several
renowned Catholic preachers, such as Jean de Lana, Antoine Finet, Melchior Flavin,
and the Jesuit, Jean Palatier.t? The parlemenl, meanwhile, countered in support of the
Catholic cause, accusing the Huguenots of holding illegal preches and armed
assemblies across the region, some of which attracted crowds so large that the town
guard could not possibly police them effectively. In an attempt to standardise the
town's responses to such infractions, Catholic magistrates proposed that a meeting of
the parlementaires and capitouls be convened to resolve these controversies. But the
assembly, held on 3 February 1562, was hijacked by militant Catholics who refused
to debate with known 'heretics'. Instead, a remonstrance was presented before the
delegates, drawn up at a secret meeting of the Catholic magistrates four days
previous, listing their grievances against the Huguenot community of Toulouse."
The moderate officials at the meeting condemned this deception, and registered their
objections. The following day, however. two of the leading capitouls, Lanta and
Montesquieu, and much of the town guard, were sighted attending an illegal preche
near a faubourg of Toulouse, confirming Catholic suspicions over the religious
affiliation of certain officials. Further, it supported Catholic concerns over changes
determined by the recent royal edict of January, which had removed jurisdiction over
the siting of Huguenot assemblies from the parlement, and transferred it into the
46 HE, I, pp. 903-904. See also Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, p. 208.
47 For 'Remonstrances faites aux capitouls sur les exces commis par les protestants' (31 January
1562), see AD Hautc>Garonne, B 55, Co. 174. For meeting ofparlement and capitouis of3 February,
see AD Hautc>Garonne, B 55, Co. 178.
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hands of the capitouls. As their surveillance had borne out, how could justice be
served in this matter when those determining policy were attending the preches
themselves?"
Several commentators have suggested that a syndicat, similar to that
operating at Bordeaux, was established within the parlement of Toulouse at this time
as a result of Catholic frustrations. This hypothesis is based exclusively on two
references within the Histoire Ecclesiastique. The first, dated March 1562, reports
'un conseil, oil ils feirent un enroulement secret des syndique, soliciteurs, capitaines,
diseniers et soldats, avec resolution d'extirper tous ceux de la religion' .49 Headed by
two Catholic presidents, Latomyand du Tournoir, and boasting eleven conseillers,
four avocats and seven procureurs, this conseil was, to the Histoire, as real a
syndicat as Lange's corporation at Bordeaux had been the previous year. The second
reference concerns a letter, dated April 1562, purportedly from the duke of Guise,
reporting that the king had decided to revoke the edict of January; as such, all
adherents of the Reformed faith were now to be viewed as guilty of lese majeste. The
Histoire alleges that the missive was addressed to the Catholic conseil within the
parlement of Toulouse, and carried from Paris by a militant conseiller of the court,
Pierre de la Costa.so Philippe Tamizey de Larroque believes this association existed
only on paper, while Mark Greengrass cautions that it may well have been
'constructed with an element of hindsight by the author of the Toulouse section of
the Htstoire'." He argues that any such entity at Toulouse was more likely to have
been a response by disenchanted judges and lawyers to the proposed alienation of
church property in late 1561, than a concerted effort to energise Catholic activists
41 AM Toulouse. BB 269, Co. 81 (4 February 1562).
49 HE, I,p. 911.
so HE, I,pp. 824-25; 911.
,. Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, 'Lettres in6dites du Cardinal d' Annagnac', Collection Meridionale,
V (paris, Bordeaux. 1874), p. 26; Greengrass, 'The anatomy of a religious riot', pp. 370-77.
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against the Huguenots in 1562. Also, the realisation of such an overt organisation
would require widespread support from the officers of the parlement, but this study
has already indicated a reluctance among many avocats to engage in systematic
Catholic activity during this time. So while they may have been prepared to resist the
alienation of church lands, they would have been less willing to support the syndicat
in its confrontation with the Reformers. Denis Crouzet, though, is more emphatic in
his evaluation of events. For Crouzet, the syndicat not only existed, but it was very
much a manifestation of Catholic angst at the concessions granted to the Reformed
church by the edict of January, the subsequent exclusion of the parlement from
jurisdiction over the sites of Reformed worship, and the establishment of a Huguenot
consistoire within the town in February. Further, he sees the syndicat as a milestone
in the evolution of Catholic activism at Toulouse, the first step in a progression
through ever-increasing levels of militant Catholicism that would culminate in the
hegemony of the Sainte Union after 1584.s2
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of surviving archival material at Toulouse to
endorse Crouzet's theory. At Bordeaux, the political and financial machinations of
the syndical left a discerruble trail within the registres du parlemenl and assorted
administrative paperwork of the period. Similar records, such as litigation,
contestation versus the capitouls, accounts and correspondence, are nowhere to be
found at Toulouse. In filet, as stated, the Histoire Ecclesiastique is the only work that
makes any mention of a syndical here. This would suggest one of three possibilities:
that the syndical did not exist, and was constructed at a later date by commentators
keen to validate or decry Catholic actions in early 1562; that the syndical existed, but
was far less vocal than the demonstrative entity so discermble at Bordeaux; or that it
S2 Crouzet. Les guerriers de Dieu, I, pp. 380-81.
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did exist, but evidence of its activities, like so much archival material relating to
Catholic activities during the religious wars, was destroyed by defeated Ligueurs in
the late 1590s, keen to erase any references to their past misdemeanours. The
syndicat at Toulouse, then, can be justifiably described as a chimera, the tag so
incorrectly applied to Lange's association within the parlement at Bordeaux.
Insurrection of 1562
The arrival of Easter, with its numerous provocative confessional festivities,
ensured that the spring of 1562 would see an explosion of sectarian tension at
Toulouse. The first critical event occurred on 2 April, with the appropriation of a
corpse from a Reformed burial service by a Catholic procession. Their aim was to
bury the body within the local Catholic cemetery, but the ensuing confrontation
between the congregations meant that the town guard was needed to restore order.
When several Huguenots later attempted to seize the maison de ville, the situation in
Toulouse seemed in danger of racing out of control. The capitouls and
parlementaires managed to effect a truce, though, by offering each side significant
military concessions: the Huguenots were allowed to maintain two hundred unarmed
guards to protect their communities; the Catholics a similar force, commanded by
four professional captains. 53 But these concessions failed to secure detente, as the
four Catholic captains were unwilling to take orders from the capitouls, and refused
to allow their men to assist in the search of Catholic houses for hidden weapons. 54 In
May, further contestation flared between the faiths, with the decision by the senechal
and parlement of Toulouse to convoke the ban-et-arriere ban to secure the town
.53 This account is taken from Greengrass, 'The anatomy of a religious riot', pp. 373-74 .
.54 HE, III, p. 8.
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against the threat of insurrection. As they had with Terride's garrison troops, the
capitouls of Toulouse objected vehemently to the presence of the ban within the
town, citing clauses within the civic charter that prevented armed soldiers gathering
within Toulouse without their consent. The parlement, though, ignored these
protests, and on 10 May, over two hundred, mostly Catholic, armed nobles gathered
in the streets of Toulouse.55 But it would be the Huguenots that seized the initiative
first. In the early hours of 13 May, barricades were erected at strategic junctures of
the town, and Protestants overran the maison de ville. For Catholics, there was a very
real possibility that control of Toulouse would soon be lost to the rebels. Subsequent
events have been well documented in recent years, so will not be detailed here. 56 The
response of the Catholic leadership, however, does need to be examined, to evaluate
its capacity to organise and counter the insurrection.
The first reaction of the Catholic magistrates within the parlement was to
send for the leading Catholic captains of the region: Monluc, Terride, Negrepelisse
and Bellegarde. While Monluc and Bellegarde moved to intercept a Huguenot relief
army travelling south, Terride and Negrepelisse arrived at Toulouse the following
day and deployed their troops. 57 Requests for help had also been dispatched to
neighbouring Catholic nobles, and within twenty-four hours Fourquevaulx, Gaston
de Foix, and the sieurs de Cauni, Bazordan, Dandofielle, Verdale, Gardouch, Ricaud
55 AM Toulouse, BB 104, fo. 530.
S6 For contemporary material relating to the insurrection at Toulouse in May 1562 see AD Haute-
Garonne, B 55, fos. 414v-15. For proces-verbal written in October 1563, see AM Toulouse, GO 824,
fos. 22-27. For contemporary Catholic version of events see AM Toulouse, GO 1022 (Georges
Bosquet, Sur les troubles advenus en la ville de tolose I 'an 1562). For later Catholic version of events,
see Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, pp. 217-43. For later Protestant version. see HE. Ill,
pp. 1-37. Two further accounts cover the uprising in varying degrees of detail: E. Connac, 'Les
troubles de mai 1562 a Toulouse', Annales du Midi, 3 (1891), pp. 310-39; and Greengrass, 'The
anatomy of a religious riot', pp. 367-91. The Greengrass article has an excellent overview of
historiographical material relating to the uprising, see especially pp. 367-71.
57 BN nouv. acq. fr, 6,001, fos. 136-37. Ironically, Terride and Negrepelisse had been ordered by the
aown to secure Toulouse only five days earlier, but could not travel to the town in time to prevent the
insurrection.
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and Savignac had all entered Toulouse along with their armed retinues." The
Catholic response was directed from the parlement building by the premier
president, Mansencal, and presidents Latomy and de Paulo, from which, according to
Bosquet and the Histoire Ecclestastique, ad hoc conunittees were set up to collect
finances, to oversee the distribution of arms and artillery, and to interrogate
suspects. S9 The town guard was also reorganised to make it more effective. Firstly,
the main body was divided into smaller sections, to allow each unit to be deployed
more rapidly, and to target more specific areas of the town. Sixty additional
Catholics were then levied to boost the numbers, and experienced military veterans
appointed as captains and sergeants to command each division, replacing the civilian
officers who had led the guard in peacetime. Precise routes were devised for each
patrol, passwords were required at each checkpoint or barricade, and all Catholics of
the town were required to wear a white cross, sewn onto the garments to indicate
their confession. Finally, strict regulations were drawn up to govern the conduct and
discipline of the guard, with disobedience punishable by death. 60 Then, on 19 May,
the Catholic leadership summarily dismissed those Huguenot capitouls and
magistrates who had not yet fled the town, filling their offices with trusted
Catholics." Even moderate Catholics came under suspicion, the most prominent
being the president, Dufaur, who was accused of aiding and abetting the
insurrectionists. Dufaur was only saved from the ignominy of arrest and prosecution
SI Lafilille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, pp. 226-28.
S9 Again, the Histoire Ecclesiastique attributes this response to the Catholic syndicat, HE, III, p. 20-
40. Bosquet also alludes to this Catholic collective, but does not give it a formal title. See AM
Toulouse, GG 1,022 (15 May 1562).
60 AM Toulouse, EE 26 (May 1562). See also AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 4.
61 The parlement appointed Guillaume La Laine, bourgeois, Jehan de Borderia, avocat, Pierre Madron
Ie jeune, Francois de Saint-Felix. docteur, Ramon Alies, avocot, Etienne de Rabestans, seigneur de
Colomiers, Gaston du Pin, bourgeois, Lament de Puybisque, seigneur de la Landelle. Their oath of
office was sworn the same day, 19 May, before the premier president Jehan de Masencal, and
presidents Antoine de Paulo, Jehan Daffis, Nicolas Latomy and Michel Dufam. AM Toulouse. AA
18, no. 88.
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by the personal intervention of MonIuc, who vouched for his long-time friend's
orthodox beliefs.62
Retribution followed recrimination. On 16 June, the capitou/, Adhemar
Mandinelli, was condemned for his part in the unrest, his goods confiscated and sold
off to contribute towards the repair of the town. 63More purges followed in July, with
the Huguenot capitou/s, Pierre du Cedre, Guillaume Dareau, Pierre Hunault,
seigneur de Lanta, Ramond de Vignes, seigneur de Montesquieu, Pierre Assezat,
Antoine Ganelon and Olivier Pastorel, all condemned in absentia, their effigies hung
in the Place Saint-George before a vociferous Catholic crowd. Each was banished
from Toulouse in perpetuity, fined 100,000 livres, and excluded, along with their
heirs, from the nobility." As a warning, the court ordered that their sentences be read
out each 17 May to remind people of the ever-present dangers posed by the presence
of Huguenots within society.6S The replacement of suspect capitou/s with trusted
Catholics had an immediate benefit. Before the insurrection, any sizeable
deployment of Catholic troops or militia onto the streets of Toulouse would elicit
complaints from the capitou/s, who referred appellants to the relevant clause of their
ubiquitous civic charter. Now, though, as most of the capitou/s were new appointees,
orthodox in their religious stance, the protestations against Catholic troops on the
streets fell away.66
62 Dubedat, Hlstoire du parlemem de Toulouse, I, p. 398. Dufaur had served as ajuge au presidial at
Toulouse (1531-1535), juge-mage at Toulouse (1535-1547), president du parlement at Toulouse
(1557-1572), and was appointed conseiller au Grand'Conseil in May 1556. See Commentaries, p.
1,249 note 3. For accusations and subsequent enquiry into the role of'Dufaur in the insurrection of
May 1562, see AM Toulouse, GO 826 (17 May 1562).
63 AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 89. The sale ofMandinelli's property raised 1,000 ltvres.
64 AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 1.
6S AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 96.
66 AD Haute-Garonne, B 55, fa. 569. It should be noted that as soon as the Huguenot officials were
reinstated at Toulouse, by royal decree in November 1562, they demanded that all Catholic troops
vacate the town immediately, and that the privileges of the civic corporation be respected once more
in full.
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The Catholic victory over the insurrection of May 1562 owed much to the
willingness of the nobility, magistrates, bourgeoisie and minor officials of Toulouse
to unite in defence of the town. This chapter has revealed that the Catholic
community had great experience in being energised by elements within society, with
the activities of the basoche, during the 1540 and 1550s, and the militant officers of
the parlement during 1560-1562. While the presence of a definitive syndicat is
difficult to prove, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that a conseil of leading
Catholics of the court coordinated affairs at Toulouse during this time, and was thus
well placed to formulate a response to the insurrection of May 1562. Certainly, the
parlement was effusive in its praise of leading activists: acclaimingthe actions of its
Catholic magistrates to the crown, and commending the senechal, Bellegarde, for his
participation in the defence of the town. Interestingly, the court urged the king to
grant Bellegarde certain ecclesiasticalbenefices as a reward for his actions, as such a
move would 'stimuler Ie zele des defenseurs de l'eglise,.67 The nobility were also
praised, especially Monluc, of whom Raymond de Pavie, baron de Fourquevaux,
wrote: without Monluc' s actions, 'ledicte ville de Tholose estoit perdu'. 68
In Chapter 8, the consequences of such solid foundations will be examined,
assessing the three most significant episodes of Catholic activism at Toulouse during
the decade: the oath-bound ligue of March 1563, the Catholic coalition
administration of 1567-1570, and the croisade of September 1568. Although quite
diverse in their nature and ambitions, these bodies all show characteristics COmmon
in their sister associations at Agen and Bordeaux at this time. They also reveal a
maturation of Catholic responses, both to the Protestant threat, and to contention with
67 Parlement of Toulouse to Charles IX (18 July 1562), AD Haute-Garonne, B 1,906, fo. 7SV;
Parlement of Toulouse to Pius IV (13 November 1562), AD Haute-Garonne, B 1,906, fo. 84.
68 Fourquevaux to Saint-Sulpice (17 June 1562), Csbie, Guerres de religion dans Ie sud-ouest, pp. 4-5.
III: TOULOUSE - 7/210
the crown over religious toleration, so that, by 1570, Toulouse would be established
as an unassailable Catholic stronghold of the south-west.
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Chapter 8. Wider Catholic activism: Toulouse. 1563-1570
Following the drama of the Protestant coup in May 1562, Catholics at Toulouse
could be forgiven for thinking that their control of the town had been re-established.
By August. the parlement and town council had been purged of Huguenot
sympathisers, the town guard had been bolstered, and Catholic nobles and their
retinues patrolled the hinterland. In September, they received further good news,
with the promotion of their leading militant stalwart, cardinal Armagnac, to the
office of lieutenant pour le roi en la ville et senechaussee de Toulouse: But, as
would happen many times during the religious wars, this would be a false dawn.
Across Languedoc. the anny of Symphorien de Durfort, the sieur de Duras, one of
the most able Protestant captains of the period, won a series of stunning victories,
securing Montauban, Pamiers and Castres for the Huguenots. Toulouse was now
more isolated than ever and, in October, Armagnac informed the crown that
Catholics were preparing for the imminent assault by Duras.2 News that the crown
intended to grant an amnesty to all prisoners taken during the recent sectarian
conflict only added to the sense of disbelief at Toulouse, as the town's prisons held a
number of defeated Protestant captains. 3
I AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 103 (1 September 1562); AD Haute-Garonne, B 55, fo. 512. George,
cardinal d' Armagnac. Born 1500. Bishop ofRodez (1529), bishop ofVabre (1536), bishop ofLescar
(1555), cardinal of Toulouse (1544), archbishop of Toulouse (17 August 1562). See Abbe Cayre,
Histoire des eveques et archeveques de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1873), pp. 329-31.
2 Cardinal d' Armagnac to Catherine de Medici (14 October 1562), AM Bordeaux, ms 299, Cos. 127-
29. Things got even worse for the Catholic party at Toulouse in October 1562, when it was reported
that the lieutenant-general of the province, Antoine de Crussol, had defected to the Huguenot cause.
3 The crown declared its amnesty in September 1562, ordering the release of all religious prisoners
capture:ct during the wars. The parlement of Toulouse refused to validate this, sending a eonsetller,
Francois de la Garde, to the crown to report Catholic disenchantment at such a policy. The king
refused to be moved, and confirmed the amnesty via a second tJrI'it of Rouen, 9 November 1562.
Dubedat, Histoire du parlemem de Toulouse, I, p. 401.
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In early December, rumour was rife that Duras and Crussol intended to
'hijack' the etats de Languedoc, due to open later that month at Carcassonne, to
extort yet more concessions on behalf of the Reformers. Annagnac convened a secret
assembly of Catholic leaders at Toulouse to decide on a response." Present at the
congress were the region's leading Catholics: Armagnac; cardinal Lorenzo Strozzi,
bishop of Albi, and lieutenant du roi in the Albigeois; three presidents of the
parlement, Jean Daffis, Antoine de Paulo and Michel Dufaur, now back in favour;
and many of the recently-appointed Catholic capitouls and magistrates' The
Catholic military were represented too, with Monluc and the sieurs de Terride,
Negrepelisse, Joyeuse and Forquevaux in attendance." The delegates agreed that
Monluc and his troops should be called from Agen to guard Toulouse and its
environs for the duration of the etats.7 While Monluc boasts in his Commentaires
that Armagnac 'ne me falloit pas semondre deux fois',8 in reality, he may well have
been reluctant to launch military action from Toulouse; Monluc's military
jurisdiction lay in Guyenne, authority for campaigns initiated from Toulouse would
need to be sanctioned by the provincial governor, Anne de Montmorency, who
Monluc had already fallenfoul of on several occasions.
Monluc obliged, though, and the arrival of his troops was sufficient to force
Duras to cancel his interjection at the etats, allowing the assemblyto proceed without
disruption. Free from this threat, Catholic delegates dominated the proceedings. After
.. Monluc informed the crown that he had been called to the etats at Carcassonne at the request of
Armagnac and the parlemem. Monluc to Catherine de Medici (10 December 1562), BN ms fr, 15,877,
fo.446.
5 On 1 June 1562, Strozzi was given responsibility for keeping the peace in Languedoc during the
absence of the provincial governor, the due de Montmorency. AD Haute-Garonne, B 1,906, fo. 57.
6 Monluc to Catherine de Medici (10 December 1562), Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 182-
85.
7 The mayor of Bordeaux, Antoine de Noailles, wrote that Monluc had been summoned to Toulouse
by Armagnac to 'surveiller les agissements de Crussol pendant la tenue des Etats de Languedoc a
Carcassonne', Antoine de N08i11es to Catherine de Medici (7 December 1562), AHG, 17, p. 284.
B Commeniaires, p. 576.
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venting their frustration at the crown's recent bias towards the Reformers, a motion
calling for the raising of 300,000 livres to fund the reclamation of Catholic lands lost
during the fighting was passed by a large majority, the sum to be amassed through
donations from the clergy, the sale of sequestered Huguenot property, and a new tax
on non-Catholic citizens." To facilitate this, a register of all those attending Easter
mass across Languedoc was to be compiled, with those absent required to pay a tax
contribution or face expulsion from the province. The etats elected Armagnac and
Joyeuse as co-chairmen of the fund, with proven 'bons catholiques' appointed as
commissioners to run the day-to-day collection and distribution. 10
In a letter to Catherine de Medici, Monluc related how recent Catholic
initiatives had forged a close bond between the leadership at Toulouse, a unity that
would, in his opinion, greatly enhance the prospects for security among the Catholic
towns of Languedoc. 11 Monluc also informed the regent that Armagnac, Daffis, de
Paulo and Dufaur were sponsoring the campaign of Bellegarde, to be elected to the
office of senechal of Toulouse. Although the alternative candidate, Jacques de
Peyrusse, sieur de Merville, was an equally staunch Catholic, and, as the brother of
the Bordeaux governor, d'Escars, was known to many across the region, the Catholic
leadership felt Merville to be politically inexperienced, and preferred to promote one
of their own trusted captains to serve in this extremely important office.
Armagnac's authority at Toulouse was increasing, as his closest allies gained
promotion to the important offices: in January 1563, Bellegarde was elected
senechal, and Jean Daffis was appointed premier president of the parlement, to
9 Armagnac to Charles IX (22 December 1562), BN ms fr, 15,877, fo. 468.
10 For text of deliberations of etats de Languedoc at Carcassonne (II to 27 December 1562), see AD
Haute-Garonne, C 2,281, fos. 113-56.
II Monluc wrote that he would remain in Toulouse to assist Armagnac, Joyeuse and the parlement,
under Dams, in their organisation against the Reformers. Monluc to Catherine de Medici (28
December 1562), BN ms fr, 15,877, Cos. 473-74.
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replace the deceased Jean de Mansencal.12 Further empire building occurred in
February, with Armagnac and Monluc presenting I 'ordre du roy to two prominent
Catholic captains, Negrepelisse and Forquevaux, at a lavish ceremony at Toulouse
cathedral." Later that same month, Jean Barthelemy, president aux enquetes, ordered
that 500 Iivres be employed 'a la construction et a l'entretien du college des
Jesuites'." Barthelemy was undoubtedly working under orders from Armagnac, as
the re-establishing of Jesuit influence at Toulouse had long been a priority for the
cardinal. In 1561, he had permitted a number of Jesuit refugees fleeing from Pamiers
to reside in the old Augustinian monastery on rue Saint-Jerome, and supported their
petition for permanent residency before the parlement. 15
It was sometime in January 1563, too, that Armagnac and Monluc held secret
talks over the state of Catholic affairs in Languedoc.i" Little is known about this
meeting, but immediately afterwards the Catholic party at Toulouse was preparing
for all-out war. The registres du parlement show that Monluc was awarded a
monthly payment of 500 livres to coordinate Catholic defensive strategy at
Toulouse.!" while Strozzi and Forquevaux were each charged with procuring large
quantities of cannon balls and gunpowder, from Marseille and Narbonne
respectively, to be stockpiled at a location of the general's choosing." Monluc
busied himself with the organising of his military forces. He appointed Terride and
12 Bellegarde was appointed senechal of Toulouse on 14 January 1563, AD Haute-Garonne, B 1,906,
fo. 83v. Daffis defeated fellow Catholics Antoine de Paulo, presidem, and Bertrand Deygua, avocat-
~eneral, in the December 1562 elections AD Haute-Garonne, B 55, fo. 575v.
3 The bishops ofCastres and ofTarbes, and many leading Catholic nobles of the region were present
at the ceremony. AM Toulouse, BB 269, fo. 89v.
14 AD Haute-Garonne, B 56, fo. 178.
IS AD Haute-Garonne, B 58, fo. 79. This application would be granted on 20 January 1563. For the
history of the Jesuits in Toulouse, see Jules Chalande, 'Les etablissements des Jesuites a Toulouse au
XVIe et XVIle sieele', Journal de Toulouse, 29 (August 1926), pp. 1-35; Lafaille, Annales de la ville
de Toulouse, I, pp. 278-280; P. Delattre, L 'etablissement de Jesuites en France (5 vols., Engheim,
1949-57), IV, p. 1,274.
16 For these secret meetings, see HGL, 5, p. 249.
17 AM Toulouse, BB 269, fo. 89v.
18 Commentaires, p. 576.
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Gondrin as his seconds-in-command, and signed an ordonnance that guaranteed
Catholic garrisons of Guyenne one month's pay, allowing his captains to remain in
Languedoc to levy the local gens de pied at Toulouse and at Perigueux, and himself
time to concentrate on affairs at Toulouse. 19
Monluc also spent a great deal of energy bolstering Catholic defences at
Agen during this time. On 4 February, he oversaw the 'Association et confederation
entre les manans et habitans de la dite ville d' Agen'. 20 This represented a definite
shift in Catholic sentiment, reflecting disillusionment with the crown's perceived
sympathy towards the Reformers, its amnesty to Protestant prisoners, and its
determination to pursue accommodatory policies despite recent heavy defeats of the
Huguenot army. The following week, intelligence gathered at Bordeaux and Madrid
suggested that Armagnac intended to reproduce the Agen ligue at Toulouse, placing
it under the auspices of the parlement, with Monluc as its military chief.21 Certainly,
all indications intimated that Catholic patience had finally run out with the
Huguenots at Toulouse. On 3 February, the parlement requested, and was granted,
crown permission to confiscate all goods and property from any Reformer found
guilty of causing unrest within Toulouse.f In the town, the capitouis consented to
increased patrols of the town guard, the expulsion of all vagabonds and known
troublemakers, and the deployment of spies to watch the houses of suspect
Huguenots.r'
19 Ordonnances de Monluc (4-6 March 1563), Ruble, Commentaires et lettres, IV, pp. 199-201; 201-
202.
20 Ordonnance deMonluc (4 February 1563), Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 190-95.
21 The captain Peyrot announced Monluc's participation in the creation of a /igue at Toulouse to the
Bordeauxparlement as early as 9 February 1563. Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, p. 347, note I.Armagnac's
secretary, la Rivoire, reported to the Spanish ambassador that the cardinal and Monluc were at work
together in Toulouse during mid-February 1563. La Rivoire to Saint-Sulpice (14 February 1563),
Cable, Guerres de religion dans Ie sud-ouest, p. 23.
22 Catherine de Medici to parlement of Toulouse (3 February 1563), AM Toulouse, AA 44, no. 22;
Charles IX to parlement of Toulouse (3 February 1563), AM Toulouse, AA 44, no. 23.
23 AM Toulouse, BB 107, fos. 178-80.
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Arrnagnac's plan to remove jurisdiction over the town guard from the town
council did not sit well with the capitouls. The cardinal no longer had confidence in
this body, as the crown had forced the Toulouse government to reinstate those
suspect capitouls evicted from office after the insurrection of the previous year.
Annagnac intended to restructure the guard, employing six Catholic captains, each
with a corps of one hundred armed men, to patrol the streetsr" The capitouls
attempted to stall over the issue, but were forced to comply in early March, when the
premier president, Daffis, sent troops to remove the keys to the town gates and hand
them over to the cardinal's captains." That the capitouls conceded to both requests is
testimony to the authority of the Catholic party in Toulouse at this time, but it may
also point to a tacit willingness of the more moderate civic officials to comply with
Catholic directives in order to ensure the security of the town, even if that came at
the price of temporary loss of prerogatives.
The reports concerning Armagnac's intention to establish a /igue at Toulouse
were correct. On 2 March 1563, leading Catholics gathered in the cathedral of Saint-
Etienne to endorse the 'Traite d'association et ligue de ceux de Toulouse pour la
deffense de 1a religion Catbolique'r'" All the usual suspects were present -
Annagnac, Strozzi, Daffis, de Paulo, Dufaur, Monluc, Terride, Negrepelisse, and
Bellegarde - as were most of the town's officials and leading bourgeoisie, and many
from the Catholic noblesse du pais. Unlike the contracts at Agen and Cadillac, which
were ostensibly blueprints for Catholic counter-action against the Reformed church,
the traite d'association at Toulouse also outlined expected standards of social
24 AM Toulouse, BB 269, £0. 89.
2S AM Toulouse, BB 107, fo. 296.
26 'Traite d'association et Jigue de ceux de Toulouse pour la deffense de la religion Catholique', AM
Toulouse, AA 18, no. 110. For secondary material relating to the Toulouse tigue, its oath and the
pledge to take up arms to defend Catholic religion wherever necessary, see HE, III, pp. 60-65; HGL,
S, p. 249; Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, p. 254; II, Preuves, p. 62; Lecler, 'Aux origines
de la Ligue', p. 196.
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behaviour and religious observance for Catholics. It was stark, too, in its assertion
that all Catholics were to sign up to and support the association without delay and
without exception. Anyone that contravened its directives would be heavily fined."
With so many magistrates in attendance at the oath-taking ceremony, there
was little trouble ratifying the ligue before the parlement. This occurred on 20
March, with orders that copies of the traite d'association be distributed across the
province to be 'proclamer vois de trompe et cri public par toutes les villes et lieux
notables dudit ressort,.28 This appears to have been a deliberate attempt by the
Catholic hierarchy to legitimise its association by employing the protocols usually
reserved for the publication of royal edicts. Of course, the standard clauses had been
written into the text to protect the Catholics from charges of subversion: that the
/igue had been 'faite par grande necessite pour conserver ledit ressort et pays de
l'invasion de toutes parts des ennemis', and that it existed only 'sous Ie bon plaisir du
roy' .29 In reality, though, the ligueurs at Toulouse paid little attention to the wishes
of the crown. Soon after its registration, Armagnac and Daffis imposed a new tax on
the Huguenot population to finance the stockpiling of arms and munitions, despite
such tariffs requiring royal consent"
Yet, just as at Agen, Bordeaux and Cadillac, Catholic aspirations were
negated by the arrival of the Peace of Amboise, on 8 April 1563, with its clause
banning allloca1 associations from the towns and countryside of France. 3 I Although
the edict was not fully ratified until the arrival of the new governor of Languedoc,
27 AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 110.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 For details of spending and taxation imposed by Cardinal d' Anoagnac, the Toulouseparlement, and
fellow Catholic sponsors of the March /igue during this period, especially for funding of troops for
Monluc, Terride, Gondrin and other captains, see AM Toulouse, CC 1,939 (War taxation and
sr:!ding in Toulouse, 16May 1562 - 30 April 1563).
3 The edict of Amboise was dispatched to Toulouse on 19 March 1563, carried by the seigneur de
Caylus. It arrived on 8 April, and was provisionally registered by the parlement the fullowingweek,
on 15April. AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 19.
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Henri de Montmorency-Damville, on 21 July 1563, the Catholic leadership at
Toulouse, most of whom were crown officials themselves, had little option other
than to dissolve their /igue with immediate effect.32 Reaction to this setback was
mixed. Armagnac spared little time in warning Catherine de Medici of the dangers
further concessions to the Huguenots would have on the fragile nature of affairs in
Languedoc." Monluc, on the other hand, was more reserved. With one eye on the
possibility of promotion, his main concern at this time was to be seen to be towing
the royal line, even if it meant compromising his militant tendencies temporarily,"
He thus retreated to his home at Estillac while the edict was debated, involving
himself with affairs at Agen. Interestingly, while the court ratified the Peace of
Amboise in April 1563, Armagnac refused to publish the edict or display it anywhere
in the province, claiming it to be so unpopular that it would rile the Catholic
populace into civil disobedience. This was in contrast to the traite d'association,
which had been widely distributed and proclaimed from the street comer of every
Catholic town in the gouvemement of Toulouse. 3S
32 AD Haute-Garoone, B 56, fo. 472v.
33 'Nous etions en grand dangier d'une sedition populaire ... et maintenant que les adversaires ont
occupe ce pays, tous se mettent en annes pour les en chasser et exterminer de tout, sans que je ny
puisse remedier, de tant que Ie peuple crie tout hault contre moy que soubz ombre de cette paixje leur
veux laysser coupper la gorge aux champs et permectre aux ennemys de venir prendre ceste ville,
qu'ils tiennent desja comme assiegee'. Cardinal d' Armagnac to Catherine de Medici (13 April 1563),
AM Bordeaux, ms 299, fos. 116-19.
34 Monluc alluded to this expedient approach in his Commemaires, reporting that the king 'me
commanderent m'en retourner et faire bien observer les edicts de Ia paix, ce que j'ay tousjours faict',
adding that, 'et ne fut point qu'on die que la guerre ait jamais commence par mon gouvernement'.
Commentaires, p. 589.
35 Armagnac informed the crown on 16 April 1563 that 'les messieurs de ceste court de parlelDent,
lacquelle ce matin, en audience, a faict lire, publier et enrigistrer la patente de sa m~este sur Iewet de
la dicte paix, sans restrictions ou modifications'. Cardinal d' Armagnac to Catherine de Medici (16
April 1563), AM Bordeaux, ms 299, fos. 120-22.
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Historiography of the ligue at Toulouse, March 1563
The premature censoring of the ligue at Toulouse ensured that it has been
treated in the historiography of the religious wars with much the same diffidence as
the associations at Agen and Cadillac. This is puzzling considering the tangible
revisions that were made to the town's taxation and militia-levyingstructures by the
Catholic leadership, and especially the controversial punitive measures taken against
local Huguenot communities to finance the Catholic war effort. Such legislativeclout
was certainly not available to the activists at Agen and Bordeaux, nor to the Catholic
nobles at Cadillac. Several commentators have explored these events in greater
detail. Ruble, for example, has speculated that the ligue at Toulouse (equally the
ligue at Agen of the previous month) was born out of a maelstrom of Catholic
disenchantment at crown policy. He sees the exasperation of militant delegates at the
etats de Languedoc of December 1562 as the breeding ground for both associations,
and claims that Armagnac, Strom, Daffis and Monluc drew up templates for the
ligues during this assembly. For Ruble, this sheds new light on the secret meeting
between Arrnagnac and Monluc earlier that month, and explains why the two ligues
were so similar in structure, oath and intent.36 If this is correct, then perhaps the
mobilisation of troops and annaments under Monluc in January and February 1563,
which was coordinated and funded from Toulouse, was also part of this plan, to
create an independent Catholic army able to be deployed in the interests of the
ligueurs throughout the south-west.
De Lamar Jensen, on the other hand, points out that the text of the traite
d'association encouraged participation from a broad spectrum of the community, and
36 Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 190, note I; HGL, 5, p. 249.
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should not be seen entirely as a tool of the Catholic elite. For Jensen, the involvement
of the middle and lower orders, even if they were ultimately directed by the elites, is
an important characteristic of the early ligues of the south-west, suggesting that
social and communal motivations drove Catholic activism at grass roots level just as
much as the political and religious controversies that devoured Armagnac, Daffis and
the other Catholic magistrates.'? The involvement of the basoche in the defence of
Catholicism in Toulouse tends to bear out Jensen's theory. Here, street performances
by minor and apprentice officials of the court were able to energise the wider
community, and to force their superiors to instigate organised activity, all in the
name of protecting the Catholic religion.
Mark Greengrass, in his study of the later Sainte Union, accepts that a broad
spectrum of society was involved in the activities of this early ligue, but suggests that
confraternal activism, and leadership from the clergy, were at best minor elements of
Arrnagnac's COrpUS.38 He argues that contributions to Catholic associations were
rarely autonomous, due to the rigid infrastructure of governing bodies:
Individuals from the parlement of Toulouse played a leading part in their
organisation, and the ressort of the parlement was regularly used to delineate their
region. The parlement legalised them and encouraged neighbouring towns and
nobles to join movements, which it saw as self-defensive organisms to supplement
the efforts of the local governors and seneschals."
Denis Crouzet, in contrast, places far more emphasis on the penitential ethos driving
the ligue at Toulouse. For Crouzet, Armagnac's association was an amalgam of
37 'II est utile et expedient d'ordonner que confederation et association sera faite entre I'etat
ecciesiastique, la noblesse et Ie commun du tiers estat des habitans des villes, dioceses, senechaussees,
vigueries, et juridictions du ressort du pariernent de Toulouse, soit du pays de Languedoc ou de
Guyenne, sous le bon plaisir du Royet de ladite cour'. AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 110. See De Lamar
Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism. Bernadino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League
(Cambridge,Mass., 1964), p. 39.
38 Mark Greengrass, 'The Sainte Union in the provinces: The case of Toulouse', Sixteenth Century
Journal, XIV, 4, (1983), pp. 471-72.
39 Greengrass, 'The Sainte Union in the provinces', p. 471.
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sorts, possessing both an elite head and a more inclusive body, with magistrates,
nobles, clergy, bourgeoisie and citizens all active in their own way, each empowered
to fulfil their respective, if disparate goals. Contemporary visions of its nature were
far from cohesive: some desired the association to defend their traditions and
prerogatives; others that it protect their space and property; others that it inflict
violence upon, or bring to justice, heretics and villains. The ligue, then, had to be
strong, yet malleable, able to cater for various interested groups, but also to unify
Catholics under a single banner. To Crouzet, it was even a precursor to later
crusading ideology at Toulouse, its raison d'etre no longer simply the defence of the
Catholic faith and the curtailment of Huguenot injustice, but the reinvigoration of the
Catholic Church across France, and the rest of Europe ifpossible."
It would be wrong, however, to suppose that Catholic activism was only
effective through formal oath-bound organisations. This study has already shown that
Catholic solidarity was possible outside the confines of affiliation to a particular
association, with independent activists prominent at Bordeaux and Agen throughout
the 1550s. At Toulouse, although Catholics were now denied their structured ligue,
they still continued to dominate political and military affairs within the town. After
all, the highest offices were still held by Catholics, and the Catholic nobility still
patrolled the immediate countryside, even if Monluc had retired to Agen. As if to
reinforce this continuing hegemony, the Catholic leadership at Toulouse ordered all
serving officials to profess their faith publicly before cardinal Armagnac. On 10 May
1563, those willing to comply filed up to the altar of the town's cathedral to swear
'vivre et mourir en l' observation des constitutions et foy de la sainte mere esglise
catholicque et romaine'." Those that refused were duly ostracised from government.
40 Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, pp. 380-86.
41 AD Haute-Garonne, B 56, fos. 285·96v (10 May 1563).
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Dubedat reports that, once more, all the leading Catholics of the region were in
attendance to add weight to the proceedings.f This caused consternation at the royal
court, as the terms of the March edict had clearly specified that all town
administrations should no longer discriminate over the confession of its serving
officials. The crown immediately dispatched two maitres des requetes from Paris to
force Armagnac and Daffis to refrain from excluding non-Catholics from office.
The Catholic leadership, however, refused point blank to allow those
Huguenots forcibly reinstated by the amnesty of December 1562 - many of whom
had fled the province to avoid reprisals following their participation in the failed
uprising of the previous May - to serve in office once more. Rather than confront the
maitres des requetes, though, the parlement chose to frustrate them, much like their
Bordeaux counterparts would do at the arrival of royal commissioners, Antoine
Fumee and Jehan Angenoust, the following month. Daffis ordered that the procedure
for appellants claiming wrongful dismissal from office as a result of the profession of
faith be changed. Instead of receiving a single hearing before an appeals panel and
judge, each appellant would now be heard before a special committee of magistrates.
This committee was to review the evidence and determine a decision, but was also
granted facility to transfer any contentious material to Paris for re-examination.Y
This was a perfect means of procrastinating, as once the verdict from Paris was
received, the appeal would be reopened and proceedings resumed from scratch.
Catholic conseillers made especially good use of this tactic, with each appeal taking,
on average, six months to resolve. Another feature of the commissioners' work was
42 Attending were: Armagnac, Daffis, de Paulo, Latomy, Barthelemy, Reynier, Boyer, de Molinier, du
Solier, d' Alzon, Hebrard, du Tournoer, Coignard, Forest. Fabry, Papus, Bonald, de Lauselergie,
d' Aussonne, d' Arjac, Boisson, de Gargas, Bruet, de Guilhemette, d'Ouvrier, de Nupces, de Murel,
Ambes, de Montfort, Richard, de Prohenques, du Luc, de Lagarde, Rudelle, d' Anticamareta,
d'Hautpoul, Benoit, Vezian, de la Chassaigne, de Salluste, Rangouse, de Sabatier, Burnet, Masencal,
Hellet, Durand, la Mamye, Laissac and Lacroix. See Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I,
E·409.
3 See, for example, AD Haute-Garonne, B 56, fos. 347v; 472v.
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to ensure that restitution of Huguenot property or objects 'pris par forme d'hostilite',
was being carried out fairly. The maitres des requetes discovered, at length, that
Catholics were refusing to countenance appeals concerning articles or property that
had 'changed in their nature or usage since confiscation'." Further, the facility to
allow the families of deceased Huguenots, including those executed for their crimes,
to reclaim inherited offices, was also found to be inappropriately administered, with
Catholic magistrates demanding indisputable first-hand testimony be presented
before the case could even proceed to court.45
The Catholics of Toulouse continued to test the patience of the crown. On 17
May 1563, a grand procession took place through the town's streets to mark the
anniversary of the defeat of the Protestant coup the previous year." The royal court
deemed this provocative, given the current political climate, and subsequently issued
an arret banning the procession from being staged in the future." The crown was
also forced to intervene in July, after the parlement issued several arrets, on the
advice of Armagnac, ordering the Catholic capitouls and basoche militia to resume
their role within the town guard." This was a show of blatant disregard for the terms
of the edict of Amboise, and the king demanded that such popular elements be
removed from street patrols. 49
A period of relative calm followed, as the crown and the Catholics of
Toulouse backed off from overt confrontation, until the grande entree of the new
.....AM Toulouse, AA 16, no. 104.
4S Lafaille notes, sardonically, that for some of those fortunate to have 'fut retabli en sa bonne fame et
renommee ... la t~e De luy fut pas rendue'. Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, p. 256.
46 AD Haute-Garonne, B 56, fo. 307v.
47 The Catholics of Toulouse appealed against this decision, but the crown's verdict was upheld in
May 1564, AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 41. Attempts were made to revive the procession by the
Catholic leadership of Toulouse in May 1569, in order to reinvigorate Catholic morale following the
recommencement of hostilities with the Huguenots. See AD Haute-Garonne, B 63, fo. 224. But it
would only be under the auspices of the militant ligueurs in May 1589 that the procession was
formally reinstated within the town.
41 AD Haute-Garonne, B 56, fos. 383; 554; 584v-85.
49 Charles IX to parlement of Toulouse (14 July 1563), AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 11.
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governor of Languedoc, Damville, into Toulouse in October 1563, threatened to re-
ignite the situation. Damville's arrival had raised the spirits of the town's Catholics.
who seemed certain he would champion their cause. 50 The governor was escorted
into the province by Monluc, and greeted by Armagnac, Strozzi, Terride, and over
four hundred Catholic nobles at Grenade, before moving on to the chateau Terride
for a celebratory banquet. 51 The entree into Toulouse was pure Catholic theatre:
Damville was met at the town gate by a guard of honour, comprising members of the
basoche and confraternity of Saint-Yves. replete in full regalia. The company then
processed through the streets to the palais du parlement, where the assembled
magistrates and bourgeoisie of the town welcomed the governor with a lavish
reception, followed by a solemn mass at the cathedral. 52 This was the opportunity
many had been seeking to underline the triumph of Catholicism at Toulouse, and the
scale of the proceedings certainly did this justice. Few could argue that the massed
ranks of assembled dignitaries. magistrates, officers, merchants and inhabitants, and
the splendid paraphernalia of the event, merely confirmed the strength of Catholic
sentiment within the town. 53
Renewal of war: 1567-1568
But Damville's tenure as governor would not, as many had hoped, revive the
halcyon days of Catholic hegemony at Toulouse. Instead, the governor employed an
'0 Joan Davies has shown that, at this point in his career, Damville was widely regarded as an
'extreme Catholic'; his reputation as a chameleon in religious matters only being applicable to his
attitude during the 1570s. Davies, Languedoc and its Governor, pp. 50-51.
St Monluc to Charles IX (8 October 1563), Ruble. Commentaries et Lettres, IV, p. 278.
S2 Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II. p. 256. The registration ofDamville's governorship
was not actually ratified until 1 October 1563. AD Haute-Garonne, B 56, fo. 639v.
S3 For full details of Damville's arrival at Toulouse in October 1563, see Franklin Charles Palm,
Politics and Religion in Sixteenth-Century France: A Study of the Career of Henry of MontmOrency-
Damville, Uncrowned King of the South (Gloucester. Mass., 1927), pp. 50-52.
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unequivocal approach to the administration of the province, a policy grounded in
explicit adherence to the royal edicts in order to secure stability as a matter of
urgency. 54 This was a big disappointment to Catholics, who had expected a degree of
leniency, if not complete partiality, from their compatriot. Such a setback, combined
with the withdrawal of Monluc to Agen, and the increasing orientation of Armagnac
towards the papal enclave at Avignon, threatened to diminish Catholic hegemony at
Toulouse.f But it would be a temporary waning, as the renewal of hostilities in
September 1567 ended such dalliances with detente. Monluc was recalled to
Toulouse, from where he issued a chilling indictment on the dangers facing the
Catholics of the region: 'les affaires sont plus graves qu'aux derniers troubles'v'" The
defence of the town was the immediate priority. In conjunction with the capitouls,
Monluc assigned control of the guard to his second-in-command, Terride, with
orders that eight Catholic captains be appointed, each with a retinue of fifty soldiers,
to secure the districts of Toulouse.i" As at Agen and Bordeaux, arrangements were
also made for Catholic magistrates and capitouls to take their place on the guard, to
show the citizens that the administration stood with them in their time of crisis.
Members of the clergy were ordered to remain in their churches, and women in their
homes, in order to prevent fires breaking out that could draw off much needed
manpower from the guard. 58 Meanwhile, Joyeuse was commanded by the parlement
'd' avertisser toutz voz voysins, gentilshommes et communautes de prendre les armes
S4 Damville's ordonnance of 18 October 1563, for example, required that Huguenots and Catholics
adhere to the letter of the edict of Amboise in equal measure. AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 15.
ss Armagnac was appointed gouverneur d'Avignon inNovember 1565 and papal legate to the enclave
in May 1566. See Venard, Rejorme protestame, pp. 491-92. Armagnac would be raised to vicaire-
ftneral at Avignon on 30 March 1568. See AD Haute-Garonne, B 62, fo. 131.
6 Monluc to Charles IX (31 September 1567), AM Toulouse, AA 48, no. 15.
S7 AM Toulouse, BB 269, fo. 93. In December 1567, Monluc ordered that the soldiers be lodged in
Protestant houses, and that Protestant goods be confiscated to fund the war effort. AM Toulouse, AA
14, no. 125.
SI AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 135.
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de se rendre forts et mettre en pieces tous ceulx qui resisteront' ,59 and on 7 October
1567, the king ordered that the parlement 'fermer Ia paIais et ne s'attendre a autre
chose qu'a Ia guerre'i'"
With Damville occupied in eastern Languedoc, Bellegarde was appointed
chef militaire de Toulouse in November 1567, although Monluc still commanded
much of the Catholic forces defending the town. 61 The parlement ordered that any
minor official suspected of being involved in the recent troubles be removed, and
replaced with a suitable Catholic candidate.f Then, on 17 January 1568, it banned all
'dances et jeux public ... faux visages, masques, fausses barbes, crepes, taffetas, ou
autre linge devant Ia figure, sous peine de 500 livres', 63 Dubedat suggests that this
was not simply a police measure, aimed at preventing rioters from disguising their
appearance during the troubles, but 'un acte d'expiation et un signe de penitence' by
an increasingly militant Catholic leadership."
Despite a brief interlude in the contlict, between March and August 1568,
Catholic consolidation at Toulouse continued unabated. The town guard was once
more revised, with Bellegarde assuming full jurisdiction over the militia, the eight
new captaincies now reduced to four, each to be filled by a trusted Catholic military
veteran. 65 The parlement also ordered two conseillers to accompany the captain of
the guard on his rounds each day - a further attempt to convince the population that
only cooperative defence would ensure the town remained secure.66 Then, on 5 May,
the parlement moved to put its own house in order, repeating the requirement that all
59 AM Toulouse, AA 48, no. 16.
60 Charles IX to Bordeauxparlement(7 October 1567), AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 120.
61 AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 191; AD Haute-Garonne, B 62, fo. 9v.
6221 November 1567, AD Haute-Garonne, B 62, fo. 3.
63 AM Toulouse, AA 18, no. 194. This edict was repeated on 19 February 1569, see AM Toulouse,
AA 18, no. 228.
M Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, I, p. 432.
6S AM Toulouse, AA 15, no. 5.
66 Dubedat, Histoire du parlemem de Toulouse, I, p. 432.
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magistrates swear 'vivre catholicque selon les constitutions et determinations de
l'egIise catholicque romaine' .67 Those that refused, which by now was only a small
number, were expelled from office. In June, the capitouls, once the epitome of
moderate government in Toulouse, pinned their colours to the mast, granting all
Catholics of the senechaussee permission 'mectre en pieces' any Huguenots caught
attending illegal gatherings/" while the inhabitants of Toulouse also sought to
declare their Catholic allegiance, drafting a remonstrance to the crown requesting
that the town remain solely under 'I'auctorite de l'egIise catholicque Romaine', to
the exclusion of all other religions/"
The outbreak of the third religious war in late-August 1568 provoked the
Catholic leadership at Toulouse to reiterate their mantra of the previous decade: 'il
seroit impossible de vivre en paix avec diversite de religion ... il n'y a eu que
schisme, division et contradiction en votre royaume, de maniere que tous les liens de
nature et d'amitie ont este rompus et violes'.7o This outburst, which struck at the
heart of the crown's ideology over toleration, did not bode well for a speedy
resolution of the current conflict, and by September, Toulouse was once more in the
iron grip of militant Catholics. Bellegarde's military jurisdiction was extended to
encompass the senechaussee of Toulouse as well as the town, while further purges
cleared those remaining moderates from the parlement." Punitive measures against
the Huguenot community were again implemented, with new taxes levied, property
67 AD Haute-Garonne, B 62, fo. 145v.
68 AM Toulouse, BB 173, fo. 65. The parJement confirmed these moves, granting Catholics
permission to sound the tocsin at the first sign of trouble, and to employ any level of force deemed
:fpropriate in the face of Huguenot violence. See AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, fo. 49.
6 'Remonstrance mit par les magistrats et habitans de Toulouse contre ceux de la nouvelle religion',
(3 July 1568), AM Toulouse, GG 825.
70 AM Toulouse, BB 12 (27 August 1568).
71 For Bellegarde's new military remit, see AD Haute-Garonne, B 62, fo. 431. For a full list of
officials removed from office during this purge, see 'Remonstrances presentees au Roi par les
delegues de la ville de Toulouse, avec les reponses de Sa Majeste', AM Toulouse, BB12 (28 August
1568).
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confiscated, and arbitrary fines for misdemeanours commonplace.F Such was the
increase in litigation caused by these impositions, that on 18 September, Daffis,
Dufaur and de Paulo were forced to extend the court sitting through into vacation,
and to increase the number of conseillers serving in the chambers, simply to allow
the cases to be dealt with effectively."
La Croisade
September 1568 was also to witness the purest manifestation of Catholic
intent to extirpate heresy: the croisade. The exact sequence of events here is unclear,
although the igniting of crusading fervour at Toulouse can be traced to three main
factors: Catholic concerns over the recent military successes of the Protestant
vicomtes; the revival of confraternal activism; and the influx of mendicant preachers
to the region, keen to disseminate the new post-Trent penitential ethos. The number
of preachers active in Toulouse had grown steadily during the past year, with the
Jacobin friar Melchior Flavin, the Jesuit Jean Palatier, and two Catholic theologians,
Ceres and Laleine, among the more vocal. Catholic domination of the parlement
meant that few restrictions were placed on these speakers, with each allowed to
preach with impunity from the cathedral, even when their sermons called for a war
72 For a role of tax levied against Protestants of Toulouse in 1568, see AM Toulouse, GG 825 (1568).
For lists of goods seized from seventy-one Protestant suspects in Toulouse, and the profits of the sale
of these items, see AD Haute-Garonne, B 63, fos. 172-99. For confiscation of private Huguenot wheat
supplies, see AM Toulouse, AA IS, no. 25. For more general deliberations of the parlement of
Toulouse concerning confiscations of Huguenot property during this period, see 'Affaires de Michel
Dufaur', AM Toulouse, GG 826 (1568; 1569). For general legal arguments concerning confiscation of
Huguenot property relating to charges of treason and heresy, see Kathleen A. Parrow, From Defence
to Resistance. Justification of Violence during the French Wars of Religion (philadelphia, 1993), pp.
33-37.
73 AD Haute-Garcane, B 62, fos. 423-24.
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against heresy." The parlement itself showed signs of being gripped by this fervour,
modifying previous arrets to further curtail dances, masques, public games and
unauthorised musicwithin the town.7S
In early September 1568, the avocat, Jean de Cardonne, preached a sermon
against heresy before the parlement, but ended by urging the Catholics leadership of
Toulouse to revive its sacred ligue of 1563, and to lead this force against the
Huguenots." Cardonne's call must have been taken seriously in Rome, because on
12 September papal emissaries confirmed that the Holy See had consented to a
Catholic croisade being launched from Toulouse." In fact, two papal Bulls were
issued: the first confirming 'une ligue et croisade faite a Toulouse contre les
heretiques'; the second 'une croisade faite a Toulouse contre ceux de la nouvelle
religion,.78Prospective adherents were ordered to meet at the cathedral of Saint-
Etienne the following day to profess their Catholic faith, attend high mass, and be
allocated to a specific captain for duty.79
If historians have distanced themselves from the Catholic associations of the
1560s, they have positively neglected the croisade. Even the commentators of the
ligues, such as Lecler, Thompson, Ramet, and Devic and Vaissete, barely
74 As a further example of the close-knit Catholic network being created at Toulouse, Laleine would
soon be promoted to the office of Inquisitor at Toulouse, serving under cardinal Armagoac. See
Dubedat, Histoire duparlement de Toulouse, I, pp. 432-33.
75 For problems of civil disturbances during 'Ia ville en £!te' in sixteenth-century France, see
Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France, pp. 263-85.
76 Dubedat, Histoire du parlemem de Toulouse, I, p. 434.
n Preuve 31, HGL, 9, pp. 534-35.
78 Both were registered before the Toulouse parlemem on 12 September 1568. For the papal Bull
confirming 'Ia ligue et croisade mite Ii Toulouse contre les heretiques', see Preuve 31, HGL, 9, pp.
535-36. For the papal Bull confirming 'Ia croisade faite a Toulouse contre ceux de la nouvelle
religion', see Preuve 32, HGL, 9, pp. 536-37. The 'Publication de la croisade faite a Toulouse contre
ceux de la nouvelle religion (12 September 1568)', is also presented in 'Preuves de I'histoire de
Languedoc', HGL, 12, pp. 885-86.
79 The croisade was solemnised under the device: 'Eamus nos moriamur cum Christo'. HOL, 9, p. 48.
Harding suggests that the Bordeaux par/ement offered financial assistance to the croisade at its birth,
see Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, pp. 63-64. Harding also infers that Monluc organised a similar
croisade at Bigorre, on 30 September 1568. Here, the town's governors were charged with organising
the militia, holding weekly mass and processions, and rebuilding the crosses and churches destroyed
during the recent fighting. The Bigorre croisade, though, would be dismantled only two months later,
on 22 December 1568. Ibid., p. 64.
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acknowledge its existence, most deeming it a non-entity. Only Crouzet and Souriac
see the croisade as having any relevance to affairs at Toulouse during the period,
stating that to dismiss it out of hand would be to fail to acknowledge its impact on
contemporaries. After all, it was sanctioned by a papal bull, promulgated through the
parlemem, and supported by the magistrates, capitouls, clergy and local Catholic
nobility. Crouzet suggests that the croisade reflects the prevailing penitential
sentiment of the period, a direct result of'l'angoisse eschatalogique' that crippled
French society during the second half of the sixteenth century. It was thus 'une sainte
armee de la foy', an expression of Toulouse's staunch Catholicism, and the ultimate
manifestation of Catholic activism. 80 Crouzet's notion is engaging, but it should be
stated that the croisade was also a political animal, the spawn of a Catholic hierarchy
at Toulouse clearly at odds with crown policy on acconunodation, unhappy about
being forced to register unwanted royal dictates, but needing a vehicle through which
the urban population could be energised in support of their cause.
Why, then, have historians so neglected the croisade of 1568? The answer
lies in the fact that, despite sizeable financial investment and the patronage of
numerous elites, there never actually was a croisade. The whole episode began quite
legitimately, with the parlement appointing the capitoul, d'Hispanie, a dependable
Catholic, to initiate the levy of troops." The initial source of funding was to be
'voluntary' contributions from the Catholic nobility and clergy of Toulouse, but this
proved inadequate. With the parlement unwilling to contribute directly, this was to
be an entirely autonomous operation, making no demands on crown revenue.
D'Hispanie was thus charged with implementing a one-off 'crusade tax' on the
80 Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, pp. 386-96; Rene Souriac, Decentralisation administrative dans
l'ancienne France. Autonomie Commingeoise et pouvoir d'etat, 1540-1630 (2 vols., Toulouse, 1992),
I,Chapter II.
B1 AM Toulouse, sa 12, foe 195.
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town's population, a move that proved most successful. Records reveal that over
60,000 livres were raised to fund the croisade in October 1568 alone, although. as a
mere 6,000 Iivres was contributed by Catholic inhabitants of Toulouse, the bulk of
the tax burden clearly fell, as ever, on the town's Huguenot community."
While d'Hispanie continued with the levy of troops, the parlement proposed
an initiative that recalled the crusader mythology of previous centuries: ordering all
Catholics to distinguish themselves by wearing a white cross on their garments, and
painting a white cross onto their doors.83 Whether this was intended to mimic
tradition, or was merely a coincidence, is hard to ascertain, but the use of identifying
or distinguishing marks would be a common feature of sectarian conflict within
close-knit and crowded communities during the religious wars. At Agen, for
instance, Monluc would frequently order the Catholic population to display white
crosses throughout the decade to delineate between the faiths, as did the Bordeaux
parlement during the insurrection of 1562, while the post-1567 confraternities also
sported similar symbols to identify their brotherhood." Later, and more celebrated
instances include the Saint-Bartholomew massacres of 1572, when the leadership of
many towns urged their Catholic population to wear white crosses on their garments
to distinguish them from the intended victims of the slaughter, and the adherents of
the Catholic League after 1584.85 While Huguenots found such tactics both divisive
and ominous, they were not averse to employing variants on this theme themselves.
At Bordeaux, the registres du parlement reveal that, during the night of8 December,
82 AM Toulouse, SS 12, (October 1568).
83 HGL, 9, p. 48.
84 For the wearing of white crosses by the Conjrerie de la Sainte-Croix at Limoges, see Cassan, Le
temps des guerres de religion, p. 238; Jean-Marie Constant, La Ligue (paris, 1996), p. 57.
as See Luc Raeualt's chapter on Catholic violence during the 1572 Saint-Bartholomew riots, 'The
problem of violence during the French Wars of Religion " in Racaut, Hatred in Print, pp. 23-37. Mark
Greengrass has shown how the wearing of emblems such as white crosses and the swearing of oaths
were regular features of the Catholic League in the 1570s and 1580s, and an excellent way of defining
loyalties within the community. Greengrass, 'The Sainte Union in the Provinces', p. 472.
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'plusieurs portes des habitans de cette ville catholiques avoient ete marques de
marques blanches en forme de potences.t" The court ordered the sieur de Candalle
to investigate. He concluded that the marks were a precursor to an attack, and
advised the occupants to arm themselves in readiness." A similar episode occurred
two months later, with several doors of houses belonging to the leading Catholics of
Bordeaux marked with various portentous symbols: a gallows, a portcullis, and a
white cross.88 This phenomenon must have been fairly common across the south-
west of France during the 1560s, for when Charles IX wrote to Damville in August
1564 to enquire about the state of the peace in Languedoc, he told the governor that
there could not be stability within the province until all 'echaufauds et potences
dresses durant les desordres' were taken down or removed from sight."
At Toulouse, the raising of the crusading army made steady progress. In
December 1568, d'Hispanie informed the parlement that the grand-prieur de
Toulouse, Pierre de Beaullac-Tresbons, sieur de Fronton, 'ont pris la charge et
conduit les soldats soubz compagnie de la croisade pour marcher et alIer combattre
l'ennemy'.90 Fronton had chosen as his captains the comte de Martigues and the
seigneur de Montlau, and the capitouls requested that the court ratify these
appointments as soon as possible. The appointment of Fronton would prove to be
most astute. The office of grand-prieur at Toulouse was steeped in crusader
mythology, and had been filled continuously since its inception in the twelfth century
86 AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo. 116.
87 AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo, 138.
88 'la porte dudit de la Chassaigne et Fauguerolles, presidens, l'on yavoit mis des potences; a la porte
d'icelui de Roffignac un eehaffaut et une potence; a la porte de l'areheveque de Bordeaux une grille; a
la porte de maitres Jean de Alesme, Antoine de Belcier, Antoine de Gautier, conseillers, Lescure,
procureur general et de Pontac greffier, une potence, en aucuns lieux des lettres Ie tout filit de croise
blanche' (19 February 1563), AM Bordeaux, ms 771, fo. 463.
19 AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 51.
90 AM Toulouse, BB 12, fo. 195v.
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to oversee the operations of the Knights Hospitaller." So by linking this new
croisade to its historic ancestor, was the parlement attempting to redefine the defence
of the 'Catholic' church in its traditional, universal sense?
There was a further motivating factor here for Catholics. The grand-prieur
was a major landowner at the nearby town of Fronton, midway between Toulouse
and Montauban, an important Catholic stronghold throughout the 1560s. Its famous
donjon des Hospitaliers housed a large Catholic garrison, and its defences made the
town a tough proposition for assailing forces. On 17 October 1567, however, the
Protestant vicomtes de Paulin, Montclar and Caumont, together with the comte de
Bruniquel, had laid siege to the town with an army approaching 7,000 strong.
Eventually, Fronton's defences had been breeched and the Protestants broke through
into the town. The grand-prieur had requested that Damville intercede, only for the
crown to reject this plea, confessing that it could not allow its forces to be drawn
away from other areas of con:t1ict.92The grand-prieur would have to recover the
town independently, a design he had been nurturing for several years. Fronton's
appointment as head of the croisade at Toulouse could thus be seen to symbolise
Catholic intentions to redress many inequities and to finally triumph over
Protestantism
The croisade continued its steady progress. In January 1569, the clergy of
Toulouse agreed a new demande of 1,000 livres to finance the acquisition of further
supplies for the troops;" in February, a consignment of fresh gunpowder had been
91 M.A. du Bourg lists the holders of the office of grand-prieur de Toulouse during this period:
Claude de Gruel de la Bourehl, 1552-1555; Pierre de Beaullac-Tresbons, 1555-1569; Balthazar des
Comtes de Vintimille, 1570-1575; Mathurin de Lescur-Romegas, Prieure d'Irlande, 1575-1581;
Antoine-Scipion de Joyeuse, 1581-1589. M. A. du Bourg, Histoire du grand-prieur de Toulouse
(Toulouse, 1883), p. 25.
92 Bourg, Histoire du grand-prieur de Toulouse, p. 272.
93 AM Toulouse, BB 12, fo. 196.
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delivered to the tour Saint-Jean in the name of the grand-prieur/" The continuing
military successes of the Protestant vicomtes, however, would force the Catholic
leadership to alter their plans and deploy the crusading army prematurely. Bellegarde
had been campaigning in the comte of Foix against the Huguenot army, but had
become trapped at Mazere by the forces of the vicomte d'Arpaion." On 15 April
1569, the parlement ordered d'Hispanie 'assembler la compagnie de la croisade et la
conduire au comte de Foix au camp de Bellegarde"." The croisade was armed and
dispatched, and reached Bellegarde by 25 April. The capitouls put the best gloss
possible on this premature posting:
pour maintenir sa querelle Ii extirper et aneantir les ennemys de nostre saincte foy,
ayant este ung des premiers pour mettre la main aux armes et estre aydant Iiconduire
la compagnie de la croisade au camp en la comte de Foix et au Carla, au grand
contentementde tout Ie pays."
But the mission was not to be the glorious campaign of Catholic hopes. The comte de
Montgomery had relieved d' Arpajon, and Bellegarde's retreating forces were heavily
defeated outside Foix. The croisade disappears from the archives at this point,
preswnably routed in the battle. It did, though, make one final contribution to the
saga, as it was a single shot from a musketeer of the croisade that ended the career,
and life, of the d'Arpajon98
Summary
The history of Catholic activism at Toulouse, then, reveals much the same
motivations and responses as witnessed at its sister citadel of Bordeaux: during the
94 AM Toulouse, BB 12, fo. 213v.
9~ HGL, 9, p. 32
96 D'Hispanie to Grand Conseil at Toulouse (IS April 1569), AM Toulouse, SB 12, fo. 229v.
97 Capitouls of Toulouse to Armagnac (25 April 1569), AM Toulouse, SS 173, fo. 121.
98 AM Toulouse, BB 173, fo. 121v.
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1540s and 1550s, confraternal and basochien activity within the town energised the
population, though in inversely proportional ways, with the players showing a greater
propensity for supporting the Catholic cause than the more reluctant avocats of the
parlement; while the 1560s saw similar participation from the magistrates of the
parlement and, after a series of purges, from the capitoulat too. Again, the
interconnectedness of Catholic activism is evident, with Monluc and his captains
extremely forceful in defending orthodoxy in Languedoc, despite many of their tasks
falling outside their official jurisdiction. Here, long-standing friendships, affiliations
and alliances, and networks of association played a big part, with most of these
Catholic elites acting as co-signatories of the Toulouse Jigue in March 1563. The
response of the Catholic administrators of Toulouse to the threat of Huguenot
violence also mirrored that at Bordeaux and Agen: usurpation of authority;
redefining of the town guard; taxing of Protestants and confiscation of property to
finance the Catholic war effort; and the use of symbolism to identify Catholics in the
community. And just as at Bordeaux and Agen, by the late 1560s, a coalition of
Catholic leaders would emerge to unite with the Catholic bourgeoisie and populace
in creating an urban defensive union, whereby all parties would come to playa role
in the protection of the town. At Toulouse, the coalition was led by the capitouls and
parlementaires, even though its ambitions blatantly contravened the king's orders of
the previous year, whereby popuJar elements were to be kept separate from the town
guard.99 Monluc would initiate a similar ethos across the Toulouse hinterland,
ordering the disparate Catholic nobility and Catholic town councils 'assembler en
annes toute la communaute de votre ville et juridiction' - again, quite contrary to
royal dictate. tOO
99 8 August 1569. AM Toulouse, AA 15, no. 49.
100 Revue d'Aquitaine, I, (Aucb, 1857), p. 559.
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Toulouse also featured a potent Jesuit presence, just as at Bordeaux. And
similarly, it was the militant Catholic element within the parlement at Toulouse that
facilitated this. In July 1566, the Catholic president, Duranti, sponsored a debate
within the court, urging that Jesuit refugees be allowed to enter the town and
establish a college '8. l'instruction de 1a jeunesse'.'?' With the vote won, the
magistrates moved to provide accommodation. Three Catholic capitouls, Pierre
Delpach, Jean Gamoy and Pierre Madron, were charged with this task and, on 4
September, the hotel de Bernuy on rue Gambetta was presented to the Jesuits for
their use.102 Two days later, Armagnac pulled off a major coup by securing the
services of the leading Jesuit of the south-west, Edmond Auger, to head the new
college.'?' Despite the fact that Auger was tempted to leave Toulouse for Bordeaux
by Baulon and Lange, Arrnagnac was able to report in March 1569 that the Jesuit
college at Toulouse was doing extremely well.104 It is interesting to note that when
the Jesuits were once more expelled from France in 1594, following the accession of
Henry IV, their companies at Toulouse and Tournon were the only two to be allowed
to remain.
But there was one aspect of Toulouse's response that was unique: the calling
of a croisade to extirpate heresy. This echoed the traditions of Languedoc in
responding to religious threats, and made use of many relevant facets still active in
Toulouse: the office of the grand-prieur of the Knights Hospitaller; the influence of
Armagnac as the papacy's representative in the south-west; and the prerogative of
Catholics to act unilaterally to defend themselves against heresy. However, the
101 AM Toulouse, BB 173, fo. 51.
102 AD Haute-Garoone, B 1,907, fo. 69v.
103 See 'Contrat passe entre Ie syndic de la ville et M. Edmond Auger, principal de la religion et
congregation des Jesuites en la province d'Aquitaine, pour l'etablissement d'un college a Toulouse,
destine a I'instruction de lajeunesse' (6 September 1566), AM Toulouse, AA 14, no. 113.
104 AM Toulouse, BB 173, fo. 111.
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croisade, a scheme clearly anathema to its attempts to inculcate toleration across
France, stands as an overt reminder of the crown's weakness during the late I560s.
For had the crown been stronger at this time, it would surely have opposed such
unilateral and overtly papal-inspired actions, and instead intervened to prohibit this
particular Catholic instrument. In light of the pre-eminence of such wider influences,
the final part of this thesis will examine the national and European dimensions
behindCatholic activism in the south-west.
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Chapter 9. The Guise. the Triumvirate. and later confratemal activism
Any study of provincial Catholic activism during the French Wars of Religion must
take into account wider political and religious considerations. It should determine the
extent to which national and European dimensions influenced events, and the roles
played by peripheral protagonists on affairs. This is particularly pertinent to a survey
that deals with conflict in Guyenne and Languedoc, where local issues were often
subsumed beneath concerns associated with the governance of a border province.
This situation would be further confused during the 1560s, with the Catholic
leadership of the south-west being offered and requesting support from national or
international powers such as the Guise, Spain and the papacy. Now, traditional
concerns over external interference in jurisdictional prerogatives, or threats to the
integrity of border security, would be compromised on occasion to facilitate dialogue
between the various Catholic bodies. Chapter 9 will address these themes, beginning
with an examination of the influence of Catholic grandees at the French court,
specifically the Guises and Montmorencies, on the course of Catholic activism in the
south-west. It will consider the extent to which these figures determined the actions
of Monluc, Annagnac and the Catholic leadership at Bordeaux and Toulouse, and the
extent to which their patronage contributed to Catholic successes. It will then
evaluate the impact on affairs of the Triumvirate, the union of elite Catholic nobles in
1562 that boasted financial and military backing from Madrid and Rome. The
Triumvirate had promised to amalgamate the many provincial associations under its
leadership, and to create a truly pan-European Catholic entity capable of confronting
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the French crown and forcing it to end its adherence to tolerant religious policies.
The veracity of this assertion will be explored. Finally, the influence of the Catholic
grandees and of the lesser Catholic captains of the provinces on the explosion of
confraternal activity across France after 1567 will be examined. Driven by the
resurgence in popular piety across Europe and the revitalisation of the Catholic
Church following the final decrees of the Council of Trent in 1563, the increase in
confraternities would immeasurablybolster Catholicism and militant activism within
the communities of France. Catholic generals were quick to take advantage of this
phenomenon, boosting their garrison forces and urban militias by recruiting large
numbers of these highlymotivated confreres.
In Chapter 10, the influence of Spain and the papacy will be scrutinised in
greater detail. The role of Spain and its king, Philip II, is of primary importance here.
Philip was a vociferous opponent of the French crown's policy of toleration, and
many of his foreign policy decisions during the 1560s can be seen as attempts to
disrupt Catherine de Medici's determination to accommodate Protestants within
France. By supplyingarms and financial aid to Catholic captains such as Monluc and
Terride, Philip sought to interdict the growth of the Reform movement in the region,
and to establish a buffer zone between the Protestant armies that roamed the south-
west and the Spanishborder. The degree to which the Catholics of the region came to
rely on Spanish investment and reinforcements will also be assessed, for if their
relationship was based more on dependency than on reciprocity, then pressure
exerted from Madrid, not independent thought, may well have shaped Catholic
policy there. This chapter will then examine the part played by the papacy in
proceedings. There is little doubt that papal backing provided important succour for
the /igues of Guyenne and Languedoc, both in terms of material benefits, such as
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finance and manpower, but also in terms of validating the associations and offering
papal sanction for the various oaths, unions and crusading ideals. The endeavours of
cardinal Armagnac, the papal inquisitor for the region, are key here. In general, the
inquisition is viewed as an anachronism by the 1560s, but there is evidence to show
that Arrnagnac used the office ofInquisitor General as a weapon to combat Huguenot
lawlessness. His contribution to the Catholic cause, and the efficacy of the papal
Inquisition in confront Protestant aggrandisement, will be explored.
Finally, Chapter 11 reveals that the sphere of influence of the Iigueurs of the
south-west was fur wider than their native Guyenne and Languedoc. It is now evident
that featured militants, such as Monluc, Armagnac, Terride and Negrepelisse, were in
constant communication with the Catholic rebels at Oloron and Lescar, providing
assistance where possible in their struggles to overthrow the Calvinist administration
of Jeanne d' Albret, queen of Navarre. Historians view the Iigues that drove these
rebellions as isolated entities, unconnected with Catholic activism around Bordeaux
and Toulouse. This is most surprising considering their similarities with the oath-
bound associations of France, the overt military assistance provided by the ligueurs
of the south-west, and the repeated intervention of the parlements of Bordeaux and
Toulouse, and, on occasion, the French crown. Concerted diplomatic and military
pressure against Jeanne was also exerted by Spain and the papacy in an attempt to
purge the territories of Calvinist faith, By assessing the dynamic between these
groups, the scale and intensity of cooperation will reveal a rarely studied aspect of
Catholic activism here: that ligue activity in the south-west was fur more diverse than
has been yet thought.
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The Guise
The machinations of the powerful Guise family are integral to most studies of
the French Wars of Religion. Military successes had seen the Guise's star rise
throughout the 1550s: the duke, Francois, was a leading light in the Italian campaigns
against the Spanish; his brother, Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, had been just as
successful in the diplomatic sphere. But the defining moment for Guise ascendancy
came with the defeat and capture of the constable of France, Anne de Montmorency,
by Spanish troops at Saint-Quentin in August 1557. Until this point, the
Montmorencies had edged the rivalry between the two houses. Now, with Francois
promoted to lieutenant-general of France in the constable's absence, and the cardinal
of Lorraine appointed to oversee domestic and foreign policy affairs, the brothers
were the dominant force at court. 1
Throughout this period, Monluc and cardinal Armagnac served the Guise
with distinction. Monluc rose to the rank of captain under Francois, excelling as a
field commander in the duke's army. Armagnac, meanwhile, acted as diplomatic
envoy for many of the Guise's foreign campaigns, also serving on several diplomatic
missions for the cardinal of Lorraine. It was in the early 1550s, in fact, that Monluc
and Armagnac began their long acquaintance, with the newly appointed cardinal of
Toulouse informing Henry II of his 'excellent relations' with Monluc during their
Italian campaign in 1555. This long-standing friendship would later prove a
1 Knecht, Catherine de' Medici, p. 48.
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fundamental factor in ensuring cordial relations between the Catholics of Guyenne
and those at Toulouse.i
After a short sabbatical back in Guyenne, Monluc was recalled by Francois in
May 1558 to take up the post of colonel-general des gens de pied of the royal army.
Two stunning victories over the Spanish army at Thionville gained both men great
renown across France, but this success had been bought at a cost.' The office of
colonel-general had become vacant as a result of renewed hostility between Guise
and Montmorency at court, with Francois removing the incumbent, Francois de
Chatillon, seigneur d' Andelot, the nephew of the constable, to spite his adversary.
Courteault believes that Monluc was a pawn in the rnanoeuvrings of the Guise;
insignificant enough in court circles to prevent civil war breaking out at his
appointment, but the perfect fall guy should the French military offensives of 1558
ultimately fail," Monluc was most equivocal about the d' Andelot affair. He claimed
to have requested not to be considered for the office, aware that it would offend the
constable, only accepting the role after being urged to do so by the king and the
cardinal of Lorraine. S As it turned out. the fortunes of the two great behemoths
changed once more in November 1558, with Montmorency reinstated as constable.
Monluc wisely resigned his commission immediately, allowing d' Andelot to resume
his office without recrimination. He requested permission to leave the royal army and
join the king of Navarre's military expedition against rebel forces inBeam and lower
2 Armagnac to Henry II (30 April 1555). Tamizey de Larroque, 'Lettres inedites du Cardinal
d' Armagnac', pp. 66-68. See also letter from pope Pius IV to Monluc reporting that cardinal
Armagnac had informed Rome of the brave deeds achieved by Monluc in Guyenne in defence of the
Catholic faith (April 1562), Memoires de Conde. III, pp. 317-18. In fact, Armagnac also attempted to
boost Monluc's profile with the Montmorency circle at court, writing a letter of recommendation to
the constable praising the Gascon captain's endeavours in March 1555. See Cardinal Armagnac to
Constable Montmorency (March 1555), Revue d'Aquitaine, V, (Auch, 1861), pp. 559-60.
3 Monluc's career had seemingly reached a new height - from archer in the Gascon regiments of
Francis I, to colonel-general of Henry II's royal army. For further details of his military service under
the Guise at Picardy in 1558, see Andrieu, Histoire de I 'Agenais. I, p. 211.
4 Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, Historien; p. 349.
5 Commentaires, p. 424.
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Navarre. This was granted by the conseil prive, and Monluc headed south in January
1559, leaving Guise and Montmorency to resume their power struggle,"
Two incidents drew Monluc back into the political arena. The first was the
death of Henry II, in July 1559, which saw Francois de Guise seize power, thereby
isolating Catherine de Medici, Montmorency and Antoine de Navarre, the prince of
the blood, who most expected would assume the role of regent for the boy king,
Francis II. Monluc, who was by now settled at Navarre's court at Pall, thus found
himself at the centre of the new Guise-Navarre rivalry. To sever ties with either party
would have been political suicide, so Monluc became a pragmatist, serving Navarre
in the south-west, but staying in contact with the duke of Guise through his brother,
Jean, bishop of Valence," The second incident occurred the following year, in May
1560. Monluc had been called by the council at Agen to quell unrest generated by the
prosecution of two Calvinist ministers, Jean Voisin and Jacques Fontaine, each
accused of over-zealous preaching. His participation in the trial, however, was
deemed provocative by local Huguenots, who complained to Navarre of Monluc's
alleged bias towards the Catholic plaintiffs. A reprimand followed from Pau,
admonishing the captain for presiding over the case without official jurisdiction.
Sanctions were also mooted, though the intercession of the duke of Guise spared
8Monluc further censure.
Courteault suggests that Guise's mediation had an ulterior motive: to secure a
spy in the south-west to watch over Navarre. Monluc appeared the perfect man for
the job, and this new role may account for his recall to the royal court in August
1560, and for his flurry of correspondence with the cardinal of Lorraine later that
6 Evans, Blaise de Monluc, p. 19.
7 For rivalry between Navarre and Guise in the late 1550s, see Sutherland's chapter: 'Antoine de
Bourbon, King of Navarre and the French crisis of authority, 1559-1562', Sutherland, Princes,
Politics and Religion /547-/589, pp. 55-72.
8 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, pp. 148-49.
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same year." It would be a short-lived reconciliation, though, as the death of Francis
II, in December 1560, released Monluc from his obligations. This time, Catherine de
Medici wasted no time securing the reins of power, promoting Montmorency and
sending for Navarre so as to counter the Guise element within the royal council. With
the Guise ostracised from court, Monluc was able to return to Guyenne, only recalled
at his appointment as lieutenant-general in December 1561.
The Triumvirate
If the Guise were excluded from power, they were never far from the centre
of wider Catholic activity during this period. When Philip of Spain proposed the
Compact of Perorme in May 1558, an attempt to secure an alliance between Spain,
the papacy and the Catholic grandees of France to ensure the triumph of Catholicism
across Europe, it was the Guise who championed French involvement.l'' Whether
they were prepared to undertake a concerted campaign to extirpate Protestantism
from France at this early stage is open to question Robert Harding certainly doubts
the Guises' commitment to such a policy, despite their bluster and belligerence. He
suggests that a more circumspect approach was being employed by the Catholic
grandees, and points as evidence to a debate within the minutes of the Assembly of
Fontainebleau, in August 1560, in which the provincial governors and local officials
were cautioned that immediate repression of the Reform movement would be more
of a threat to public order than a cure. II Harding also cites a royal directive of early
1561 that warned the militant duke d'Etampes, governor of Brittany, that:
9 Courteault, Blaise de Monluc. Historien; p. 390.
10 Marthe W. Freer, Jeanne d'Albret (London, 1862), p. 237.
II Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p. 50.
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As long as Protestants, in praising God make no scandal for others and assemble in
small numbers and peaceably, they should not be prevented ... In the times we are in,
we must conduct all things cautiously with reason, great calmness, and moderation,
precipitating nothing. 12
Other conunentators support this view. Powis reports that in late 1560 Burie warned
the parlement at Bordeaux that 'at this moment royal ministers may be unwilling to
proceed with a policy aimed at the total annihilation of Huguenot supporters'," while
Yardeni refers to the view of Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence, who wrote in 1562
that:
Ie nombre de sectateurs de ceste religion est si grand et ils sont si fermes et constans
en leur opinion que celui qui voudroit les avoir par force, il faudroit les faire tous
mourir; autrement celuy qui restoroit en vie avec cendres des mortes, on feroit
ressussister d'autres."
But if the Guises did not seek to defeat the Huguenots on the battlefield, they
did endeavour to deny the Protestant elites of France access to the corridors of
power. IS It was to achieve this purpose that Francois de Guise reconciled with
Montmorency in 1561, and, together with marshal Saint-Andre, formed a cabal to
further Catholic military potential." This Triumvirate found many prominent
Catholics willing to support its cause, including the duke of Montpensier, the
cardinal of Tournon, and the marshals Brissac and Termes, all of whom opposed the
crown's policy of toleration, 17 Even Navarre converted to the Catholic cause and
12 Charles IX to Etampes (March 1561), quoted in Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p. 51.
13 Powis, 'Order, religion, and magistrates', p. 183.
14 Yardeni, La conscience nationale, p. 89.
IS Benedict has suggested that the Guise may have been plotting to exterminate all Protestants in 1560,
but adds that there is little proof to confirm this theory. Benedict, 'The Saint Bartholomew's
Massacres in the Provinces', p. 214.
16 Jacques d'Albion, sieur de Saint-Andre, marechol of France since 1547, was a long time
acquaintance of Monluc, having supported his nomination to the governorship of Siena in 1554. See
Roy, Blaise de Monluc, p. 234. For general history of the formation of the Triumvirate, see Jouanna et
al, Histoire et diaionnaire, p. 100; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 16.
17 Holt, French Wars of Religion, p. 47; Sutherland, The Massacre of Saim-Bartholomew, p. 350.
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joined the Triumvirate in mid-1562. That his two erstwhile patrons were no longer
sworn adversaries must have been a relief to Monluc.
A driving force behind this alliance was Thomas de Perrinot de Chantonnay,
the Spanish ambassador. Chantonnay had made an art of garnering intelligence and
policy details from senior authority figures in France, repeatedly outmanoeuvring the
Gallican majority at the French court with his 'informed' rhetoric." Of especial
service in this regard were successive French ambassadors to Spain, Claude de
l'Aubespine and Saint-Sulpice, the bishops of Limoges and Rennes, who represented
Catherine de Medici before the papal and imperial courts respectively, and Hippolyte
d'Este, cardinal of Ferrara, the papal legate in France, who became an important
conduit between Rome and the Guise." Chantonnay saw the Triumvirate as far more
than an anti-Protestant force in France. He envisaged a pan-European Catholic army,
funded and provisioned by Rome and Spain, and directed by his master, Philip II,
and worked tirelessly to ensure that enmity and jealousy were not allowed to splinter
the union. It was through Chantonnay's efforts that the pope agreed to ratify the
Triumvirate as une grande ligue, and to dispatch 2,500 soldiers, together with
sufficient funds to hire several companies of Swiss and German mercenaries, to the
Guise in mid 1562.20 In fact, the scale of the support from Rome has led Nicola
Sutherland to paint the duke of Guise as a knight-errant of the papacy, rather than as
18 For analysis of the Gallican liberties/tendencies of the French court and various parlements, see
Jonathan Powis, 'Gallican liberties and the politics of later sixteenth-century France', Sixteenth
Century Journal, 26 (1983), pp. 515-30.
19 For analysis of Chantonnay's espionage network in France, see Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, I,
p. 218. For correspondence between d'Este and Guise, see Hippolyte d'Este, Negociauons ou lettres
d'affaires ecclesiastiques et politiques escrites au Pape Pie IVet au cardinal Borromee par Hippolyte
d'Este, Cardinal de Ferrara, legat en France au commencement des guerres civiles (Paris, 1658).
20 Edouard Fremy, Essai sur les diplomates du temps de la Ligue, d'apres des documents nouveaux et
inedtts (paris, 1873), esp. Chapter I, pp. I-56. See also Holt, French Wars of Religion, p. 56; Louis
Pierre Anquetil, L 'esprit de la Ligue, ou histoire polittque des troubles de France pendant les XVIe et
XVIIe steeles (2 vols., Paris, 1818), I, pp. 77-81.
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a religious appellant of France." However, Chantonnay also secured sizeable
assistance from Spain too, with troops sent north to Guise, and south to boost
Monluc's garrisons in Guyenne. Accusations that the Triumvirate was being funded
directly from Madrid now proliferated, though the Huguenot grandees struggled to
prove these Claims.22 The English ambassador to France, however, was in no doubt
about who the driving force behind the Triumvirate was: 'which enterprise is pushed
forward by the Spanish ambassador here and Spanish threatenings'v"
Guise patronage in the south-west
With the duke and cardinal of Guise undoubted champions of Catholicism in
France during this period, the extent of their influence over events in the south-west
was more indeterminate. It is not at all clear that Monluc was still an active client of
the duke after his departure from court in December 1561. Communications between
the two are extremely rare during this period, and, perhaps because the Guise were so
occupied with affairs in the north and north-east, there is thus little evidence of their
direct involvement in Catholic intrigues in Guyenne or Languedoc. There are
indications, though, that relations were not entirely severed. In December 1563,
Monluc wrote to Damville to congratulate the new governor of Languedoc on his
overt Catholicism. Included with this document was a letter from Claude, duke
d' Aumale, Guise's brother, which had been sent to Monluc for safekeeping until it
could be delivered securely to Damville.i" More significantly, Mark Greengrass has
21 Sutherland, The Huguenot Struggle/or Recognition, p. 144.
22 For Huguenot accusations of Spanish financing of the Triumvirate, see Memoires de Conde, III, p.
395.
23 See Recueil des choses memorables passees et publiees pour Ie fait de 10 religion et elm de 10
France (Strasbourg, 1566), in Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 51.
24 Monluc to Damville (28 December 1563), Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 308.
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examined the August 1563 indentures of a client of the Guise, Guy de Daillon, comte
de Lude, and found that this official not only 'promes et jure par Ie dieu vivant de
randre toute telle obeisance et loial servince a Monsr Ie ducq de Guise, a messieurs
les cardinaus ses oneles, et madame sa mere', but that he also promised 'obeir ace
que sera commande par Monsr de Monluc comme a selui que je reconnais lieuten
general et chef de lentreprinse en la guienne' .25 There is certainly little doubt that
Lude was an active supporter of Catholic activism at Bordeaux; he would
subsequently be identified by Lagebaton and the Parisian commissioners as one of
those Catholic nobles accused of attempting to usurp power at Bordeaux/" Lude may
well have been a conduit between the Guise and Monluc, but the dearth of relevant
archival survivals at Bordeaux fail either to confirm or reject such a supposition.
What should be remembered, though, is that Monluc had served under
Francois de Guise in the Italian campaigns of the 1550s not his son, Henri, who had
assumed the title of duke at the death of his father at Orleans in February 1563.
Therefore, any Guise involvement in the Catholic Iigues at Agen, Toulouse and
Cadillac after this date would have been orchestrated by Henri, whose bond with
Monluc could not have been as strong as had that between the two veteran
campaigners. Evidence of these weakened relations may be seen in the events of
February 1565. WIth the royal court lodged at Toulouse as part of its tour of the
provinces, Monluc was approached by d' Auma1e and the marquis d'Elbeuf to garner
support for the creation of a national Catholic ligue in France, to be headed by Henri
de Guise. Monluc declined to be involved, instead reporting the information to
Catherine de Medici, claiming, rather mischievously, considering his participation in
25 Greengrass, 'Functions and limitations'. p. 79.
26 D'Escars to Catherine de Medici (6 September 1563), BN nouv. aeq. fr, 20,598, fo. 197.
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the ligues at Agen and Toulouse, that 'ce n'estoit pas viande de mon goust,.27
Perhaps aware that the Guise would not take kindly to having their plans exposed,
Monluc openly credited the duke with the inspiration for such an organisation,
though he did acknowledge that a national /igue was feasible if the king himself
headed it.28Michel de Castelnau, the royal diplomat, reported in his memoirs that the
king gave the proposal serious thought, but decided against such an overt institution,
as the risk of inciting further sectarian contlict was too great.29 It would be fair to
say, then, that while Francois de Guise was a major influence on the careers of
Monluc and cardinal Armagnac during the mid 1550s and early 1560s, his son,
Henri, played little part in the development of Catholic activism in the south-west
after 1562. Other notables of France, however, would have an impact on the course
of Catholic affairs across the provinces, as a new arena of activism established itself
in 1567: the militant confraternity.
Confratemal activism (post 1567)
Across Europe, communal, 'popular' piety had been rejuvenated by the
missives of the Council of Trent, which finally concluded its business in 1563.
Spanish military successes in the Netherlands helped raise Catholic spirits also,
following a period of sobering reversals. But it was within the towns that the
revitalisation of Catholicism was most evident. Here, townsfolk emolled in the
confraternities in ever increasing numbers, boosted by support from the reinvigorated
27 Commentaires, p. 586.
21 Commentaires, pp. 587-89. See also Manfred Orlea, La noblesse aux elats generaux de 1576 et de
1588 (paris, 1980), p. 33.
29 Michel de Castelnau, Les memotres de Messire Michel de Castelnau; seigneur deMawisa/ere el de
Concressata, ausquelles sont traictees les choses plus remarquables qu'tl a veues et negotiees en
France. Ang/ete"e, el Escosse, soubs les rois Francois JI et Charles IX. tam en temps de paix qu'en
temps de guerre (paris, 1671), pp. 314-15.
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local guilds. Some areas witnessed more activity than others: Crouzet shows that
across Provence during the 1550s a level of confraternal activism similar to that of
the confraternity of Saint-Yves at Bordeaux was evident; Venard states that in the
ecclesiastical province of Avignon there were fifteen corfreries penitentes by 1560;
Benedict reports that 1,241 confreres et consoeurs assembled to swear an oath to the
confraternity ofSaint-Sacrement at Rouen, on 15 June 1561; and Galpern shows that
confraternal membership at Champagne remained robust, and rose in certain
parishes, through the first decade of the religious wars.30 Across Burgundy, the
Catholic governor, Gaspard de Sau1x-Tavannes, was able to deploy militia drawn
from the many confraternities of the region throughout the early 15605, under the
pretext that they were necessary for the defence of a 'frontier province', while at
Dieppe, Daval describes how, in April 1561, 'quelques gens mecaniques firent une
confrairye ou plutost une ligue ... pour exterminer les fideles, se qualifiant de
gentilshommes de la confrairye de St Goistan'." At Paris, though, the crown
censured a nascent Catholic fraternity in June 1561 after allegations that it was
sponsored by the cardinal of Lorraine came to light. 32
Given the restrictions placed on many traditional Catholic observances, in
order to placate Huguenot sensitivities, the renaissance of widespread confraternal
membership should not be that surprising. Jensen has shown, for example, that many
urban craftsmen remained staunchly orthodox during the 1560s, their guilds offering
30 For Provence, see Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, p. 357; For Avignon, see Venard, Reforme
protestante, p. 1,175; For Rouen, see Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, pp. 83-88; For
Champagne, see Galpern, The Religions of the People, pp. 204-13. For a general overview of
confraternal activity during the early 1560s, see Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 218-24; Chevalier,
Les bonnes villes de France, pp. 76-83; 248-55; Christopher F. Black, Italian Confraternities in the
Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, 1989).
31 For Burgundy confraternities in 'frontier province', see Robert J. Knecht, The Rise and Fall of
Renaissance France (2ad Edition, Oxford, 2002), p. 323; Henri Druout, Mayenne et 10 bourgogne:
Etude sur 10Ligue, 1587-1595 (2 vols., Paris, 1937), II, p. 132. For Dieppe, see Guillaume Daval and
Jean Daval, Histoire de 10 reformation a Dieppe, 1557-1657 (ed. E. Lesens, Rouen, 1878), p. 19.
32 Orlea, La noblesse DUX etats generaux, p. 33.
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both an outlet for Catholic sensibilities, and a communal refuge for those ostracised
from traditions and customs recently censored by royal edict. They also provided a
focal point for anger at continuing Protestant abuses, with many confreres and
guildsmen forced to endure the ridiculing of their patron saints, and the smashing of
chapels and statues by iconoclasts." The growing affiliation to confraternities and
guilds thus ensured that Catholic sentiment retained a militant edge within the towns,
despite the crown's continuing attempts to silence its leadership - a development that
Thompson suggests would have important ramifications for the ligueurs: 'the
identification of the guilds and confraternities with the Catholic party gave them
great and unexpected support ... under the new order of things, they became the
nuclei of local and provincial Catholic leagues' .34
The French crown, however, was stronger in 1566 than it had been for many
years, and it moved quickly to counter this threat. In February, it issued the
ordonnance de Moulins, laying down strict guidelines governing the structure and
conduct of all guilds and confraternities. All such bodies were now to be audited,
with those that transgressed the new rules suppressed. To achieve this, the crown
commissioned a number of mattres des requites to visit the provinces, much to the
disgust of the local Catholic clergy, who claimed that the crown was once more
pampering to the whims of the Protestant grandees at court" Catholics were even
more aggrieved when royal edicts of 11 December 1566, and 4 February 1567,
restricted, and in some instances banned entirely, certain guild and confratemal
banquets, festivals and celebrations." The memorialist, Jacques-Auguste de Thou,
33 Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39. For a broad study of the interaction and balance between
guilds and confraternities in urban centres in sixteenth-century France, see Howell A. Lloyd, The
State, France and the Sixteenth Century (London, 1983), pp. 37-41.
34 Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 222-23.
3' For the commissions of the maitres des requetes in 1566, see AHG, 13, pp. 157-250.
36 Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 222.
IV: NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS - 9/253
whose writings attempt to validate the moderate consensus at court, claimed that this
legislation was justified, as it weeded out those confraternities that threatened the
stability of the town, or whose popular elements were deemed too unruly:
qu' on abolisse entierement les confreries etablies sous pretexte de religion panni Ie
petit peuple, les festins, les repas, les batons (batons de confrerie, qui servent a
porter aux confreries I'image de quelques saints, ou la representation de quelque
mystere) et autres choses sernblables, qui donnent lieu a la superstition, aux troubles,
a la debauche, aux quereJles, et aux monopoles."
A parallel aim of the ordonnance was to stem the flow of adherents to the
confraternities at source. One of its clauses prohibited the guilds from affiliating to
any of the local fraternities, while another denied them the right to remodel
themselves as confraternities, a prerogative that many guilds had previously taken
advantage of.38
Crown censure of the guilds, though, was hardly innovative. Michel de
l'Hopital had used the ordonnance d'Orleans to restrain the excesses of the guilds as
early as January 1561, supplementing this with further punitive legislation in
February 1562 and December 1565.39 Hauser has contended that the crown's
repeated attacks on the guilds in the 1560s were not simply to limit militant
Catholicism, but aimed to also dissolve their political power and loosen their
stranglehold on economic enterprise within the towns. For Hauser, this persistent
legislation backfired, though, as it aggravated the guilds, and drove them into the
arms of the Catholic leadership: 'the trade unions fell under the sway of the religious
brotherhoods, which excluded the non-Catholics, and were soon to lead the
37 De Thou. Histoire Universelle, V, p. 183.
38 Anquetil, L 'esprit de la Ligue, I, p. 213.
39 See especially the lettres patentes restricting the activities of the confreries de metiers in 1565.
Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 222.
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revolutionary movement of the League'i''" This argument is valid to some extent, but
if, as Hauser contends, social tensions and politico-economic stresses within urban
centres were the engine driving the empowerment of the guilds and confraternities at
this time, it does not explain why many emerging Catholic fraternities after 1567
were centred on the 'quieter' towns of the Limousin, Burgundy, Comminges and
Franche-Comte, rather than within vibrant economic centres such as Lyon, Marseille
and Rouen. It would suggest that religious motivation was a decisive factor in the
rise of these urban bodies, with radical and revolutionary political and economic
factors serving to agitate the milieu further.
The development of the confraternities was helped noticeably by the return to
favour of Henri de Guise, in 1567. Now reconciled with the king, Guise was able to
soften the crown's position regarding the confraternities, advocating an oath of
allegiance as a means of securing the loyalty of the populace, rather than the current
harsh, punitive legislation. In light of this relaxed sentiment, several new
confraternities sprang up across France. At Roussillon, the confraternity of Saint-
Esprit was founded in early 1567; the Burgundian confraternity of Saint-Esprit, an
innovation of the province's Catholic lieutenant-general, Gaspard de Saulx-
Tavannes, was formed in June 1567, while the confraternity of the Sainte-Croix at
Limoges was established the following month, its affiliates identified by the cross of
pewter worn on their bats." The resumption of hostilities in September 1567,
however, turned the political picture in France on its head. Catholic elites now
petitioned the king to end all sanctions against the confraternities, arguing that the
Protestant army was now so strong that Catholic generals would welcome the
40 Hauser, 'The French Reformation and the French People', p. 227.
41 For the creation of the Roussillon confraternity, see Orlea, La noblesse aux etats generoux, p. 33.
For the creation of the Burgundian confraternities of Saint-Esprit, see Druout, Moyenne et la
bourgogne, II, pp. 130-35. For the birth of the confraternity of the Saint-Croix at Limoges. see Cassan,
Le temps des guerres de religion, pp. 237-38.
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additional manpower these brotherhoods could provide. Consequently, a number of
more militant bodies were created; at Autun, another confraternity paying homage to
the famous crusading confraternity of the Sainte-Croix of the twelfth century was
established.f while at Angers the bishop, Gabriel Bouvery, headed a coalition of
confreres, clergy, nobles and bourgeoisie, all pledging 'courir sus contre tous
perturbateurs, innovateurs et contrevenants a la religion catholique et l'Etat de Sa
majeste ... Ie tout jusqu'a la mort inconclusivement' .43 Orlea has detailed the rise of
confraternities at Chalons, Bourges, Troyes and Berry during the first months of
1568, while Castelnau reported similar bodies forming across Anjou, Touraine and
Maine during the same period. At Maine, the confreres were reported to have
combined with a local Catholic association, formed by the lieutenant-general, Talon,
so as to harass the nearby Huguenot communities more effectively."
The militant confraternities of Saulx- Tavannes and Monluc
With the crown still adamant that any sanctioning of formal Catholic ligues
would only exacerbate matters, the Catholic generals of France jumped at the
opportunity to co-opt the highly motivated, well-organised manpower offered by
these confraternities. It is no coincidence, then, that two of the most important
militant Catholic associations of the late 1560s were just such bodies, connnanded
by the two leading Catholic generals of the time: Saulx- Tavannes, who headed the
Burgundian corfrerie du Saint-Esprit, and Monluc, who directed the establishment
42 Lecler, 'Aux origines de la ligue', p. 198.
43 E. Mourin, La reforme et la Ligue en Anjou (paris, 1888), pp. 86-88.
44 Orlea, La noblesse aux elms generaux, p. 34. For Catholic association at Maine (18 July 1568), see
BN ms fr, 15,547, fos. 66-72, 194; at Troyes (25 June 1568), see BN ms fr, 15,591, fos. 1-2; at
Boulogne (18 August 1568), see BN ms fr, 15,547, fo. 278; across Brittany (20 August 1568), see BN
ms fr, 15,547, Co. 279; across Provence (26 August 1568), see BN ms fr, 15,547, fos. 329. See also
Joanna et al, Histoire et dictionnaire, p. 152; Memolres de Conde, VI, pp. 327 on.
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of a confraternity at Cornminges, in Guyenne, in June 1568.45 That two such
prominent leaders were the driving forces behind these associations raises an
important question: were the Catholic generals merely beneficiaries, profiting from a
rejuvenation in confraternal ethos in France; or were they instigators, recreating their
associations under a different guise, and re-establishing their power bases by allying
themselves to these new symbols of Catholic piety? If the latter is true, their intention
may well have been to side step crown censure by involving themselves with bodies
generally perceived to be 'less illegal' than the ligues of the early 1560s.
Thompson suggests that Saulx- Tavannes' confraternity was based on
observations made of similar Catholic groups active in the Flemish revolts of 1565-
67, especially the confrerie de la Sainte-Barbe in neighbouring Francbe-Corote."
SauIx-Tavannes would apparently scrutinize their structural, organisational, and
financial strengths, then incorporate these into his Burgundian enterprises. It seems
that the lieutenant-general also tailored the 'articles of association' to suit this
purpose, with the oath of allegiance, inwhich members pledged to fight to the death
for the defence of the Catholic Church, leaving little doubt over its militant
tendencies, while Saulx-Tavannes himself was most explicit in its raison d'etre:
'Rien n'etonna jamais tant les Huguenots que cette confrerie; c'etait les battre de leur
45 For details of Saulx-Tavannes' confrerie de Saint-Esprit in Burgundy, see Crouzet, Les guerriers de
Dieu, I, pp. 383-84. For Monluc and confrerie at Comminges, see J. Lestrade, Les Huguenots en
Comminges (Paris, Auch, 1900), p. 19; Lecler, 'Auxorigines de la tigue', p. 203; Courteault, Blaise de
Monluc, p. 512; Joanna et al, Histoire et dictionnaire, pp. 174-75.
46 Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 313. For analysis of the structures of confraternities of 1567 and
1568 at Dijon, Angers, Le Mans, Chalons-sur Saooe and Macon, see Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu,
I, pp. 383-91; Robert Harding, 'The mobilisation of confraternities', Sixteenth Century Journal, II
(1980), pp. 85-107. Mariejol notes that each confraternity was dedicated 'au nom de notre seigneur
Jesus-Christ et par la communion de son preeieux corps et sang [contractaient) une fraternite pour de
tout leur pouvoir, soutenir l'Eglise de Dieu, maintenir la foi ancienne et Ie roi, souverain naturel et tres
chretien seigneur'. Jean Hippolyte Mari6jol, 'La reforme et la Ligue. L'edit de Nantes (1559-1598)',
in Ernest Lavisse (ed.), Histoire de France depuis res originesjusqu'o la Revolution (9 vols., Paris,
1903-10), VI, ii, p. 103.
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meme invention de fraternite, opposer d'intelligence contre intelligence, ligue contre
ligue' .47
The establishment of the confraternity at Comminges had a different history,
a product of the convoluted political climate of mid 1568. The Peace of Longjumeau
may have ended the second religious war in March 1568, but it did little to solve the
overriding sectarian crisis. Despite the continuing presence of the Guise at court, the
crown decided to once more temper Catholic ambitions. Reiterating its ban on all
associations across France was seen as a gesture of goodwill to the Protestant
grandees, who had complained bitterly of the insidious nature of these Catholic
compacts. Possibly aware that such a directive would not be entirely successful, or
that certain allegiances would be difficult to terminate, all citizens were required to
swear an oath of fidelity to the crown, and to proclaim they had rejected all illegal
affiliations. This very much mirrored the crown's policy of May 1565, but with one
important distinction. Then, the focus of attention was the proscribing of Catholic
militancy. Now, the crown desired popular consensus and acknowledgement of its
authority, which required that Huguenots as well as Catholics agreed to pledge their
loyalty. The expedient answer was to draft two oaths: one to be sworn by Catholics,
one by Protestants, each draft containing an identical body of text, save for the last
sentence. Thus, Catholics pledged observance to 'une seule esglise romaine et un
seul soverain', while Protestants promised 'vivre en bonne intelligence avec les
catholicques'."
47 Gaspard de Saulx- Tavannes, Memoires de plusieurs choses advenues en France es guerres civiles
(8 vols., eds. J. Michaud and J. Poujoulat, Paris, 1838), VlII, p. 289. For articles of confraternity of
Saint-Esprit, see Holt, 'Burgundians into Frenchmen', p. 359.
48 For text ofrayal oath of allegiance of May 1565, see BN ms fr, 20,461, fo. 57. For text of the
Catholic oath of allegiance of April 1568, see AM Toulouse, AA 15, no. 2; for text of the Protestant
oath of allegiance of April 1568, see AM Toulouse, AA 15, no. 4.
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The crown's expectation over the efficacy of the oath does not appear to have
been that great, however, for while it pressed the population to pledge their fidelity, it
also initiated a plan to augment the royal army with volunteers from the provinces. In
June 1568, the leading generals around the kingdom received the following directive:
Pour ce que sa Majeste desire scavoir de quel nombre de ses subiectz aptes Ii porter
armes elles se pourra ayder en cas de necessite, a ceste cause nous vous mandons et
ordoonons par ces presentes d'en faire la discution par toutes les villes et Iieux de
vostre dioceze, et scavoir en quel equipage ilz sont, soit d'armes ou cheval, et en
dresser les rolles lesquelz vous nous envoyeres au plus tost que fere ce pourra,
mettant a part et separment ceulx de la religion catholique, et en ung autre rolle
ceulx de la religion pretendue reformee."
Monluc received his orders in early July, and delegated the senechal of
Guyenne to start the count. Significantly, though, he ordered only that a
'denombrement des catholiques' be made, with no facility to list the potential
Huguenot forces of the province. so Monluc then instructed Pierre de Lancrau, the
bishop ofLombez, to undertake a 'description' of all Catholics within the jurisdiction
of Comminges, a town that Monluc had long been closely associated with, having
been a confidant of the former bishop, Pierre d' Albret. 5 I On 10 August, he added a
further twist, requesting that Lancrau 'faire la description et confederation en forme
de confrerie en 1a ville,.52 This effectively ordered the bishop to draft a number of
those Catholics counted into the new confraternity, to be based within the town.
Lancrau complied fully with Monluc's request, summoning the etats of Comminges
49 Joyeuse to consuls at Comminges (July 1568), Abbe Jean Lestrade, 'Les Huguenots en Comminges.
Documents inedits, II', Archives Historiques de la Gascogne, 14, (paris, Auch, 1910), p. 81.
50 AHG, 19, p. 323.
51 Monluc to Pierre de Lancrau, bishop ofLombez (26 July 1568), AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, fos.
3-4. Pierre d'Albret served as an emissary of the French king to the Spanish and papal courts during
the early 1560s, and was present at the infiunous 'secret meeting' of Catholic nobles ofGuyenne at
Grenade in 1563, at which, claimed Jeanne d'Albret, the Catholic leadership of the south-west agreed
to hand over the province to Philip II of Spain. See Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, p. 331, esp.
note 2.
52 AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, £0. 31.
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on 11 August to validate this innovation. The delegates were unanimous in their
support, pledging their affiliation to the confraternity, and vowing 'vivre et mourir
dans la religion de ses predecesseurs'r '
The results of the count are recorded in the 'rolle et description des chefs de
maisons et habitans catholicques romaines du comte de Comminges', a voluminous
account listing the name, age, occupation and weaponry possessed by each Catholic
of the region." Incredibly, the majority of those questioned admitted to owning some
form of weapon, despite the numerous disarmament edicts of the preceding years, the
most common being an arquebus, hallebarde, pique or arbalete. Anyone whose
Catholic credentials were questioned was required to provide a testament from local
'bons et fidelles catholicques', usually office holders or town councillors, otherwise
their name would not be entered into the roll. 55 It seems evident, then, that Monluc
and Lancrau were not simply counting heads, but recreating the associations that had
served Catholics so well in 1563. That it took the form of a confraternity seems to
have been an expedient, a devious way re-establish Catholic power bases and
augment local militias while avoiding censure from the crown, as confraternities
were not yet as strictly censured as the many other forms of Catholic association
were. But these were /igues by any other name; organised by a Catholic captain,
unified through a sacred oath, and manned by civilian militia sworn to live and die in
the defence of the Catholic church. Souriac is forthright in stating that: '[Monluc]
cherche encore une fois a mettre Ie pays en etat d'alerte sous la forme d'une
association des catholiques'. Courteault concurs; noting that in its structure and
S3 Etats de Lombez, maison eptscopale de Pierre de Lancrau, eveque de Lombez (9-11 August 1568).
AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, fos. 44-47. For full text of the Catholic oath sworn at Comminges, see
AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, fos. 11-18.
S4 AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, fos. 60-62. A similar dossier exists giving a 'description' ofC8tholics
of the chatellenie ofl'Isle-en-Dodon. See AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, fo. 37.
S5 AD Haute-Garonne, C 3,498, fos. 41-44.
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purpose, the confraternity at Cornminges imitated Monluc's 'ligues campaneres' of
the Agenais extremely closely, while Crouzet and Lestrade have no doubt this was a
'confederation militaire' rather than a pious union.56 Monluc was not alone in
spotting this loophole in crown legislation. Within months, similar Catholic bodies
were established at Anjou, Touraine, Champagne, Perigueux, Agen and Limoges,
each the result of the local Catholic hierarchy'S usurpation of the directive. 57 In
Burgundy, Saulx-Tavannes appears to have taken the orders to initiate a count of
Catholics within his jurisdiction as a validation of the associations that had already
been established - the lieutenant-general maintained his militia under arms at al
times, claiming that Burgundy, as a 'frontier province', required a strong, permanent
military presence - and simply accelerated the growth of these Catholic bodies.i"
Lecler, however, notes that Saulx- Tavannes was astute enough to distance himself
from the leadership of many of these confraternities, appointing Jean Begat,
conseiller at the Dijon court, to head them, so as not to be seen to pose too great a
threat to crown authority. 59
This chapter has revealed that, while the Catholic grandees within the French
court had little influence on events in the south-west of France during the 1560s, they
were integral to wider Catholic activism across the kingdom throughout this period.
The dukes and cardinal of Guise, for example, were instrumental in securing Spanish
and papal military and financial assistance for the Catholic cause, and, during their
participation in the Triumvirate, it seemed for a brief moment in 1562 that Catholic
56 Souriac, Decentralisation administrative, I, p. 405; Courteault, Histoire de Gascogne et de Beam, p.
229; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, p. 386; Lestrade, 'Les Huguenots en Comminges', pp. 76-80.
57 At Agen, the archives reveal that the etats de l'Agenais met in September 1568 to allocate 4,000
livres to allow Monluc and Martial de Nort to make a 'description' of Catholics across the region. AD
Lot-et-Gironde, E Sup. Agen, CC 67 (27 September 1568).
58 Protestants in Burgundy had complained repeatedly to the king that Tavannes's confreres were
actively (and illegally) involved in maintaining order and policing the towns of Burgundy. Maurice
Wilkinson, A History of the League or Sainte Union 1576-1595 (Glasgow, 1929), p. 4.
59 Lecler, 'Aux origins de la ligue', pp. 201-202.
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consensus might be capable of forcing the crown to overturn its adherence to
toleration. The military generals played a role in supporting the Catholic cause too,
especially Saulx- Tavannes and Monluc. Monluc's involvement in the explosion of
confraternal activity across France after 1567 revitalised Catholic activism, which
had been effectively censored by this time. The generals took advantage of this
phenomenon, and of a loophole in crown legislation that seemed to deem the
confraternities 'less illegal' than the preceding ligues, to usurp the leadership of these
bodies, and to employ the confreres in the defence of Catholic towns. Anquetil has
little doubt about the importance of these episodes, seeing in the confraternities of
1568 a mirror image of the militia-based ligues of 1563, and a precursor to
organisational elements adopted by the Catholic League after 1576:
La jalousie entre les deux religions ne se boma pas Ii l'emulation d'une plus grande
regularite; elles chercherent Ii s'appuyer l'une contre I'autre de la force des
confederations et des serments. Depuis long-temps la romaine entretenoit dans son
sein des associations connues sous Ie nom confreries, Elles avoient des Iieux et des
jours d'assemblee fixes, une police, des repas, des exercises, des derniers communs.
IIne fut question que d'ajouter Ii eela un serment d'employer ses biens et sa vie pour
la defense de la foi attaquee. Avec cette formule, les confreries devinrent comme
d' elles-memes, dans chaque ville, des corps de troupes prates Ii agir au gre des chefs,
et leur bannieres, des etendarts militaires."
The role of Spain and the papacy will now be examined in greater detail, to
determine the full extent of external influences on Catholic activism in the south-
west, and to assess more accurately the roles played by individuals in these affairs.
60 Anquetil, L 'esprit de la Ligue, I, p. 183.
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Chapter 10. Spain and the papacy
If the influence of the Guise has been shown to be limited at best, what, then, of the
part played by foreign powers such as Spain and the papacy in affairs at Bordeaux,
Agen and Toulouse? With Catholic militants of the south-west ever eager to gain
leverage against the crown and its policy of accommodating Protestantism. the
intrigues of Madrid and Rome could only muddy the waters of an already volatile
region. By offering financial and military support, these two potentates had a prime
opportunity to manipulate the Catholics of Guyenne and Languedoc, and to
destabilise the French crown's waning authority there yet further. Both of these
eventualities will be shown to have occurred during the 1560s. The question, then,
would be: if the ligueurs of the south-west did, in fact, commit themselves to these
foreign agencies, were their subsequent motivations a reflection of their personal
beliefs or grievances, or were they acting as puppets of their new patrons? And if
financial and military assistance was forthcoming, to what extent were their agendas
free from any constraints placed on them by their foreign paymasters? This chapter
will explore these issues by examining the relations between the associations of the
south-west and the Catholic powers of Europe, and by determining the extent to
which the ligueurs were independent entities, free from obligations to peripheral
bodies, or tied to specific policies as a result of their commitments to these external
powers.
Although France and Spain negotiated the peace of Cateau-Cambresis in
1559 to end decades of conflict, the detente failed to re-establish amicable relations.
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Madrid was especially perturbed at the degree of leniency being granted by the
French crown to its Huguenot population. For the Spanish king, Philip II, religious
plurality was anathema, and religious toleration should be opposed unreservedly. His
intent to combat such a conciliatory stance was clear as early as 1561: 'le premier
point est de se detacher de 1a reine mere, qui manque ou de fixite dans les idees, ou
d 'honnetete dans les intentions: il faut done encourager les practiques de Montluc et
des catholiques'.' Courteault suggests that the French crown was well aware of this
hostility, and appointed Monluc as lieutenant-general to Guyenne in December 1561
specifically to reassure Philip of its commitment to pacifying the south-west, thus
forestalling any Spanish military intervention across its borders? If so, the ploy
seemed to have worked, for Chantonnay, the Spanish ambassador, informed his
sovereign that, in Monluc: 'Guyenne has found its saviour'. 3
For the moment, Philip seemed content to menace France rather than
intervene directly. Spanish gold lined the pockets of the Triumvirate, while his
soldiers reinforced Catholic armies throughout 1562. In Guyenne, Spanish troops
under Don Carbajal were integral to Monluc's successes at Castelvieux (3 July),
Penne (August), Realville (9 September), Lectoure (2 October), and at the battles of
the Dordogne (5-8 October), and Vergt (9 October)." Indeed, the Catholics at
Bordeaux were so keen to secure further reinforcements that the French ambassador
at the Spanish court, Saint-Sulpice, became inundated with requests for additional
units to be dispatched north. So much so, in filet, that in one reply to Burie, the
I Fomeron, Histoire de Philippe Il, I, p. 327.
2 For Monluc's role in reassuring Philip, and his general relations with Spain during this early period,
see Courteault, Un cadet de gascogne, pp. 208-212.
3 Chantonnay to Philippe II (December 1561), in Nancy Lyman Roelker, Queen of Navarre. Jeanne
d'Albret /528-1572 (Cambridge, MA., 1968), p. 193.
4 Commemaires, pp. 517-69.
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ambassador retorted, rather irritably, that: 'les gens de guerres n'assemblent pas
comme chanoines en chapitre'. 5
Early in 1563, however, Spanish foreign policy towards France received two
setbacks. First, its attempts to prevent further concessions being granted to the
Reformers failed, as the Peace of Amboise enshrined explicit, if limited, rights of
worship for Protestants within French law. Chantonnay was blunt in his
condemnation of the edict, fearing Catherine had been intimidated by Protestant
powers across Europe:
Si les heretiques obtiennent ce qu'ils desirent avec l'appui de la reine d'Angleterre...
les catholiques se souleveront a leur tour, et i1s seront soutenus pari Ie roi mon
mature et par tous les princes catboJiques; leur cause serait sainte et conforme aux
interets de Dieu.6
Secondly, when the Council of Trent closed in January 1563, promises of reform and
revitalisation of Catholicism were forthcoming from all European affiliates; all, that
is, except the Gallican delegates, who refused to register its dictates, or to accept its
ideological development within France. Spain now meed a conundrwn. Should it
intervene to prevent Protestantism becoming irrevocably established within the
kingdom that bordered its northern reaches?
Spain and Monluc
One possible course of action lay in offering support to the numerous
Catholic associations that sprang up across France during 1563. This would allow
S Saint-Sulpice to Burie (20 July 1562), Edmond Cabie, Ambassade en espagne de Jean Ebrard,
seigneur de St. Sulpice de 1562 ci 1565 (Albi, 1903), p. 53. For communications and requests from
Burie, Monluc, and Noailles to Saint-Sulpice for additional Spanish troops, see Cabie, Guerres de
religion, pp. 8-15; Cabie, Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ebrard, pp. 61; 84-86.
6 Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, I,pp. 276-77.
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Spain to apply pressure on the crown from within. The obvious choice for such
attention was Monluc, whose military reputation and known commitment to the
Catholic ligues had recently been augmented by promotion to the lieutenancy of
south-west Guyenne, with the more moderate Burie reassigned east of the Lot river.
Both Fomeron and Ruble are convinced that Monluc was to become, if he was not
already, an agent of Philip, and quote his voluminous correspondence with Spanish
intermediaries such as Jean de Bardaxi, a Spanish agent living in Guyenne, as
evidence." While archival remains fail to corroborate accusations of overt collusion
between Spain and Monluc, several of the letters between the two do discuss the state
of Catholic hegemony in Guyenne, the progress of the Reform movement in the
south-west, and the need for Spanish reinforcements or finances to be sent to
Bordeaux'[ Even Monluc's biographer, Courteault, notes the close relationship
between Monluc and Bardaxi, reporting that at one meeting, in February 1564,
Bardaxi enquired how Spain could gain the confidence of the governor of
Languedoc, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, and the extent to which the Catholic
nobility of Guyenne would support Spanish attempts to oust the Calvinist Jeanne
d'Albret, queen of Navarre, from her capital at Pau," Courteault adds that Philip
promised great rewards to those that helped, with safe haven in Spain and a pension
from the crown as a safety net should their campaign fail.'" While Courteauh's
version of this meeting is speculative at best. a later letter from Philip reveals that the
7 See Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II, I, pp. 293-330; Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 317-
71; V, pp. 76, 77, notes. Bardaxi had gained the ear of Monluc through his cousin, Felipe, who had
served for two decades as a loyal captain of the veteran general. Ironically, Felipe Bardaxi was
accused of blasphemy by the inquisition in 1558 while his force was camped at Saragossa. He only
escaped punishment when Monluc intervened and managed to rescind all charges. Felipe was still
hung in effigy at Saragossa, though, in October 1563, and his name only cleared from the warrant
book of the Inquisition in 1567, on the orders of the king of Spain. See Ruble, Commentaires et
Lettres, IV, p. 318 note 1.
8 See, for example, Monluc to Philip II (February 1564), Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 319-
27; Monluc to Philip II (March 1564), Ibid., pp. 333-37.
9 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gasgogne, pp. 13-14.
10 Ibid.
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Spanish king was most pleased with Monluc's cooperation at the time, thanking him
personally for his influence in rousing a strong force to invade Beam. II
It is difficult to know Monluc's mindset at this juncture. It is doubtful that he
ever considered ceding French soil to Spain, as his detractors later claimed, or that he
would allow Spanish troops to invade France from the Pyrenees, simply to secure
stability within his province. As regards the accusations of bribery and improper
financial dealings, they are impossible to validate due to the loss of relevant
accounts. It would be naive to presume that Monluc was never involved in financial
irregularities, though. They were common practice in this period, and, for some, a
perk of nobility. Roy, for example, has said of Monluc, that he 'sold commissions,
pardons and exemptions, accepted gifts, and falsified musters', and that as
lieutenant-general in Guyenne he was 'able to corner the market in essential military
supplies, which he then resold at great profit. His house at Agen was a kind of bank,
for he lent money, at high rates, to intending purchasers' Y But, again, without
surviving financial records, much of this is mere speculation What appears to be
certain, though, is that Monluc was quite willing to have the king of Spain help him
and other generals re-establish stability and security in France, even promoting, in
October 1564, the idea of a meeting between Philip and Charles IX to collaborate
over the restoration of peace." But his uneasiness over the Peace of Amboise, and
concern that accommodation was having a negative influence on Catholic
communities, caused Monluc to use his relations with the Spanish court more as a
political weapon within his own government, implying that he had the full support of
Philip to gain leverage against the moderates at court.
11 Philippe II to Monluc (13 September 1566), see Pierre Honore Champion, Charles IX, 10France et
Ie contrOle de I 'Espagne (2 vols., Paris, 1939), I, p. 33.
12 Roy, Blaise de Monluc, p. 24.
13 Monluc to Bardaxi (27 October 1564), Ruble, Commemaires et Lettres,N, pp. 361-64; 365-71.
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Jeanne d' Albret and the Catholic leadership
It is evident, nevertheless, that Monluc did share a concern with Philip of
Spain over their troublesome neighbour, the Calvinist queen of Navarre, Jeanne
d'Albret. Jeanne had commenced the Protestantising of Beam and Navarre in 1561,
banning Catholicism from her territories and using its churches as temples for
Reformed services. By 1563, the extent of this conversion began to a1ann Catholics
in Spain and Guyeme, more so when it was confirmed that Huguenot grandees, such
as admiral Coligny and Odet de Chatillon, bishop of Beauvais, were known to
support Jeanne's Calvinist state within the French court. It is alleged that Monluc
actually warned the queen of Navarre, in early 1563, that if she continued to favour
the Reformers, then he would be forced to intervene in affairs." When Conde heard
of this, he complained to the crown over Monluc's insolent behaviour to a monarch.
Both the king and the regent, Catherine de Medici, felt compelled to reprimand
Monluc for his audacity: 'vous entretenir doulcement avec la Royne de Navarre, sans
l'offencer ny l'irriter de parolles ny d'autres choses,;5 and ordered that the Spanish
troops garrisoned within the region be maintained under close control," In late
November 1563, Monluc felt compelled to ignore this curb, warning his fellow
Catholics at Bordeaux that Jeanne: 's'en va faire perdre entierement nostre
religion'. 17
As a result of these tensions, the relationship between Monluc and the queen
of Navarre deteriorated rapidly. Jeanne repeatedly accused the Catholic leadership of
Guyenne of biased governance of the south-west, and of repealing the terms of royal
I.Courteault, Blaise de Monluc. Historien; p. 470.
" Charles IX to Monluc (June 1563), BN DOUV. acq. fr, 6,001, fos. 42-43.
16Charles IX to Monluc (May 1563), BN DOllV. acq. fr, 6,001, fos. 7-8.
17 Memoires et instructions de Monluc (November 1563), Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, pp.
294-301.
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edicts that validated Huguenot rights of worship, while confirming those that
reproached Protestant practices. In October 1563, she added collusion to these
accusations, alleging that Monluc, Damville, Armagnac, Terride, Negrepelisse and
Pierre d'Albret, bishop of Comminges,had plotted against her and the French king at
a secret meeting at Grenade, and that Monluc's son, Jean, had already been
dispatched to Madrid to secure Spanish troops for a coming confrontation." Monluc
rejected these accusations out of hand in December, claiming they were a slight on
the good name of the Catholic nobility of Guyenne. He reiterated his devotion to the
crown, and commended the good behaviour ofhis captains to Catherine."
In February 1564, however, the allegations resurfaced. The Protestant
captain, Marchastel, baron de Peyre, presented six articles before the French crown,
each signed by Jeanne d'Albret, four vicomtes and many other leading Protestant
dignitaries of the south-west, claiming that a Catholic cartel was active in Guyenne,
its aim to deliver the province over to the king of Spain.20 Apparently, the senechal
de Quercy, Francois Seguier, seigneur de la Graviere, had overheard Monluc
discussing the cartel's activities, and had dispatched the captain Rapin to inform
Marchaste1.21 On hearing these new accusations, Monluc was furious. In a blunt
letter to Catherine de Medici, he denied all knowledge of such a cartel, and rejected
assertions that he, or any other Catholic captains in Guyenne, were intent on
18 Jean had, in fact, recently visited Spain, but merely as a stopping offpoint on his journey to Malta.
See Courteault, Un Cadet de Gasgogne, p. 210.
19 Monluc to Charles IX (27 December 1563), Ruble, Commentaires et Lettres, lV, pp. 302-305.
Monluc to Catherine de Medici (27 December 1563), Ibid., pp. 305-307. Monluc cites that Candalle,
de Trans, d'Estissac, de Lauzan, de Montpezat, Gondrin, Terride and Negrepelisse were slighted by
Jeanne, though only the latter two appear in the queen' s initial accusation.
20 In a letter to Philip of Spain, Pierre Albret, bishop ofComminges, warned the king that accusations
from Jeanne d' Albret and the Protestants of Beam had been delivered by Rapin, a Protestant cavalry
captain, to Catherine de Medici, alleging that Monluc, Damville, Terride, vicomte d'Orthe, de Luxe,
cardinal Armagoac, and himself 'se soot reunis et ont resolu de donner a votre majeste toute la
Guyenne, et ils ont envoye leur decision a vostre majeste par un fils du dit Monluc'. Pierre d' Albret to
Philippe II (15 April IS64), in Raymond Ritter, 'Jeanne d'Albret et les troubles de la religion en
Beam, Bigorre, Soule et Navarre, 1560-1572', Revue de Beam, 4 (1929), p. 82.
21 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gasgogne, p. 214.
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delivering the province into Spanish hands: 'Je n'ay ni n'auray jamais aucune
intelligence avec Ie roy d'Espagne ny autre prince que ce soit pout luy bailer la
G fair hose uui soi le servi d ,22Armauyenne, ny e aucune c s qUI s it contre s r ice u roy . gnac
similarly rejected any involvement in such affairs, claiming that the meeting at
Grenade had witnessed nothing more sinister than the funeral obsequies for the baron
de Clermont, and the marriage of the son of Mirepoix to Terride's daughter.r' This,
he continued, accounted for the presence of Monluc and so many Catholic nobles
within the town, adding that he and the bishop of Comminges had performed the
ceremonies personally.
The affair dragged the Catholic-dominated parlements at Bordeaux and
Toulouse into the fray. Jeanne d' Albret's evidence was scrutinised openly before the
courts, while Rapin was arrested at Toulouse, and la Graviere and Marchastel
summoned before the Bordeaux magistrates to explain their accusations. When
Jeanne complained to the conseil prive that mere provincial courts were challenging
her testimony, the crown intervened and ordered the processes against the three to be
dropped." Catholics, though, were far from content. In May, Monluc went on the
offensive. In a letter to the king, he wrote: 'ceulx qui ont dit et escript que j'ay
intelligence avec Ie roy d'Espaigne ... et que [nous] avons faict ligue ensemble et
sommes resolluz de rendre ladicte paix de Guyenne entre les mains du roy
d'Espaigne, ont menty,.2S The crown received similar, individual remonstrations
from all prominent Catholic captains of Guyenne, followed by a joint letter, written
at the abbey of Belleperche, near Montauban, which denounced the lies of la
22 Monluc to Catherine de Medici (5 March 1564), BN ms fr, 15,879, fo. III.
23 'Madame, j'ay este adverty ... que ledict sieur de Monluc et moy avions quelque intelligence
ensemble, pour mectre Ie Roy d'Espaigne dedans vostre pays de Guyenne ... et pour ce, madame, que
ces calomnies ne doibvent estre tollerees a I'endroict des boos serviteurs du Royet vostres'. Cardinal
d'Armagnac to Catherine de Medici (5 March 1564), BN ms fr, 15,879, fo. 112.
24 Rapin though remained in prison for several more months. See Courteault, Un Cadet de Gasgogne,
~. 211.
s Monluc to Charles IX (5 May 1564), BN ms fr, 15,879, fo. 113.
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Graviere and Marchastel, and demanded reparation from those involved in such
slanderous accusations.i" Damville, meanwhile, wrote a separate letter to Catherine,
expressing his dismay at being accused by such 'imposteurs', claiming he had not
even been present at Grenade during the period stated.27
The Catholic elite of the south-west then rallied to the defence of their co-
religionists. At Bordeaux, a requete was drafted by Prevot, Lange, Bourdin, and
many leading members of the clergy of Bordeaux, and presented to the parlement in
May 1564, condemning Jeanne's accusations as fulsehoods.28 At Toulouse, the
premier president of the parlement, Jean Daffis, informed the crown that continuing
suspicions against the Catholic leadership of the region would be viewed as a direct
slight against the parlementaires toO.29 The situation, however, soon become
entangled with the ongoing controversy at Bordeaux between Lagebaton and Lange,
with the premier president insisting that Candalle's /igue remained a threat to the
stability of the province, but that Monluc and the Catholic nobility were actively
supporting this illegal compact. 30 The Memoires de Conde make much of this
allegation, claiming that Monluc, Prevot and the clergy of Guyenne had urged
26 See, for example, Monluc to Catherine de Medici (5 May 1564), BN ms fr, 15,879, fo. 113;
Armagnac to Catherine de Medici (15 May 1564), HGL, 9, Preuves 13, p. 512; Terride to Catherine
de Medici (27 March 1564), BN ms fr, 15,880, £0. 11; Terride to Charles IX (27 March 1564), BN ms
fr, 15,880, fo. 13. For joint letter signed by Armagnac, Monluc, Negrepelisse, Mirepoix and Terride
(15 May 1564), see Tamizey de Larroque, 'Lettres inedites du Cardinal d' Armagnac', p. 37.
27 Damville to Catherine de Medici (30 May 1564), BN nouv. acq. fr, 6,013, fo. 31. As if to prove his
loyalty to the crown, Damville added that he had received secret information on the arrival, incognito,
of the Spanish Ambassador, Chantonnay, to Avignoo that month.
21 Devienne, Histoire de la ville de Bordeaux, I,p. 154.
29 Daffis to Charles IX (17 May 1564), HGL, 9, Preuves 14, pp. 512-14.
30 Lagebiton to Charles IX (20 August 1564), Memoires de Conde, V, pp. 182-85. A second letter,
written the following week, named Candalle, de Trans, Savignac, Lanssac, the sieur de Merville,
Candalle's brother, Lange, and other Catholic genlilshommes ofGuyenne, as continuing to arm and
assemble men to patrol the local countryside, their numbers swollen by the participation of many
locals, and even several royal officials from the sb,echaussee. Lagebiton to Charles IX (28 August
IS64), BN ms fr, IS,880, fos. 246-47.
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Candalle and the ligueurs at Cadillac to continue armed resistance in defiance of the
royal edicts, and offered them succour as necessary."
The allegations against the Catholic leadership of Guyenne and western
Languedoc of conspiring with Spain have become the bedrock of chronicles that try
to prove a link between the ligues of the 1560s and the intrigues of Philip II.
Thompson, for example, suggests that much of Monluc's activity in the south-west
was determined by Spanish ambition: 'Monluc was the military, the cardinal of
Lorraine the diplomatic, agent of Philip's purpose,.32But the subject has also been
influenced by the numerous Protestant histories, many written in hindsight in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which claim that the Catholics of the south-
west met secretly with Spanish officials at Bayonne in 1565 to plan the later Saint-
Bartholomew massacres of French Huguenots of 1572. De Thou certainly had little
doubt that this meeting was both a logical progression from the Compact of Peronne,
and a precursor to massacre:
It is a well known fact that... the matter under discussion was the means to deliver
France from the Protestants, whose faith was regarded as pestilential. The
conference ended in the adoption of the opinion expressed by the duke of Alba,
which coincided with that of Philip; namely, that all the most illustrious heads
should first fall; and that the plan of the SicilianVespers should be followed, and all
Protestants massacred indiscriminately.f
While much of the hysteria surrounding a 'Spanish plot' as the genesis of the 1572
massacres has been de-bunked by recent historiography, there is no doubt that
contemporaries were extremely concerned about Monluc's standpoint in Franco-
31 See 'Deliberation du sieur de Candalle et autres de sa ligue contre Ie Royet ses edits faits au mois
d'dt 1564', Memo;res de Conde, V, pp. 170-76; 'Ligue, confederation et alliance du sieur de
Candalle et autres sieurs papistes de Guyenne, boos fideles sujets do Roy catholique, voulans vivre et
mourir en la religion ancienne Romaine et Catholique, au mois d'aoQt 1564', Memo;res de Conde, V,
fr. 177-81.
Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 351.
33 Freer,The Life of Jeanne d'Albret, p. 247.
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Spanish affairs.34 Jeanne d' Albret' s warning that the Catholic general was pJanning
to 'sell' Guyenne to Philip in return for significant military aid has been noted above,
but Conde also alleged that Monluc might facilitate a Spanish invasion into Navarre
in order to secure military reinforcements, while Catherine de Medici hinted that she
was well aware of: 'ceulx qui veullent estre estimez obeyssans ne peuvent soustenir
sans encourir Ie mesme cryme de rebellion dont ilz ont accuse leurs adversaries' .35 If
this is correct, Monluc was playing an exceedingly dangerous game, for affiliation
with a foreign power was a treasonable crime. Certainly, Monluc's correspondence
does refer to a meeting of Catholic nobles taking place at Grenade in late-1563, but
there is no evidence to support claims that such 'subversive' projects were discussed
there.i" And it should be noted, as Sournia does, that the allegations against Monluc
were nothing compared to the accusations of high treason levelled against Coligny
(and for that matter Conde too), for conspiring to deliver Le Havre to Elizabeth of
England: 'Coligny a livre a l'etranger une partie du territoire francais, Monluc a ecrit
une correspondance qui n'a eu aucune consequence historique'. 37
One thing worth noting here, however, is that despite the French crown's
awareness of Monluc's 'friendliness' with Spain, it never once moved to oust its
general from power in Guyenne. In fact, throughout the 1560s, Monluc was only
ever promoted, and rarely officially rebuked. The reason can only have been one of
34 Bourgeon thinks the 1572 massacres were not coordinated events, but merely an interruption of
Charles IX's plans. Jean-Louis Bourgeon, Charles IX devant la Saint-Barthelemy (Geneva, 1995), pp.
181-84. For debate surrounding Catholic meetings at Bayonne in 1565 and discussions over
premeditation of massacre, see Denis Crouzet, La nuit de la Saint-Barthelemy. Un reve perdu de la
renaissance (Paris, 1994), pp. 142-78. For wider discussions of Saint Bartholomew's massacres, see
Sutherland, The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew; Geralds Nakam, Au lendemain de la Saint-
Barthelemy. Guerre civile et famine (paris, 1975); Alfred Soman (ed.), The Massacre of Saint
Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents (The Hague, 1974); Robert M. Kingdon, Myths about the
Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre 1572-1576 (London, 1988).
3S For Conde's accusation, see Courteault, Blaise de Mon/uc, Historien, p. 470 note 4. For Catherine's
quote, see Catherine de Medici to Monluc (31 March 1563), Lettres de Catherine de Medici, I, p. 552.
36 Monluc to protonotaire of Sainte-Gemme (S March 1564), Ruble, Commentatres et Leures; IV, p.
331.
37 Jean-Charles Sournia, Blaise de Monluc. Soldat et ecrivain (1500-1577) (paris, 1981), pp. 293-94.
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expediency: Monluc had successfully maintained the peace in what had previously
been the most fractious of French provinces. Catherine was certainly not about to
allow Guyenne to explode into uncontrollable civil war or to remove the main
buttress against almost certain Protestant hegemony of the south-west, so long as
Monluc remained loyal - if only tacitly - in his duties. In March 1565, there was an
official inquiry into the general accusations against the Catholic leadership of the
south-west. This inquiry was conducted by marshal Bourdillon, on the orders of the
conseil prive, currently resident in Bordeaux as it accompanied the king on his tour
of the kingdom. Numerous witnesses were interviewed, including Monluc, Candalle
and Lange, but no recriminations were forthcoming." Moreover, Catholic advisors to
the king, such as Vieilleville, warned that the south-west was now a powder keg,
ready to explode at the smallest of provocations. It would be wise, they suggested,
for the crown to lean more towards the Catholic party for the time being, at least until
the king had returned safely to Paris. As such, all complaints against Monluc and the
Catholic hierarchy were dismissed, and the general ordered to ready his forces to
support the crown at a moment's notice, should civil strife erupt once more.39 In
general, then, the allegations that the Iigueurs colluded with Spain prove
inconclusive. It is certain that Spanish troops did play an important role in Monluc's
defence of Guyenne during 1562, and that he and his co-activists, Armagnac,
Candalle, Terride, Roffignac, d'Escars, and others, all had favourable relations with
Madrid. But accusations of duplicity, such as the secret meetings at Grenade in 1563,
and Bayonne in 1565, and of Monluc's intention to 'sell' Guyenne to Philip, remain
fragmentary and ambiguous, more supposition and speculation than fact.
~89~amazeuilth, Histoire de l'Agenais, II,p. 126; O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, II,pp. 236-
39 Charles Weiss, Papiers d'etat du Cardinal de Granvelle (1516-1565) (9 vols., Paris, 1841-1852),
VIII, p. 632.
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The papal inquisition
That certain of the region's Catholic elites acted as agents of papal aspirations
in the south-west during this period is, however, more evident. The main protagonist
here was cardinal Armagnac, with much of the focus falling on the campaign of
European powers to reverse the policy of Jeanne d'Albret, queen of Navarre, to
establish Protestantism within her lands. With the important Bourbon territories of
Beam and Navarre sandwiched between south-west France and northern Spain, the
Catholic parties of Guyenne and Madrid were understandably nervous of these
Calvinist enclaves, so close to their own lands. Concerted efforts to dissuade Jeanne
had begun from an early stage. In November 1559, the cardinal of Lorraine urged the
military captains of the south-west, Monluc and de Termes, to cooperate fully with
the Spanish viceroy to Navarre, who was attempting to unite the Catholic forces of
the region so as to intimidate the king and queen of Navarre.t" A breakthrough of
sorts was reached in early 1562, with the Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay, cajoling
Antoine de Navarre into acquiescence, wooing the king with the offer to join the
compact of Catholic grandees (the Triumvirate) against Conde and the Huguenots.
Attempts to secure the denunciation of his wife, and a promise to void all recent
legislation validating the Calvinist faith in his lands failed, with Jeanne stiffening her
resolve to push ahead with further religious reform. 41 But the queen of Navarre was
now isolated and surrounded by baying Catholic powers. Spain, keen both to
eradicate Protestantism and to regain the territory it had lost to the Bourbons in 1517,
moved large numbers of troops to its borders, while the French crown put its forces
on alert, for fear the presence of these enclaves might destabilise the region. In May
40 See Freer, The Life of Jeanne d'Albret, p. 107.
41 De Thou. Histoire Universelle, IV, pp. 124-26; Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret (4
vols., Paris, 1881-86). III, pp. 225-27,255-58.
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1563, with Antoine now dead, Catherine de Medici warned Monluc to watch Jeanne
closely, 'de ne tolerer ni predication ni exercise de la religion nouvelle dans votre
gouvernement, sinon comme ilest contenu dans l'edit'.42
The papacy also sought the removal of Jeanne d'Albret from power. To
Rome, the queen was a heretic who had escaped censorship for too long. Papal
dismay at the spread of Calvinism across this region and the inactivity of Catherine
de Medici can be seen in a series of letters between Chantonnay, Francois Vargas,
the Spanish ambassador to Rome, the pope and the Spanish king. dated September
1561 to February 1562, with the papacy informing Philip:
que Ie temps de la douceur emit passe, et combien I'on eOt gagne en procedant des
I'origine avec vigueur et severite; que pour tout marcbait desormais vers une ruine
generale.,; que Ie seul remede possible, independamment du concile universel, etait
votre majeste.43
The ambassador continued with stark information on the prospects for French
neutrality in this matter:
si la reine mere de France refusait I'appui qui lui est offert par votre majeste pour
proteger la foi catholique dans Ia royaume... vous etes dispose... d'ernployer Ia
force et d'en venir aux mains... [etl de former une ligue."
But while Rome encomaged Spain and its Catholic allies to intimidate Jeanne
with massed armies and holy ligues, it pursued its own more legalistic approach to
prising the queen of Navarre from her throne: the papal inquisition. The inquisition
had been revived in France during the 1550s to confront the rising numbers of heresy
42 Catherine de Medici to Monluc (28 May 1563), Ritter, 'Jeanne d'Albret', p. 60.
43 Chantonnay to Vargas (7 November 1561), Weiss, Papiers d'etat du Cardinal de Granvelle, VI. pp.
399-401. See also Vargas to Philip II (30 September 1561), Ibid., VI, pp. 342-68; Vargas to Philip II
(3 October 1561), Ibid.• pp. 369-96; Vargas to Philip II (7 November 1561). Ibid.• VI, pp. 401-08;
Vargas to Philip IT(15 November 1561), Ibid., VI, pp. 413-18; Vargas to Philip IT(22 February 1562).
Ibid., VI, pp. 511-27.
44 Chantonnay to Vargas (7 November 1561), Weiss, Papiers d'etat du Cardinal de Granvelle. VI. pp.
399-401.
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accusations brought before the courts. The cardinal of Lorraine was instrumental in
this, overseeing the implementation of the chambres ardentes, judicial bodies with
exclusive jurisdiction over heresy trials within the regional parlements.45 Lorraine
was also charged with nominating the various prelates who would investigate heresy
within the provinces and, in 1557, he appointed cardinal Armagnac to the office of
inquisitor general for the south-west, with jurisdiction over Guyenne and Languedoc,
extended in 1560 to include Jeanne d'Albret's territories of Beam, Navarre, Foix and
Albret." It is important not to view the inquisition as an anachronism at this time.
Despite hostility from the French crown to papal interference, the inquisitor general
possessed two potent weapons in the fight against miscreants: the inquisitorial
visitation and tribunal, and the papal monitoire. Inquisitorial tribunals were
infrequent, but effective, during the 1560s, possessing papal dispensation to enter
any town in southern France, and to accuse or arrest a heresy suspect, regardless of
rank. In early 1564, for example, even though the peace of Amboise now defined
relations between the faiths within the community,Armagnac was able to assert this
prerogative to seize two merchants at Roussillon in the name of the inquisition.The
two had been served with warrants to face charges of heresy the previous year, but
had evaded arrest by royal officials and fled to Jeanne d'Albret's lands for
protection. Armagnac, however, entered the town supported by a force of Spanish
infantry, enlisted from a nearby border garrison, and arrested the men.47 Such a bold
enterprise elicited outrage from the courts of France and Navarre. Armagnac was
vilified for invading sovereign territory, while Philip II was accused of meddling in
45 Lorraine would preside over the infamous trial and execution of the Toulouse parlememaire, Du
Bourg, in December 1559). For the reintroduction of the Inquisition into France in the 15505, see
Venard, Reforme protestame, pp. 329-39; Sutherland's chapter: 'Was there an Inquisition in
Reformation France?', in her Princes, Politics and Religion, pp. 13-29.
46 Abbe Dubarat, Documents et bibliographie sur la reforme en Beam et au pays basque (pau, 19(5),
p.57.
47 Freer, The Life of Jeanne d'Albret, p. 244.
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foreign affairs by supplying the troops. Philip denied all knowledge of the affair, but
added that any act carried out in the name of the inquisition was not illegal, as its
commission allowed it 'to act without respect to nation, quality, or person...
privileged to chastise those guilty of heresy' .48
The benefit of being able to call on military support from Spain and the
established Catholic networks and alliances of Guyenne was an asset for the
inquisition in the south-west. The French court was certainly aware of this, with
Saint-Sulpice noting that Spanish military aggression now provided the backbone to
Armagnac's inquisitorial dealings.49 This, of course, was a most troubling
development for Huguenot communities of the region, a1readyforced to live under
the shadow cast by the various Catholic associations. Now, many Reformers faced
the possibility that the itinerant inquisitorial court might visit their town to interview
suspected heretics.
The papal monitoire
The Protestant nobility, however, tended to ignore the demands of the
visitations. In such cases, the inquisitor had recourse to an additional tool: the papal
monitoire. The monitoire was essentially a summons, ordering the accused to appear
in person before the papal court in Rome. usually within a given time period, to
answer specific charges. Should the recipient of the monitoire fail to attend,
excommunication could be threatened.50 Armagnac employed this sanction against
48 Saint-Sulpice to Charles IX (31 December 1564). Freer, The Life 0/Jeanne d'Albret, p. 244.
49 Saint-Sulpice to Lanssac, French ambassador at Council of Trent (July 1562). Cabie, Ambassode en
Espagne de Jean Ebrard, p. 28.
soRobin Briggs has shown that a version of this monitoire had, in fact, been frequently employed by
the French church during early sixteenth century, to force witnesses to testiiY on pain of
excommunication. Briggs, Communities of Belief, p. 190.
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Jeanne d'Albret and Louis d'Albret, the bishop of Lescar, on 28 September, only to
receive a terse rebuff from the queen.51 At this, Jeanne was given six months to
appear in person before Pius IV to explain her actions, with excommunication the
penalty, her lands to be deemed forfeit, and given over to the 'first despoiler', should
she refuse.52 The parlements of Bordeaux and Toulouse followed the papal lead,
issuing decrees that negated Jeanne's sovereign rights to Beam, declaring her
principalities the property of the king as suzerain-paramount. This meant that the
queen's abolition of Catholicism was now effectively illegal and could be
rescinded.53
For the French crown, however, the serving of the monitoire against Jeanne
d' Albret was seen as a step too far, yet another instance of papal interference in the
government of France. Early in 1563, for example, the inquisition had investigated
the alleged heretical tendencies of the French bishops, in direct violation of the
agreed Gallican liberties of the French clergy. Catherine de Medici complained
vociferously to Rome over this intrusion, but received little reassurance from the
Holy See.54 Further, the French crown also protested against the papal declaration
that deemed Jeanne's lands open to the 'first despoiler', which at this juncture
seemed likely to be the troops of Philip of Spain. Catherine argued that, as the queen
of Navarre was technically answerable to her suzerain lord, the king of France, then
Rome had no power to cede her lands to a third party. In a stem letter to Saint-
Sulpice, Charles IX deemed the monitoire invalid, and reiterated that France would
51 See Mbnoires de Conde, IV, p. 594; Freer, The Life of Jeanne d'Albret, pp. 211-15.
52 For full Latin version of papal monuoire against Jeanne d' Albret (28 September 1563), see Dubarat,
Documents et bibliographie sur Ja reforme en Beam, pp. 27-38.
53 Roelker, Queen of Navarre, pp. 220-25.
54 This programme would continue into 1566, and would only be concluded when Pius V issued the
papal bull of 11 December that condemned six French bishops for heresy: Jean de Gelais, bishop of
Uzes; Antoine Caracciolo, bishop of Troyes; Charles Guillart, bishop of Chartres; Jean de Monluc,
bishop of Valence; Louis d' Albret, bishop of Lescars, and Claude Regin, bishop of 0101'011.See
Roelker, Queen of Navarre, p. 240.
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not accept papal interference in or close to its territories.55 As a result, the conseil
prive and Paris parlement ordered that the specific 'first despoiler' decrees, still
extant at Bordeaux and Toulouse, should be rescinded immediately and in their
entirety.56
The Catholic powers were determined to entrap Jeanne d'Albret, though. In
the sununer of 1564, a plan was hatched for a military incursion to arrest the queen
and bring her to justice. Pierre Olhagaray claims that the scheme originated in the
correspondence of Philip II and Pius IV, and required that Annagnac, Monluc,
d'Aspremont, d'Escars and the vicomte d'Orthe, governor of Bayonne, move their
forces into Navarre from Guyenne and Languedoc, driving Jeanne and her entourage
from the security of Pau into the arms of an invading Spanish army, assembled at
Barcelona under the pretence of manoeuvring to expel a nearby Moorish
community.57 Significantly, Freer claims that once captured, the queen would be
delivered to the inquisition in Spain, not to Armagnac's papal inquisition,no doubt to
serve as a bargaining chip for Madrid in its relations with the papacy.58 The waters
become muddied at this point regarding the exact nature of the plot. Dubarat
intimates that a formal /igue was established between the Catholics of Guyenne,
Spain and the papacy, to facilitate the capture of the queen, with d'Orthe, Depart, the
governor of the chateau Hi at Bordeaux, and Dominge, a Bearnais captain,
SS Charles IX to Saint-Sulpice (30 November 1563), in Cabie, Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ebrard,
pp. 186-87. See also Pierre Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, Beam, et Navarre, diligemment
recueillie tant des precedens historiens, que des archives desdites maisons (Paris, 1629), p. 554.
S6 Dubarat, Documents et bibliographie sur la reforme en Beam, pp. 38-43.
S7 Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, p. 559.
sa See Freer, The Life of Jeanne d'Albret, pp. 230-40. Two independent inquisitorial systems existed
in southern Europe at this time: the papal Inquisition and the Spanish Inquisition, which thrived as a
tool to subdue heresy across the Iberian peninsula. Philip II had removed the Spanish Inquisition from
papal control in the late l550s, assuming leadership of its many sections, validating all appointments
and determining its activities thereafter. See Henry Kamen, The Spanish Inquisitton: An Historical
Revision (London, 1997). Forneron has shown that Philip rejected any interference from Rome in the
running of his Inquisition, and was especially dismissive at attempts to censor its activities through the
issuing of papal bulls. See Forneron, Histoire de Philippe 11, I, pp. ]87.88.
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coordinating the military wing of this organisation. S9 D' Aubigne, on the other hand,
believes this to have been a Jesuit plot, an assertion rejected out of hand by Mirasson,
who states the whole episode was nothing more than an artifice, Catholic propaganda
concocted to intimidate Jeanne and force her to reintroduce Catholicism within her
lands: 'cette pretende conspiration, imputee aux Jesuites par d'Aubigne, ne fut qu'un
projet chimerique, imagine par quelque factieux ou faux zele et abandonne aussitot
qu'on connut les dangers'v'" Monluc is cagey about these events in his
Commentaires, hinting at the existence of a Catholic alliance against Jeanne
d' Albret, but distancing himself from any involvement:
je sentis donc Ie vent qu'une Jigue s'estoit dressee en la France. la oil it y avoit de
grands personnages, princes et autres, lesquels je n'ay affaire de nommer, bien
engages de promesse. Je ne sais au vray Iiquelle fin ceste ligue se faisoit."
Regardless of the veracity of these observations, what is apparent is that the
Catholic powers arrayed against Jeanne d' Albret at this time were extensive. They
involved not only Spanish diplomacy and military might, the intrigues of the papacy,
and its authoritative arm in France, the inquisition, but also the Catholic noble
leaders of Guyenne and Languedoc, and the two provinces' respective parlements.
The disparate networks and alliances that comprised Catholic activism across the
region, then, merged here, presenting the Calvinist governors of Beam and Navarre
with a formidable opponent. The role of cardinal Armagnac typifies the multifaceted
nature of the Catholic counteraction: cardinal; papal legate; inquisitor general;
59 Dubarat,Documents et bibliographie sur fa reforme en Beam, p. 79. Dubaratsuggeststhat theplot
failedbecauseit was discoveredby one of Jeanne's officials,Vespiede Nerac, and passed on to the
queenof Navarreby d'Evrard, Saint-Sulpice'ssecretary.Freer, on the other hand, claimsthat the
conspiracyonlyfailedbecauseof a lackof careby a Spanishmessenger, Dimanche,whomislaidhis
deliveryof secretplans,discoveredby Huguenotsand sent to Pauto warn Jeanned'Albret.See Ibid.,
E; ?~.y eut de ce tempsun desseinproposepar les jesuites'. D'Aubigne,Histoire untverselle, II, p.
295; P. Mirasson, Histoire des troubles du Beam, au sujet de fa religion, dans Ie XVIle steele (Paris,
1768), p. 480.
61 Commentaires, p. 586.
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supporter of Monluc's defence of Guyenne in 1562; a key signatory of the /igue at
Toulouse in 1563; and a stout defender of Catholic prerogatives during the second
and third wars. He would prove just as pivotal a figure in the course of Catholic
activity during the decade as his long-time friend and ally, Monluc.
Jeanne d' Albret, however, would escape this kidnap attempt and flee to the
security of the Protestant stronghold of La Rochelle. But there was one final piece to
add to this puzzle. Throughout the decade, Catholic militants within Jeanne's lands
had been resisting the proselytising of region. Centred at Oloron, Lescars and Pau,
the Bearnais and Basse-Navarrais rebels were quickly recognised by the ligueurs of
the south-west as having the potential to act as fifth columnists to Catholic designs.
The rebels would thus play an integral role in subsequent Catholic policy against
Jeanne, being supported and financed in 1563 in their insurrection of 1563, becoming
involved in mounting guerrilla operations within their homelands after 1565, before
finally joining up with a Catholic force under captain Tenide, to launch a final
assault in 1569. It says much about the strength of Catholic hegemony at this time
that the rebels were resourced by the parlement and elites of Bordeaux, by the /igue
captains of Guyenne and western Languedoc, and by Spanish and papal military and
financial might. The course of these rebellions, and the outcome of this clash of
confessions, will be examined in the following chapter.
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Chapter 11. Wider Catholic activism: Beam and NavaJTe
Before the nature and degree of success of the Catholic rebellions in Beam and
Navarre are assessed, it is worth re-visiting the confused political situation in these
lands during the early 1560s. Jurisdiction over Jeanne d' Alhret' s various territories
was rarely free from contention. The French crown, for example, :frequently asserted
its military prerogative over Beam and Navarre during the sectarian crises; in June
1562, Monluc was ordered by the parlement of Bordeaux to end the unrest at
Lectoure by removing jurisdictional prerogatives from Jeanne's officials into the
hands of the senechal of Armagnac, with a Catholic captain, the sieur de 1a Chapelle,
appointed as military governor of the town.' The unitary duchy of Albret was another
contentious region. Created by Henry II in 1556 as a sop to appease Antoine de
Bourbon, its removal from the remit of the senechaussee of Guyenne, and the
influence of Jeanne's courts at Nerac, Tartes and Casteljaloux, into the hands of the
Bordeaux parlement caused great consternation at Pau.2
Confusion over religious matters had been equally divisive. As early as
October 1558, cardinal Armagnac had cause to visit Beam and Navarre repeatedly to
resolve significant religious disturbances, and to re-establish ecclesiastical discipline
in some parts of the region.' But this was merely the forerunner of things to corne.
On Christmas Day 1560, the queen of Navarre formally legalised the Reformed
1 'Les articles accordes par monseigneur de Monluc, lieutenant pour Ie Roy en son pays et duche de
Guyenne, aux manans et habitans de la ville de Lectore et estrangiers ... ' (2 October, 1562), Ruble,
Commemaires et Lettres, IV, pp. 162-67.
2 Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 251.
3 Cardinal Armagnac to Montmorency (15 October 1558), Tamizey de Larroque, 'Lettres in6dites du
Cardinal d' Armagnac', pp. 99-102.
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church across her territories, ordering all Catholic practices to desist immediately."
However, several towns refused to comply. At Navarrenx, a Catholic captain.
Bassilhon, informed the Bordeaux parlement that he had unilaterally armed local
Catholics with the intention of repelling any advance against their churches," At
Lescar, Pall, Monein, and Nay, the clergy, supported by the Catholic corrununities,
organised resistance to Jeanne's ordonnance, while the disturbances at Lescar during
October 1562 were especially violent, as Catholics focussed their rage against the
town's Reformed bishop, Louis d' Albret, the queen's uncle."
The pivotal moment for the area was reached in 1563. In July, Jeanne ordered
two thousand armed men to cleanse the cathedrals and churches of the region of all
idolatry, ready to be used by Reformed congregations." But the purges quickly
deteriorated into widespread iconoclasm, forcing the etats de Beam, now consisting
almost exclusively of disenchanted local Catholic nobles, to meet later that month to
formulate a remonstrance against such destruction.! Leading this assembly was
Antoine de Montesquiou, sieur de Sainte-Colomme et d'Aydie-en-Bearn, a respected
Catholic from a renowned family of Beam. 9 Saint-Colomme had been one of
Jeanne's key advisors at court, and Catholics hoped his influence would sway the
4 Mark Greengrass, 'The Calvinist experiment in Beam', in A. Pettegree, A. Duke, O. Lewis (eds.),
Calvinism in Europe, 1540-1620 (Cambridge, 1994), p. 125.
S AM Bordeaux, ms 767, fo. 341.
6 Charles Dartigue-Peyrou, Jeanne d'Albret et Ie Beam (Mont-de-Marsan, 1934), p. 43. The following
year, Cardinal Armagnac also took exception to Louis d' Albret's governance of his bishopric at
Lescars, warning him in August 1563 that unless he brought his see back into the Catholic church, he
would forfeit his office and bring disaster onto his flock. See Dubarat, Documents et bibliographie sur
la reforme en Beam, pp. 24-27.
7 Ritter, 'Jeanne d'Albret', p. 65.
8 The procureur-gbreraL of Beam refused to allow this remonstrance to be accepted as it opposed the
will and government of her majesty. Preuve 62, Pierre de Saleftanque, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam.
Manuscrit de Pierre de Saleftanque, Conseiller du roi, Secretaire et Dante-sacs du Parlement de
Navarre', in Bulletin de La societe des sciences, lettres et arts de Pau, lIe serle, XLID-XLVI (ed.
Abbe Dubarat, Pau, 1920-1923). XLIV, p. 199.
9 It was Saint-Colomme who presented the Peace of Amboise before the Bordeaux parlement on 10
AprillS63. BM Bordeaux, ms 370, fo. 710.
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queen. By the close of the etats, however, the queen had conceded little ground,
while Saint-Colommehad been forced to retire to his lands.
Insurgency at Oloron
In December 1563, these simmering tensions finally exploded at Oloron, a
town 18 kilometres south-west of Pau. Oloron had been one of the initialhotbeds of
Reformed activity in Beam in the 1550s, a site of numerous preches, and the seat of
the renowned Calvinist bishop, Roussel," But on the arrival of Jeanne's officials to
begin the removal of Catholic imagery from the cathedral of Sainte-Marie, the
Catholic population rebelled. Under the leadership of Abbadie, a canon of the
cathedral, barricades were erected and the royal officers were turned away. Military
assistance was provided by Charles, comte de Luxe, the leader of Catholic resistance
in Basse-Navarre, who rallied a number of troops in support of his co-religionists at
Oloron." In response, Jeanne personally led a military unit to the town's gates,
demanding that the cleansing of the churches be allowed to commence. Jaurgain
explains the queen's surprising presence at the head of the troops as a necessity, to
forestall any intervention from the Catholic governor of Oloron, Jacques de Saint-
Colomme, seigneur de Escoarrabaque, the nephew of her estranged advisor.12
10 Greengrass, 'The Calvinist experiment in Beam', p. 123. Dartigue-Peyrou states that of all the
d' Albret lands, Olaron was the first to witness significant levels of radical Protestantism before 1555.
Charles Dartigue-Peyrou, La vicomte de Beam sous la regne d'Henri II d'Albret (15/7-1555) (Paris,
1934), pp. 478-80.
II Far details of the Olaron rebellion in 1563, see Dartigue-Peyrou, Jeanne d'Albret et le Beam, p. 80.
12 There is much confusion over the correct identity of individuals referred to as Sainte-Colomme in
the archival and secondary material of the 1560s at Beam and Navarre. This centres on the filet that
there were five individuals, all related, who shared the same name. Antoine de Montesquiou, sieur de
Sainte-Colomme et d' Aydie-en-Beam' was the head of the family. His son, Jacques 11de Sainte-
Colomme, seigneur de Escoarrabaque, became a key player in the Catholic ligue of 1568 at Olaron,
while his two sons, Jacques III de Sainte-Colomme, abbe de Sauvelade, and Tristan de Sainte-
Colomme were prominent in Terride's invasion of Beam in 1569. A fifth family member, Antoine's
brother, Bernard de Sainte-Colomme, is less conspicuous, but he did hold great authority within the
region. Far the purposes of accuracy, then, this thesis will delineate the family as follows: Antoine de
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Escoarrabaque had yet to deploy his forces at this time, and was thus courted by both
sides during the ensuing standoff.13 As it transpired, the governor declined to
intervene in the matter and withdrew his troops.
It seems probable that Escoarrabaque was not yet ready to stand and be
counted alongside his Catholic compatriots at Oloron, and openly oppose Jeanne's
will, nor did he feel comfortable siding with the crown in its purgatorial policy.
Raymond Ritter offers an intriguing, if largely anecdotal, precis of this event,
suggesting that the proselytising of Beam and Navarre had not been as successful as
Jeanne would have liked by this point. He claims that a conversation took place
between Escoarrabaque and Jeanne before the gates of Oloron, in which the queen
demanded to know whether the governor's troops were loyal to her. The reply was
yes. Jeanne than enquired as to the number of these men that were 'of her religion',
to which Escoarrabaque replied that in the whole of the queen's lands, there were
only a thousand such people, and in his company, perhaps only thirty. At this
rebuttal, the queen ordered the governor out of her sight, to play no more part in the
subsequent assault on the barricades." There is, however, scant evidence to confirm
or deny that such a poignant dialogue ever occurred.
Oloron would eventually fall to the royal army, but in an attempt to reduce
the fallout from such an episode, Jeanne issued a Simultaneum, in February 1564, a
declaration of liberty of conscience for all subjects, essentially legitimising
coexistence between Calvinists and Catholics, who would now share usage of
religious sites, such as churches and burial grounds. IS But neither faith welcomed
Montesquiou will be referred to as Sainte-Colomme, Jacques II de Sainte-Colomme will be referred to
as Escoarrabaque, while the remaining will be given their full titles at all times.
13 See J. de Jaurgain, 'Les capitaines chitelains de Mau16on', in Revue de Beam, Navarre et £annes
(1884), p. 313.
14 Ritter, 'Jeanned'Albret', p, 65.
U Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la guerre civile, I, p. 69; Roelker, Queen of Navarre, p. 267.
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conciliation, and the Simultaneum did little to lessen the sectarian violence in Beam
and Basse-Navarre. Although an uneasy truce lasted for two years, Catholic activity
was once more censured in May 1566 with the parlement of Navarre ordering that:
tous ceux de la religion romaine... de plus faire aucunes processions publiques, de
porter en publicq des croix, banieres et austres bastons, mais, sy bon leur semble, les
fairont en leurs cloistres et temples et non ailleurs, leur enjoignant de se contenir
modestement, sous peine de punition exemplaire."
The Catholic clergy of Beam were exasperated at this, and formally opposed the
publication of the patent.I7 They were further aggrieved the following month when
the Synod of Nay voted to renew the suppression of idolatry, and to introduce a
Calvinist, puritan code ofmoraIs for the population of Jeanne d' Albret's territories. IS
These restrictions forced Catholics to reassess their position within the region
once more. At the etats de Beam, in early 1567, delegates decried these attacks. Not
only were their rights of worship being impinged upon, but also the right to nominate
to benefices, a major source of income and patronage for many Catholic nobles and
clergy, was under threat from the synod's reforms. At Oloron, this outrage
manifested itself in the formation of a ligue, headed by Gabriel de Beam, sieur de
Gerdrest, and supported by leading local dignitaries such as Escoarrabaque, Jean de
Bordenave, baron de Monein, Francois de Beam, sieur de Bonasse, Henri de
Navailles, sieur de Peyre, his son-in-law Guy de Biran, sieur de Gohas, Jean, sieur
d' Armendaritz, and two avocats ofthe civil courts at Pall, Guillaume Tasta and Jean
de Supersantis. The principal canons of the cathedrals of Oloron and Lescar
16 'Extraits des ordonnances de Registres du Parlementde Navarre' (1566), Salefranque, 'Histoire de
l'heresie de Beam', XLIV, p. 193.
17 Those writing in opposition included Martin de Lacu, advocat et procureur to the bishop ofLescar
(Preuve 57); Pierre Arbusio, advocat et procureur to the bishop of Oloroo (Preuve 58); Bernard de
Sorberio, advocat et procureur to the cathedral chapter at Lescar (Preuve 59); Martin de Luger and
Jean de Supersantis, advocats et procureurs to the cathedral chapter at 0101"011(Preuve 60),
Salefranque, 'Histoire de I'heresie de Beam', XLIV, p. 196.
18 Roelker, Queen cf Navarre, p. 268.
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promised to finance the ligue, while Charles, comte de Luxe, offered his services
once more.'? The involvement of Charles de Luxe in their cause was a major coup
for the Catholic party. As the brother of the murdered noble, Tristan de Moneins,
who died during the Gabelle riots at Bordeaux in 1548, Luxe was an important
political and military figure in the south-west. He had served under Monluc in the
campaigns of 1562-64; he was named as one of the Catholic cartel that included
Monluc, Armagna.c, Terride and others, accused of attempting to 'sell' Guyenne to
Spain in 1564; he had modelled the defence of his lands in Basse-Navarre on
Monluc's initiatives at Agen.20 Luxe's son, Valentin de Domezain, baron de
Moneins, was also present in this force; a proven captain who had served both his
father and Monluc in Guyenne and at Oloronduring 1563.21
Catholic consensus and Jeanne d' Albret
The ligueurs of Oloron were to receive an immediateboon, with the defection
of two of Jeanne d'Albret's key advisors: Armand de Gontaut, seigneur d'Audaux,
senechal of Beam, and Claude Regin, bishop of Oloron. Audaux had masterminded
the military successes of Jeanne's forces against the Catholic rebels in 1563, being
appointed lieutenant-general of the kingdom, along with Louis d'Albret, bishop of
Lescar, while the queen visited the French court in 1564. Regin's contribution to
Jeanne's successes, meanwhile, lay in the religious field, most notably supervising
the implementationof Calvinist reform across Beam and Navarre. The precise reason
for their desertion is not evident, although the alienation of elite prerogatives to
19 Dartigue-Peyrou, Jeanne d'Albre/, p. 80.
20 Ritter, 'Jeanne d'Albret', p. 82.
21 The LuxeIMoneins fiunily had strong bonds with many of the great Catholic fiunilies of the region,
including marriage ties with the houses of Saint-Colomme and Terride. See Commentaires, p. 944
note.
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nominate benefices may have been at the root of the dissent. What is clear, though, is
that the ligueurs could now claim a good deal more legitimacy for their cause now
that Jeanne's chief ministers were supporting it.22 The significance of these
developments can be seen in the fact that the Bearnais crown tried to reconcile with
the various parties immediately. In November 1567, Jean d'Etchart, the procureur-
general of Beam, was dispatched to Oloron to lure Audaux back to court, but failed.
He then sought to separate Luxe and Domezain from the ligueurs by feigning an
assault into Basse-Navarre to rally support for the Queen's cause, only to find that
Luxe had guarded his homeland well.23
If Jeanne's manoeuvrings were stalling, Catholic activity was proving more
fruitful. The presence of Luxe, Audaux, Regin and Gerdrest at Oloron meant that
Catholic forces could be moved from a defensive to offensive orientation. Olliagaray
states that:
Alors, ceux de la Ligue se voyant presses, s' assemblent en la maison de Gabriel de
Beam, sieur de Gerdrest, oU se trouverent Henry de Navailles, seigneur de Peyre,
avec aultres gentilshommes, Jean de Bordenave, conseiller, Jean Supersantis, avocat
Ii Pau, Guillame Tasts a Oloron, et aultres delegues des chapitres de Lescar and
d'Oloron, et vallees de Beam, esperat en se saisissant de la Royne et monseigneur
son fils, venir aisement au bout de leur desseins, n'ayans affaire qu'a une femme;
conclusion qu'ils prindrent et iureret devant leur depart, et signerent de leur propre
sang."
The capture of Jeanne d' Albret, and the revocation of the religious reforms, were
now the goals of the ligueurs, who set about expanding their network of alliances to
22 For the defection ofRegin and Audaux, see Roelker, Queen of Navarre, pp. 279-80.
23 Bordenave states that: 'Ies chefs de la ligue ne furent plustot advertis de ces remoostrances et des
promesses de la Royne qu'ils ne taschassent de divertir le peuple ... et pour ce fiUre firent une
convocation de Ia noblesse, villes et vallees du pais'. Nicolas de Bordenave, Histoire de Beam et
Navarre (ed. P. Raymond, Paris. 1873), p. 145. See also 'Manifeste des gentilshommes de la Basse-
Navarre et du peuple, qui ont pris les armes pour la defense de la religion catholique ... ', in A.
Communay, 'Les Huguenots dans le B6arn et la Navarre. Documents inedits'. A.rchives historiques de
fa Gascogne, 6 (Paris, Auch, 1885), pp. 129-39.
24 Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de FDa, p. 565.
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reinforce their position. Domezain was dispatched to meet with Monluc at Agen to
request reinforcement from Guyenne, while a similar petition for aid was sent to
Madrid." Escoarrabaque, meanwhile, journeyed to Paris to seek consent from the
French crown for the /igue at Oloron,26 while in January 1568, Navailles attempted to
convince d' Albret to defect through a series of letters which relayed news of various
Catholic victories under Anjou and Guise."
At Pall, Jeanne d' Albret was becoming increasingly perturbed by Monluc's
role in affairs, and complained to the Bordeaux parlement that his interference was
compromising her ability to defend her borders.f Monluc countered by stating that
he was merely patrolling his own territory and, in any case, it was illegal for the
queen of Navarre to mass troops in Foix and Albret, as only the king's lieutenant had
authority to levy such soldiers. In this, Monluc was supported by the new premier
president of the parlement, Christophe de Roffignac, Monluc's long time Catholic
associate, who dismissed Jeanne's claim. The French crown, however, was less than
happy with the parlement's response. It was more concerned at the build up of
Spanish troops on the southern borders of Beam than the queen's activities, and
rebuked Roffignac for his interference."
The ligue, though, was about to be betrayed before it could press home its
advantage. In early March 1568, a Catholic noble, Jean de BeIzunce, seigneur de
Monein, informed one of Jeanne's spies that the forces at Oloron intended to march
towards Pau that week. 30 At nearby Ossau, another Catholic noble still loyal to
Jeanne, Armand de Saint-Genies, baron d' Audaux, rallied the queen's forces and
25 Jaurgain, 'Les capitaines chitelains de Mauleon', II, p. 265.
26 Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, p. 566.
27 Navailles to Louis d'Aibret, bishop of Lescar (15 January 1568), Preuves 79-80, Saleftanque,
'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam', XLV, pp. 32-34.
28 Jeanne d'Albret to Bordeauxparlement (February 1568), BN ms ft, 22,373, fa. 308.
29 Charles IX to Roflignac (25 February 1568), BN ms ft, 22,373, fo. 373.
30 Olhagaray wrote of Monein's betrayal of his fellow Catholics: 'Ce fut un eschec et mat au dessein
de ces ligues'. Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, p. 566.
IV: NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS - 11 /290
moved to cut off the rebels' path.31 The ligue army was thus encircled by royal
troops and forced to surrender. Its leaders were spared execution, however, when
Charles IX intervened, ordering Bertrand de Salignac, seigneur de La Mothe-
Fenelon, to negotiate a truce between the two parties. In a public show of
reconciliation, many of the Iigueurs, including Luxe, Audaux, Domezain, Sainte-
Colomme, Antin, and Gabriel de Beam, were awarded the highest honour possible,
the colier de l'ordre de Navarre, in return for a commitment to respect Jeanne's
authority.32
This mollification of the Catholic rebels would rankle with Protestant
conunentators for decades after the event. Olhagaray, a Basse-Navarrais himself, was
especially outraged by the award made to Charles de Luxe, who he saw as the arch
enemy of many Reformed communities of the lower Pyrenees, and a traitor to the
queen of Navarre: 'ce fut un coup donne mal a propos qui :fit gronder toute la
noblesse de Gascogne, qui avoit plus merite que ce renard de montagne'.33Indeed, it
soon became apparent that Jeanne's olive branch had failed to secure the loyalty of
the /igueurs and, with the resumption of sectarian conflict across France in
September 1568, and the re-emergence of a Catholic coalition force within Beam and
Navarre, the queen saw fit to flee with her advisors to the security of La Rochelle.
This was a most astute decision, as Jeanne managed to evade capture by converging
armies ofMonluc, Sainte-Colommeand Fontenillesby a singleday.34
31 Salefranque, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam', XLV, p. 59.
32 Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, p. 585.
33 Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, p. 574. Luxe later received numerous rewards for his
services to the French crown during the 15605; an outright gift of20,OOO livres, an annual pension of
800 livres, the vicomt« of Soule, and l'ordre royale de Saint-Michael. See Roelker, Queen o/Navarre.
E·287.
4 Courteauit, Blaise de Monluc. Historien; p. 513.
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Rebellion and invasion
With the government of Beam and Navarre in turmoil once more, many of its
territories rose against the queen's rule. One, the comte of Foix, was immediately
garrisoned by Spanish troops who claimed to be supporting the fledgling Catholic
rebellion there. This move perturbed the French crown, which, on 18 October,
ordered the parlements of Bordeaux and Toulouse to issue edicts authorising the
seizure of all lands, castles and towns of Beam, Foix, Navarre, Armagnac and
Bigorre by royal troops before Spain could consolidate its forces." The crown also
ordered the parlements to promote Charles de Luxe to the office of lieutenant pour Ie
roi de France, to assume authority over Jeanne's government in the name of the
French king.36 Moves were then put in place to make this campaign self-financing.
On 2 November, the Bordeaux parlement ordered the seizure of all Jeanne's
properties, goods and supplies in Guyenne to pay for troops and supplies." Two
weeks later, on 15 November, the parlement at Toulouse claimed jurisdiction over
Beam and dispatched a number of officials to Pau. But it soon learned that Monluc,
in consultation with Roffignac at Bordeaux, had formulated a similar claim over this
realm, arguing that as Jeanne had fled as a traitor, her lands were now forfeit to any
3S Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, pp. 578-80. On 19 November 1568, the Toulouse
parlement ordered a conseiller, Pierre Ferrandier, to begin seizing lands belonging to Jeanne d' Albret
in the comtes ofRodez and Rouergue. HGL, 9, p. 48. Freer has transcribed a letter from Charles IX to
the Toulouse parlement (18 October 1568), which reveals the political intrigues of the crown in
claiming to be merely 'looking after' Jeanne's territories until her return; 'We have found no remedy
better calculated to obviate the evil designs of those who would do the said queen disservice, than to
take possession of her territories'. Freer, The Life of Jeanne d'Albret, pp. 299-300.
36 'Lettres du roi de France au parlement de Toulouse, portant commission a Charles de Luxe de se
saisir des terres de la Reine de Navarre (18 October 1568)" in Jaurgain, 'Les capitaines chitelains de
Maul6on', II, pp. 310-11.
37 AD Gironde, IB 314, A"et du parlement (2 November 1568), fo. 2.
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legitimate party. The dispute was referred to the French crown. which ordered that,
for the moment, Luxe was to remain in control of these lands."
In December 1568, the Bordeaux parlement dispatched conseillers Belcier
and Malbrun to act as advisors to Luxe, promising the new leader the full support of
the administration and the Catholics of Guyenne." From his headquarters at Oloron,
Luxe promoted his former /igue compatriots, Domezain, Sainte-Colomme, Bonasse
and Guy de Gohas to serve on a temporary council. He also opened communications
with Monluc, at that time leading a company of Catholic nobles from Guyenne,
including Leberon, Savignac, Caumont, Lauzun, against the Protestant vicomte,
Piles, whose forces had besieged several Catholic Bearnais towns.40 Luxe then
attempted to lure Jeanne's key advisor, Louis d'Albret, to the Catholic side,
dispatching Regin to tempt the bishop away from his queen by arguing that Luxe's
commission had already seen the re-establishment of order across the troubled lands.
But d' Albret was not for turning."
Despite this flurry of activity, by February 1569, much of Beam and Navarre
still remained outside the control of Luxe and French royal authority. Charles IX was
forced to raise the stakes, instructing the pariements and Catholic generals of the
south-west to prepare for a full-scale invasion. On 4 March, Roffignac confidently
assured Luxe that 'la justice sera exercee en terres de la Reyne de Navarre, soulz Ie
nom et autorite du Roy'. 42 The choice of commander to lead the royal army into
Beam and Navarre was, however, controversial. Monluc was the obvious choice, but
the duke of Anjou, the crown's lieutenant-general, and overall military commander
38 Bordenave, Histoire de Beam et Navarre, p.166.
39 AHG, 13, p. 253.
40 O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux, II, p. 249. .
41 Bishop ofOloron to bishop ofLescar (24 November 1568), Preuve 94, Salefranque, 'Histoire de
I'heresie de Beam', XLV, p. 69. Louis d'Albret was such a pivotal figure in events that the Catholic
party tried again in April 1569 to tempt him to their cause, away from Jeanne d' AUnt, Preuve 106,
Salefranque, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam • XLV P Ill.
42 ' ,.
AD Gironde, IB 319, Arret du parlement (4 March 1569). £0. 42.
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at the time, decided upon his former captain, and co-signatory of the /igues at Agen
and Toulouse: the sieur de Terride.t' The official reason was that the duke of Anjou
thought it pragmatic to keep Monluc in Guyenne, which was still threatened by the
Protestant vicomtes at this time. Monluc, though, suspected the hand of his rival,
Damville, in the appointment, and was most aggrieved at this 'slight'." Terride
entered Beam on 28 March 1569, at the head ofa strong army, to be greeted by Luxe
and the Bearnais captains Sainte-Colomme, Bonasse, Escoarrabaque, Gerdrest,
Domezain, Eschaux, Armendaritz and 'la plus grand part de la noblesse de Beam',
all pledging allegiance to the French general, and swearing to fight 'pour la
conservation du pays' .45
Serving as commissaire des vivres in Terride' s army was Monluc's former
adjutant, the Bearnais captain, Jean de Fleurdelis, sieur de Lannevielleet de Gallos.46
This was an astute appointment by Terride. Fleurdeliswas a proven organiser of men
and a successful commander in the field. He was also well known to the Catholic
parties of the south-west, having served as commissaire de guerres in Monluc's
forces in Guyenne between 1562-65, as commissaire ordinaire under Negrepelisse in
the Agenais during 1568, and had carried the controversial edict of Amboise to the
Toulouse parlement in April 1563.47 Fleurdelis had also served under Charles de
Luxe during the Catholic rebellions in Basse-Navarre between 1564 and 1567,
commanding three companies of Basque gens de pied, and so knew the geographical
43 'Commission de Monsieur d' Anjou frere du Roy, a monsieur de Terride, pour saisir le pays de
Beam', in Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, pp. 585-88.
44 For Courteault's analysis of the hostility between Monluc and Damville in 1569, see Courteault,
Blaisede Monluc.Historien, pp. 534-553.
45 Preuve 106, Salefranque, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam', XLV, p. 111.
46 Communay, 'Les Huguenots dans le Beam et la Navarre', pp. 127 note 1; 131.
47 For Fleurdelis' service as commissaire de guerres under Monluc, see Muster Rolls of Blaise de
Monluc (7 December 1562), BN ms fr, 25,800, Co. 58. For appointment as captain under Monluc, see
Charles IX to Monluc (May 1563), BN nouv. acq. fr, 6,001, fos. 7-8; Lestrade, 'Les Huguenots en
Comminges. Documents inedits, II', pp. 40-41. For his service under Negrepelisse in 1568, see BN
nouv, acq. fr, 8,627, fo. 63. For his delivery of the edict of Amboise, see Courteault, Un cadet de
gascogne, p. 200.
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and political pitfalls facing Terride's army as it moved into Beam.48 But this would
also be a most astute appointment for Monluc, as the former pupil maintained
frequent communication with his master throughout Terride's assault, a relationship
confirmed in the testimonial of Valentin de Domezain and Bernard de Saint-
Colomme, at Paris on 27 October 1570, in which both attest that: 'Ie capitaine
Fleurdelis ... a este employe tant par M. de Monluc que par Ie feu sieur de Tarride au
fait et maniement des affaires et guerres du pays de Beam et des environs' .49
Terride's army was tested immediately at Orthez, where combined action
from his troops and the Bearnais nobility won the day. His first objective was to
establish an interim military administration capable of reinforcing the government
being put in place by Luxe from Pau. To ensure that the Bearnais and Navarrais
nobility saw these moves as legitimate, Terride called the etats de Beam, and
received overwhelming support for his policy. so The delegation of offices began
immediately, viewed by many, especially the Protestant commentators, as little more
than a rewards system for those Catholic leaders active in the rebellions and ligues of
recent years: Audaux was reappointed senechal of Beam; Navailles received the
governorship of Pau; Escoarrabaque was reinstated as governor of Oloron; Sainte-
Colomme was given command of Terride's gens de pied, with Du Tilh made his
chief adjutant; Regin became Terride's commissaire des finances; Bordenave the
president du conseil militaire; Luger was charged with enforcing legislation; while
the avocat, Jean de Supersantis, who had served under Terride as a delegate of the
48 BN ms fr, 25,803, fos. 314-16. It would be from the Beamais captain, Fleurdelis, that Monluc
learned of Terri de's defeat at Orthez in 1569. See Courteault, Blaise de Monluc. Historien, p. 548.
49 BN piece orig. vol. 1,010, dossier 23,011, Domesain no. 2.
so Present at the euus de Beam in May 1569 were: Jean de Cassanave, abbe of de la Reule,
represented the clergy of Navarre, Gerdrest, Audaux, Sainte-Collome, Bonnasse and Seridos appeared
for the nobility, while Jeannot de Gramont, a jurat at Morlaas, Raimond de Nabera, de Laruns, and
Peyrouton de Pauyadie, from Ossau, and Bernard de Medalon and Arnaud de Crohare, from Nay,
represented the third estate. Dubarat, Documents et bibliographie sur La refonne en Beam, p. 107;
Olhagaray, Histoire des compIes de Foix, pp. 593-96.
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Catholics of Beam to the Toulouse parlement during 1563, was made procureur-
general of the royal army." In fact, such was the magnitude of the administrative
changes made by Terride in April 1569, that when Jeanne d'Albret returned to power
in September it required three specific ordonnances to remove the rebels and re-
instate her legitimategovernment officials.52
The next major test of Terride's army came at the end of May, as his forces
prepared for the assault on the fortified defences ofNavarrenx. Terride was joined in
this operation by his former Catholic ligueur from Toulouse, Negrepelisse, and by
most of the Bearnais nobility. It soon became apparent, though, that the Catholic
attacks were being too easily blunted. Amid recriminations over Terride' s
competence, Charles IX ordered Monluc to send reinforcements from Comminges.
The baron de Fontenilhes,Monluc's captain, was dispatched to facilitate this. But by
late July, despite numerous meetings with the councillors and nobles of Comminges,
no reinforcements were forthcoming, and only small quantities of wheat and
munitions sent.53 Such inactivity infuriated Monluc, who was already embroiled in a
heated debate with Damville over the course of the campaign. Monluc had long
sought permission from Damville, now notional commander of the royal forces of
the south-west, to lead his forces into Beam to relieve Terride, only to be rejected at
each request. Damville argued that a second Catholic force at Navarrenx was too
great a gamble, especially given the potential instability that Monluc's absence from
Guyenne would pose to the security of the region as a whoIe.54 Monluc was outraged
at Damville's reticence to assist Terride. On 9 August, he met with Catholic captains
SI Dartigue-Peyrou, Jeanne d'Albret et Ie Beam. p. 121. See also Preuve 112, Salefranque, 'Histoire
de l'heresie de Beam', XLV, p. 142. For promotion of Jean de Supersantis, see AM Toulouse, aa
172, fos. 147; 165.
S2 Preuve 119, Saleftanque, 'Histoire de "heresie de Beam' XLV pp 149-50.S3 ' ,.
Lestrade, Les Huguenots en Comminges. Documents inedits, I, p. 69.
S4 HGL, 9, p. 56.
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Arne, Larboust, and Campagne to express his concern at Damville's intransigence. 55
Perhaps keen to set the record straight in case Damville's plan saw the defeat of the
royal forces in Beam and Navarre, Monluc spelled out his helplessness to Terride
and Luxe in a series of letters, including copies of Damville's restriction on his
movement as evidence that his hands were tied. 56
Ironically, one week later, on 15 August 1569, Terride's bedraggled army
succumbed to the inevitable and surrendered before Navarrenx to the comte de
Montgomery. Terride, Gerdrest and Gohas did manage to escape the field, only to be
recaptured at Orthez three days later. The rest of the Catholic nobility were taken
prisoner, including Sainte-Colomme, Escoarrabaque, Bordenave, du Tihl, and many
other Catholic ligueurs from Oloron and Lescar.51 On 21 August, Terride, Gerdrest
and Gohas were transferred back to Navarrenx where they, along with captains
Candau, Salles, et Pordeac, were stabbed to death for having taken flight. 58 The
defeat of the rebellion allowed Jeanne d' Albret to return to Navarre in September. A
list of Catholic rebels was drawn up, with orders that their lands and wealth be
confiscated and a warrant issued for their arrest. 59 As a result, the Catholic coalition
melted away. Some, like Luxe, Domezain, Peyre, and Bonasse fled to Basse-Navarre
to rejoin Catholic forces there. Others, like Escoarrabaque, who was released from
55 Commentatres, pp. 691-92. Campagne's son, Odet de Monlezun, would become an infamous
~eneral of the ligue at Toulouse in the 1580s.
One missive in particular captures Monluc's frustration best: on 14 August, he informed Henry de
Navailles, governor of Pall, that while the conflict raged in Beam he intended to join up with the
senechal of Toulouse, Bellegarde, where the two 'joueroient des ongles'. Bordenave, Histoire de
Beam et Navarre, p. 265.
57 Other Catholic nobles captured at the siege ofNavarrenx were Francis, sieur de Meritaing; Bertrand
de Beam, dit Ie capitaine Salies; Henrie, sieur d' Abidos, Joanot, sieur d' Abere; Jacques de Lassalle,
sieur de Candau; Domecq de St-Abit, Jean de Suus; Jean de Puy, soucuew; Jacques de Vispalier,
comrolteur de Navarrenx; Forticq de Lasalle, and Frere Jean de Navarrenx. See Preuve 118,
Salefranque, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam', XLV, p. 149.
58 Jaurgain, 'Les capitaines chitelains de Mauleon', pp. 317-18.
59 See 'Ordonnance de Jeanne d' Albret sur Ia justice, les rebelles, les ecclesiatiques et la confiscation
des biens (29 September 1569), Preuve 130, SaJefranque, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam', XLV, pp.
176-79; 'Ordonnance de Montgomery, confisquant les biens eeclesiastiques (2 October 1569)"
Preuve 129, Ibid., XLV, pp. 175-76; 'Ordre de confisquer les biens de certains personnages (5
November 1570)" Preuve 134, Ibid., XLV, p. 185.
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incarceration after Navarrenx, d'Idron and Tristan de Sainte-Colomme, continued to
fight against Montgomery's forces, each subsequently killed at the siege of Tarbes in
1570.60 De la Torte, one of the chiefs of the Catholic ligue at Lescar, was later
captured by Montgomery's forces and hanged for his part in the rebellions," while
only Audaux and Supersantis reconciled with Jeanne, both returning to serve in her
govemment.P'
The following years saw only intermittent contact between these Catholic
allies of the south-west. In November 1569, the continuing, though sporadic,
violence along the Guyenne - Beam/Navarre border saw the French diplomat,
Lanssac, urge the king to send a great noble to unite the disparate factions in
Guyenne.63 Charles declined to act, though, content to leave Monluc and Damville to
iron out their dispute and administer royal authority throughout the region. Then, in
July 1570, Monluc and his captains held council with Luxe, Moneins and Bernard de
Saint-Colomme at Rabestens, near Tarbes, to discuss the possibility of a joint assauh
on Jeanne d' Albret. Luxe proposed that should Monluc assist in their struggles
against the queen of Navarre, he could count on a large Catholic force from Basse-
Navarre/" But with Luxe now a resident in Paris, a fixture of the royal court, Monluc
hesitated at such an offer. He knew that Luxe had become embroiled in a legal battle
with Jeanne d' Albret, which precluded his return to head an army of Basse-
Navarrais, and so doubted his commitment to this endeavour. As such, the plan was
shelved, and Monluc returned to his 'official' duties as lieutenant du roi. Whether or
not Luxe ever intended to retake the field, he continued to work tirelessly for the
60 Dubarat, Histoire de Beam, pp. 282, 303; Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, p. 625.
61 Bordenave, Histoire de Beam et Navarre, p. 281.
62 See 'Enter-inement des lettres de grAce de Jean de Supersantis (23 June 1571)', Preuve 143,
Salefranque, 'Histoire de I'beresie de Beam', XLV, pp. 191-92. Audaux later became a favourite of
Jeanne's heir, Henri de Navarre, receiving the governorship of'Beam from him in 1584.
63 Lanssac to Charles IX (21 November 1569), AHO, 10, p. 346.
M Monluc to Catherine de Medici (9 July 1570), Commentaires, pp. 770; 1,378 note. Monluc's
captains at the meeting were Goodrin, Saint-Orens and d'Orthe.
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Catholic cause in the south-west from Paris. In August 1571, Luxe secured a stay of
execution from Catherine de Medici for those Catholics held prisoner for their part in
the rebellions of the 1560s, claiming that they were merely following the directives
of the French parlements in 'securing' Jeanne's lands in her absence." In September
1571, the queen of Navarre even offered Luxe a compromise, urging him to bury his
past and return to his lands as a loyal subject to oversee the rebuilding of the
government there/" Luxe refused, preferring the relative safety of the capital to
recriminationsin his homeland.
Summary
This final section of the thesis has examined the national and European
dimensions to Catholic activism in the south-west during the 1560s, and has shown
that wider political and religious considerations did play an important role in events
at Bordeaux, Agen and Toulouse. Spanish military and financial support to Monluc,
for example, was crucial to the Catholic forces' successes between 1562 and 1563,
while papal advocacy of Armagnac's inquisition, and its validation of the numerous
oaths and codes promulgated by the ligues, benefited the Catholic party immensely
throughout the decade. It would be wrong, though, to suggest that such initiatives
were undertaken simply to bolster French Catholicism. Both Madrid and Rome had
ulterior motives: Spain needed its northern borders secured against the Protestant
armies of the vicomtes, a feature the presence of numerous armed Catholic
associations in Guyenne would facilitate; the papacy sought to infihrate France and
re-establish a degree of authority - something the inquisition would allow to a
65 Luxe to Catherine de Medici, (August 1571), Roelker, Queen of Navarre, p. 287.
66 Jeanne d'Albret to Luxe (29 August, II September, 25 September, 1571), Rochambeau, Lettres
d'Amoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d'Albret, pp. 323-27.
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limited extent without overtly aggravating the Gallican consensus within France. Yet
the receipt of such contentious succour left the ligueurs open to accusations of
colluding with foreign powers, 'treasonous activities' that Huguenot officials and
later Protestant commentators alike made great play of. The archival remains of the
region, though, fail to prove such allegations one way or another, leaving historians
to sift through the propaganda to determine the extent and nature of their complicity.
Conversely, this study has also shown that certain figures were less
influential in the region than previously thought. The Guise, for instance, made scant
impression on the course of affairs at Bordeaux and Toulouse during the 1560s, and
little impact on the patronage networks of the south-west either, despite their position
as the dominant Catholic family of the national arena. Furthermore, the office of
provincial governor at both Guyenne and Languedoc was conspicuous by its vacancy
during this decade. These are surprising features of this study, especially given the
close relations of the ligueurs of the south-west throughout the period. In filet, this
inter-connectedness of Catholic activists provides the final theme of the thesis,
revealing that men such as Monluc, Annagnac, Terride, Negrepe1isse, Candalle,
Bellegarde and others, were involved with a wide variety of concerns, covering many
different arenas. Their enterprises across the Agenais, Bordelais and Toulouse plain
have been detailed above, but their support of Spanish and papal intervention in
Beam and Navarre shows a far broader tapestry of activity than has been previously
acknowledged. Integral to this were the intentions of Madrid and Rome, and to a
lesser extent Paris, which sought to remove Jeanne d' Albret, the Calvinist queen of
Navarre, from her throne and re-establish Catholicism across her lands. Here, the
ligueurs of the south-west would join forces with the Catholic rebels of Beam and
Navarre, and with the Basse-Navarrais forces of Charles de Luxe, the bane of
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Protestant military efforts throughout the decade. Cardinal Armagnac, meanwhile,
was active in his capacity of inquisitor general of prosecuting heresy suspects across
Jeanne's territories of Foix, Albret and Navarre, while Monluc and Armagnac both
targeted the queen on numerous occasions to maintain the pressure on her and her
administration. With a number of Monluc' s captains actively assisting the Bearnais
rebels, and Luxe, Gerdrest, Domezain, Saint-Colomme and other leading Catholic
rebels serving under the lieutenant du roi at various times, the network of Catholic
alliances grew ever more extensive during the decade. By 1570, Catholic activism in
the south-west thus encompassed not only the close-knit /igues and associations
examined in the first three parts of this study, but now embraced Catholic
protagonists from Beam and Navarre in a collective ethos that, potentially, could
deploy sufficient resources across a wide power base so as to ensure the successful
defence of the Catholic faith, and, perhaps, the defeat of the Reform movement
across the region too.
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Conclusion
This thesis has shown that Catholic activism in the south-west of France during the
1560s was a .significant, multifaceted phenomenon. The various /igues and
associations there were potent forces within provincial affairs, shaping the course of
events by usurping authority and dictating local policy, or by simply providing a
dissenting voice against the detractors of Catholic consensus. Five distinct forms of
association have been identified here. The first is the syndicat, formed at Bordeaux
in the late 1550s by Jean de Lange and disenchanted avocats of the parlement,
aggrieved at the leniency shown by the crown to escalating levels of Huguenot
violence across the Bordelais. This study has refuted standard interpretations that
position the syndical as a novelty of May 1561, a response to Protestant aggression
against the chateau Trompette. Instead, it reveals it to have been a product of wider
Catholic activism at Bordeaux, specifically the activities of the confraternity of
Saint-Yves and the players of the basoche. The confreres and basochiens are shown
to have begun the defence of the Catholic faith within the town as early as 1540,
rousing Catholic sentiment and energising their co-religionists through their rituals,
ceremonies, plays and polemic. The discovery that the confraternity was also
supported and legitimised by leading magistrates of the parlement, and that these
figures were fundamental to its administrative proceedings, revises traditional
perceptions of the structure of relationships between local and crown officials at
Bordeaux. That the meetings of the confraternity played host to the inception of the
syndicat is equally important, as it shows the syndical to have been a culmination of
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Catholic sentiment within the town, but also reveals that local associations were
being considered by Catholics as a means of responding to the growth of the
Reformed church as early as the 1550s, well before the outbreak of the religious wars
in 1562. Current historiographical debate concerning the chronology of: and
motivation behind, Catholic activism at Bordeaux must, therefore, be modified in
light of these findings.
The second form of association encompasses the elite-led, oath-bound ligues,
most evident at Agen, Toulouse and Cadillac in 1563. Here, it was the principal
Catholic nobles and high ranking military and church officials of the region that
directed operations, with the lesser classes affiliated through a formal ceremony in
which they pledged loyalty at the altar of the local cathedral. Again, these /igues
have been marginalized in the historiography of the religious wars, overlooked as
spontaneous, transitory affairs, created only as an expedient, and then dismantled by
royal order within weeks of their inception. This thesis has shown that this is also an
inaccurate assessment of events. The /igues were, in fact, extremely important
phenomena within the political constitution of the south-west during the early years
of the conflict. Not only were they potent vehicles with which Catholics could
confront the Huguenot threat militarily, but they also sought to augment Catholic
domination of the localities by serving as a police force and town guard as necessary.
Further, it has been shown that the ligues at Agen and Toulouse were planned in
December 1562, months in advance of their nascence. This was the height of the first
war, with little prospect of a peace being agreed to any time soon. As such, it would
seem logical to assume that these were intended to be permanent institutions,
carefully structured to facilitate military, policing and guard roles, and maintained
under constant preparedness by a Catholic leadership and membership dissatisfied
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with the crown's management of the sectarian conflict. In essence, they were to be
important tools of the Catholic war effort. This contradicts the numerous evanescent
labels ascribed by commentators and historians to the ligues, with the longevity of
Candalle's association at Cadillac eliciting the following testimony from Thompson:
[It] exhibited a strength of organisation and an audacity which foreshadows that of
the Holy League of 1576, in whose genesis, indeed, it represents an evolutionary
stage. What made the league of Guyenne so peculiarly formidable was not so much
its perfection of organisation and its wide expansion, as the fact that it was organised
and existed without the knowledge or consent of the crown, and in transgression of
the royal authority which forbade such associations. I
The third manifestation of Catholic militancy was confraternal activism.
Harding identifies the 1560s as the moment when 'lay brotherhoods became bases
for political mobilisation that were illegal or aimed to change official policies'," as
does Crouzet, who sees the rise of the confraternities in France during the 1560s as a
defining moment in Catholic sentiment, a shift onto a more aggressive, offensive
footing.' That Catholic military commanders such as Blaise de Monluc and Gaspard
de Saulx- Tavannes were keen to bolster their forces by co-opting highly motivated
confreres into their urban militias and local garrison troops after 1567 suggests that
the resurgent confraternities were viewed as less illegal by the crown, which had
legislated against former Catholic bodies in the edict of 1563. The generals were thus
simply adapting their strategies accordingly. 4
The fourth distinct phenomenon, the urban coalition administrations formed
by elite Catholics throughout the decade, are the least explicit model of association,
1 Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 254.
2 Harding, 'The mobilisation of confraternities', p. 85.
3 Crouzet, Les guemer» de Dieu, I, p. 356.
4 At Micon, for example, in Burgundy, Tavannes' confraternity of Saint-Esprit was ten times larger in
1568 than its earlier sixteenth-century original, with the number of affiliated confreres, which now
contained a complete cross-section of the local society, outnumbering the Huguenot population of the
town by twenty-four to one. Harding, 'The mobilisation of confraternities', pp. 87-88.
CONCLUSION / 304
and also the most difficult to define, as formal concords were rarely drawn up
between these activists. Yet their concerted efforts to override extant governmental
policy and protocol in favour of directives partial to the Catholic cause did leave a
paper trail within the archives, a result mainly of their desire to validate their
governance and ensure that all dealings were promulgated through legitimate
channels. Thus, at Agen, in 1561-63, 1567-69; at Bordeaux, in 1562-63 and 1568-69;
and at Toulouse, in May 1562, 1563, 1567-70, control of local government
institutions was usurped by the various coalitions of Catholic magistrates,
councillors, senior members of the clergy, and leading nobles and military captains
of the region. These juntas were augmented in their ambitions by Monluc, whose
preferred method of securing isolated urban centres against a belligerent enemy was
to install an emergency council to assume authority, remove any suspicious officer
from power, contain all hostile elements, and then energise the population to defend
the town as a homogenous unit. This had proven a spectacular success at Siena in
1555, and throughout the 1560s, he would urge the leaders of numerous towns across
the south-west to adopt a similarapproach to defending against the Protestant threat.s
Such policies dovetailed nicely with the ambitions of the juntas, and provided solid
foundations for the coalition regimes.
The fifth expression of Catholic zeal, and without doubt the most ephemeral,
was the croisade at Toulouse of 1568. Again, most historians have neglected the
S In April 1562, Monluc urged the lieutenant-general, du Franc, to prevent insurrection at Condom by
taking arms and assuming personal command of the town in the king's name. Commemaires, p. 499.
At Toulouse, following the unrest of May 1562, Monluc advised the parlement to clear the town of
any potential <dangerous elements' and to vet all visitors so as to prevent a repeat of the unrest: 'II
vaut mieux se tenir au dehors pour y faire acheminer Ie secours, sachant bien que ceste canaille
n'estoient pas pour forcer si tost votre ville; que, s'i1s m'eussent attendu, jamais entrepreneurs
n'eussent ~e mieux accomodez. Puisque Dieu vous a delivrez, c'est a present a vous a faire des
vostres et faire puyr les cantons des charognes de ces meschans traistres a Dieu, au Roy et a leur
patrie'. Commentaires, p. 506. At Bordeaux, in March 1563, he urged the magistrates to maintain
stability by governing with strictness, using force as necessary, and advocating the population sign a
written accord acknowledging that any deviation or delinquency would be severely dealt with.
Commentaires, p. 578.
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croisade as a non-entity given that, despite detailed preparations, it would fizzle out
without ever achieving its purpose. Denis Crouzet and Rene Souriac have recently
countered this conception, claiming that to dismiss the croisade out of hand would be
to fail to acknowledge the groundswell of Catholic sentiment from which it evolved.
After all, the croisade was sponsored by the parlement, sanctioned by the papacy,
and patronised by numerous Catholic elites of the region," This echoes the
controversy surrounding the /igues of 1563 where, arguably, the mere fact that an
organisation was formed in the first place makes its existence important to the history
of the period. For Crouzet and Souriac, the relevance is in the way in which the
croisade reflects the prevailing penitential ethos of the period, and confirms the
staunch Catholicism of Toulouse. It also reveals the increasing slide into militancy of
the town's ruling corpus, which sanctioned this most feted of Catholic traditions in
an attempt both to engage the Huguenot rebels and to energise the population into
supporting the defence of their town.
Several wider political and religious influences on Catholic activism at this
time were also examined to determine the impact of national and European affairs on
the course of events in the south-west, and the degree of interaction between
'external' Catholic protagonists and the region's ligueurs. Surprisingly, the thesis
found that national figures, such as the Guise and the Triumvirate, made little
impression on events at Bordeaux and Toulouse during the 1560s, despite their
dominance in the broader political forum. The roles of Spain and the papacy, though,
were far more overt, with financial and military succour flowing freely from Madrid
and Rome to Monluc, Armagnac and their captains. The support of the papacy was
especially important for the associations of the south-west in terms of validating the
6 Crouzet, Les gue"iers de Dieu, I, esp. 'Premieres experiences d'association: un lien renoue avec
I'imaginaire de la croisade?', pp, 378-96; Souriac, Decentralisation administrative, Chapter XI.
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various oaths, unions and crusading ideals, while the presence of the papal inquisitor
added yet another weapon to the Catholics' arsenal against the Reform movement.
The final theme examined, the support proffered by activists such as Monluc,
Terride and Negrepelisse to the Catholic rebels at Oloron and Lescar in their
struggles to overthrow the Calvinist government of Jeanne d' Albret, proves that the
sphere of influence of the /igueurs reached far wider than their native Guyenne and
Languedoc. Such connections have rarely been assessed by historians: the /igues
formed by the Beamais rebels are usually viewed as isolated entities, unconnected
with Catholic activism at Bordeaux and Toulouse; reciprocal engagement in /igue
affairs has never been appraised; the role of the inquisition in the 1560s is generally
dismissed as an anachronism; and Armagnac's dual roles as papal inquisitor and
leader of the Catholic /igue at Toulouse have not been correlated before. The
findings of this study are important, therefore, as they not only set the influence of
Spain, the Guise and the Triumvirate in context with events in the south-west of
France, but they link the various associations of the wider region and indicate that
the phenomenon of Catholic activism of the 1560s was more diverse than has been
hitherto acknowledged.
The thesis has also broached the marginalizing of the /igues and associations
in the historiography as little more than belligerent mechanisms of the elites;
instruments with which the noble, clerical and administrative Catholic hierarchies of
Guyenne could more easily fulfil their ambitions.' Certainly, an inner circle of
Catholic elites did control many of the associations of the period, and the upper
echelons of Catholic society held greater sway in the enterprises of the activists than
did the bourgeoisie or menu peup/e. But the study has shown that a delicate
7 See, for example, Wilkinson,A History of the League, p. 3; Jouanna, La devoir de la revolte, p. 181.
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interaction existed between the different social strata of the south-west. At Bordeaux
and Toulouse, there was substantial input from the lesser officials of the parlements,
while at Agen, it was the Catholic councillors of the towns and the local clergy that
formed the main body of resistance to the Reformers in the early 1560s.
Additionally, and most significantly,it has shown that 'grass roots' activism, through
the confraternities of Saint-Yves and the basoches at Bordeaux and Toulouse, had a
major impact on elite Catholic policy during the period. Filtering up from the streets,
parishes and districts into the administrative and judicial institutions, this 'popular'
sentiment served to bolster Catholicism within the community, and to support and
further the aims of those Catholic superiors seeking to enter the political fray. In
return, the communal activists received protection from their new patrons, with the
magistrates attending their ceremonies and sitting in as administrators on their
committees. This allowed them to pursue their devotions (and their assaults on the
Protestants of the towns) with a greater degree of confidence and security. Only such
levels of patronage could have allowed the confreres and basoches to deploy such
vitriolic polemic against the moderate and Reformed parties of Bordeaux and
Toulouse, for without the support of leadingparlementaires, their performances and
rhetoric would have been quickly silenced by the administrations. These motifs have
been promoted before; Jensen noted in 1964 that: 'it is important to call attention to
the fact that the nucleus of many of these provincial leagues was not the nobility, nor
even the clergy (although they did playa key role), but the local guilds or fraternities
of middle- and lower-class artisans,.8 But it is within current research, such as
Ramsey study of Catholic relations in Paris, Galpem's overview of religiosity in
• Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39.
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sixteenth-century Champagne, and Crouzet's Les guerriers de Dieu, that these
themes are findingmost resonance.9
Reciprocity - another notable feature of Catholic activism - also crossed
social barriers in the south-west. In fact, the ligueurs seem to have made a conscious
resolution to establish as homogenous a support base as possible, enfranchisingmany
from the disparate social, economic and political Catholic bodies of the region. From
the outset, they sought to gain and maintain power by subsuming themselves within
the political infrastructure of town and province, a modus operandi that required the
co-opting or manipulating of crown and provincial officials in order to usurp control
of the local institutions. The participation of sympathetic parlementaires and
municipal councillors in support of Catholic policy would thus be a prerequisite for
their success, and a staple of the various associations initiated in the 1560s, but the
backing of the menu peuple, and especially the urban Catholic populaces, would also
prove of immense benefit.
But such levels of cooperation would come at a price. On occasion,
consenting magistrates and councillors would demand a tightening of traditional
urban and provincial prerogatives against centralised interference in return for ceding
control over the machinery of local government. Contention over such parochial
concerns had long been a feature of the political scene of the south-west, with much
of the debate centred on the internecine conflict and fractious relations between the
parlements, presidiaux and local councils, at odds with one another over acceptable
levels of crown 'interference' in local jurisdiction. Hanlon states that fractured
relations within the administrations of the south-west meant that 'complicities and
compromises might have been normal in local contexts, even during the most
9 Ramsey, Liturgy, Politics and Salvation; Galpern, The Religions of the People in Sixteenth-Century
Champagne; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu.
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paroxysmal phases of the wars of religion'v'" while Powis reveals that a mild
schizophrenia affected the Bordeaux parlementaires, uneasy in their role as royal
officials when it compromised their position as notables of Guyenne: 'was the
magistrate an agent of the king's wiU- or a local notable struggling to reconcile the
responsibility of office with the network of loyalties and interests which bound him
to his province?' I I
The outbreak of sectarian conflict in 1562 tended to polarise these
controversies, hardening the stance of Catholic magistrates who became more and
more disgruntled at the crown's determination to deviate from traditional,
conservative religious attitudes, and implement a policy of limited toleration of
Protestantism. Courteault believes that the parlementaires were urged on here by the
local Catholic nobility and clergy, concerned at the equivocal nature of royal
legislation, which seemed (to Catholics) to condone the consolidation of Huguenot
religious, political and military structures, while maligning Catholic responses and
ordering their forces to disengage. As such, Courteault sees the syndicat and
subsequent associations not simply as Catholic zealots, irked by confessional
controversies, but as manifestations of provincial independence, concerned with
regional miscarriages of justice. 12
It is worth reiterating, then, that the ligueurs' grievances were ranged just as
much against the crown and its policy of conciliation, as they were against their
Huguenot enemies. Many among the provincial magistrature clearly felt betmyed by
the crown, which, they claimed, had fulled to protect Catholics from rising levels of
Huguenot violence. Schneider and Parker, in fact, show that Catholics believed the
10 Gregory Hanlon, ConfeSSion and Community in Seventeenth-Century France. Catholic and
Protestant coexistence in Aquitaine (Philadelphia, 1993), p. 5.
II Powis, The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux, p. 297. See also Powis, 'Order, religion and
magistrates', p. 196.
12 Courteault, Histoire de Gascogne et de Beam, p. 223.
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crown to have become so insipid during the early 1560s that many viewed
themselves as the true defenders of royal authority, and the sole protectors of
Catholic traditions and prerogatives in the localities.F This meant that those crown
officials who were active in the defence of Catholicism were faced with a stark
choice: continue their obligation to the Iigues, and risk being accused of dereliction
of duty, or conform to crown dictate, and be vilified by their co-religionists for
deserting the cause. The edict of Amboise, in 1563, made matters yet more acute.
Now, the magistrates themselves were charged with implementing the crown's
accommodatory policies in the province, and with policing any contraventions. This
placed Catholic officials in a most awkward position, as the edict also declared that
maintaining links with any outlawed associations would be deemed a treasonable
offence. 14
The crown's ambiguous management of its military forces in the region
further confused this situation. Tholin has shown that, throughout the 1560s, the
lieutenants du rot, lieutenants-generaux and senechaux of Guyenne and western
Languedoc were mostly left to their own devices where the raising and deployment
of troops and the levying of urban militia was concerned." Harding concurs, stating
that Catherine de Medici granted her generals 'considerable liberty to interpret and
execute the law', adding that the crown was invariably tardy or negligent in meeting
its financial military obligations too, forcing the various captains to transfer the
burden of maintaining their troops onto the surrounding towns and countryside, thus
creating greater resentment in the process," The size of the forces deployed by
Burie, Monluc, Armagnac, Terride et at thus greatly depended on the wealth,
J3 See especially Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse, p. 96; Parker, The Making of French Absolutism,
p.37.
14 Stegmann, Edits des guerres de religion, p. 36.
IS See especially Tholin, 'La ville d' Agen', XIV, pp. 204-07.
16 Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p. 52.
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resources and personal standing of the individual captain. Such licence had three
significant ramifications for the south-west. Firstly, with the majority of royal
military officers subsequently committing themselves to the Catholic cause,
contradictions over obligations abounded. Allied with their autonomy in decision-
making, this meant that a coherent strategy for the provinces was rarely, or
inconsistently applied. Secondly, there was seldom any sense that these forces were
neutral in character, ambivalent to sectarian issues. Instead, they are reported as
merely armed retinues of biased Catholic captains.
There is little doubt that the absence of grandee patronage exacerbated this
situation, to the benefit of the Catholic party. With no significant Guise,
Montmorency, Chatillon or Bourbon influence throughout the 1560s, the Iigueurs of
the south-west were forced to and, in fact, were free to nurture their own networks.
This would prove integral to Catholic abilities to form associations in the early part
of the decade, with most bodies initially constituted of collectives of co-workers or
acquaintances. In fact, Jean Marie Constant suggests that while the grandees at court
may well have desired to influence political strategies during this period, it would
actually be the second layer of elites - the military commanders, leading magistrates
and prominent provincial noblemen - that had the greatest say in the form and degree
to which elite prejudices were disseminated into the provinces." Furthermore, it
should not be forgotten that these networks and local amities, so successful in
allowing Catholics to fend off early attempted usurpations of town councils by quasi-
official Protestant bodies, would remain in place despite the censoring of the formal
Iigues by royal edict. Their continued presence within the community would,
17 Constant, 'The Protestant nobility in France', p. 69.
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therefore, facilitate considerable independent and concerted opposition to the Reform
movement throughout the decade, regardless of the current national political climate.
A final point draws this debate back to the inconsistencies within the
historiography of the wars, specifically the lack of consensus within the
commentaries as to whether the /igues and associations of the 1560s can be regarded
as precursors to later Catholic activism under the League. Many of the leading
authorities on the Sainte Ligue fail to acknowledge these early bodies: Labitte,
Anquetil and Jouanna commence their studies of Catholic activity at the St.
Bartholomew's massacres of 1572; Barnavi, Constant, Mariejol, Fremy, Gilbert and
Wilkinson all begin their surveys of the League at 1576, with the birth of the nobIe-
led rising at Peronne, in which Catholics expanded their opposition to the crown to
include discontent at fiscal and religious policies. IS Only a few make any reference to
these formal associations, with even fewer remarking on their potential as provincial
antecedents. Of these, Vaissiere and Valois are brief. Vaissiere writes:
En face des Protestants, qui s'associaient et s'organisaient contre les Catholics, ceux-
ci avaient de bonne heure forme des unions locales pour resister aux enterprises des
heretiques. Ces premieres Iigues ont seulement un but religieux. Elles sont
generalement composes de bourgeois devone a la royaute et sincerement emus des
dangers auxquels est expose la cathohcisme."
Similarly, Valois notes their variety of purpose: 'une ligue de religion, une ligue
social, une ligue pour conserver la religion catholic, une ligue pour opposer a la ligue
anti-protestant, ... une ligue d'etat, Ie dessien ... Ie secret duquel Dieu seul connoit'. 20
While both are astute in their commentaries, their analyses are too stark, and they fail
18 Charles Labitte, De la democratie chez les predicateurs de la ligue (paris, 1865); Anquetil, L 'esprit
de la Ligue; Jouanna, La devoir de la revolte, esp. pp. 181-89; Elie Barnavi, Le parti de Dieu: Etude
social et politique des chefs de la Ligue parisienne 1585-1594 (Louvain,1980); Constant, La Llgue:
Mariejol, La reforme et la Llgue; Fremy, Essai sur les diplomates du temps de la Ligue; Wilkinson, A
History of the League.
19 Pierre de Vaissiere, 'Ligue', in La grande encyclopedie, (Paris),xxn, p. 234.
20 Charles Valois, Histolre de la Ligue. Oeuvre inedite d'un comemporain: J, (Paris, 1914), p. 4.
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to explore the complexities of the /igues fully. A more emphatic correlation is
provided by the Protestant noble, Theodore Agrippa d'Aubigne, who in his Histoire
universelle reflects that the /igue created at Toulouse in March 1563 was: 'le
prototype et premier exemple de toutes les ligues qui ont depuis paru en France'.21
This view is shared by Lafaille, who notes that: '11est vray que la grande Ligue, que
se forma sous la regne suivant, qui bouleversa le Royaume et le porta a deux doigts
de sa ruine ... ce fut sur le modelle de la ligue de Tho lose ,,22 and James Westfall
Thompson, who states that: 'In 1568 ... a process of federation is to be observed by
which the provincial leagues are gradually welded into one whole - in a word, the
mighty Sainte Ligue of 1576 exists now, potentially'r" Mark Greengrass's
suggestion that the revolutionary part committees and juntas established by the
ligueurs in Paris after 1584 'had ample precedent in the civic and confraternal
institutions on which they were partly modelled' invites closer scrutiny_24Were the
manifestations of Catholic activism present during the Holy Union truly the
successors of the associations of the 1560s? Denis Richet and Robert Descimon are
not so certain. Richet argues that concerted Catholic Reform only commenced with
the birth of the League in the 1580s, while Descimon suggests that it was the force of
the League's impact on France that actually: 'provoqua l'eclosion provinciale
d'associations diverses (,confreries', 'fraternites', 'syndicats', 'unions', 'ligues' ... )
pour la defense d'un catholicisme exclusif .25 Robert Harding disagrees, however.
For Harding, it was the other way round, with the renaissance of the confraternities
in the 1560s serving to create a fertile environment for the birth of the Catholic
21 D' Aubigne, Histoire universelle, II, p. 137.
22 Lafaille, Annales de la ville de Toulouse, II, p. 254.
23 Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 351.
24 Greengrass, 'The Sainte Union in the Provinces', p. 470.
25 Denis Riebet, 'Socio-cultural aspects of religious conflicts in Paris during the second balf of the
sixteenth century'. in Robert Forster and Orest Ranum (eds.), Ritual, Religion and the Sacred:
Selections from the Annales, Economies, Societes, Civilisations (Baltimore, 1982), p. 200; Robert
Descimon, 'La Ligue a Paris (1585-1594): Une revision'. Annates, 37 (1982). p. 73.
CONCLUSION / 314
League after 1584.26 Certainly, the explosion of Catholic piety and devotion that
accompanied these 'reborn' confraternities helped to buoy Catholic activism during
the late 1560s, but can we say that this religiosity was subsequently inherent within,
and parallel to, the Sainte Union too? Harding argues it was intrinsic and that the
experiences of the confraternities in these early years of conflict provided the
foundations for League stratagem: 'the creation of a politically active confraternity
meant an effort to organise, politicise, and sometimes to arm social groups that were
traditionallydisorganised, politicallypassive and disarmed'.27
Two historians have advanced this debate considerably, proposing that
antecedents to the League can actually be found in Catholic polemic and propaganda
of the 1540s and 1550s. Ramsey's suggestion that the basic symbolism and
significance of the League's post-1584 rituals and processions can be traced to
Catholic activismwithin the capital during the 1540s and 1550s, and Denis Crouzet's
assertion that: 'La Ligue est preexistante a la crise de la Ligue. ElIe est deja vers
1550 en gestation dans la pensee d'Artus Desire', are both intriguing, and should be
born out with further localised research" This study, with its examination of the
activities of the confraternity of Saint-Yves and the players of the basoche at
Bordeaux and Toulouse, tends to support their findings. The fact that these episodes
of Catholic activism are finally receiving attention is significant for our
understanding of Catholic responses to the Protestant threat, and to crown attempts at
imposing confessional toleration during the first decade of the wars of religion. This
detailed survey of militant Catholic activity across the south-west of France and its
environs should, therefore, make a valuable contribution to the expanding
historiography ofthis intriguing facet of the sectarian conflict of the 1560s.
26 Harding, 'The mobilisation of confraternities', pp. 85-107.
27 Ibid., p. 103.
28 Ramsey, Liturgy, Politics, and Salvation, pp. 14-29; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, p. 434.
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Appendix. Discussion of the sources used in the thesis
As there are so few religio- or socio-political models and little secondary material
relevant to the study of Catholic activism in the south-west of France during the
1560s, a detailed discussion of the archival, printed primary and secondary sources
used in this thesis has been provided below.
This thesis is very much driven by primary material. The bulk of the
resources consulted are drawn from the departmental and municipal archives at
Bordeaux, Toulouse and Agen, the main centres of Catholic activism during the
period. The richest vein of source material concerning the ligues and associations of
the 1560s is to be found in the registres du parlement at Toulouse and Bordeaux,
voluminous tomes that report explicit details of events, participants, behaviour and
arguments within the chambers of the sovereign courts. They also reveal more
nuanced insights into Catholic relationships, both with one another and with royal
and provincial structures of authority. Amongst other important material examined
are documents containing information on military affairs, town council deliberations,
ecclesiastical records, financial transactions and, of course, correspondence.
Occasionally, these contain overt references to associations and their adherents, or at
least allow the researcher to trace them through their oaths of allegiance or the royal
arrets that censored them. But mostly they are more oblique citations that allude to
Catholic activity: troop muster, demand for munitions, provisioning of towns, and
the punitive taxing and fining of Huguenot citizens. That such references are
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circuitous is understandable, of course, given the ligueurs' reticence to declare
themselves as such, especially after the edict of pacification of 1563 made such
revelations a potentially treasonous matter. This means that it is also particularly
problematic to distinguish who among those cited was actually an activist, an
affiliate of the ligues, rather than simply a supporter of their cause, a /igue
sympathiser. Much attention, therefore, needs to be paid to the finer points of these
prosopographical studies to determine accurately the extent and the nature of
relations between the various Catholic officers and nobles.
Access to material relating to events in Beam and Navarre, however, is more
problematic. The Navarrais archives were completely destroyed by fire in 1716,
taking with it the entire collection of manuscripts of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries.1 Fortunately, we have access to a number of these documents thanks to
Pierre de Salefranque's L 'histoire de I 'heresie de Beam et de Navarre, a late
seventeenth-century work that includes many transcriptions of these records in its
appendices.t Nancy Roelker believes Salefranque, a minor official from an important
robin family in Beam, may have written his history in preparation for the revocation
of the edict of Nantes in 1685.3 His work was never published, though, and lay
undiscovered for centuries after his death in 1687 until Abbe Dubarat unearthed the
manuscript in 1910, and published it in four parts in the Bulletin de la societe des
1 The same can be said of the Registres de la jurade at Bordeaux for the period 1560-1580. It is
thought that these documents were either burned in the numerous fires that plagued the town's
archives over the centuries - a fire in the pa/ais de justice on 11 January 1597 devoured most of the
papiers du grefJe, while tires at the hOtel de ville in December 1657, and at the current archives, on 13
June 1862, also consumed large amounts of material - or were destroyed by later officials keen to
eradicate certain events from history.
2 Pierre de Salefranque, 'Histoire de l'h6'esie de Beam. Manuscrit de Pierre de Saleftanque, conseiller
du roi, secretaire du parlement de Navarre', in Bulletin de la societe des sciences, /ettres et arts de
Pau, Ile S6'ie, XLIII-XLVI (ed. Abbe Dubarat, Pall, 1920-1923).
3 Nancy Roelker, Queen of Navarre, Jeanne d'Albret 1528-1572 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 128.
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sciences, lettres et arts de Pau.4 Dubarat seems to have been aware of the
contentious nature of such a find as he used his editorial preface to provide an
extensive and convincing account of the reliability of Salefranque's work and of the
veracity of the copying of the registres du parlement. As expected, the preuves
caused considerable debate among historians at their appearance, and it required a
second expert in the history of Beam, C. Dartigue, to confirm the veracity of the
preuves before they were finallyaccepted as reliable.' It is these documents that have
formed the basis of the study of the Catholic activists in Beam and Navarre, and of
the reaction of the queen, Jeanne d'Albret, to the rebellions and invasions across her
lands.
While the provincial archives of south-west France are the staple of primary
research for this study, the centralised resources of the Bibliotheque Nationale in
Paris are also valuable, especially for crown documentation such as royal edicts,
letters of commission, and correspondence with its representatives in the localities.
Numerous printed primary sources are also indispensable here, such as the
collections of letters of various monarchs of the period, and the correspondence of
the crown with its provincial governors and urban magistrates," Lawrence Stone has
shown how the incorporation of personal correspondence into the analysis of the
.. Abbe Dubarat, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam. Manuscrit de Pierre de Salefranque, conseiller du roi,
seeretaire et Darde-sacs du parlement de Navarre', Bulletin de la societe des sciences, lettres et arts de
Pau, lIe Serie, XLIII (pau, 1920).
5 Charles Dartigue-Peyrou, La vicomte de Beam sous Ie regne d'Henri II d'Albret (1517- 1555) (paris,
1934), pp. 455-75.
6 For example, Charles IX, Lettres de Charles IX a M. de Fourquevaux, ambassadeur en Espagne
(1565-1572) (ed, C. Douais, Paris, 1897); Catherine de Medici, Lettres de Catherine de Medicis (10
vols., eds. H de la Ferriere and G. Baguenault de Puchesse, Paris, 1880-1909); Marquis de
Rochambeau, Lettres d'Amoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d'Albret (Paris, 1877); Henri Forneron,
Histoire de Philippe II (4 vols., Paris, 1881-87); Philip II, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les
offaires des Pays-Bas (1558-1577), (5 vols., ed. L. P. Gachard, Brussels, 1848-79); Gustave
Baguenault de Puchess, 'La politique de Philippe II dans les affaires de France: 1559-1598', Revue
des questiOns historiques, 25 (1879), pp. 5-66. Unfortunately, much of the long and numerous
communications between the Guise and Philip II of Spain, especially those relating to the early
1560's, were burnt by the Paris Commune when the Louvre was stormed in the nineteenth century,
and its prized collections destroyed.
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largely legaIistic and administrative archival material adds a greater variety of
bibliographical detail to the survey, resulting in stronger prosopographical
perspective on the issues." Catholic accounts are best appraised through the memoirs
and correspondence of active military commanders such as Blaise de Monluc and
Gaspard de Saulx- Tavannes, with important contemporary Catholic testimony also
found in Tamizey de Larroque's 'Lettres inedites du Cardinal d' Armagnac', Claude
Haton's Memoires, Cabie's publication of the letters of Saint-Sulpice, and the
Depeches de M de Fourquevaux, ambassadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne.8 The
most important Protestant account of this period is the Histoire Ecclesiastique, a
chronicle of the rise of the Reformed church in France, written by Calvin's right-
hand man in Geneva, Theodore de Beze. Beze's personal correspondence is most
illuminating too, while other important contemporary Protestant commentaries are
recorded in Castelnau, d' Aubigne, Brantome, Simon Goulart and, of course, the
Memoires de Conde, a beautifully crafted, if utterly biased, account of the role
played by successive princes of Conde in the religious wars. 9
7 Lawrence Stone, 'Prosopography', in Felix Gilbert and Stephen R Graubard (eds.), Historical
Studies Today (New York, 1972), p. 124.
8 Commentaires; Gaspard de Saulx-Tavannes, Correspondance des Saulx-Tavannes au XVIe steele
(ed. L. Pingaud, Paris, 1877); Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, 'Lettres inedites du Cardinal
d' Armagnac', Collection Meridionale, V (Paris, Bordeaux, 1874), pp. 1-134. Claude Haton, Memoires
de Claude Halon (1553-1582) (2 vols., Paris, 200 I); Edmond Cabie, Guerres de religion dans Ie sud-
ouest de la France et principalemem dans Ie Quercy, d'apres les papiers des seigneurs de Sainl-
Sulpice de 1561 a 1590. Documems transcrits, classes et annotes (Paris, 1906); Edmond Cabie,
Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ebrard. seigneur de St. Sulpice de 1562 Ii 1565 (Albi, 1903);
Raymond de Rouer Fourquevaux, sieur de, Depeches de M de Fourquevaux, ambassadeur du roi
Charles IX en Espagne (1565-1572) (3 vols., ed. C. Douais, Paris, 1896-1904).
9 Theodore de Beze, Histoire Ecclesiasuque des eglises reformees au royaume de France (3 vols .•
eds. W. Baum, E. Cunitz, Nieuwkoop, 1974); Theodore de Beze, Correspondence de Theodore de
Beze (26 vols., ed. H. Aubert, Geneva, 1960-2002); Michel de Castelnau, Les memoires de Messire
Michel de Castelnau, seigneur de Mauvissiere et de Concressaia, ausquelles som traictees les chases
plus remarquables qu'il a veues et negotiees en France, Angleterre, et Escosse, soubs les rots
Francois 11 et Charles IX, tant en temps de paix qu'en temps de guerre (Paris, 1671); Theodore
Agrippa d'Aubigne, Htstoire universelle (10 vols., ed. A. de Ruble. Paris, 1886-19(9); Brant6me,
Oeuvres completes de Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantome (2 vols .• ed. L. Lalanne, Paris,
1864-82); Memo;res de Conde, ou recueil pour servir a l'htstoire de France, conlenant ce qui s 'est
passe du plus memorable dans Ie Royaume (6 vols., London. Paris, 1743).
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However, while these tracts offer valuable perspectives on the roles played by
leading figures in the conflict, their intensely personal nature dictates that most are
also a minefield of deceit, misinformation, and prejudice. Pierre Daniel has a
particular warning for historians who make use of memoirs containing accounts of
civil wars, advising them to exercise particular caution with sources liable to
'partialite et animosite,.10 In some instances, it is the author's omissions that are
more of a dilemma for the reader than the simple inaccuracies: Monluc's
Commentaires, for example, omit any reference to the period 1559-1561, a time
during which, the Reformers claimed, Monluc dabbled with Protestantism; similarly,
the correspondence of Beze and Calvinwere both doctored at their death to eradicate
similar faux-pas, references to activities that may well have compromised the
Calvinistchurch at a later date.
Interestingly, Monluc's Commentaires, often dismissed as blatant Catholic
propaganda, have recently undergone something of a revision. Monluc's biographer
concludes that the Commentaires:
meritent de conserver leur place au premier rang des sources narratives de l'histoire
de France et d'Italie au seizieme siecle, Monluc est presque partout admirablement
informe; ce qu'il raconte est exact; sa minutieuse precision n'est pas un leurre; ses
jugements sont moderes et circonspects.!'
Similarly, Pierre Michel sees no reason to dismiss Monluc as an unreliable source:
'the objectivity of Monluc is remarkable... generally the Protestant historians and
memorialists confirm his versions of events' .12 As this thesis draws from the
Commentaires for a number of Monluc's (and his Catholic captains') activities
10 Pierre Daniel, Histoire de France - quoted in J. Heritier, Catherine de Medici (London, 1963), p.
122. See similar caveats on the use of memoirs in Robert J. Knecht, 'Military autobiographies in
sixteenth-century France', in J.R Muiryne, and M. Shewring (eds.), War, Literature and the Arts in
Sixteenth-Century Europe (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 3-21.
II Paul Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, Historien (Geneva, 1970), pp. 618-19.
12 Pierre Michel, Blaise de Monluc (paris, 1971), pp. 128-29.
APPENDIX: DISCUSSION OF SOURCES / 320
during the 1560s, this is satisfying to know. Two printed editions of the
Commentaires will be used in this study: the nineteenth-century five-volume set
edited by the baron Alphonse de Ruble; and Paul Courteault's more recent edition,
featuring extensive notes and variants. 13 Monluc only began writing his
Commentaires after his retirement in 1570, and although he finished them by 1572,
they were amended and added to over the following years. It seems evident that
many of these revisions were borrowed from the memoirs of Guillaume and Martin
du Bellay, in an attempt by Monluc to augment his more vague recollections of early
events. The result, however, was not only a commentary on his life's deeds, but a
vindication of his proud reputation in the face of recent allegations of corruption and
malpractice. 14
Historians have drawn from three distinct versions of the Commentaires for
their editions: the extant original manuscript; the 1592 text, published by Florimond
de Raemond; and a later incomplete edition held by Monluc's nephew, Jean de
Monluc de Balagny, which featured Jean's additional notes in the margins. Ruble
used Balagny's manuscript as the framework for his edition, with the other two
employed to fill the gaps as required. Although much of the original text and
grammar are retained, Ruble did correct many of Florimond's alterations, and
restored proper names throughout. Courteault, on the other hand, preferred to use the
original manuscript as his basis, with Florimond's and Balagny's texts added where
necessary. Where the different editions offer supplementary original information,
Courteault supplies multiple versions, something Ruble does not, highlighting text
13 Blaise de Monluc, Blaise de MonJuc. Commemaires /52/-/576 (eds. P. Courteault and J. Giono,
Paris, 1964); Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres de Blaise deMonluc. Marechal de France (5
vols., ed. A. de Ruble, Paris, 1864-12).
14 For the influence of Guillaume and Martin du Bellay on the text, and Monluc's desire for
vindication through his Commemaires, see Robert J. Knecht, 'The sword and the pen: Blaise de
Monluc and his Commentaires', Renaissance Studies, 9 (1995), pp. 104-18.
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from alternate editions by the use of italics, parentheses and footnotes. He corrects
the pre-1564 calendar, by which New Year began at Easter, to the modem
equivalent, an amendment that Ruble also ignored. In fact, Courteault is extremely
critical of Ruble's editorial methodology, describing it as 'un amalgame perpetuel,
impossible il controler', IS For Courteault, Ruble interchanged the different texts too
often and too readily, with the result that a less than authentic complete work is
created from less than complete materials. For all references within this thesis,
therefore, Courteault's more complete edition of 1964 will be used. Ruble's edition,
though, will be cited for all references to Monluc's correspondence, as it contains
two additional volumes of transcribed letters sent and received by Monluc during his
career, something Courteault was unable to complete.
A further feature of the research material consulted in this survey will be the
numerous local histories of south-west France. The 58-volume Archives historiques
du departement de la Gironde (1858-1932) is invaluable for matters pertaining to
Guyenne, as are Ducourneau's La Guienne historique et monumentale, and Souriac's
Decentralisation administrative dans l'ancienne France." For Bordeaux, Devienne's
Histoire de Bordeaux, Boutrouche's Bordeaux de 1453 il 1715, Julian's L 'histoire de
Bordeaux depuis les origines jusqu'a 1895, and O'Reilly's Histoire complete de
Bordeaux, are the most informative for this period.'? For histories of the parlement at
Bordeaux, the researcher is spoiled for choice, with Metivier's Chronique du
parlement de Bordeaux, Boscheron-Desportes' Histoire du parlement de Bordeaux
U Commemaires, p.xxx.
16 Archives historiques du depanemen: de la Gironde (58 vols., Bordeaux, 1858-1932); Alex
Ducoumeau, La Guienne htstorique et monumentale, II (2 vols., Bordeaux, 1844); Rene Souriac,
Decentralisation administrative dans l'ancienne France. AutollOmiecommingeoise et pouvoir d'etat,
1540-1630 (2 vols., Toulouse, 1992).
17 Dom Devienne, Histoire de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1771); Robert Boutrouche, (ed.), Bordeaux de
1453 a 1715 (Bordeaux, 1966); Camille Julian, L'histoire de Bordeaux depuis les originesjusqu'a
1895 (Bordeaux, 1895); Abbe Patrice-John O'Reilly, Histoire complete de Bordeaux (6 vols.,
Bordeaux, 1863).
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depuis sa creation jusqu 'a sa suppression, Communay's Le parlement de Bordeaux,
notes biographiques sur ses principaux o/ficiers, Gaullieur's Histoire de la
reformation a Bordeaux et dans Ie ressort du parlement de Guyenne, Hauchecome's
article 'Le parlement de Bordeaux pendant la premiere guerre civile', and Tamizey
de Larroque's study 'Jean Lange, Conseiller au parlement de Bordeaux', all most
instructive.IS For Agen, the Revue de l'Agenais (1871 on) is a valuable reference
source, as are Andrieu's Histoire de l'Agenais, Barrere's Histoire religieuse et
monumentale du diocese d'Agen, and Tholin's study, 'La ville d'Agen pendant les
guerres de religion du XVIe siecle'. 19
For a general survey of Languedoc during the religious wars, Privat's 15-
volume Histoire de Languedoc (1872-90) is indispensable, as it also contains
numerous transcriptions of original sixteenth-century preuves. Devic and Vaissete's
Histoire generale de Languedoc (1872-92) is also useful although this life-work of
two Dominican monks needs careful reading as it often overstates Catholic
sensibilities and is prone to denigrate any and all Calvinist thought or actions.
Arnaud's Histoire des protestants du Vivarais et du Velay, pays de Languedoc
(1888) and Gachon's Histoire de Languedoc (1921) offer a Protestant counter-
perspective to these works, while the Revue d'Aquitaine (1857-68) offers a fairly
neutral viewpoint on the sectarian conflict.20 General surveys of Toulouse can be
18 Jean de Metivier, Chronique du par/ement de Bordeaux (2 vols., Bordeaux, 1886); C. B. F.
Boscheron-Desportes, Histoire du par/ement de Bordeaux depuis sa creation jusqu '0 sa suppression
(/451-1790) (2 vols., Bordeaux, 1877); A. Communay, Le parlement de Bordeaux, notes
biographiques sur sea principaux ofJiciers (Bordeaux, 1898); Ernest Gaullieur, Histoire de la
reformation 0 Bordeaux et dans Ie ressort du par/ement de Guyenne (2 vols., Bordeaux. 1884); F.
Hauchecome, 'Le parlement de Bordeaux pendant la premiere guerre civile (d6cembre 1560-mars
1563)" Annates du Midi, 62 (1950), pp. 329-40; Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, 'Jean Lange,
conseiller au parlement de Bordeaux', Revue Catholique de Bordeaux, 1883 (Bordeaux), pp. 685-97.
19 Jules Andrieu, Histoire de l'Agenais (2 vols., Agen, 1893); Abbe Joseph Barrere, Histoire
religieuse et monumentale du diocese d'Agen; depuis les temps les plus reculesjusqu'o nosjours (2
vols., Agen, 1855-1856); Georges Tholin, 'La ville d'Agen pendant les guerres de religion du XVIe
siecle', Revue de I 'Agenats et des anciennes provinces du sud-ouest XIV - XVI (Agen, 1887-1889).
20 Claude Devic and Jean Joseph Vaissete, Histoire generale de Languedoc (10 vols., ed. Lacour,
Toulouse, 1994); Arnaud, Histoire des protestants du Vivarais et du Velay, pays de Languedoc
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found in Lafaille's Annales de la ville de Toulouse, Schneider's Public Life in
Toulouse 1463-1789, Gaches's Memoires sur les guerres de religion a Castres et
dans Ie Languedoc, and Ramet's Histoire de Toulouse, while access to the parlement
is through Mentzer's 'Calvinist propaganda and the Parlement of Toulouse',
Dubedat's Histoire du parlement de Toulouse, and Viala's Le parlement de Toulouse
et I'administration royale laique.21There is a wealth of historiography focussing on
the insurrection of the 1560s, with the most accessible being Connac's 'Troubles de
mai 1562 a Toulouse', Davies' 'Persecution and Protestantism: Toulouse, 1562-
1575', Greengrass' 'The anatomy of a religious riot in Toulouse in May 1562', and
Roschach's 'Documents inedits concernant l'edit de pacification de 1568 et le regime
des suspects a Toulouse'.22
The historiography of Beam and Navarre during this period is divided along
confessional lines far more than for most regional studies. Protestant sources are
mainly Olhagaray's Histoire de Foix, Beam et Navarre, Dartigue's Jeanne d'Albret
et Ie Beam, Communay's Les Huguenots dans Ie Beam et la Navarre, and
Bordenave's Histoire de Beam et Navarre.23 Several Catholic narratives exist;
(Toulouse, 1888); Gachon, Histoire de Languedoc (Toulouse, 1921); Review d'Acquitaine (16 vols.,
Auch, 1851-68).
21 Germain de Lafaille, Annales de fa ville de Toulouse (2 vols., Toulouse, 1687; 1701); Robert A.
Schneider, Public Life in Toulouse /463-1789. From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City
(Ithaca, 1989); Jacques Gaches, Memoires sur les guerres de religion a Castres et dans Ie Languedoc
(1555-1610) (Geneva, 1910); Henri Ramet, Histoire de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1935); Raymond A.
Mentzer, 'Calvinist propaganda and the Parlernent of Toulouse' .Archtv fUr Reformationgeschichte, 68
(1971), pp. 268-83; Jean-Baptiste Dubedat, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse (2 vols., Paris, 1885);
Andre Viala, Le parlemem de Toulouse et I'administration royale la;que, 1420-1525 environ (Albi,
1953).
22 Emile Connac, 'Troubles de mai 1562 a Toulouse', Annales du Midi, 3 (1891), pp. 310-39; Joan
Davies, 'Persecution and Protestantism: Toulouse, 1562-1575', Histortcol Joumal, 22 (1979), pp. 31-
51; Mark Greengrass, 'The anatomy of a religious riot in Toulouse in May 1562', Journal of
Ecclesiastical History, 34 (1983), pp. 367-91; Ernest Roschach, 'Docwnents inedits concernant I'edit
de pacification de 1568 et le regime des suspects IiToulouse', Memoires de I 'academie des sciences,
inscriptions et belles-lettres de Toulouse, 10 (1878), pp. 318-S7.
23 Pierre Olhagaray, Histoire des comptes de Foix, Beam, et Navarre, diligemment recueillie tant des
precedens historiens, que des archives desdites maisons (Paris, 1629); C. Dartigue, Jeanne d 'Albret et
le Beam (Mont-de-Marsan, 1934); A. Communay, 'Les Huguenots dans le Beam et la Navarre.
Documents inCdits', Archives Historiques de la Gascogne, 6 (Paris, Auch, 1885); Nicolas de
Bordenave, Histoire de Beam et Navarre (ed. P. Raymond, Paris, 1873).
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Dubarat's two works on Protestantism in Beam, Labenazie's Histoire de la ville
d'Agen and pays d'Agenois, and Lestrade's 'Les huguenots en Comminges', which
examines extant documentation.i" The more impartial texts, though, are found in
Bourgeon's La reforme a Nerac, Jaurgain's 'Les capitaines chatelains de Mauleon',
Mirasson's Histoire du Beam, Ritter's 'Jeanne d'Albret et les troubles de la religion
en Beam, Bigorre, Soule et Navarre, 1560-1572', Roelker's Queen of Navarre.
Jeanne d'Albret 1528-1572, Ruble's Jeanne d'Albret et la guerre civile,
Greengrass's 'The Calvinist experiment in Beam' and Courteault's Histoire de
Gascogne et de Bearn.25
Finally, for reference to the general state of the Catholic church in the south-
west, Cayre's Histoire des eveques et archeveques de Toulouse, Devienne's Histoire
de l'eglise de Bordeaux, Gaullieur's Histoire du college de Guyenne, and Du
Bourg's Histoire du grand-prieure de Toulouse are essential.i" For articles relating to
the influence of the Jesuits in Catholic activism during the 1560s, see especially
Chalande's 'Les etablissements des Jesuites Ii Toulouse au XVIe et XVIle siecle',
Delattre's Les etablissements des Jesuites en France depuis quatre steeles, Picot's
Les Italiens en France au seizieme steele (Rome, 1995) and Piaget's Histoire de
24 Abbe Dubarat, Le Protestantisme en Beam et au pays basque (Pau, 1895); Abbe Dubarat,
Documents et bibliographie sur la reforme en Beam et au pays basque (pau, 1905); Labenazie,
Histoire de la ville d'Agen et pays d'Agenois, I, (Montauban, 1888); Abbe Jean Lestrade, Les
Huguenots en Comminges. Documents inedits, I, (Paris, Auch, 1900); 'Les Huguenots en Comminges.
Documents inedits, II', Archives Historiques de la Gascogne, 14 (Paris, Auch, 1910), pp. 1-160.
25 G. Bourgeon, La Reforme a Nerac. Les origines (1530-1560) (Toulouse, 1880); J. de Jaurgain, 'Les
capitaines chatelains de Mauleon. Appendice', Revue de Beam, Navarre et Lannes, III (1885), pp. 13-
81; 'Les capitaines chatelains de Mauleon', Revue de Beam, Navarre et Lannes, II (1884), pp. 241-
341; P. Mirasson, Histoire du Beam (Paris, 1770); Raymond Ritter, 'Jeanne d' Albret et les troubles de
la religion en Beam, Bigorre, Soule et Navarre, 1560-1572', Revue de Beam, 3-6 (1928-1933); Nancy
Lyman Roelker, Queen of Navarre. Jeanne d'Albret 1528-1572 (Cambridge, MA., 1968); Alphonse
de Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la guerre civile (Paris, 1897); Mark Greengrass, 'The Calvinist
experiment in Beam', in A. Pettegree, A. Duke, G. Lewis (eds.), Calvinism in Europe, 1540-1620
(Cambridge, 1994), pp. 119-42; Paul Courteault, Histoire de Gascogne et de Beam (paris, 1938).
26 Abbe Cayre, Histoire des eveques et archeveques de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1873); Dom [)evienne,
Histoire de l'eglise de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1862); Ernest Gaullieur, Histoire du college de Guyenne
(Paris, 1874); M. A. du Bourg, Histoire du grand-prieure de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1883).
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l'etabltssement des Jesuites en France (1540-1640) (Leiden, 1893).27 With regards to
the phenomenon of urban confratemal and basochien activism, it is fortunate that
several nineteenth-century antiquarian studies survive as they explore many facets of
religiosity within the towns of the south-west.i"
27 See especially, Jules Chalande, 'Les etablissements des Jesuites a Toulouse au XVIe et XVIle
siecle', Journal de Toulouse, 29 (August 1926), pp. 1-35; Pierre Delattre, (ed.), Les etablissements des
Jesuites en France depuis quatre steeles (5 vols., Enghien, 1949-57); Emile Picot, Les ltaliens en
France au seizieme steele (Rome, 1995); E. Piaget, Histoire de I 'etablissemem des Jesuites en France
(1540-1640) (Leiden, 1893).
28 For confraternities of the south-west, see A. de la Borderie, Monuments originaux de I 'histoire de
Saint Yves (Saint-Brieux, 1887); Christian Chavanon, Beatification professionnelle de Saint Yves
(Bordeaux, 1936); N. Ricard, Panegyrique de Saint- Yves, Patron de MM les Avocats (prononce dans
I 'eglise de Nazareth) (Toulouse, 1764); S. Ropartz, Histotre de Saint Yves,patron des gens de Justice
(Saint-Brieux, 1856). For general study of the confraternities of France. see Robert R. Harding. 'The
mobilisation of confraternities against the Reformation in France'. Sixteenth Century Journal. 11, 2
(1980). pp. 85-107. For the basoche, see M. Brives-Cazes, Notices Historiques sur la bazoche de
Bordeaux du XVe auXVl/le steele (Toulouse. s.d.); o. Boyer, 'La basoche Toulousaine au quinzieme
siecle, d'apres les archives du parlement', Memoires de la societe archeologique du midi de la
France, 18 (1932), pp. 64-71; Abbe Can-Durban, 'Statuts de la basoche du senechal de Toulouse',
Memoires de la societe archeologique du midi de la France, 16 (1908), pp. 166-84; Rene 0langeaud,
La basoche de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1912); E. Vatsse-Cibiel, 'Notes retrospective sur la basoche
Toulousaine', Memoires de I'academte imperiale des science, inscriptions et belles-lettres de
Toulouse, 6 (1868), pp. 221-43.
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Map 1. France in the Sixteenth Century
Guyenne
Map 2. The South-West of France, c.1560
MAP 2: SOUTH-WEST OF FRANCE / 327
Re
Limoges•
~gouleme
•Perigueux
Coutras•
·Montsegur
Clairac•
.Fumel
•Cahors •
Villcfranchc
Bordeaux•
Targon•
, .
La Reole
p Casteljaloux •
Mont de
Marsan •
Lescar e .Pau
•• OloronNavarrenx
•Agen
.MoissacNerac• •Estillac • Montauban
Cond~m
•Albi
•Auch •Toulouse
•
Castrcs
Bibliography
Manuscript Sources:
Paris
Bibliotheque nationale [BN]:
InS fr, 3,159 (royal correspondence)
InS fr, 3,185 (correspondence ofCatberine de Medici, 1561-1580)
InS fr, 3,186 (correspondence, 1562)
InS fr, 3,189 (correspondence, 1560s)
InS fr, 3,197 (correspondence, 1560s)
InS fr, 3,210 (correspondence, 1560s)
InS fr, 3,217 (correspondence, 1560-1572)
InS fr, 3,242 (correspondence, 1569)
InS fr, 3,362 (correspondence, 1560-1590)
InS fr, 3,960 (Guyenne, 1569-1580)
InS fr, 5,011 (Commentaires ofMonluc)
InS fr, 6,911 (correspondence, Noailles)
InS fr, 6,948 (correspondence)
InS fr, 10,751 (correspondence, Forquevaulx)
InS fr, 10,752 (correspondence, Forquevaulx)
InS fr, 15,547 (miscellaneous of1568)
InS fr, 15,548 (miscellaneous of 1568)
InS fr, 15,558 (miscellaneous of 1573)
InS fr, 15,591 (edicts of Catholic League, 1568-1590)
InS fr, 15,596 (rebellions and civil wars, 1360-1657)
InS fr, 15,871 (miscellaneous of 1558-1 56 1)
InS fr, 15,872 (miscellaneous of 1558-1559)
InS fr, 15,873 (miscellaneous of 1560, 1582-1640)
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 328
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 329
InS fr, 15,874 (miscellaneous of 1560-1561)
InS fr, 15,875 (miscellaneous of 1560s)
InS fr, 15,876 (miscellaneous of 1562)
InS fr, 15,877 (miscellaneous of 1562-1563)
InS fr, 15,878 (miscellaneous of 1563)
InS fr, 15,879 (correspondence, 1558-1566).
ms fr, 15,880 (miscellaneous of 1564)
ms fr, 15,881 (miscellaneous ofI553-1567)
InS fr, 15,882 (miscellaneous of 1566)
InS fr, 20,461 (miscellaneous of 1560s)
InS fr, 20,462 (Agenais, 1560-1575)
InS fr, 22,369 (registres secret du parlement de Bordeaux, 1462-1582).
InS fr, 22,372 (registres secret, 1531-1564)
InS fr, 22,373 (registres secret, 1567-1568)
InS fr, 25,800 (military, 1559-1563)
InS fr, 25,801 (military, 1564-1567)
InS fr, 25,802 (military, 1567-1568)
InS fr, 25,803 (military, 1568-1570)
nouv. acq. fr, 6,001 (correspondence of Charles IX)
nouv. acq. fr 6,013 (correspondence of Damville, 1560-1600)
nouv. acq. fr, 8,625 (military, 1562-1566)
nouv. acq. fr, 8,626 (military, 1567)
nouv. acq. fr, 8,627 (military, 1568-1569)
nouv. acq. fr, 8,628 (military, 1569-1570)
nouv. acq. fr, 8,629 (military)
nouv. acq. fr, 20,052 (memoirs of Bordeaux, Beam)
nouv. acq. fr, 20,053 (memoirs of Beam)
nouv. acq. fr, 20,598 (correspondence, 1562-1566)
nouv. acq. fr, 20,599 (correspondence, 1566-1571)
pieces originates, vol. 1,010 (assorted documents, Da-Do)
Dupuy, 588 iproces-verbal of provincial estates, 1560s)
fonds italienne, 1,721 (correspondence)
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 330
Agen
Archives departementales de Lot-et-Garonne [AD Lot-et-Garonne]:
E Sup. Agen, AA 43 (political, 1560-88)
E Sup. Agen, BB 30 (administration, 1554-1566)
E Sup. Agen, BB 31 (administration, 1554-66)
E Sup. Agen, BB 60 (administration, 1560-1569)
E Sup. Agen, BB 86 (administration, 1558-1576)
E Sup. Agen, CC 52 (financial, 1551-1553)
E Sup. Agen, CC 57 (financial, 1552-1566)
E Sup. Agen, CC61 (financial, 1554-1580)
E Sup. Agen, CC 62 (financial, 1555-1583)
E Sup. Agen, CC 65 (financial, 1558-1585)
E Sup. Agen, CC 66 (financial, 1561-1565)
E Sup. Agen, CC 67 (financial, 1564-1569)
E Sup. Agen, CC 70 (financial, 1569-1578)
E Sup. Agen, CC 302 (financial, 1561-1577)
E Sup. Agen, CC 306 (financial, 1568)
E Sup. Agen, EE 16 (military 1515-1709)
E Sup. Agen, EE 56 (military 1563-1577)
E Sup. Agen, FF13 (military 1554-1566)
E Sup. Agen, FF 31 (military, 1559-1561)
E Sup. Agen, FF 32 (military, 1563-1566)
E Sup. Agen, FF 33 (military, 1566-1570)
E Sup. Agen, FF 199 (military, 1568-1579)
E Sup. Agen, FF 212 (military, 1539-1773)
E Sup. Agen, GG 196 (Protestantism. 1552-1700)
E Sup. Agen, GG 201 (Protestantism, 1560-1585)
E Sup. Agen, GG 202 (Protestantism, 1567-1568)
E Sup. Agen, 422 (La Plume BB2, 1563-1564)
E Sup. Agen, 2,630 (Francescas BB1, 1550-1582)
E Sup. Agen, 2,386 (CasteJjaloux BB1, 1561-1577)
E Sup. Agen, 2,429 (CasteJjaloux EEl, 1562)
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 331
E Sup, Agen, 2,981 (80S BB 1, 1500-1720)
Bordeaux
Archives departementales de la Gironde [AD Gironde]:
H 2378 (Jesuits)
H 2380 (Jesuits)
H 2512 (Jesuits - proces Baulon, 1572-1579)
6E 63 (Huissiers du parlement, 1521-1599)
G 35 (Bordeaux clergy, 1560-1650)
G 39, 40, 41 (Decimes, 1560s)
G 42 (Decimes, 1567)
G 43, 44, 45 (miscellaneous, 1530-1580)
G 287 (chapitre du Saint-Andre, 1547-1570)
G 479 (correspondence of Clergy)
IB 124 (arret du parlement, March 1553)
through to
IB 359 (arret du parlement, June 1572).
Archives municipales de Bordeaux [AMBordeaux]:
AA 19 (correspondence, 1568-1787)
BB 11 (jurade, 1559-60)
BB 12 (jurade, 1561)
BB 153 (mairesetjurats, 1559-1768)
BB 165 (clerc de ville, 1520-1603)
BB 192 (jurade, 1563-1785)
BB 196 (jurade, 1566-1779)
CC 4 (comptes de Jehan de Salignac,1559-1560)
CC 5 (comtes, 1560-1561)
CC 1099 (impositions, 1563-1770)
CC IlOOa (faille, 1560s)
CC 1102 and 1102b (tax on soldiers, 1556-1758)
DD 3g (notary records of Bordeaux, 1560-1567)
DD 3h (notary records of Bordeaux, 1567-1579)
EE 1 (military)
EE 2 (town guard, 1569-1787)
EE 3 (military jurisdiction of Jurade)
EE 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (bourgeois militia)
EE 11 (town guard)
EE 14 (soldiers' lodgings, 1450-1789)
EE 34 (chateau Trompette)
EE 35 (chateau Ha)
FF 5a (parlement de Bordeaux, 1462-1771)
FF 14 (cour criminel de lajurade. 1556-1580)
GG 928 (harangues of archbishops of Bordeaux)
GG 929 (ecclesiastical nominations)
GG 930 (Catholicism)
GG 937 (confraternities)
ms 213 (miscellaneous)
ms 222 (histoire de Bordeaux)
ms 297 (Guyenne)
ms 299 (letters of Cardinal Armagnac, 1562-1585)
ms 371 (Guyenne clergy)
ms 421 (registre du clerc de Bordeaux, 1551-1603)
ms 502/1,2 (Chronique Bordelais)
ms 592 (Protestantism)
ms 60115 (Cadillac, 1469-1675)
ms 630 (Libourne)
ms 666 (actes civiles of the Bordelais Nobility)
ms 753 (registres secrets du parlement de Bordeaux, 1462-1582)
ms 763 (registres secrets, 1552-1556)
ms 764 (registres secrets, 1556-1558)
ms 765 (registres secrets, 1558-1559)
ms 766 (registres secrets, 1559-1560)
ms 767 (registres secrets, 1560-1561)
ms 768 (registres secrets, 1561-1562)
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 332
IDS 769 (registres secrets, 1562-1562)
IDS 770 (registres secrets, 1562)
IDS 771 (registres secrets, 1562-1563)
IDS 772 (registres secrets, 1563-1564)
IDS 773 (registres secrets, 1564-1565)
IDS 774 (registres secrets, 1568-1569)
IDS 775 (registres secrets, 1565-1570)
IDS 776 (registres secrets, 1570-1571)
IDS 777 (registres secrets, 1570-1572)
Bibliotheque municipales de Bordeaux [BM Bordeaux]:
IDS 367 (registres secret du parlement, 1462-1582)
ms 369, II (registres secret, 1556-1566)
IDS 369, III, (registres secret, 1564-1573)
ms 370 (registres secret, 1526-1571)
IDS 383 (registres secret, 1555-1567)
IDS 712,8, II (miscellaneous registres secret)
IDS 728 (chroniques des rois de France)
IDS 738 (miscellaneous)
IDS 828, V (Catholicism)
ms 1003 (military)
ms 1,497, III (Bordeaux)
H 8613 (harangue of Jean de Lange, 1560)
Toulouse
Archives municipales de Toulouse [AM Toulouse]:
AA 6, (Toulouse, 1550-1575)
AA 14 (1427-1568)
AA 15 (1539-1575)
AA 16 (1546-1645)
AA 17 (1488-1556)
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 333
BIBLIOORAPHY / 334
AA 18 (1484-1613)
AA 19 (1488-1563)
AA 20 (1488-1608)
AA 21 (1553-1616)
AA 44 (1540-1588)
AA 48 (letters of governors, commanders etc)
AA 53 (miscellaneous letters, C16)
BB 11 (deliberations of the conseil generaux, 1558-1564)
BB 12 (deliberations of the conseil generaux, 1565-1570)
BB 62 (deliberations of the conseil generaux, 1568-1570)
BB101 (registres de capitouls, December 1558-December 1559)
BB102 (registres de capitouls, December 1559-December 1560)
BBI03 (registres de capitouls, December 1560-December 1561)
BBI04 (registres de capitouls, December 1561-May 1562)
BBI05, i, (registres de capitouls, December 1561-May 1562)
BBI05, a iregistres de capitouls, May 1562-December 1562)
BBI06 (registres de capitou/s, December 1562-December 1563)
BB107 (registres de capitouls, December 1562-December 1563)
BBI08 (registres de capitouls, December 1563-December 1564)
BB 152 (proclamations of capitouls, 1534-1562)
BB 172 (lettres missives de capitouls, 1551-1563)
BB 173 (Iettres missives de capitouls, 1564-1617)
BB 175 (miscellaneous of capitouls, 1551-1573)
BB 176, ii, (lettres de capitouls, 1556-1575)
BB 223 (miscellaneous correspondence of 1559-1563)
BB 269 (annates de Toulouse)
CC 256 icotisations, impots, 1563)
CC 259 icottsations, impots, 1567-1568)
CC 354 (cotisations, daurade, 1563)
CC 356 (cotisations, daurade, 1568)
CC 357 (impot, daurade, 1569)
CC 616 icotisatton; paiement des gens de guerres, 1568)
CC 1,939 (accounts relating to Cardinal d' Armagnac and par/ement of Toulouse)
CC 1940 (recettes de Jean de Pezecbe, tresorier de capitouls, 1563-1615)
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 335
EE 4 (1558-1639)
EE 11 (defence de la ville, fortifications, etc, 1528-1687)
EE 12 (payment of troops, 1562-1596)
EE 26 (military, town guard, 1534-1789)
EE 45 (town guard)
EE 46 (town guard)
EE 87 (logement de troupes, 1560-1575)
FF 191-196 (greffe du consistoire, 1560-1566)
FF 373 (rapports des proces du consistoire, 1558-1568)
FF 609 (royal letters, 1407-1789)
FF 620 (rondes du guet, 1560-1562)
FF 621 (rondes du guet, 1562-1565)
GG 824 (affaires de religion, 1555-1581)
GO 825 (affaires de religion, 1560-1657)
GO 826 (offaires de Michel du Faur, president au parlement de Toulouse, 1562-
1570)
GG 828 (association faicte entre les manans et habitans de la ville et vigieur de
Tholose ... 1577)
GG 1,022 (Georges Bosquet sur les troubles advenus en la ville de tolose I 'an
1562)
Archives departementales de la Haute-Garonne [AD Haute-Garonne]:
B 20 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, 1523-1525)
B 37 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1543-November 1544)
B 50 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1556-November 1557)
B 52 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1558-November 1559)
B 53 (registres duparlement de Toulouse, November 1559-November 1560)
B 54, I, (registres duparlement de Toulouse, November 1560-November 1561)
B 54, II, (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1560-November 1561)
B 55 (registres duparlement de Toulouse, November 1561-November 1562)
B 56 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1562-November 1563)
B 57 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1563-November 1564)
B 58 tregistres duparlement de Toulouse, November 1564-November 1565)
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 336
B 59 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1565-0ctober 1566)
B 60 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1566-May 1567)
B 61 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, June 157-0ctober 1567)
B 62 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1567-November 1568)
B 63 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1568-November 1569)
B 64 (registres du parlement de Toulouse, November 1569-November 1570)
B 1,906 (lettres patentes of Charles IX, 1560-1565)
B 1,907 (various edicts ofparlement of Toulouse, 1537-1569)
B 3,440 (registreslarrets de la Tournelle de Toulouse, May-July 1562)
B 3,444 tregistreslarrets de la Tournelle de Toulouse, February-April 1563)
C 2,281 (proces-verbaux des etats de Languedoc, 1561-1566)
C 2,282 (proces-verbaux des etats de Languedoc, 1567-1573)
C 3,498 (etats de Lombez, maison eptscopale de Pierre de Lancrau, eveque de
Lombez, 9-11 August 1568)
E 1,013 (dossiers concerning corfrerie de St Yves et la basoche de Toulouse)
IG 488 (ordonnances of Cardinal d'Armagnac)
IG 370 (affaires of Cardinal d'Armagnac, 1565-1566)
Printed Primary Sources:
Aubigne, Theodore Agrippa d', Histoire universelle (10 vols., ed. A. de Ruble,
Paris, 1886-1909).
--- Les tragiques (2 vols., ed. C. Read, Paris, 1896).
Beze, Theodore de. Correspondance de Theodore de Beze (26 vols., ed. H.
Aubert, Geneva, 1960-2002).
--- Htstoire Ecclesiastique des eglises reformees au royaume de France (3
vols., eds. G. Baum, E. Cunitz, Nieuwkoop, 1974).
Biron, Armand de Gontaut, baron de, 'Correspondence inedite du marechal
Armand de Gontaut-Biron', Archives historiques du departement de la
Gironde, 14 (1873), pp. 1-271.
--- The Letters and Documents of Armand de Gontaut, Baron de Biron,
Marshall of France (1524-1592) (2 vols., eds. S. Ehrman, 1.
Thompson, Berkeley, 1936).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 337
Beetle, Estienne de Ia, Memoire sur la pacification des troubles (ed. M. Smith,
Geneva, 1983).
Brantome, Oeuvres completes de Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Branuime (11
vols., ed. L. Lalanne, Paris, 1864-82).
Cabie, Edmond, Guerres de religion dans Ie sud-ouest de la France et
principalement dans Ie Quercy, d'apres les papiers des seigneurs de
Saint-Suipice de 1561 a 1590. Documents transcrits, classes et annates
(Paris, 1906).
---- Ambassade en espagne de Jean Ebrard, seigneur de St. Sulpice de 1562
01565 (Albi, 1903).
CasteInau, Michel de, Les memoires de Messire Michel de Castelnau, seigneur de
Mauvissiere et de Concressaut, ausquel/es sont traictees les choses
plus remarquables qu'il a veues et negotiees en France, Angleterre, et
Escosse, soubs les rois Francois II et Charles IX, tant en temps de
paix qu'en temps de guerre (Paris, 1671).
Charles IX, Lettres de Charles IX a M de Fourquevaux, ambassadeur en Espagne
(1565-1572) (ed. C. Douais, Paris, 1897).
Conde, Memoires de Conde, ou recueil pour servir a l'histoire de France,
contenant ce qui s' est passe du plus memorable dans Ie Royaume (6
vols., London, Paris, 1743).
Darnal, Jean, Chronique Bordelois. Supplement (Bordeaux, 1619).
Dast Ie Vacher de Boisville, J. N., Inventaire sommaire des registres de lajurade de
Bordeaux, 1520 a 1783 (Archives municipales de Bordeaux, 6-13)
(Bordeaux, 1947).
Este, Hippolyte d', Negociations ou lettres d'affaires ecclesiasttques et politiques
escrites au Pape Pie IV et au cardinal Borromee par Hippolyte
d'Este, Cardinal de Ferrara, legat en France au commencement des
guerres civiles (Paris, 1658).
Fourquevaux, Raymond de Rouer, sieur de, Depeches de M de Fourquevaux.
ambassadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne (1565-1572) (3 vols., ed. C.
Douais, Paris, 1896-1904).
Gaches, Jacques, Memoires sur les guerres de religion a Castres et dans le
Languedoc (1555-1610) (Geneva, 1970).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 338
Granvelle, Antoine Perrenot, cardinal de, Papiers d'etat du cardinal de Granvelle,
d 'apres les manuscrits de la bibliotheque de Besancon (9 voIs., ed. C.
Weiss, Paris, 1841-52).
Haton, Claude, Memoires de Claude Haton (1553-1582) (2 voIs., Paris, 2001).
Lafaille, Germain de, Annales de la ville de Toulouse (2 voIs., Toulouse, 1687;
1701).
L'Estoile, Pierre de, Memoires et journaux de Pierre de l'Estoile. Nouvelle
collection; memoires pour servir a I 'histoire de France (eds. Michaud,
PoujouJat, Paris, 1837).
L'Hopital, Michel de, Oeuvres completes de Michel de I 'Hospital, chancelier de
France (5 voIs., ed. P. J. S. Dufey, Geneva, 1968).
Lorraine, Cardinal Charles de, Lettres du cardinal Charles de Lorraine (J525-
1574) (Geneva, 1998).
Lurbe, Gabriel de, Chronique Bordeloise (Bordeaux, 1594).
Medici, Catherine de, Lettres de Catherine de Medtcts (l0 vols., eds. H. de la
Ferriere, G. Baguenault de Puchesse, Paris, 1880-1909).
Metivier, Jean de, Chronique du parlement de Bordeaux (2 vols., Bordeaux,
1886).
Monluc, Blaise de, Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires 1521-1576 (eds. P.
Courteault, J. Giono, Paris, 1964).
--- Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Monluc, marechal de France (5
voIs., ed. A. de Ruble, Paris, 1864-72).
---Lettres de monsieur Blaise de Monluc, chevalier de l'ordre, cappitaine de
cinquante homes d'armes de ses ordonnances: escriptes au Roy touchant
le gouvernement de la Guyenne, avec la response de la Majeste audit
sieur de Monluc (Lyon, 1571).
Noue, Francois de la, Discours politiques et militaires (ed. F. E. Sutcliffe, Geneva,
1967).
Olhagaray, Pierre, Histoire des comptes de Foix, Beam, et Navarre, diligemment
recueillie tant des precedens histortens, que des archives desdites
maisons (Paris, 1629).
Pasquier, Etienne, Lettres historiques pour les annees 1556-1594 (Geneva, 1966).
Philip II, Correspondance de Philippe II sur les of/aires des Pays-Bas (1558-
1577) (6 vols., ed. L. P. Gachard, Brussels, 1848-79).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 339
Reemond, Florimond de, L 'histoire de la naissance, progrez et decadence de
I 'heresie de ce steele (2 vols., Paris, 1610).
Rochambeau, Marquis de, Lettres d'Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d'Albret
(Paris, 1877).
Salefranque, Pierre de, 'Histoire de l'heresie de Beam. Manuscrit de Pierre de
Salefranque, conseiller du roi, secretaire du parlement de Navarre', in
Bulletin de la societe des sciences, lettres et arts de Pau, lIe Serie,
XLIII-XLVI (ed. Abbe Dubarat, Pau, 1920-1923).
Saulx-Tavannes, Gaspard de, Correspondance, 1552-1573 (ed. L. Pingaud,
Paris, 1877).
--- 'Memoires de tres-noble et tres-illustre Gaspard de Saux, Seigneur de
Tavannes', in Nouvelle collection des memoires pour servir a
I 'histoire de France, depuis Ie Xl/Ie steele jusqu'a la fin du Xl/Ille,
vol. 8, (ed. Michaud, Paris, 1838).
Thou, Jacques-Auguste de, Histoire universelle, depuis 1543 jusqu 'en 1607 (16
vols., London, 1734 and Basle, 1742).
Secondary Sources:
Andrieu, Jules, Histoire de I 'Agenais (2 vols., Agen, 1893).
Anquetil, Louis Pierre, L 'esprit de la Ligue, ou histoire politique des troubles de
Francependant les XVIe et XVlle steeles (2 vols., Paris, 1818).
Ascoli, P. M., 'French provincial cities and the Catholic League', Occasional
Papers of the American Society for Reformation Research, 1 (1977),
pp. 15-37.
Baguenault de Puchess, Gustave, 'La politique de Philippe II dans les affaires de
France: 1559-1598', Revue des questions htstoriques, 25 (1879), pp. 5-
66.
Barnavi, Elie, Le parti de Dieu. Etude social et politique des chefs de la Ligue
pansienne 1585-1594 (Louvain, 1980).
Barrere, Abbe Joseph, Histoire religieuse et monumentale du diocese d 'Agen,
depuis les temps les plus recules jusqu'« nos jours (2 vols., Agen,
1855-1856).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1340
Barry, Jonathan and Christopher Brooks, The Middling Sort of People. Culture,
Society and Politics in England, 1550-1800 (London, 1994).
Baudouin, A., 'Les 'mea culpa' de Blaise de Montluc', Memoires de l'academie
des sciences, inscriptions et belles-lettres de Toulouse, vol. I,
(Toulouse, 1901), pp. 21-30.
Bellecombe, A. de, Aide-memoire pour servir a I 'histoire de I 'Agenais (Auch,
1899).
Benedict, Philip (ed.), Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France
(London, 1989).
Benedict, Philip, Rouen during the Warsof Religion (Cambridge, 1981).
'The Saint Bartholomew's massacres in the provinces', Historical
Journal, 21 (1978), pp. 205-25.
Birnstiel, Eckart, 'Les chambres mi-parties: les cadres institutionnels d'une
juridiction speciale', in Jacques Poumarede and Jack Thomas (eds.),
Les parlements de Province. Pouvoirs, justice et societe du XVe au
XVIIIe steele (Toulouse, 1996), pp. 121-38.
Black, Christopher F., Italian Confraternities in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge,
1989).
Bonney, Richard, 'The obstacles to pluralism in early modem France', in Keith
Cameron, Mark Greengrass, Penny Roberts (eds.), The Adventure of
Religious Pluralism in Early Modern France (Bern, 2000), pp. 209-
29.
Bordenave, Nicolas de, Histoire de Beam et Navarre (ed. P. Raymond, Paris,
1873).
Borderie, Louis Arthur de 1a, Monuments originaux de I 'histoire de Saint Yves
(Saint-Brieux, 1887).
Boscheron-Desportes, C. B. F., Histoire du parlement de Bordeaux depuis sa
creation jusqu'a sa suppression (J451-1790) (2 vols., Bordeaux,
1877).
Bossy, John, 'Leagues and associations in sixteenth-century French Catholicism',
Studies in Church History, 23 (1986), pp. 171-89.
'The Counter-Reformation and the people of Catholic Europe', Past
and Present, 47 (1970), pp. 51-70.
Bourg, M. A. du, Histoire du grand-prieure de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1883).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 341
Bourgeon, G., La reforme a Nerac. Les origines (1530-1560) (Toulouse, 1880).
Bourgeon, Jean-Louis, Charles IX devant la Saini-Barthelemy (Geneva, 1995).
Boutrouche, Robert (ed.), Bordeaux de 1453 a 1715 (Bordeaux, 1966).
Boyer, G., 'La basoche Toulousaine au quinzieme siecle, d'apres les archives du
parlement', Memoires de la societe archeologique du Midi de la
France, 18 (1932), pp. 64-71.
Briggs, Robin, Communities of Belief Cultural and Social tensions in Early
Modern France (Oxford, 1995).
Brives-Cazes, M., Notices historiques sur la bazoche de Bordeaux du XVe au
XVIlle steele (Toulouse, s.d.).
Buisson, Albert, Michel de 1'Hospital (Paris, 1950).
Carroll, Stuart, Noble Power during the French Wars of Religion. The Guise
Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy (Cambridge, 1998).
--- 'The Guise affinity and popular protest during the Wars of Religion',
French History, 9 (1995), pp. 125-51.
Cassan, Michel, Le temps des guerres de religion. Le cas du Limousin (vers 1530-
vers 1630) (Paris, 1996).
Catalogne, Roland de, 'Monluc et la reforme a Toulouse', Archistra, 42-43
(October-December 1979), pp. 67-88.
Cau-Durban, Abbe, 'Statuts de la basoche du senechal de Toulouse', Memotres de la
societe archeologique du Midi de la France, 16 (1908), pp. 166-84.
---Histoire des eveques et archeveques de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1873).
Chalande, Jules, 'Les etablissements des Jesuites a Toulouse au XVIe et XVIle
siecle', Journal de Toulouse, 29 (August 1926), pp. 1-35.
Champion, Pierre Honore, Charles IX, la France et le controle de I 'Espagne (2
vols., Paris, 1939).
Chavanon, Christian, Beatification professionnelle de Saint Yves (Bordeaux,
1936).
Chevalier, Bernard, Les bonnes villes de France du XIVe au XVIe steele (Paris,
1982).
Christin, Olivier, 'From repression to pacification: French royal policy in the face of
Protestantism', in Philip Benedict, Guido Marnef, Henk van Nierop,
Marc Venard (eds.), Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and
the Netherlands 1555-1585 (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 201-14.
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 342
Christ in, Olivier, Une revolution symbolique. L'iconoclasme huguenot et la
reconstruction catholique (Paris, 1991).
Cloulas, Ivan, Catherine de Medicis (Paris, 1979).
Cocula, Anne-Marie, Etienne de la Boetie (Bordeaux, 1995).
Collins, James B., The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism (Berkeley, 1988).
Communay, A., Le Parlement de Bordeaux, notes biographiques sur ses
principaux officiers (Bordeaux, 1898).
--- 'Les Gascons dans les armees francais', Revue de l'Agenais, 21 (1894),
pp. 379-91,492-510; and 22 (1895), pp. 165-76,229-39,392-406.
'Les Huguenots dans Ie Beam et la Navarre. Documents inedits',
Archives historiques de la Gascogne, 6 (Paris, Auch, 1885).
Connac, Emile, 'Troubles de mai 1562 a Toulouse', Annales du Midi, 3 (1891),
pp.310-39.
Conner, Philip, Huguenot Heartland. Montauban and Southern French Calvinism
during the Wars of Religion (Aldershot, 2002).
Constant, Jean-Marie, 'The Protestant nobility in France during the Wars of
Religion: A leaven of innovation in a traditional world', in Philip
Benedict, Guido Marnef, Henk van Nierop, Marc Venard (eds.),
Reformation, Revolt, and Civil War in France and the Netherlands
1555-1585 (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 69-82.
--- La Ligue (Paris. 1996).
---Les Guise (Paris, 1984).
Courteault, Paul, Blaise de Monluc. Historien (Geneva, 1970).
--- Histoire de Gascogne et de Beam (Paris. 1938).
--- Un cadet de gascogne au XVle steele. Blaise de Monluc (Paris, 1909).
Douze lettres inedites de Blaise de Monluc, publiees et annotees
(Toulouse, 1898).
--- L 'invasion de I 'armee des princes en Agenais (fin novembre 1569-
janvier 1570) (Agen, 1898).
Crouzet, Denis. La genese de la reforme francoise (Paris, 1996).
--- Les guerriers de Dieu (2 vols., Seyssel, 1990).
--- La nuit de la Saint-Barthelemy. Un reve perdu de la renaissance (Paris,
1994).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 343
Dartigue-Peyrou, Charles, 'Une cabale politico-religieuse a Bordeaux en juillet
1562: le syndicat contre le parlement', Bulletin de la societe de
I 'histoire du protestantisme francais, 98 (1951), pp. 141-52.
---Jeanne d'Albret et Ie Beam (Mont-de-Marsan, 1934).
--- La vicomte de Beam sous Ie regne d'Henri II d'Albret (1517-1555)
(Paris, 1934).
Daval, Guillaume and Jean Daval, Histoire de la reformation a Dieppe, 1557-
1657 (ed. E. Lesens, Rouen, 1878).
Davies, Joan, 'Persecution and Protestantism: Toulouse, 1562-1575', Historical
Journal, 22 (1979), pp. 31-51.
--- Languedoc and its Governor, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, 1563-
1589 (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1974).
Davis, Nathalie Zemon, Society and Culture in Early Modern France (Stanford,
CA., 1975).
Delachenal, Roland, Histoire des avocats au parlement de Paris, 1300-1600
(Paris, 1885).
Delattre, Pierre (ed.), Les etabltssemems des Jesuites en France depuis quatre
steeles (5 vols., Enghien, 1949-57).
Devic, Claude, and Jean Joseph Vaissete, Histoire generale de Languedoc (10
vols., ed. Lacour, Toulouse, 1994).
Devienne, Dom, Histoire de I 'eglise de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1862).
--- Histoire de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1771).
Diefendorf, Barbara B., Beneath the Cross. Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-
Century Paris (Oxford, 1991).
Dognol, Paul, Les institutionspolitiques et administratives du pays de Languedoc du
XIIle steele au guerres de religion (Toulouse, 1895).
Druout, Henri, Mayenne et la Bourgogne: Etude sur la Ligue, 1587-1595 (2 vols.,
Paris, 1937).
Dubarat, Abbe, Documents et bibliographie sur la reforme en Beam et au pays
basque (Pau, 1905).
--- Le Protestantisme en Beam et aupays basque (Pall, 1895).
Dubedat, Jean-Baptiste, Histoire du parlement de Toulouse (2 vols., Paris, 1885).
Ducourneau, Alex, La Guienne historique et monumentale (2 vols., Bordeaux,
1844).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 344
Dupre, A, 'Projet de ligue catholique a Bordeaux en 1562 et 1563', Revue
Catholique de Bordeaux, 12 (1891), pp. 372-78.
Evans, A W.,Blaise de Monluc (London, 1909).
Evennett, Henry 0., The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent. A Study in
the Counter-Reformation (Cambridge, 1930).
Farr, James R., Hands of Honor. Artisans and Their World in Dijon, 1550-1650
(Ithaca, 1988).
Felice, Paul de, Proces-verbaux de la prestation du serment de fidelite au Roi
Charles IXpar les huguenots d'Orleans en 1568 (Orleans, 1882).
Forneron, Henri. Les dues de Guise et leur epoque: Etude historique sur Ie
seizieme steele (2 vols., Paris, 1893).
--- Histoire de Philippe II (4 vols., Paris, 1881-87).
Fournel, Jean Francois, Histoire des avocats au parlement de Paris depuis Saint
Louisjusq 'au 15 octobre 1790 (2 vols., Paris, 1813).
Freer, Marthe W., The Life of Jeanne d'Albret (London, 1862).
Fremy, Edouard, Un ambassadeur liberal sous Charles IX et Henry III:
Ambassades a Venise d'Arnaud du Ferrier (Paris, 1880).
--- Essai sur les diplomates du temps de la Ligue, d'apres des documents
nouveaux et inedits (Paris, 1873).
Galpern, A N., The Religions of the People in Sixteenth-Century Champagne
(Cambridge, Mass., 1976).
Gardere, J., Histoire de la seigneurie de Condom et de I 'organisation de fa justice
dans cette ville (Condom, 1902).
Garrisson-Estebe, Janine, Les protestants au XVIe steele (Paris, 1988).
---Protestants du midi 1559-1598 (Toulouse, 1980).
Gaullieur, Ernest, Histoire de la reformation a Bordeaux et dans Ie ressort du
parlement de Guyenne (2 vols., Bordeaux, 1884).
--- Histoire du college de Guyenne (Paris, 1874).
Geisendorf, Paul-F., Theodore de Beze (Geneva, 1967).
Giesey, Ralph, 'State-building in early modem France: The role of royal
officialdom', Journal of Modern History, 55 (1983), pp. 191-207.
Gigon, S. C., La revolte de la gabelle en Guyenne, 1548-1549 (paris, 1906).
Glangeaud, Rene, La basoche de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1912).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 345
Greengrass, Mark, 'Financing the cause: Protestant mobilization and accountability
in France (1562-1598), in Philip Benedict, Guido Marnef Henk van
Nierop, Marc Venard (eds.), Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in
France and the Netherlands 1555-1585 (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 233-54.
'Functions and limitations of political clientage in France before
Richelieu', in Neithard Bulst, Robert Descimon and Alain Guerreau
(eds.), L 'bat ou Ie roi. Les fondations de la modemite monarchique en
France (XIVe-XVIle steeles) (Paris, 1996), pp. 69-82.
'The Calvinist experiment in Beam', in A. Pettegree, A. Duke, G.
Lewis (eds.), Calvinism in Europe, 1540-1620 (Cambridge, 1994),
pp. 119-42.
--- 'The anatomy of a religious riot in Toulouse in May 1562', Journal of
Ecclesiastical History, 34 (1983), pp. 367-91.
--- 'The Sainte Union in the provinces: The case of Toulouse', Sixteenth-
Century Journal, 14,4 (1983), pp. 469-96.
Hanley, Sarah, The Lit de Justice of the Kings of France (Princeton, 1983).
Hanlon, Gregory, Confession and Community in Seventeenth-Century France.
Catholic and Protestant coexistence in Aquitaine (Philadelphia, 1993).
Harding, Robert R., 'Revolution and reform in the Holy League: Angers, Rennes,
Nantes', Journal of Modern History, 53 (1981), pp. 379-416.
--- 'The mobilisation of confraternities against the Reformation in France',
Sixteenth Century Journal, 11,2 (1980), pp. 85-107.
--- Anatomy of a Power Elite. The Provincial Governors of Early Modern
France (New Haven, 1978).
Harvey, Howard Graham, The Theatre of the Basoche. The Contributions of the
Law Societies to French Medieval Comedy (Cambridge, Mass., 1941).
Hauchecome, F., 'Le parlement de Bordeaux pendant la premiere guerre civile
(decembre 1560-mars 1563)" Annales du Midi, 62 (1950), pp. 329-40.
Hauser, Henri, 'La preponderance espagnole (1559-1660), in L. Halpbin and P.
Sagnac, Peup/es et Civilisations. Histoire Generale, IX (Paris, 1940).
'A Review of Courteault, Blaise de Monluc', Revue Historique, 97
(March-April, 1908).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 346
Hauser, Henri, 'The French Reformation and the French people in France in the
sixteenth century', American Historical Review, 4 (January 1899), pp.
217-27.
Heller, Henry, Iron and Blood. Civil Wars in Sixteenth-Century France (Montreal,
1991).
--- The Calvinist Revolt in Sixteenth Century France (Leiden, 1986).
Heritier, J., Catherine de Medici (London, 1963).
Hipkin, Stephen, "Sitting on his Penny Rent': Conflict and Right of Common in
Faversham Blean, 1595-1610', Rural History, 11,1 (2000), pp. 1-35.
Holt, Mack P., 'Burgundians into Frenchmen: Catholic identity in sixteenth-
century Burgundy', in Michael Wolfe (ed.), Changing Identities in
Early Modern France (Durham, N.C., 1997), pp. 345-70.
'Wine, community and Reformation in sixteenth-century Burgundy',
Past and Present, 138 (1993), pp. 59-93.
--- The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 (Cambridge, 1995).
Holt, Mack P. (ed.), Society and Institutions in Early Modern France
(Athens, 1991).
Huseman, W.H., 'The expression of the idea of Toleration in French during the
sixteenth century' , Sixteenth Century Journal, 15 (1984), pp. 293-310.
Jaurgain, J. de, 'Les capitaines chatelains de Mauleon, Appendice', Revue de
Beam, Navarre et Lannes, III (1885), pp. 13-81.
--- Les capitaines chatelains de Mauleon', Revue de Beam, Navarre et
Lannes, II (1884), pp. 241-341.
Jensen, De Lamar, Diplomacy and Dogmatism. Bernadino de Mendoza and the
French Catholic League (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).
Jouanna, Arlette, Jacqueline Boucher, Dominique Biloghi and Guy Ie Thiec (eds.),
Histoire et dictionnaire des guerres de religion (Paris, 1998).
Jouanna, Arlette, La devoir de la revolte. La noblesse francaise et la gestation de
l'etat moderne, 1559-1661 (Paris, 1989).
Julian, Camille, L 'histoire de Bordeaux depuis les origines jusqu'. a 1895
(Bordeaux, 1895).
Kaiser, Wolfgang, Marseille au temps des troubles. Morphologie sociale et luttes de
factions 1559-1595 (Paris, 1992).
Kamen, Henry, The Spanish Inquisition. An Historical Revision (London, 1997).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 347
Kettering, Sharon, 'Clientage during the French Wars of Religion', Sixteenth
Century Journal, 20 (1989), pp. 221-39.
'Patronage and kinship in Early Modem France', French Historical
Studies, 16 (1989), pp. 408-35.
Kingdon, Robert M., Myths about the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre 1572-
1576 (London, 1988).
--- Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France 1555-1563
(Geneva, 1956).
Knecht, Robert J., The Rise and Fall of Renaissance France 1483-1610 (2nd
Edition, Oxford, 200 1).
--- TheFrench Civil Wars, 1562-1598 (London, 2000).
--- Catherine de' Medici (London, 1998).
'The sword and the pen: Blaise de Monluc and his Commentaires',
Renaissance Studies, 9 (1995), pp. 104-18.
'Military autobiographies in sixteenth-century France', in J. R.
Mulryne, and M. Shewring, (eds.), War, Literature and the Arts in
Sixteenth-Century Europe (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 3-21.
Konnert, Mark W., Civic Agendas and Religious Passion. Chdlons-sur-Marne
during the French Wars of Religion, 1560-1594 (Kirksville, Miss.,
1997).
'Provincial governors and their regimes during the French Wars of
Religion: the due de Guise and the city council of Ch8lons-sur-
Marne', Sixteenth-Century Journal, 25 (1994), pp. 823-40.
Labenazie, Histoire de la ville d'Agen andpays d'Agenois, I, (Montauban, 1888).
Labitte, Charles, De la democratie chez lespredicateurs de la ligue (Paris, 1865).
Labrunie, Abbe Joseph, 'Abrege chronologique des antiquites d' Agen', Revue de
l'Agenais et des anciennes provinces du sud-ouest, XV (Agen, 1888).
Lamouzele, Edmond, Essai sur I 'organisation et les fonctions de la compagnie du
guet et de la garde bourgeoise de Toulouse au XVIIe au XVIIIe steele
(Tulle, 1906).
Lavisse, Ernest, Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'i: la revolution (9
vols., Paris, 1903-10).
Lecler, Joseph, Toleration and the Reformation (2 vols., London, 1960).
BIBLIOGRAPHY I 348
Lecler, Joseph, 'Aux origines de la Ligue: premiers projets et premiers essais (1561-
1570)', Etudes, 227 (1936), pp. 188-208.
Le Palenc, 'La confrerie des avocats de Rieux au seizieme siecle', Bulletin de la
societe archeologique du midi de la France, 25-28 (1899-1901), pp.
312-22.
Lestrade, Abbe Jean, 'Les Huguenots en Comminges. Documents inedits, II',
Archives historiques de la Gascogne, 14 (Paris, Auch, 1910), pp. 1-
160.
Les huguenots en Comminges. Documents inedits, I, (Paris, Auch,
1900).
Lloyd, Howell A., The State, France and the Sixteenth Century (London, 1983).
Major, J. Russell, From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy. French
Kings, Nobles and Estates (London, 1997).
Mariejol, Jean Hippolyte, Catherine de Medicis, 1519-89 (Paris, 1922).
--- La reforme et la Ligue. L 'edit de Nantes (1559-1598) in Ernest Lavisse
(ed.), Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu 'a la revolution, VI,
ii, (9 vols., Paris, 1903-10).
Mege, Alexandre du, Histoire des institutions religieuses, politiques, judiciares et
litteraires de la ville de Toulouse (4 vols., Toulouse, 1864).
Mentzer, Raymond A., 'Calvinist propaganda and the Parlement of Toulouse',
Archiv fur Reformationgeschichte, 68 (1977), pp. 268-83.
Michel, P., Blaise de Monluc (Paris, 1971).
Miquel, Pierre, Les guerres de religion (Paris, 1980).
Mirasson, P., Histoire des troubles du Beam, au sujet de la religion, dans Ie XVIle
siecle (Paris, 1768).
Mourin, E., La reforme et la Ligue en Anjou (Paris, 1888).
Mousnier, Roland, Les institutions de la France sous la monarchie absolue 1598-
1789 (2 vols., Paris, 1980).
--- 'Les concepts d'ordres d'etats, de fidelite et de monarchie absolue en
France de la fin du xve siecle a la fin du xviiie', Revue Histortque, 247
(1972), pp. 289-312.
Nakam, Geralde, Montaigne et son temps. Les evenements et les essais (Paris,
1982).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 349
Nakam, Geralde, Au lendemain de la Saint-Barthelemy. Guerre civile et famine
(Paris, 1975).
Neuschel, K.B., Word of Honour. Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century
France (Ithaca, 1989).
Nicholas, David, The Evolution of the Medieval World (London, 1992).
Nicholls, David, 'Protestants, Catholics and magistrates in Tours, 1562-1572: The
making of a Catholic city during the religious wars', French History, 8, 1
(1994), pp. 14-33.
O'Reilly, Abbe Patrice-John, Histoire complete de Bordeaux (6 vols., Bordeaux,
1863).
Orlea, Manfred, La noblesse aux etats generaux de 1576 et de 1588 (Paris, 1980).
Palm, Franklin Charles, Politics and Religion in Sixteenth-Century France: A
Study of the Career of Henry of Montmorency-Damville, Uncrowned
King of the South (Gloucester, Mass., 1927).
Parker, David, TheMaking of French Absolutism (London, 1983).
Parrow, Kathleen A., From Defence to Resistance. Justification of Violence
during the French Warsof Religion (Philadelphia, 1993).
Petris, Loris, 'Faith and religious policy in Michel de l'Hospital's civic evangelism',
in Keith Cameron, Mark Greengrass and Penny Roberts (eds.), The
Adventure of Religious Pluralism in Early Modern France (Bern, 2000),
pp.129-42.
Piaget, E, Histoire de l'etablissement des Jesuites en France (1540-1640) (Leiden,
1893).
Picot, Emile, Les ltaliens en France au seizieme steele (Rome, 1995).
Potter, David (ed.), The French Wars of Religion. Selected Documents (London,
1997).
Potter, David, 'The due de Guise and the fall of Calais, 1557-58', English
Historical Review, 388 (1983), pp. 481-512.
Potter, De, Lettres de Saint Pie V, sur les religieuses de son temps en France,
suivi d 'un catechisme catholique-romain (Brussels, 1827).
Poumarede, Jacques, and Jack Thomas (eds.), Les parlements de Province.
Pouvoirs,justice et societe du XVe au XVIlle steele (Toulouse, 1996).
Powis, Jonathan, 'Gallican liberties and the politics of later sixteenth-century
France', Sixteenth Century Journal, 26 (1983), pp. 515-30.
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 350
Powis, Jonathan, 'Order, religion, and the magistrates of a provincial parlement in
sixteenth-century France' , Archiv fur Reformationsgeschichte, 71
(1980), pp. 180-97.
The Magistrates of the Parlement of Bordeaux c. 1500-1563 (PhD
Thesis, Oxford University, 1975).
Racaut, Luc, Hatred in Print. Catholic Propaganda and Protestant Identity
during the French Warsof Religion (Aldershot, 2002).
Ramet, Henri, Histoire de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1935).
Ramsey, Ann W., Liturgy, Politics, and Salvation: The Catholic League in Paris
and the Nature of Catholic Reform 1540-1630 (Rochester, 1999).
Rey, R., 'Le cardinal Georges d'Armagnac, colegat a Avignon (1566-1585)"
Annales du Midi, 10 (Toulouse, 1898), pp. 273-306.
Ricard, N., Panegyrique de Saint-Yves, patron de MM les avocats (prononce
dans I'eglise de Nazareth) (Toulouse, 1764).
Ritter, Raymond, 'Jeanne d'Albret et les troubles de la religion en Beam, Bigorre,
Soule et Navarre, 1560-1572', Revue de Beam, 3-6 (1928-1933).
Roberts, Penny, 'Religious pluralism in practice: The enforcement of the Edicts of
Pacification', in Keith Cameron, Mark Greengrass, Penny Roberts
(eds.), The Adventure of Religious Pluralism in Early Modern France
(Bern, 2000), pp. 31-44.
--- 'The most crucial battle of the Wars of Religion? The conflict over sites
for reformed worship in sixteenth-century France', Archiv fur
Reformationsgeschichte, 89 (1998), pp. 247-66.
A City in Conflict. Troyes during the French Wars of religion
(Manchester, 1996).
Roelker, Nancy Lyman, One King, One Faith. The Parlement of Paris and the
religious reformations of the sixteenth century (Berkeley, 1996).
Roelker, Nancy Lyman, Queen of Navarre. Jeanne d'Albret 1528-1572
(Cambridge, MA., 1968).
Romier, Lucien, 'A dissident nobility under the cloak of religion', J. H. M.
Salmon (ed.), The French Wars of Religion. How Important were
Religious Factors? (Boston, Mass., 1967).
--_ La conjuration d 'Ambotse (Paris, 1923).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 351
Ropartz, S, Histoire de Saint Yves, patron des gens de justice (Saint-Brieux,
1856).
Roschach, Ernest, 'Documents inedits concernant l'edit de pacification de 1568 et le
regime des suspects a Toulouse', Memoires de l'academie des
sciences, inscriptions et belles-lettres de Toulouse, 10 (1878), pp. 318-
57.
Roy, Ian, Blaise de Monluc (London, 1971).
Ruble, Alphonse de, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret (4 vols., Paris, 1881-
86).
--- Jeanne d 'Albret et la guerre civile (Paris, 1897).
Salmon, J. H. M., Society in Crisis. France in the Sixteenth Century (London,
1975).
Salmon, IH.M. (ed.), The French Wars of Religion. How Important were
Religious Factors? (Boston, Mass., 1967).
Samazeuilth, J-F., Histoire de I 'Agenais, du Condomois et du Bazadais (2 vols.,
Auch, 1847).
Sarrasi de Capela, 'L'ancienne procession du 17 mai a Toulouse', La semaine
Catholique de Toulouse, 20 (May 1874), pp. 474-76.
Sauzet, Robert, Contre-reforme et reforme catholique en Bas-Languedoc. Le
diocese de Ntmes auXVlle steele (Louvain, 1981).
Schiffman, Zachary Sayre, 'An intellectual in politics: Montaigne in Bordeaux', in
Michael Wolfe (ed.), Changing Identities in Early Modern France
(Durham, N.C., 1997).
Schneider, Robert A., Public Life in Toulouse 1463-1789. From Municipal
Republic to Cosmopolitan City (Ithaca, 1989).
'Mortification on parade: Penitential processions m sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century France', Renaissance and Reformation, 22
(1986), pp. 123-46.
Soman, Alfred (ed.), The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew. Reappraisals and
Documents (The Hague, 1974).
Sournia, Jean-Charles, Blaise de Monluc. Soldat et ecrivain (J500-1577) (Paris,
1981).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 352
Souriac, Rene, Decentralisation administrative dans I 'ancienne France.
Autonomie Commingeoise et pouvoir d'etat, 1540-1630 (2 vols.,
Toulouse, 1992).
Stankiewicz, W. 1., Politics and Religion in Seventeenth-Century France
(Berkeley, 1960).
Stegmann, Andre, Edits des guerres de religion (Paris, 1979).
Stone, Lawrence, 'Prosopography', in Felix Gilbert and Stephen R. Graubard
(eds.), Historical Studies Today (New York, 1972), pp. 107-40.
Sutherland, Nicola M., Princes, Politics and Religion 1547-1589 (London, 1984).
--- The Huguenot Strugglefor Recognition (London, 1980).
--- The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-
1572 (London, 1973).
'Review Article: The foreign policy of Philip II and the French
Catholic League', History, 51 (1966), pp. 323-31.
Tallon, Alain, 'Gallicanism and religious pluralism in France m the sixteenth
century', in Keith Cameron, Mark Greengrass and Penny Roberts
(eds.), The Adventure of Religious Pluralism in Early Modern France
(Bern, 2000), pp. 15-30.
Tamizey de Larroque, Philippe, 'Jean Lange, Conseiller au parlement de
Bordeaux', Revue Catholique de Bordeaux, 1883 (Bordeaux), pp. 685-
97.
Antoine de Noailles a Bordeaux d'apres des documents inedits
(Bordeaux, 1878).
--- Notes et documents inedits pour servir a la biographie de Christophe et
de Francois de Foix-Candal/e, eveques d'Aire (Bordeaux, 1877).
--- 'Lettres inedites du Cardinal d'Armagnac', Collection Meridionale, V
(Paris, Bordeaux, 1874), pp. 1-134.
--- Lettres inedites de Janus Fregose, eveque d 'Agen (Bordeaux, 1873).
--- 'Quelques pages inedites de Blaise de Monluc', Receuil des travaux de la
societe d'agriculture, sciences et arts d'Agen (Paris, 1863).
Tholin, Georges, 'La ville d' Agen pendant les guerres de religion du XVIe siecle',
Revue de I 'Agenais et des anciennes provinces du sud-ouest, XIV -
XVI (Agen, 1887-1889).
BIBLIOORAPHY / 353
Thompson, James Westfall, The Wars of Religion in France, 1559-1576 (New
York, 1958).
Turchetti, Mario, 'Middle parties in France during the Wars of Religion', in Philip
Benedict, Guido Marnef Henk van Nierop and Marc Venard (eds.),
Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands
1555-1585 (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 165-84.
--- 'Religious concord and political tolerance in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century France', Sixteenth Century Journal, 22, 1 (1991), pp. 15-25.
Vafsse-Cibiel, E., 'Notes retrospective sur la basoche Toulousaine', Memoires de
l'academie imperiale des science, inscriptions et belles-lettres de
Toulouse, 6 (1868), pp. 221-43.
Vaissiere, Pierre de, 'Ligue', inLa grande encyclopedie. XXII. (Paris, 1920).
Valois, Charles, Histoire de la Ligue. Oeuvre inedite d'un contemporain. 11574-
1589 (Paris, 1914).
Venard, Marc, 'Catholicism and resistance to the Reformation in France, 1555-
1585', in Philip Benedict, Guido Marnef Henk van Nierop and Marc
Venard (eds.), Reformation, Revolt, and Civil War in France and the
Netherlands 1555-1585 (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 133-48.
--- Reforme protestante, reforme catholique, dans la province d'Avignon au
XVle steele (Paris, 1993).
Viala, Andre, Le parlement de Toulouse et I 'administration royale latque, 1420-
1525 environ (Albi, 1953).
Vigneron, Francois, Eloge d'Armand Gontaut de Biron, marechal de France sous
Henry IV, suivi notes historiques sur les actes de valuer et de
patriotisme de la noblesse de Guienne, et particulierement de celie de
Gascogne (Paris, 1788).
Vindry, Fleury, Les parlementaires francais auXVle steele (2 vols., Paris, 1910).
Watson, Timothy, The Lyon City Council c. 1525-1575: Politics, Culture,
Religion (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Magdelen College, 1999).
Weill, Georges, Les theories sur Ie pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de
religion (Paris, 1891).
Weiss, Charles, Papiers d'etat du Cardinal de Granvelle (1516-1565) (9 vols.,
Paris, 1841-1852).
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 354
Wilkinson, Maurice, A History of the League or Sainte Union, 1576-1595
(Glasgow, 1929).
Wolfe, Michael (ed.), Changing Identities in Early Modern France (Durham,
N.C., 1997).
Wolff, Philippe, Histoire de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1974),
Wood, James B., The King's Army. Warfare, soldiers and society during the Wars
of Religion in France, 1562-1576 (Cambridge, 1996).
'The royal army during the early Wars of Religion, 1559-1576', in
Mack P. Holt (ed.), Society and Institutions in Early Modern France
(Athens, 1991).
'The impact of the Wars of Religion: A view of France m 1581',
Sixteenth Century Journal, 15 (1984), pp. 131-68.
Yardeni, Myriam, La conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de
religion (1559-98) (Paris, 1971).
Zeller, Gaston, Les institutions de la France au XVIe steele (Paris, 1948).
